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PREFATORY.

The cases appearing- in this vokime have been selected for

use in connection with the lectures on Suretyship given in the

Law Department of the University of Michigan. Barring omis-

sion of irrelevant matter in some instances and of the briefs and

arguments of counsel in all instances, the cases appear in this

volume as they appear in chc reports themselves. Uniformity in

PREFATORY.

•spelling and punctuation has not been attempted or thought desir-

able. In regard to these matters, the reports have been followed,

except in cases of manifest error.

The purpose has been to put into the hands of the students

taking the course in Suretyship in this University a limited nimi-

ber of cases which will serve to illustrate and, in some measure^

to supplement the lectures on that subject. Some cases have been

selected for the forms and suggestions they furnish in the prac-

tical work of preparing bonds and such other instruments as per-

tain to the general subject — such work being a material feature

of the course. Such a volume as this would not be necessary

were it possible for students to consult 'the reports themselves in

season to prepare the work required of them. The great number
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of students attending the Law Department of this University puts

that possibility out of question, and that, too, despite the very com-

plete Law Library so arranged as to afford the best means for its

largest use.

Uni\'eksitv of Michigan,

Ann Arbor, Mich.

November, 1902.

Ror.ERT E. Bunker.

6710B0

The ca e appearing in thi volum haY ~ be n elected for
u e in connection with the lecture on ~- urety hip giYen in th e
Law Department of th
niver ity of Iichio-an. Barring mi ion of irrelevant matter in some in ta nee an 1 f the brief · and
arguments of coun el in all in ·tances, the ca
appear in thi
volume as they appear in the report. themselve . Uniformity in
· pelling and punctuation ba not been attempted or thought d irable. In regard to the e matter , the report have been foll owed,
except in cases of manifest error.
The purpo e has been to put into the hand of the tudent
taking the cour e in Surety hip in this Univer ity a limited mnnber of cases which \Vill erv e to illu trate and, in ome mea. urc,
to supplement the lectures on that subject.
orne cases have be n
elected for the forms and ugge tions they fumi h in the practical work of preparing bonds and such other in trument a p rtain to the general ubject-such work being a material featurr
of the course. Such a volume as thi would not be nece ary
were it posisible for students to consult "the reports themselves in
sea on to prepare the work required of them. The great numb r
of students attending the Law Department of thi Univer ity put
that possibility out of question, and that, too. despite the very c mplete Law Library o arranged a to afford the be t means f r it
laro-est use.
RonERT E. BuNKEH.
~I\'ER ~ ITY OF i\I1 cn 1GA

JJ

RBOR , i\IrcH.
N overnbe r, 1902 .
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ON

GUARANTY AND SURETYSHIl

Kearnes 7'^\ Montgomery (1870).

4 W. V^a. 29.

Boggcss. for plaintift' in error.

Dennis & Price, for defendant in error.

The facts are stated in the opinion of Maxwell, J-

Maxwell, J. This was an action of assumpsit, to recover

CASE8

from the defendant the sum of 2,000 dollars, with interest. The

facts certified show that on the 28th day of January, i860, the

plaintiff held the bond of the defendant and one J.N. Montgomery

ON

for 2,000 dollars ; that the defendant, on the day and year afore-

said, proposed to exchange with the plaintiff for the said bond, a

Gt ARAN1~Y AND

bond of 2,000 dollars executed by Thomas Creigh and L. S. Creigli^

to the plaintiff , that the ])laintift' refused to accept the said last

mentioned bond unless the defendant would indorse the same,

inasmuch as it was payable to the plaintiff and not to the defendant :

whereupon the said defendant wrote his name upon the back of the

K E.\R .NEs

said bond, which was then accepted by the plaintiff', who. in ex-

<'S . .:\Io.1'\TGmIERY ( 1870).

chanafe therefor, delivered to the defendant the said bond of the

-t \ V. Va. 29.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

defendant and J. N. Montgomery ; that afterwards, and after the

institution of the suit, l)ut before the trial, the plaintiff' wrote above

Boggess. fo r plaintiff in er ror.

the blank indorsement of the defendant, a promise binding the

defendant as surety of the said Thomas Creigh and L. wS. Creigh ;

Dennis fr P rice . fo r defenda nt in er ror.

that the bond with the indorsement thereon is as follows:

■'On or before the first of March, 1861, with interest from the first

of .March, 1860, we or either of us bind ourselves,, our heirs, etc., to pay

The facts are stated in the opinion of l\Iaxwell , J -

J.

Thi \\·as an action of as umpsit, t o recover
from th e defendant tb sum of 2,000 cloliars, with in ter t. The
facts certified how that on the 28th clay of January, L86o, the
plaintiff held the bond of the clef nclant and one J. ;..J. l\Iontgornery
for 2,000 dollar ; that th e defendant, on the clay and year aforesaid, propo eel to exc ha1io-e with the plaintiff for the said bond, a
bond of 2 ,000 dollars exec uted by Thomas Creig h and L. . Creigh,
to th e plaintiff ; that th e plaintiff rd u ·eel to accept the said last
m entioned bond unl ess th e (]ef ndant would indorse the amc,
inasmuch as it wa s pa\able to the plaintiff and not to the defendaut:
\\·hereu1 or; th e said defendant ',n ote his name upon the back of the
aid bond. \Yhich \\"as th en accepted by the plaintiff, who, in exchange therefor, delivered to the defendant the said bond of the
def nda nt and J. >I. l\lontgomery; that afterward s, and after the
in titution of the suit, but bffo re th trial, the plaintiff w rote above
the blank-: indor em ent of the defe nda nt, a promi e binding the
defendant as ur ty of th e aid Thoma
reigh a nd L.
reigh ;
that the bond with th e ind ors m ent thereon i a fo llow :
?\I. \X\\' ELL,

of

"On o r before the fir~t of Iarch, 1861, w ith intere t from the first
1860, we or eit he r of us bind our. elves, our heir , etc., to pay

~Iarch ,

2

a GUARANTY AND SURETYSIIIP.

(;L\R \'\TY .\ . ·o Sl ' RE'I \':'IIIP.

Alexaiulcr Kearnes the jus-l and full sum of two thousand dollars, for

value received.

"Witness our hands and seals this 2Sth of Januarj-, i860.

"Tho.m.vs Ckeigh. [seal]

"Lewis S. Creigh." [seal]

"For value received, I herebj- become the surely of Thomas Creigh

and Lewis S. Creigh as obligors in the within bond.

"Wm. H. Montgomery."

That the debt r.g'ainst the Creighs could have 1)een made by suit in

the year 1861, and after the close of tlie war in i<%5. and that the

:\ k.~:l rnkr

,·aluc

[(l':t rl1l''i thl' j u-.t ;,nd full . um of two tlwu and <lullar~. for
l' d .
"\\ llnl''is our han <b a nd sl'als this 2 .1 th of January, r,'60.
"1'110:-1.\s
REI011.
[. l'al]
"LE\\' Is '.
REH;rr . .. [:-.cal]
n :L'L I\

" i:, >r \'a l lll' recl'i \'eel. 1 he n :lry becoml' I he surely of Thoma .
1"'i oh
an d Ll·\\' i-, '. Creigh as ob lign rs in the \\'ithin bond.
"\\.:\J. II. .\IoxTGo:.1E1n- ..

said Crcighs have been insolvent since i860, and that since that time

the debt could not have ])cen made off of them by suit. I'jjon

these facts judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaint-

iff in error insists that the judgment is erroneous, because upon

the facts proved, the defendant was a surety or maker of the bond

in question and primarily liable for its payment, while it is insisted

for the defendant that he was a guarantor merely and only liable

for the payment of the bond in case the money could not be made

oft' of the makers of the paper after it fell due, by the use of due
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diligence which, he insists, was not used before the makers became

insolvent. Whet her, the defendant is guaranli"/ or niaker depejitls,,

Qn_ tlie understanchng of tlie parties, li_tlie^[3a}:e,e jjrjassi gnee of

paper^ not negotiali k^ indorse, his name in blank on t he back of it,

. he is JU'iincL facie assignor, buLif a stranger indorse his n a m e in

blank on the back of paper, not negotiable, he is prima facie guar-

a ntor : but this p restmiption may be relmlted by sbnwing the

original understanding of the parties, by showing an express

agreement other\^e,,,jjr3y_shp\ying;_circumk^iices from which

one. may be inferred. """" "

The contract of a guarantur is collateral and secondary. It

dift'ers in that respect generally from the contract of a surety

vliicli is direct; and in general the guarantor contracts to pay if,

by the use of due diligence, the debt cannot be made out of the

princix)al debtor, while the surety undertakes directly for the pay-

ment and so is responsible at once if the principal delator makes

default. As the proper diligence w^as not used against the Creighs,

if th.e defendant is guarantor merely he is not liable for the pay-

ment of the debt; while if he is to be treated as surety, he is liable.

It becomes, therefore, necessary to determine whether he is a

technical guarantor merely or a surety. * '■- *

The plaintiff', after suit brought, wrote over the name of the

defendant, "For value received, 1 lurel)} become the surety of

That the debt 2.g-ain . t the 'r 'igh .' could han~ been made by . uit in
the year t8 r, and after the 'lose of the \\'ar in 1 5. and that the
. aid 'rcib·h ha\' ' been in!'okenL. ince lt 6CJ, and that . in 'e that time
the debt could not ha,·c been made off of them by · uit. L·pon
these fact jucl~mcnt \\·as rcnclcrecl for th defendant. The plaintiff in 'rror ins1. L that the j ulgm 'llt i ' IToneou , becau . upon
the facL proYecl. the clcfenclant \Ya. a . urcty o r maker f the I ond
in qu stion and primarily liable for it payment, \\·hi! it i in i · t cl
for the defendant that he \\'a. a guarantor merely and only liable
for the payment of the bo ne! in ca e the money could not b ma l
ff of the mak r of the paper after it fell clue, by the u
f lue
diligence \\'hich, he in i t., wa" not u eel bcfor the maker became
in oh-ent. \)' h etb •r the defendauLis o-uaranto r or mal~ ~uls
on the under tancling of the parti . . lithe_ i1ci.ye _QL a.s.sig+l - f
pa12 r ngt n eggti<1l lc, inc.Lorse. hi ·name in blank on the_hack f it,
he i _prillla facic a . igno r, but if a trang·er indor
hi naiu in
l)lank on the back of paper, n ot n egotiab l , he i prinrn facic rruarantor · hut thi . pr umption may be r butt d by hmD.rio- the
o rigina l under · tanclinrr of the parti , 1 y h ow in rr an ex1 r
a~cement othcrwi e, \:l!' by bo wing cir ·um_ tance fr om which
one may bemf rr cl.
Th co ntract f a guarantor 1
!lat ral and
c ndary. It
di ff e r in that re pect ;:::;ene rally from th c ntract of a . ur ty
wliich i clire t: ancl in gen ral th guarantor contra t t I a ' if,
bv th u e of clu e cliligcnc , th cl ht cannot b made o ut of th
principal debtor, whil the urety un I rtak
directly fo r th pay1·1 nt an 1 o i. r pnn ible at once if the I rin i1 al cl ht r mak
d·:fault. A . th I rope r clilig~n wa not u eel ao-ain t th
r igh ,
if the d frnclant is :---uarantor m rely h i n t lial l f r th I ayment of the c.lcl t; \\'hile if h i to 1 e treat cl a ur ty, h i lial 1 .
It b 'come , th r f r , n
cl te rmin wh th r h
a
techn ic:il guarantor m r ly r a ur ty. * * *
Th plaintiff, aft r uit brought, wr t ov r th nam o f the
defendant, "For value r ·ceiv cl, I h r 1 y hecom th . ur l\· nf

3

SAINT VS. \viieelf:r. 6

.\I XT \ ' S. \ \ . HEELER.
Thomas Crcigh and Lewis S. Crcigh as obligors in the within

bond." It is upon this contract, so written by the plaintiff, that

he claims his right to recover from the defendant. The plaintiff

might write anything over the name of the defendant, consistent

with the contract of the defendant, so as to carry it 'out. He could

not write the words which he did write, unless upon special con-

tract between the parties, disclosed by the evidence and surround-

ing circumstances. The evidence, instead of sustaining and au-

thorizing this special contract as written by the plaintiff', does not

even tend to show any such understanding, but on the contrary

shows, so far as can be inferred from it, that the defendant was

to assume the same situation as to liability that he would have

occupied if the paper had been executed to him as payee and trans-

ferred by liim to the plaintiff". As the facts proved wholly fail to

show a contract on the part of the defendant to be liable as maker

or surety, it follows that he is liable only as guarantor.

The facts proved show afilirmatively that, by the use of due

diligence against the Creighs, the plaintiff' might have made the

money.
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The judgment complained of will, therefore, have to be af-

firmed with damages and costs.

The concurring opinion of Brown, Pres't, is omitted.

Saint ct. a!, z's. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. (1891).

95 Ala. 362; 36 Am. St. R. 210; 10 So. 539.

Action by Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. against R. F. Saint,

A. J. Crosthwait, C. M. Wright, J. F. Hall and J. R. Spragins,

parties to a contract under seal, in the words and figures following:

"For value received and in consideration of the within contract, R. F.

Saint (and the other defendants, giving their names and residences re-

spectively), hereby guarantee to the Wiieeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., its suc-

T homa
r ig h a n I L c\r i, . . r i0 h a - obligor in th within
bon l.' ' It i upon thi c ntract, o writt n by th ' plaintiff, that
h claim hi ri g ht to recover from the defenda nt. Th plaintiff
mig ht writ anythin g ov r tb e nam
f the defenda nt, con istent
with th contra t of the defendant, o as to ca rry it' ut. He could
not 1nite th e " ·ord whi ch he did write, unle s up n pecial cont ract betw e n tb e pa rtie , di closed by the evidence a nd urrouncling circumsta nce . T he evidence, in tead of u ta ining and authorizin g thi pecial c ntract as writte n by the plaintiff, loe not
even tend to ho" · any "uch under tanclin g, bu t on the contra ry
hows, o fa r a can be inferred fro m it, that the clefenclant wa
to a ume the am
ituation a to li al ility that he wo ul d have
occupi cl if th e paper had been xecuted to him a pay e and t ransferred by him to the plaintiff. A the facts pr vecl wholl y fai l to
how a contract on the part of the lefendant to be liable as maker
or urety, it fo llows that he i liable onl y a g uarantor.
The fac t proved how affirmatively that, by the u e of clue
diligence again t the Creig hs, the plaintiff mig ht have made the
m oney.
The judgment complained of will , th erefore, have to be affinn ed with damage and costs.

cessors or assigns, the full and faithful performance of the foregoing con-

tract, including all damages which may result to the said company from

Th e con c urr ing opin io n of

BR O W N,

Pres' t , is o m it ted.

any failure on the part of said R. F. Saint to 'perform any of the provisions

of said agreement to the amount of $1,000; hereby waiving all necessity

on the part of said company of instituting legal proceedings against said

R F Saint before havina, recourse on us ; herebv waiving the benefit of

/
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vVH EEL E R

95 Ala. 362; 36

& \ i\T II .SOX

m. St. R.

210 ;

I:r-G. Co. ( 1891) .
IO

So. 539.

Action by \Vheeler & W-ilson Mfg. Co . again t R. F. Saint,
Cro thwait, C. _.A. Wrio-ht, J. F . Hall and J. R. Sprag ins,
parties to a contract under ea! , in the words and figur s foll owing :

J.

"Fo r valu e rece ived and in con iderat ion of the within contract, R. F.
aint (and th e oth er defendan t , g iving t heir na me and re idences re. pectively ), her by g uarantee to th e \ A/ heeler & \ Vil son Mfg. Co., its ucce sor s or a<; ign , the foll and faithful per fo rmance of the fo r going contract, inclu din g all dam age whi<::h may res ult to th e sai d company fr om
any failur e on the pa rt of aid R. F . Sa int to •perfo rm any of the prov i ions
of aid agreemen t to th e a mount of ~I.OOO ; herehy waiving all n ece sity
on th e pa rt of said company of in tituting legal proceeding aga in st said
R . F . Sain t befo re h:win g reco urse on us; hereby waivin g the benefit of

;(/; I

G
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all constitutional or statutory homestead or exemption laws now in force;

further agreeing to pay plaintifif's attorney's fees and all costs should suit

l)e necessary to enforce the collection of this bond.

"Witness our hands and seals, etc."

Tliis conlracl or ])uncl was written on llic Ijuck ul the cuutract

therein referred to. by which said company, as party of the first

all cotbtitutiona: or latutory homestead or ·x cmpti n la\\'S now in force;
f urtht:r agreLin~ w pay plaintiff"s a tt o rn ey's fee.; and all ·osh s hou ld uit
Ii <: necl';,sary to enfon·e the coll ·cti o n uf thi s bond .
"" \\"itm·s-. Ultr hands and seals, etc."

part, employed said Saint, party of the second part, as its col-

lector, which contract sustained these provisions, among others :

1. The party of the first part (Wheeler & Wilson Alfg. Co.)

agreed to employ the partv of the second part as its collector.

2. The party of the second part is to engage in no other btisi-

ness but to devote his time exclusively to collecting claims given

liini frnm lime to time by the i)arty of the first part.

3. The jjarty of the second part agrees to remit to the party

of the first pai't on Sattu'day of each week the full aniotmt of all

collections made by him.

4. All notes, leases and cash received by the party of the

second part on account of the party of the first \rAV[ shall be held

and rendered strictly as die property of the said party of the first
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])art sul)ject to their order and under their control.

6. The party of the second part is to receive as full compen-

sation for his services under this agreement, a salary of $50 per

month and necessary traveling expenses '•' '•' '•'.

All the defendants filed the plea of the general issue. The

other sureties on the bond filed separate pleas, twenty-two in num-

l)er, including those to which demurrers were sustained.

A. J. Crosthw^ait separately pleaded that, before Saint liad

entered on the discharge of his duties as collector, he notified

plaintiff to take his name ofl^ the bond — that he would not become

a suretv on the bond: tlial tlic ])laintiff made no olijection and he

was therebv released from any obligation on the l^ond. The other

sureties on the bond filed a separate plea that they signed the bond

with the understanding that Crosthwait was also jointly liable

with them on the bond and that a release of Crosthwait on the bond

without their consent released them.^

The evidence introduced on the trial of the case established

the following facts: That the above contract was executed l)y the

plaintiff and R. F. Saint and the bond was executed b\ the de-

fendants. Wright, Crosthwait, Hall and Spragins, as sureties on

the bond. That Saint received from the plaintiff a large list of

'The other pleas of the defendant and tlic furtlicr statement of facts arc omitted.

This contract r h ncl \\'a ·w ritten 0 11 th ba -k f th e contract
th erein referred to, by \\"hich aid ·ompany, a party of the fir t
part. employed . aid : aint, party o f th e e o nd part, a it collecto r. \\'hich ·ontracl su tain ecl th e c provi ion , among oth er
1. The part y of the first part ( \ Vhccl r & \Vil
n :\Ifg. 'o.)
~g r eed to empl o:· th e party nf the ·ccond part a · it ·oll tor.
2. The party of the .·econd part is t c1wagc in n o other bn inc. hut to dc\·ote his time excl n ~ iv e ly l colic ting claim ;l\· n
him fr om time to tirn ' by ll1C' party of th fir t 1 art.
3. The party of th e second part agrc
lo r emit to th party
o f the fir ·t part on Salnrday of eac h \\'' k th e full amount of all
co llec tio n . macle bv him.
-J . . \ll n o tes , lea. e and ca h rece iv ed by th e party of th
. cconcl part C' n account of th e party of th e fir t part hall be held
and rende red stri ct ly as the property o f th e aid party of th e fir t
part s ubject to their ord er ancl under their control.
6. The party of th e second part is to receiv e as full compenatio n fo r hi s services under this agr crncnl, a alary o f $so per
month and ncces ary traveling expcn cc: ':' ''' ':' .
. \II the clcfenclants fi!ecl the pl a o f the general i ue . The
o th er suretie s on the bond fil ed eparate plea , tw enty-two in number. inclucling th o c to \\'hich clemnrrcrs were . u tain d .
.\. J. Cro tlrn·::i.it , cparatcly plead cl that, before aint hacl
entered 0 11 th' di ·hargc of his clutics as colic t r. h e notified
plaintiff to take hi. name o ff the boncl- that b ,,. ulcl no t bee m e
a urety o n the bond : that th e plaintiff made n obj 'Ction ancl he
\\'a th er eby r lea eel from aiw obli;ati n o n th b ncl. Tb other
urctic s on the bond :fi \eel a . eparat plea that th y ign ecl the bo nd
with th e uncl r tancling that
ro thwait wa als jo intly liable
with th em n th e b ncl ancl that a r lea e of ro thwait on the bo nd
\\"ithout their ·on nt r 1 a secl th ern. 1
The vidcnc intr clue 1 on th trial of th
a
tabli b d
th fo ll owi ng fa ts: That Lh ab vr
ntra t wa
x utecJ by the
plaintiff and H.. F. Saint an.cl th e bon 1 wa
.· ecnt d 1 y th d f ndants, \Vright, ' ro thwait. Hall and ~ prac;in , a
ureties n
th bo ne\. That Saint r ·eiYecl fr om th plaintiff a large li t f
1

Thc other pkas of th

clcfcnclan t and th e further s tatement of facts ar c omi tte d.
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notes and accounts for collection ; that he collected a considerahle

amount of money for it. paying over a portion of it and retaining

or embezzling the balance of it. After the l)ond was executed,

Saint carried it or sent it to Nashville to the plaintiff; that when

Saint went to Nashville to begin work under the contract and

before he had reached that place or had received any notes or

accounts from the plaintiff', Crosthwait notified i^laintiff' to take

his name off the bond, which was a revocation of his guaranty,

and, plaintiff' not having refused, he regarded himself released.

Plaintiff' did not decline to release him but simply asked his rea-

sons ; and after that plaintiff' gave Saint the notes and accounts

to collect. That when Saint went to Nashville to take charge of

the work assigned to him under the contract, the original con-

tract was changed and Saiiit was permitted to retain from his

weekly collections all his expenses and a salary of $50 per month

instead of remitting to plaintiff the full amount of his collections.

That in Feljruary. 18S8, the plaintiff', through W. W. Walls, made

another change in the contract, whereby Saint was to get only

$9 per week instead of $50 per month for his services as collector,
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and that Saint worked under this last contract until he quit, but, on

a settlement he made with the company through Walls, he was

allowed $50 per month. That Saint was required to sell and dis-

count notes and accounts which had been put in his hands for

collection under the contract. That he was required to take up

the sewing machines and sell them again for such prices as he

could get for them, and that he did take up some machines for

the plaintiff', but did not know how many, and sold some of them

vmder instructions from the plaintiff'. That Wright, Hall and

Spragins knew nothing about Crosthwait revoking, his guaranty

on the bond : that they signed it with the understanding and agree-

ment that Crosthv.ait was jointly liable with them. It was also

proved that in February, 1888, the plaintiff', through its agent,

had notice of Saint's defalcation and that after such notice said

company continued Saint in its employment. The defendants

knew nothing about the changes made in this contract between

Saint and the plaintiff after the bond was signed. They never

consented to any of the changes. The plaintiff never notified either

of them of Saint's dishonest act in appropriating the plaintiff"s

money. Defendants then offered to prove by each of the defend-

ants that they had not consented to a change in the contract and

had no knowledge of such change.

notes ancl accounts fo r coll ection; that he collected a considerable
amount of m oney fo r it. paying OYCr a po rtion of it and retaining
or mbezzling the balan ·e o f it. ~ \fter th e · bond was cxcc utecl,
a int carried it or se nt it to ?\a hvill c to th e plain ti ff: that \\'hen
Saint went- to _' ashvill e to begin work under th e ·ontract ancl
before he had r eac hed that place or had recei ved any note or
account from th e plaintiff. Cro th\\'ait notified plai ntiff to take
hi name off th e bond. \Yhich \Y a a revocation of hi g uaranty,
an l, plaintiff not havin g r fu sed, h e regarded him el{ rel a. eel.
Plaintiff clicl not decl ine to release him but simply asked hi reaons: and after that plaintiff gave Saint the note and accounts
to collec t. That wh n a int \\'ent to ~as h ville to take charg of
the \\'Ork a sig ned to him under the contract. th original contract \Ya s changed and aint wa s permitted to retain from hi
weekly col lecti ons all hi expen es and a alary of $50 per m onth
instead of r mitting to plaintiff the full am ount of hi collection .
That in Febrnary. 1888. the plaintiff. through \Y. \Y. \Yall . made
another chan:--.e in th e contract. \\'hereby ~ aint \\'a to a-et only
9 per \\·eek in stead of 50 per rn on th fo r hi services a collector,
and that aint \\'Orked und er thi last contract until he quit, but , on
a ettlement he mad \\'ith th e company through \Vall , he \\'a
allO\Yecl $:0 per m onth. That Saint \Ya required to sell and di count notes and accounts \\'hich had be n put in his hands for
collection under the contrac t. That he wa r equired to take up
the sewing ma chine anc~ seli th em again fo r such price a he
could get fo r them , ancl that he did take up om e machine for
the plaintiff, but lid not know how many, and sold om e of them
under instruction fr om th e plaintiff. That \Vrig ht, Hall and
pragins knew nothing about Cro th\\'ait revoking hi g uaranty
on the bond; that they io·nerl it with the understanding and agreem ent that cro ~ t lw: ait \Yas jointly liable with them . It was al 0
proved that in February, i888, the plaintiff, through its agent,
had notic of Saint's defalcation and that after such notice aid
company continu ed Saint in it cmploym nt. The defendant
knew nothing- al out the change mad e in this contract between
aint and the plaintiff after the bond was igned. They never
consented to any of the changes. The plaintiff never notified eith r
of them of Saint' di honest act in appropriating th plaintiff'
m oney. Def ndant then offer ed to prove by each of the defendants that they had not conse nted to a change in the contract and
had no knm\"leclge of uch chan?·e_

(; L\R.\ '\TY
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Defendants introduced as evidence a number of letters written

by plaintiff to the defendant, R. F. Saint, in which they authorized

him to discount notes and use his discretion. All the letters show

that Saint was required to do other work than that required under

the written contract ; all of which increased the risk which the

sureties had incurred.

In addition to the other charges rec^uested by the defendant

in writing were the following :

5. "If the jury believe from the evidence that in February,

1888, Saint had only used $50 or $60 of the plaintiff's money,

and that Saint notified the plaintiff that he was short that amount,

then it was the duty of the plaintiff to notify the sureties, Wright,

Crosthwait, Hall and Spragins, and, if the plaintiff failed to notify

them of such fact, they cannot recover against these sureties for

any defalcation of Saint after that time."

7. "If the jury believe from the evidence that A. J. Crosth-

wait was released from the bond as guaranty after the other sure-

ties, Wright, Crosthwait, Hall and Spragins had signed it. then I

charge you that such release was a material change in tlu' con-
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tract. And if you further believe from the evidence that such

change was made without the knowledge and consent of \\'right,

Hall, and Spragins, and Crosthwait, then the plaintiff cannot re-

cover against them."

9. "If the jury believe from the evidence that in February,

1888, the plaintiff" had notice that defendant. Saint, had collected

money for it w'hich he had converted to his own use, then it was

the duty of the plaintiff to notify Wright, Hall, Crosthwait, and

.Spragins, his securities, and if it failed to notify them, the plaintiff'

cannot recover against said sureties for the money collected and

appropriated to his (jwn use after the time."

The defendants separately excepted to the court's refusal to

give the several charges requested by them * * *.

There were verdict and judgment for the ])laintiff. Defend-

ants appeal.

Kirk & Alinoii, for appellants.

RouUiac & Nathan, for appellee.

McClellan, J. The contract sued is not a guaranty, but

one of suretyship. Crosthwait and the other defendants, who

undertake that Saint shall faitlifully perform his contract with the

company, are sureties of Saint and not guarantors. The distinc-

tion between the two classes of undertakings is often sliadowy,

Defendants introduced a c\·id nee a numb r of 1 tter \\ rilt n
lJ, plaintiff to the d f ndant, R F. aint, in \\'hich they authoriz d
him t ckcount not and u c hi di er ti n. _\ll th Jett r hO\
that ~ain t \\'a.' required to cl
ther \\'Ork than that r i u i r cl uncler
the \\ ritten contract; all of \\'hi h increa ed th ri k \\'hich the
sureties had incurr d.
In aclditi n to th olh r charo-e r q ue tecl by th lefendant
in writing \Yer· the following :
5. "If th jury b lie\· from the ,·idenc that in F bruary,
I
'c. ~'a int had only u eel
50 or 6 of th plaintiff' mon y,
and that 'aint notified the: plaintiff that he wa hart that amount,
then it \\'a the duty of the plaintiff to notify the ureti , \Yrirrht,
' ro. tlrn·ait, If all and pragin , an 1, if the plaintiff fail I to notify
them of nch fact, they cann t recov r ao-ain t the e ur ti
for
any defalcation f aint after that time.''
7. "If th jury b li '\' fr m th evidence that
J. 'ro th\\'ait \\"a relea , cl from th bon 1 a guarcwty after th other uretic - . \Yright, ro tlrn·ait, Jlall and 'prarrin had ignecl it, then I
cha ·gc you that . uch rel a e \\'a a m~terial chano- in the contract.
\ncl if you further belicv from the vi Jen
that uch
change \\'a made \\'ithout th knowleclg and c n nt of \\' right,
IJall, and 'pragin , and 'rostlnYait th r: the plaintiff cannot r cov r again t th m. ··
9 ... Tf the jury b Ji eve from th evidence that in I•ebruary,
I 8 ' , the plaintiff had n tice that clef nclant,
aint, had c 11 cted
mo11cy for it ,,·hich h had conv rtecl to hi
\\·11 u , th 11 it was
the duty f the j)laintiff to n tify \Vri ght J Jal!, 'r thwait, and
. pragin , hi . ccuriti . , and if it failed to notify them, the plaintiff
cannot recover against . aid ur tie. for th money coll ct d and
appropriated to hi CJ\\·n ti. c aft r th time .. ,
The def nclant
CJ aratcly exc I tccl t the court's refu al to
rriv · th
v ral charge · r qu st cl by them * : : :::
There \\' ' re yerdi t an I j udbment for the plaintiff. Def ndant. app<"al.
J\.ir!? & . 11111011, for a1 pellant..
Ho11lhac & Xal lzan, for appcll
::\I · ' LELL.\ . · , ]. Th c ntract su •_cl i. n l a o-uaranty, but
on of ur ty. hip.
r sthwait an I th
thcr 1 f ndant . \\'ho
undertake that .'aint . hall bithfully perf rm hi
ntra t \\'ith the
company, arc uretie of 'aint an I n t o-uarant r . Th di tincof t n . hado\\'y,
of uncl rtakinoti on b tw ' n the l\\·u cla s
.L \ .
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and often not observed by judges and text-writers; but tbat tbere

is a substantive distinction, involving not infrequently important

consequences, is, of course, not to be doubted. It seems to lie in

this : that when the sponsors for another assume a primary and

direct liability, whether conditional or not, in the sense of being

immicdiate or postponed till some subsequent occurrence, to the

creditor, they are sureties ; but when this responsibility is second-

ary, and collateral to that of the principal, they are guarantors.

Or, as otherwise stated, if they undertake to pay money or to do

any other act in the event their principal fails therein, they are

sureties ; but. if they assume the performance only in the event

the principal is unable to perform, they are guarantors. Or, yet

another and more concise statement, a surety is one who under-

takes to pay if the debtor do not ; a guarantor, if the debtor can-

not. The first is sponsor absolutely and directly for the prin-

cipal's acts; the latter, only for the principal's ability to do the

act. "The one is the insurer of the debt ; the other, an insurer of

the insolvency of the debtor." This is the essential distinction.

There is another, going as well to its form. The contract of
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suretyship is the joint and several contract of the principal and

surety. "The contract of the guarantor is his own separate un-

dertaking, in which the principal does not join." Indeed, it has

been held, pretermitting all other considerations, that no con-

tract joined in by the debtor and another can be one of guaranty

on the part of the latter. (McMillan v. Bank, 32 Ind. 11, 10 Amer.

Law Reg., N. S., 435, and notes.) Though we apprehend that a

case might be put, involving only secondary liability on the spon-

sors, though the undertaking be signed also by the principal.

However that may l)c, it is certain that in most cases the joint

execution of a contract by the principal and another operates 1-0

exclude the idea of a guaranty, and that in all cases such fact is

an index pointing to a suretyship. See Brandt, Sur. Sections i,

2 ; 9 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 68 ; Marherger v. Pott, 16 Pa.

St. 9; Allen V. Hubert, 49 Pa. St. 259; Reigart v. White, 52 Pa.

St. 438; Kram pit's H.v'r v. Hata's Ex'i\ Id. 525; Birdsall v. Hea-

cock, 18 Amer. Law Reg. (N. S.) 751. and notes; Hartman v.

Bank, 103 Pa. St. 581 ; Courtis v. Dennis, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 510;

Kcarnes v. Montgomery, 4 W. Va. 29 : Walker v. Forbes, 25 Ala.

139.

Applying these principles to the bond sued on, the conclusion

must be tliat it is not a guarantv, but a contract of suretyship, on

and often not ob en-eel by judo·e and tcxt-\ni te r but that there
i a ub tantive di tincti n, i1woh·ing not in freq uently important
con equence , i , of cour e, not to be 'l ubtecl . I t c 'm s to lie in
this : that when the pon or fo r anothe: r a um c a prim ary a ncl
direct liability, wheth er conditi onal or not, in t he se n c of being
immediate or po tponed till ome . ubseq uent occur r nee. to the
creditor, they are suretie ; but wh n thi - re pon ibili ty is econclary, and collateral tc. that of th e principal, th ey a r ' g ua rantor -.
Or, a oth erwi se stated, if th ey underta ke to pay money or to do
any other act in the event their prin cipal fail th erein . they are
uretie - ; but, if they a um e the per for mance onl y in th e en:nt
the principal i unabi e to per fo rm , th ey are guara ntor . O r. ye t
another and more conci e statement, <l surety is one wl1 0 uncler take to pay if th e debtor clo not: a g uarantor. if th e clehtor cannot. Th fir t is ponsor ab. olutely aucl direc tly fo r the principal' act ; the latter, only for the principal' s ability to do the
act. "Th one i the in urer of th debt; the other. an in urer of
th e in olv ncy of th e debtor." Thi 1 the e ential clistincti n.
There i another. going a ,,·ell to it fo rm . The contract of
urety hip i the joint and everal contra ct of the principa l and
urety. ''The contract of the guarantor i hi own eparate tmdertaking, in which the principal doe i~ o t join." Incleecl. it ha.
been held. preterrnitting all oth er con ideration , that no contract joined in by th e debtor and anoth er can be one of g uaranty
on the part of the latter. ( 11! cJiillall ' " B ani?, 32 Ind. II, IO Am er.
Law Reg., N . ., 435, and note . ) Though we apprehend that a
ca e might be put, involving only econdary liability on the ponors. though the m-;.dertaking be igneJ al o by the principal.
H owever that may be, it is certain thal in mo t ca es the joint
execution of a contract by the principal and anoth er operates to
exclude the idea of a guaranty, and that in all ca e uch fac t i
an index pointing to a surety hip. See B randt, Sur. ections I,
2; 9 .Amer. & Eno-. Enc. Law, p. 6 : J fa rbcr ucr v. P ott, 16 Pa.
t. 9; Allm v. Hub ert, 49 Pa. t. ~5 9 : R cigart v. TT711itc, 52 Pa.
t. -t-3 : I\.ra111ph s E. 1.-r v. H at-::'s Ex'r, Id. 525: B irdsall Y. Heacock, 18 Arner. Law R eg. ( . . . S. ) ;-51, and note : H art11za11 v.
Bani?, 103 Pa. t. 581; Co urtis v. D eJ1 11 is, / ::\Ietc. ( :\Ia .) 5ro;
J\.carnes v. Jfontgo111rr3 -t \V. Ya. 29 : fl 'a/!? cr v. Fo rb es. 25 Ala .
139·
Applying the e principle to th e bond ued on. the conclu ion
mu t be that it is not a guaranty, but a contract of urety~ hip. on
1

1,
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the part of Crosthwait. W'riyht, I lall ami Spragins. It is no<j

their separate undertaking, but the principal also executes it.

While they employ tlie wo'-d "guaranty," they directly obligate

themselves, along with Saint, to pay — absolutely and wholly,

irrespective of Saint's solvency or insolvency — all damages which

may result to the obligee from his default. Not only so. but they

expressly stijjulate that the C'impan\- need not exhaust its rem-

edies against Saint before proceeding against them, it is, in other

words, and in short, a primary undertaking on their part — not

secondary and collateral — to pay to the companx' in the event of

Saint's failure, jind not an undertaking to pay only in the event of

Saint's default and inal)ility to pay. They are sureties of Saint,

and not his guarantors ; and their rights depend upon the law

applicable to the former relation, and not u]x)n the law controlling-

the latter. On.e of the im])orta]it dilYcrences in the operation,

eifect, and discharge of the two contracts finds illustration in this

case. The undertaking of guaranty, in a case like this, is primar-

il\- an otter, and does not l)ecomc a binding obligation until it is

accepted and notice of acceptance has been given to the guarantor.
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Till this has been done, it cannot be said that there has been that

meeting of the minds of the ])arties which is essential to all con-

tracts. Machine Co. v. Richards, 115 l'. S. 524, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.

173; IValkcr v. I'orbcs, 25 Ala. 139. T-eing thus a mere offer it

may be recalled, as. of course, at any time before notice of accept-

ance. Indeed, there are authorities which hold that even after

acceptance, and notice thereof, the guarantor may revoke it by

notice that he will no longer be bound, unless he has received a

continuing or independent consideration which he does not re-

nounce, or unless the gaiarantee has acted upon it in such way

as that revocation would be inequitable and to his detriment ; and,

in cases of continuing guaranty, the effect of such revocation is

to confine the guarantor's liability to ])ast transactions. 2 Pars.

Cont. 30; .llhiii v. Kcniiiiii^, 9 Bing. 6ivS; Offord v. Paz'ics, 12 C.

B. (X. S.) 748; Tischler v. Hofhcinicr, (\'a.) 4 S. E. Rep. 370.

All this is otherwise with respect to the contract of a surety. He is

bound originally, in all respects, upon the same footing as the

principal. 1 lis is not an oft'er depending for efficacy upon accept-

ance, but an absolute contract, depending for efficacy u])on com-

plete execution ; and its execution is completed by delivery, hroni

that moment his liability continues until discharged in accordance

witli stipulations of the instrumeiU. (ir by some unauthorized act

the part uf Cro stll\\ ait, \ \ ' rig·ht, [ lall a11cl Spragins. It is 1101.l
lhl'ir sl'paratc u11dcrtaki11g. !mt the p:·incipal also executes it.
\\'hilc they L'mpl uy the \Hml "guaranty ... they clirectly oliligalc
thcmseh·cs. a lu ng \\'ilh Saint, to pay- absolutely and wholly .
irrcspccti,·e of Sairn \ so l \'Cncy or insohTncy- all damages which
may result to the ohligeL' from hi cl ·fault. Xot only ~ O, but they
expressly stipulate that the: -·m1pa11y n ·eel not 'xhau t it · remedies again:t Saint before proceeding against them. It i · . in other
\\ o rds. and in ~: hurl. a primary undertaking o n their part- not
secondary ancl collateral- to pay to th e company in th cv nt of
Saint's failure, and not an undertaking to pay only in the event of
Saint's default and inabilit_,. to pay. They arc suretie of 'aint,
and not his guarar:l u rs; and their ri ghts d pend upo n th e bw
applicable to the funner relati on. and not upon the law c ntrolling
the latter. ( )ne: u1- the important cliff renrcs in the ope ration,
effect, and clischarg' · of th ' t\\·o -o nlracls tlncl - illu . tration in thi ·
case. The undertaking of guaranty, in a case like this. i primarily an offe r, and d ocs not bE:'cornc a hincling obligation un ti l it i
accepted and n otice of ac, 1•tancc has been given to the g uaranto r.
Till this has been clone, it cannot be said that there ha been tbae
meeting of the mind~ of the parties which is essent ial to all c ntracts. Jfachinc Co. v. Ricfza:·ds, 1 15 L<. S. 52 . ~. 6 ' up. 't. R p.
173; IFal/~cr v. Furbcs. -5 _\la. l:)S). )king tbu a mere ffer it
may be re ·allccl, as. of cour e. at any time before n ot ice [ acceptance. Incl eel, thcr ' are autho rities wbi ·h hold that even aft r
acceplanc, a n d n o tice thereof , t h e gua rantor may r vok it by
notice that he will no longe r be bound, un lcss b e ha re eivecl a
continuing- or independent con icl era tio11 \Yhi ch h docs n ot renounce, or unlc ·. the gua rantee has acted upon it in su h way
a . that revocation would b in eq uitabl e ;:u1cl 10 hi s detriment: ancl,
in ca ·e of continuing guaran ty, th e effect of Ll h revocat ion i
to confine the guarantor' · liability to pa t tran action . - Par .
'ont. 30; . 11/an v. /{ CJ111i11g, 9 Bing. [S; ()!Tard v. Da·z•ics . 12
IL (. · . .~ .) 7-+ 1 ; Tischler\'. Tfof/1ci!llcr, ( \ -a.) .+ . E. l cp. 370.
1\ll tbi - is otherwise \\·ith resp ect to th 'O ntract of a surety . lJ e i ~
bound origina lly, in all r sp ct , upo n th e sam foo tin g a the
principal. lTi is not an ffer dep nclin g for effica y upon acceptan ·c, but an absolute cont ra t, clepcndin~· fo r fficacy up 11 complete execution; and its exec ution is ·o mpl 'tccl 1 y cl livery. From
that momc:nt hi · liability ont inu
until di charg cl in ace rdan
with stipulations of the in trument, r hy o m e unauthor iz d act
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or omission of the oblig'ee violative of his rights under tlie instru-

ment, or l)v a vaHd release. Nothing that he can do outside of the

letter of the bond can free him from the (kities and liabilities it

imposes. He cannot assert the right to revoke unless the right is

therein nominated. As was said by the English court, if he

desired to have the right to tenninate his suretyship on notice, he

should have so specified in his contract. Calvert v. Gordon, 3

Man. & R., 124; Brandt. Sur. Sec. 113, 114.

The evidence here as to the release of Crosthwait tends to

show no more than this : That after the bond had been delivered

to plaintiff, and after its officers had advised Saint that they were

ready for him to enter on the discharge of his duties under the

contract secured by the bond, he (Crosthwait) requested plaintitt"

to take his name off the paper. Xo assent to this request is

shown, but only an inquiry on the part of plaintiff as to Crosth-

w^aite's reasons for desiring to be released. It would seem that the

court itself should have decided that these facts did not release

Crosthwaite, but the question appears to have been submitted to

the jury. If this submission, or any of the instructions accom-
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panying it. was erroneous, no injury resulted to defendants, since

the jury determined the point against the alleged release, as the

court should have done, assuming it to have been a question of

law. On the other hand, if it were a cjuestion for the jury, it is

to be presumed they were properly instructed as to the rules of

law wdiich should guide them to its solution, as no exceptions were

reserved in that regard. The exceptions which w-ere reserved on

this part of the case are to charges given, and to the refusal to^

give charges asked hv defendants declaratory of the eff"ect which

the discharge of Crosthwaite. if the jury found he had been dis-

charged, would have upon the liability of his co-sureties. As the

jury found expressly that he had not been discharged, these ex-

ceptions present mere abstractions not necessary to be decided.

We have no doubt, however, but that che law in this respect was

correctly declared by the court to be that the release of Crosth-

waite operated 10 release the other sureties only to the extent of

his aliquot share of the liability.

Brandt, Sur. Sec. 383; Burge, Sur. 386; Kliiigcnsiuitli v.

Kliiigcnsinith, 31 Pa. St. 460; Ex Parte Giff'ord. 6 Ves. 805;

Shock V. Miller, 10 Pa. St. 401 ; Currier v. Baker, 51 X. H. 613;

Governor v. Jeiniso;i, 47 Ala. 390.

or orni sion of the obligee violati\·e of hi s rig hts unclcr the instrum ent, or by :t valid relea e. :\Tothing th~l he can clo outside of the
letter of the bond can free him from the duties ancl liabilities it
imposes. H e cannot assert the right to rcrnke unl ess the right i ·
therein nominated. _-\ \\·as said by the Engl ish court, if he
desired to have th e ri g-ht to terminate 11i.:; suretyship on notice, he
should hav e so specified in his contract. Ca/.-i.·crt v. Cordon, 3
]\fan. & R., 12-!-; Dr~ndt, Sur. Sec. I I 3, l q .
The evidence here as to the release of Crosthwait tends to
show no more than this : That after the bond hacl been delivered
to plaintiff. and after its officers had advised Saint that they \\·ere
ready fo r him to ent er on the discharge of his duties und er the
contract secured by th e bond, [1e ( Cro.:;th ,vait ) requested plaintiff
to tak e his name off the paper. 1\ o assent to this req ue t is
hown, but only an inquiry on the part of plaintiff as to Crostbwaite's reasons for desiring to be released. It \voulcl seem that the
court it elf should have decided that these facts did not release
Crosthwaite, but th e question appears to have been submitted to
the jury. I£ this submission, or any of the inst ru ctions accompanying it was erroneo us, no injury rpsulted to defendants, since
the jury determined the point against the alleged r elease, a the
court should have done, as urning it to have been a question of
law. On the other bane!, if it w ere a questio n for the jury, it is
to be presumed they were prope rly instructed as to the rules of
law which sho uld guide them to its solution, as no exceptions were
reserved in that regard. The exceptions which were rese rved on
this part of the case are to charges given, ar>.d to the refu sal to
give charges asked by defendants declaratory of the effect which
the di scharge of Crosthwaite, 1f the jury fo und he had been discharged, would have upon the liability of his co-sureti es. A the
jury fou nd expressly that he hacl not lxen discharged, these exceptions present m ere abstractions not necessa ry to be decided.
\Ve have no doubt, however , but that the law in this respect was
correctly declared by the court to be that the release of Crosthwaite operated Lo rtl ease the other sureties only to the extent of
his aliquot shar e of the liability.
Brandt, Sur. Sec. 383: Burge, S ur. 386; K!illgenslllitlz v.
Klingensll1itlz, 31 J?a . St. 460; Ex Parte Gifford, 6 Y e . 805;
Shock v. JI ill er, IO Pa. St. 401 : Currier v. Ba!?er, 5 r T . H. 613;
Governor v. ]el1liso11, 47 Ala. 390.
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The sureties of Saint insisted on the trial below that they

were discharg-ed from all lialjility on the bond by reason of certain

alleged changes made in the original contract between their prni-

cipal and the company, by tlio jwrties thereto, after they became

sureties for its faithful performance, and without their knowledge,

consent, or ratification. It is not pretended that the paper writing

evidencing this contract was ever altered in any respect, but that

its terms were changed by subsequent parol agreements, in the

following- respects, among others to be presently considered : First,

tliat under this contract, which constituted Saint a collector only

for the company, he was instructed and required to take up and

resell sewing machines when he found the notes for the purchase

money of the same, and which were in his hands for collection,

could not be collected ; and, second, that he was authorized to dis-

count or sell the notes placed in his hands for collection, when the

same could not be otherwise realized upon. Nothing is claimed

in this action 011 account of Saint's misconduct in respect of any

property thus taken up or resold, or of any note discounted by him,

or with respect to the proceeds of any such sale or discount. If
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these duties were such as usually devolved upon a collector for a

sewing machine company, — as to which there is no evidence in this

record, and no necessity for any, under the present complaint, —

it may be that Saint's sureties would be responsible for their faith-

ful performance on his part to the same extent as for money col-

lected on notes in his hands. Bank v. Zicglcr, 49 Mich. 157, i-^ N.

W. 496.

However that nia\- l)e, the fact that they were imposed upon

him, assuming they were not covered by his contract, and hence

were in addition to those assured by the other defendants, cannot

relieve his surties from liability with respect to those which were

imposed by the contract, unless the imposition of these new duties

and their performance by Saint rendered impossible, or materially

hindered or impeded, the proper and faithful performance of the

service originally undertaken. There is no evidence here that

these new and additional duties interfered with the collection of

notes placed in his liands for that purpose, nor is any claim made

against his sureties on account of any failure to collect such notes.

]]ut the gravamen of the action is that he ( i ) did collect these

notes, and converted the proceeds to his own use; or (2) that

he failed to deliver such notes to the company on the termination

of his emnlovment. ^^'e arc unable to conceive how the fact that

The ~urcti\..·-. ui ,'aint in . i-,tccl un tl1 · trial belo\\' that they
\\'l'rc tli charged fru111 all liability on the bond by r 'a ·on of certain
alleged 'hangc. made in the original contract between their prmcipal and th· curnpan), b~· the parti · thereto, after they became
.:un: tits for its faithiul performance, a111 l \Yithout their kno\\ ledge,
c01bent, or ratification. 1t i not pretended that the paper "riling
Yiclencing this contract "· a ~ eyer altered in any re peel, 1 ut that
its term . \\·ere changed by ub. cquent parol agreem nt , in the
follo\\·ing rc. pect ·, among otlwr to be pre ntly con iclerecl: hr t,
that under thi contract, " ·hich con tituted aint a collector only
for the company. he was instructed and r quired to take up and
resell se\\·ing machine " ·hen he found the note for the purcha e
money of th ~ same, and which were in hi hand for collecti n,
could not be collectell: and, second. that he \\·a authorized to di count or . ell the n ok . placccl in hi hand for collection, when the
ame could not be othern·i. e realized upon. X othing i claimed
in thi action on account of 'aint' mi conduct in re pect of any
property tbu taken up or re. old, or of any note di counted by him,
or with re pect to th<.: proceed of any uch ale or di count. If
the e clutie were uch a u ually de,·oh·ecl upon a collector for a
e\\·ing machine company.-a to \Yhich there i no evidence in thi
record. and no nece ity for any, uncler the pre ent complaint,it may he that aint's uretie woulcl be re pon ible for their faithful performance on hi par~ to the ame extent a for money collected on note. in hi hancl . Balli? v. Ziegler, -t-9 ),lich. i7, i3 ::-J.
\\·. -t-96.
IIowever that may be, the fact that they \Vere impo eel upon
him. a .. urning they were not covered by hi contract, and hence
\n.:rc in addition to those a. sured by the oth r clcfcnclant , cannot
rclie,·e his ~ urtie from liability with re pect to tho e which were
impo_ ed by the contract, unlc . the impo ;ti n of the e new clutie
ancl their performance by Saint rendered impo ible. or materially
hindered or impeded, the proper and faithful performan e f the
en·icc originally uncl rtaken. 'l here i _ no eYiclence here that
the. e new and additional dutie int rf r cl with the coll ction of
note. placed in his hand. for that purpo ~ e. nor i any claim made
agai1bt hi . uretics on account of any failure to collect such note .
nut the grai. '(/11/Cll of the acti0n i. that 11e ( l) cli J col) Ct tb e
n ote". and cr>nvertecl the pr c cl . to hi . mvn u
r ( 2) that
he failed to dcliYer uch not to the company on th t rmination
of his employment. \\'e are unahl to conceive how the fact that
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he had other property and funds — machines and the proceeds of

discounted notes — in his possession, could have hindered or im-

peded him in the accounting for funds coUected or notes remain-

ing in his hands, or could in any degree have conduced to his con-

version of such funds or notes. To the contrary, it would seem,

in all reason, that the possession of this other property and these

other funds, out of which he might have met the necessities which

presumablv induced his malversations, would have lessened the

chances of misappropriation of the funds and property for which

his sureties were responsible, and thus have lessened, instead of

increased, their exposure to liability. We are very clear to the

conclusion that the imposition of these new duties, not covered by

the contract, did not discharge the sureties with respect to those

embraced in the contract, and as to which no change in the partic-

ulars we are considering was attempted.

City of Nczv York v. Kelly, 98 N. Y. 467; State v. Vilas,

36 N. V. 459; Ills. Co. v. Potter, 4 Mo. App. 594; Coin. v.

Holmes, 25 Grat. 771 ; Bank v. Traube, 75 Mo. 199; Gaussen v.

U. S., 97 U. S. 584; .Ao/;r.y v. ['. 6"., 18 Wall. 662 ; Ryan v. Morton,
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65 Tex. 258; Bank v. Cerke (Md.), 13 Atl. 358, 6 Amer. St. R.

453, and note, 458; Bank v. Zeigler, 49 Mich. 157, 13 N. W. 496.

The sureties further defended on the ground that the con-

tract between Saint and the company was changed without their

knowledge or assent by a subsequent parol agreement entered

into by their principal and Walls, representing the company,

whereby Saint's compensation was to be reduced from $50 per

month to $9 per week. There was evidence of such agreement

but none that it was supported by a consideration or that it was

approved bv plaintifl' ; and it appears from other evidence that all

of Walls' contracts were subject to approval or rejection by other

officers of the corporation, and that plaintiff settled with Saint on

a basis as to compensation of $50 per month. We think, on these

facts, this defense is wiuiout merit.

Steele v. Mills, 68 Iowa, 460, 27 N. W. 294.

Equally untenable, in our opinion, is the defense which pro-

ceeds on the ground that the instruction of plaintifT to Saint to

retain his salary and expenses out of collections made by him was

a material change of that provision of the contract which required

him to remit to the com.pany on the last day of each week the

amount collected up to that day. The contract provided for Saint's

compensation and expenses, l)ut was silent as to the manner of

he had o th r prop rty ancl funcls--marhine and the proceeds of
di counted note -in hi pos e ion, could have hindered or imp eded him in th e ::i.ccountino- for fund s coll ected or note remain ing in hi hand , or could in any deo-ree haYe conduc d to hi conver ion of uch fund or notes . To the contrary, it would eem,
in all rea on that the po . cs ion of thi other 1 ropcrt.y and these
other fund s, out of which he might have met the nece siti which
pre umabl y induced hi m ::tl\'er ation , w ulcl haye 1 ened tile:
chances of mi appropriation of the fund and pr perty for which
hi ureti
,,·ere r spon ible, and thu have lessened, in tead of
increa ed, their expo ure t._ liability. \ Ve are very clear to the
conclu ion that the impos ition of these new dutie , not covered by
the contract, did not di charge the suretie ,,·ith re pect to tho e
embraced in the contract, and a to which no change in th e particulars we a r e con idering wa attempted.
City of Xe'-"' }'ark v. Kelly, 9 :;..J. Y. -+67; State Y. T'ilas,
36 N. Y. -+59; Ins. Co. "· Potter, -+ ~Io. App. 59-+; CoJ11. v.
Holl/les, 25 Grat. 771; Banli? v. Traube, 75 ::\Io. 199; Gaussen v.
U.S., 97 l-.,. 5 -+;.Tones v. U.S., I \\'a ll. 662; Ryan Y. ~1Iorton
65 Tex. 258; Bani;: v . Gerke ( l\Id.), 13 .'\tl. 358, 6 mer. St. R.
453 , and note, -+5 ; Ban li? v. Zeigler, -+9 l\Iich. 157, 13 K. \Y. 496.
The uretie forther defenclecl on the ground that the contract betw een Saint and the company wa changed without their
knuwl edge or a ent by a sub sequent para! agreement entered
into by their principal ancl \Va!L . repr sentin g the com pany,
whereby aint' compen ation wa. to be reduced from 50 per
m onth to 9 per w eek. There wa evidence of uch agreement
but none that it was supported 1y a con sideration or that it wa
approved by plaintiff; and it appear from othe r ev idence that all
of \ Vall ' contract were St1 bj ect to approval or rejection by other
officer of the corporation, and that plaintiff ettled ·w ith a int on
a ba is a to comp n sa tion of 50 per m onth. \\ e think, on the e
fact . thi defen e i \\"1u1 01~t merit.
Steele v. Jli!ls, 68 Towa, 460, 27 N. vV. 294.
Eq ually untenable, in our opinion , i the defen e \Yhich proceeds on the gro und that the in. trnction of plaintiff to Saint to
retain hi alary an i expen se out of collection made by him was
a material change of that provi ion of the contract which required
him to remit to the company on the la t day of each w ek the
amount collected up to that day. The contract proviclecl for aint'
compen ation and expens s, but wa s , ilent as to th e manner of
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payment. Method of payment tlms adopted tended to decrease the

risks of the snreties. as affordins:;- less occasion for conversion by

Saint than had jjayments to liim l)een made onlv at the end of

payment. .\ lctlt()d (J i pa: llll'nt thus adupt ·cl te nd ed to deer ' a.-c the
ri k:-- 11f thl' -.urLtie-.. as affllr'ling- !cs <>n:asion for con\TLiun by

each month. It is well settled that mere indulg-ence of the cred-

itor to the principal, tlu' mere forl)earance to take steps to enforce

a liability u])()n defauli. or evvn an understanding- between them

looking to payment of the deficit presently due at some time in the

future, which does not, for the want of a consideration iu support

it. or other inlirmily, prevent the creditor from immediately de-

manding paynienl. will not discharge the surety, i fence what took

place between Walls and Saint in l-\'bruary, 1888, in regard to

allowing the latter furtiier time to wiikv good the sum he had

theretofore converted, afforded no defense to the sureties with

respect to the sum, then due.

3 15rick Dig., ]>. 715. Sec. 3<^-43; o .\mer. & I'jig. I'.nc.. Law,

p. 83, note 4; Canal, etc., Co. v. Can I'orsl, 21 X. J. Law, 100.

The sureties, liowever, on another aspect of the transaction

last above referred to between Saint and Walls, predicate a defense

going to the amount of their liability. They insist that Saint was
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at that time a defaulter by embezzlemenl : that Walls knew this

lacl. and, without giving any notice of it to them, he, acting for

the company, continued Saint in its employment, and committed

other funds to him. which were al.so converted ; and that this action

of Walls discharged them from all lial)ility for funds thus con-

verted after he knew of Saint's dishonesty. The general principle

here relied on hnd-. al)undant support in the authorities. In the

leading case of PhiUihs v. Po.vall. L. R. 7. O. U. 666, the propo-

sition is tluis stated by Qitain, I.:

"W e think that in a case of continuing gtiarantv for the hon-

esty of a servant, if the ma.ster disccners that the servant has been

guilty of acts 01 dishonesty in the course of the service to which

the guaranty relates, and if. instearl of dismissing the servant, as

he may do at once and without notice, he chooses to continue in

his employ a dishonest servant, without the knowledge and con-

sent of the surety, express or implied, he cannot afterwards have

recourse to the surety to make good any loss which may arise from

the di.shonesty of the servant during the suljseciuent service."

And this proposition is rested upon con.;iderations which, to

our mind,-,, are iinintiit!\- satisfactory. I "remising that had a de-

fault involving dishonesty, and occurring before the surety became

bound, been known to the cnMlitor, and concealed bv him from

. 'ai11t than had pa_ 11lL'llh Lt> hirn liee11 made unl y al th e end of
L'<tch 111< >nth. l t i-. ''ell -.etl!e(L tha.l merL' 111clulgcncc oi till' crcditur ~<1 the principal. th e mere f<>rlicarancc to take ste ps lo enforce
a lialiility up<>n cl ·fault. or e\'.._n an uncl ' r standing bct\\' een th l'.m
lu<>king t<> pa_:- 111l'11l of the d e ficit prL·scn ly cl u · a l some time in the
f uturc. \\ hich clue~ m 1 l . for the \\ant of a consid ration to ·uppo rt
it, or ntl1l'r infirmity. prc\'L'lll the c reditor from imm cdiat ly demanding payment. ,,·ill not clisd1arµ;c th· sure ly. If e n ce what took
place bet\\·ern \\ 'alls and Saint !n February, 1888 . in r ega rd to
a\lm\·inµ; the latt T iurti1er tim · to 111akc good th e . um he had
th ' ITl< >fore.: com·e rt ·cl. afforded n u clcfrn:c tu the ur tic '' ith
re. peel to tb ' · um t hen due.
3 !~ri ck Di g .. p. 715. Sec. ;)0 ·-13 : CJ .\m e r . & Eng. ]•,nc .. Law,
p. 83 . note -J.: Canal. etc. . CJ.\'. {'an I ' ors! , 21 '.\. J. Law, 100.
The sure ti es. hu\\·eyer, o n Zdlotlv.~r aspect o f th tran action
last ahm·e referred to bet \\·ccn Saint and \\ '·ill., pr clicat ' a cl f n e
goi n g to the amoum <'f their liability. They insist that .'aint wa
at that time a d efa~1llcr lw embe zz lerne nl: that \\'all s knew thi
fact, and, ,,·ithoul giving any no tice of it to them, he, acting f r
the -umpany , co ntinu cc\ ~a int in its empl oym ent, ancl cornmitl cl
ther foncl s lo him, whi -h \\'ere al so co1we rted: ancl that thi acti n
of \\ 'alls di . charg 'd th em fr om all lia bility f, r fund s thu con" ·rtcd after he kne\\· of Saint's di s hon es ty. The gen ' ral princii 1
h e re relied on find:-- a bundant . upport in th e authorities. In th e
leading case uf Phill1ps v. Foxlrll. I ~ . R. 7, Q. B.
, th pro1 osit ion is tlrns tatcd by Q u;i.in. J.:
"\\ 'c think that in a ca~c of cont inuin~ g uaranty for the ho nesty oi a e r\'ant . if the ma . t , . di scovers that th ' . c rvant ha he n
guilty r>i acts oi dishonesty in th e course f the scrvic to which
the gua ra nty r ela t ' s. and if. in s t 'ad of dismis ·ing th ' s ~ rvant, a
h e may do a t o nce anc\ ,,- i ~ h o 1 Jt n ot ice, h e ho•J . e t continue in
hi s em p loy a di h nest se P:anl, \\·itl10 ut th kno\\'lccl~. ;e and c nsent of th·: s urety, ex prcs o r impli cl, he cann t aflen,·arcls ha\'
rccoursl' to th e urcty to m ak' ~;ood any loss which may ari from
th e di slw n ·s ty of th ' se n ·a nl during the s ub quent ervi
. \nd this proposi ti on i. rc .:;t 'I upo n c n..; iclerati n ,,·hich, to
o ur mind .;;, are em in ' ntly . atisfactory. 1>r mi , inh- that ha cl a cl fault im·ulving cli-lirmcsty, a nd occ urring b fore th
ur ty became
bound, be n kno,,·n to the cn~clilor, and conceal l by him fr m
..

SAINT VS . WH EE L ER .

SAINT VS. WHEELER. IS-

13·

the surety, the effect would have beeu to discharge the surety, — a

doctrine which appears to be well established. — the court ])roceeds

to declare the same result from a concealment of dishonesty pend-

ing- a continuins: sfuarantv, as follows : "One of the reasons usually

given for the holding that such a concealment (at the time the

surety enters into the obligation) would discharge the surety is

that it is only reasonable to suppose that such a fact, if known to^

him, would necessarily have influenced his judgment as to whether

he would enter into the contract or not ; and, in the same manner,

it seems to us equally reasonable to suppose that it never could

have entered into tlie cnntemplation of the parties that after the

servant's dislion.esty in the service had been discovered the guar-

anty '^ * ''■ should continue to apply to his future conduct, when

the master chose, for his own purpose, to continue the servant iit

his employ, without the kiiowledge or assent of the surety. If

the obligation of the surety is continuing, we think the obligation

of the creditor is equally so, and that the representation and under-

standing on which the contract was originally founded continue

the ur ty , th e eff ect \\' Oulcl hc:i vc bee n to dis ·ba r ge the ~ u rcty ,- a
doctrine which appears to be well rs ta hli. hecl, -th e co ur t pro ·cccls
to d clare th e sam e re ult fr om a co ncca lrnrnl of cli sho ne ty pending a co ntinuin g g u 2. ranty, as fo lkrn·s : "On e of the r eason s u sua ll y
g iven fo r th e holding tha t such a concea lme nt (at th tim e the
s urety enter into th e obligatio n ) wo ul d di sch a rge th e su r ·ty i that it is only r ea sonabl e to suppose th a t u ch a fac t, if kn o wn to
him, wo uld nece arily have in fluence d his j ud g m e nt as to wh et her
h e w o uld ente r into the contract o r not: a nd, in the sam e m a nn er,
it se m s to u equally rea . 0na hk to sup pose that it neve r cou ld
have e nter ed into the cnnt<'l11J"la tion 0f th e parties th a t afte r t he
serva nt' s di shon esty in 1he service had been di scove red the g uaranty "' '
houlcl co ntinu e to apply to hi futur e con d u ct, \\·hen
the ma ster cho , for hi ow n purpose, to continu e th e se rva nt ir1
his employ, without th e k nn \d eclge 01- assent of th e surety. If
th e obli g atio n oi the s ur e t~- i continuin g , \\' C think the obli ga tion
of the c red ito r i equ a lly so. and that th e i'epre enta tion ancl undcrtandin g on which ~h e co ntract \ \ '<'- o ri g inall y fo unded co nt inue
to apply to it during- it co ntinu a n ce a nd until its te rmination ."
Th e citations suppo rting thi co nclu ion a r c qu as i di cta of
L o rd R edesdal e in 5 111ith v . /-5un/( , 1 D o w. 287. ancl of :d a lin ,
Y. C , in Burg ess v. E<.·c. L. R. 13. Eq. --tjO: but th e ca e \\' as ubsequently foll ow ed in E ng !ancl a nd th l Tnited States . and nowher e ab stra ctly doubted. \Ve fo ll ow th ese auth o riti es and a d op t
their conclu ion s a s o und in p rin cipl e.
a11dcrson \' . •i.s fc)/l , L. R . 8 E'\:ch. 73: Dranclt. ur. . cc.
368 ; R oberts v. D onm ·a11. ;-o Cal. rn8. L l Pac . R. 5 9~ ; R ai/r(l ad
Co. v. Go'L ', 59 Ga. 685 : T dcgra th Co. v. Barn es, 6--t ?\ - Y . 385 ;
N c7c•ar!? v. Stout . 52 ?\ . J. La\\ . :,_:;, r ~-\tl. C)--!-3Indeed, the for r g oing doctri1w · is no t co nt rov erted in thi .
Gl. 'e, but it i contended that it has n o a pplicatio n a . 1 tw ee n a
co rpo ration. b ing the crcditor. and th e s ur e t ~v of o ne of its offi ce rs
or empl oye : and th e r e ar _ not a f e\\' adj uclged ca ses \\'hich ~ u p
port thi s view. Th e arg--Llm cnt up0n \\'bi ch thi conclu io n is
reached is that "co rporatio n can act only by offi ce r s an c~ age nt .
They clo n ot guaranty to th e sureti es of o ne offic e r the fid elity of
the oth e r s. The fa ct that th e r e \\·e re other unfaithful office r a nd
agent of th e co rporatio n. wh o kn ew and connived at hi s (the
principal's ) in fid e ~iiy. ought not in r ea so n , and cl oe n ot in law
or equity, r elieve the sureti es from th eir r e pon sibility fo r him.
They und ertake that h e shall be ho ne t. tho ugh all aroun d h im he
1
'

to apply to it during its continuance and until its termination."
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The citations supporting this conclusion are quasi dicta of

Lord Redesdale in Sinifh v. Bank, i Dow. 287, and of Alalins,

V. C, in Burgess v. Ei'c, I.. R. 13, Eq. 450; but tlie case was sub-

secjuently followed in England and the United States, and no-

wdiere abstractly dou])te(l. We follow these authorities and adopt

their conclusions as sound in principle.

Sanderson v. Asfon. L. R. 8 Exch. ~t,\ Brandt, Sur. Sec.

368; Roberts v. Donoz'an. 70 Cal. to8, 11 Pac. R. 599; Railroad

Co. v. Gozv, 59 Ga. 6S5 ■ Telegraph Co. v. Barnes, 64 N. Y. 385 ;

Ne-ojark v. Slouf, 52 N. J. Law. 35. 18 Atl. 943-

Indeed, the foregoing doctrine is not controverted in this

case, but it is contended that it has no a])plication as between a

corporation, being the creditor, and the surety of one of its officers

or employes; and there are not a few adjudged cases which sup-

port this view. The argument u]ir^n which this conclusion is

reached is that "corporations can act only l)y officers and agents.

They do not guarantv to the sureties of one officer the fidelity of

the others. The fact that there were other unfaithful officers and

agents of the corporation, who knew and connived at his ( the

principal's) in fidelity, ought not in reason, and does not in law

or equity, relieve the sureties from their responsibility for him.

They undertake that he shall be honest, though all around him be

::
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rogues. Were the rule different, by a conspiracy between the

officers of a bank or other nioncyrd insiitutiun all their sureties

niiglit be discharged. It is iniunssible that a doctrine leading to

such consequences can be sound."

Railzi'ay Co. v. Shacffcr, 50 I'a. St. 356; Taylor v. Bank, 2

J. j. Marsh. 565; McS/iaiicy v. Bonk, (Md.) 20 Atl. 776; Brandt,

rnguc-... \\ .L·re the rule differen t , liy a cn n:-. piracy bet \\ ·en th e
l)ftlccr-.. uf a ba nk o r o th er m o rn.?\ eel in st ituti on all th ' ir . uret i '
might lie discha r nTtl. J t is irnno .. ibi t' tha t a doc trin e leading to
-..uch cu1bcquenccs ·a n be . o un cl."

.Sur. Sec. 369.

It is to he noted that these cases — and there may he others

which follow them — hold, not only that, where there is a con-

spiracy between the officers of a corporation to embezzle its funds,

Ha1fr,•ay Cu. \'. _','/111c/lcr. -n Pa. St. 3-

J. J. .\ lar-..h . 56: : .1/c. 'ha11cy \'.Uc 11/,>,
.'ur. ~

(.\[ cl. ) _

Taylor Y . Ra11!? . 2
. \ti. 770: Uranclt,

'C. 3()~.

the dereliction of neither officer will discharge the sureties of the

other, but also where ihvw is a negligent faihu-e on the part of one

.sucii officer to give notice to the sureties of another of his dishon-

esty, and a continuance of the dishonest servant in the corporate

.service without the assent of his sureties, given with a knowledge

of the default, the sureties are not discharged from liability for

subsequent deficits, though confessedly they would be were the

..creditor an individual or copartnership. It may be that the first

position stated is sound. Tt would seem to be immaterial whether
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an original default results from the dishonesty of the principal

alone, or conjointly from his and the dereliction of another cor-

porate employe. The sureties are bound to answer for the results

of any form of original dishonesty. That is what they insure

.against. It may be, too. — doubtless w^ould be, — that no conceal-

ment by a conspirator of the fact of the principal's original de-*

.fault, no continuance in the service by an officer of the corpora-

tion in pari delicto with the principal, would suffice to discharge

the surety, since all of this is malversation participated in by the

principal, and violative of the contract which the sureties have

undertaken to see faithfully performed. Moreover, the acts and

.omissions of one agent of a corporation, in conspiracy with an-

other to filch their common master, in furtherance of their nefari-

ous purposes, are, in the nature of things, without authorization.

by implication or otherwise, and can in no just sense be said to be

•acts or omissions ot the corporation. Upon this idea, it may be

that where one officer, though not originally participating in the

default of another, conceals that default from the sureties of his

fellow-officer and from the company for sinister purposes of his

own, and not as representing his employer or in its interest, and

('Continues the defaulting officer in the service, the sureties would

:not be discharged as to subsequent deficits. This far we may go

It is to he no ted th at th e. e ca:e:-.-a ncl th e re m a y he oth lrs
"hi ·h fo lio \\ th cm- ho lcl , nut nl y th a t, wh e re th r ' 1s a o n, pirac_: heh\ crn tlw offi 't: r o f a co rpo rati n to mb zz l it - fun d ,
the cl Tc li ct io n o f ne ither oftl c ' r \\'ill di scharg' th
ur til s of th e
other, hut al so wh cr ' th e re i. a neg li g ' nt failur ' on the l art f ne
of a nr>th r o f h i· cli ho nuch uftl ·er tu g i,·e no li ·e to th e s urcti
c:-.ty. a nd a co nt i11ua 11cc o f th ' di . ho ne. t s ' rvant in th ' c rpora te
c n ·icc " ·ith o ut th ' a ss nt o f h i ureti c. , gin·n \Yith a kn wl d gc
of th · cl ' fault, th
m cti c are n t cli charg ' d fr om liability f r
suhscq urn t defi cits , th o u g h ·o nfc .. clly th ey \\"O ulcl be \\" r th
c red ito r a n incli,·iclua l o r cupartn e r shiy. lt may be that th fir t
pos iti o n stated is so ~mcl. lt ,,. ulcl . cem to b immate rial \\·heth r
a n o ri g in a l default r ult fr 111 th e li ho n ·ty o f th ' principal
a lo ne . or co nj o intly fr om hi . and th cl r eli ction f an th r c rpo ra t ' empl oyc. Th . urcti e. arc ho und t an \\·e r fo r th e r ult
of any fo rm of rig-in.a l di . b nc. ty. That i · what th y in ur
agai nsl. 1t may b , t o .- cl u bti c
w o ul l b , -that no o ne alm cnt hy a co n pirrtt r o f the fact f the I rin ci1 al' o riginal le-i
fa ult . no co ntinuan c in th f' . c rvicc by an offi r o f the c q orat io n in pari d licto with the principal w o uld uffic to ck har b
the . urcty, in ce all f thi i. malY r ati n participat 1 in by th
prin cipal, a nd Yi la tiY of th
ntract whi b th
ur ti
hav
uncl ' rtak n to
faithfully p rf rm l. ::\I r Ye r, th a ct and
1111 1 n
f n :i.gent of a c rp rati on, in
n pira ·y with an f th ir n fari o th r t fi l h th r:: ir , mm n ma t r, in forth ran
o u 1 urp u~ . , ar , in th n?tur
f thine , with ut auth rizati n.
hy impli a t i n r o th e rwi , an I an in n j ll ~ t n b . aid t he
a ts o r omi . ion . o t th co rp rati n. l'"p n thi icl a, it may b
that \\·he r
n
ffi r , th u ·h n t rio-inall y parti ipatin in th
d fault o E an th r, c nc al. that d fa11lt fr 111 th
ur ti
f hi.
f ll ow -offi c r and fr m th company for ini t r purp
f hi .
m Yn, and no t a repr . ntino- hi
mp! y r r in it int r . t. an I
th cl fa-ulting ffi r in th
, th ~ ur ti
w nld
ntim1
n t b ' di bar ed c-.-; t .: uh [U nt I fi it . Thi far w may :--:n
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with the learned courts in which the cases we have cited were

decided. But even our conservatism in following adjudications

of courts of acknowledged ability and learning can in no degree

constrain us to adopt the second proposition stated above. We

cannot subscribe to the doctrine that there is the radical difference

insisted on, or any material difference in fact, between the efficacy

of acts and omissions of an agent of a creditor corporation, having

authority in the premises, on the one hand, and the acts and omis-

sions of the agent of an individual creditor, or of the individual

himself, on the other, in respect of condoning the defalcation of an

emplove, omitting notice to the employe's sureties, and continuing

him in the service, to operate a release of the sureties as to subse-

quent deficits of the dishonest employe. No doctrine of the law

is more familiar than that notice to an agent, within the scope of

his agency, is notice to the principal ; and the doctrine has in no

connection been applied more frequently and uniformly than to

corporations and their agents. Indeed, there is an absolute neces-

sitv in all cases for its application to corporations, since they act

and can be dealt with only through agents. Notice to one agent
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of a corporation with respect to a matter covered by his agency

must be as etffcacicus as to its directors or to its president, since

these also are only agents, with larger powers and duties, it is true,

but not more fully charged with respect to the particular thing

than he whose authority is confined to that one thing. In the case

at bar, Walls had authority to make the contract with Saint, sub-

ject to the approval of another agent of the corporation. He did

in fact make it. This contract contained a provision for its ter-

mination by either party at pleasure. The evidence was that

Walls had full supervision over Saint, and over all matters em-

braced in the contract made by Saint. It was at least a fair in-

ference to be drawn by the jury that he could terminate the em-

ployment, either under the stipulation in the instrument, or for a

violation of it by Samt, subject to the approval of the other officer

or agent referred to. There is no ground to doubt but that to

have given the sureties notice of Saint's default w^ould have been

in the line of his duty and authority. Equally clear it must be

that their assent to him to a continuance of Saint's employ-

ment would have bound them for the subsequent defalcation;

and on the other hand it must be that their dissent from such

continuance, communicated to him, would have had the same

effect as had it been given to any other officer of the creditor com-

with the lea rned c art in which the ca e~ ,,·e have cited were
decided. Dut even our conservatism in fo llo,,·ing adjudications
of court of acknowledged ability and learn in g can in no cleoTee
con train u to adopt the sec·Jncl propo 1tion stated above. \\' c
cannot ub crib to th e clorrrine ~hat th ere i the radical difference
insi ted on, or any material differ ence in fact, between th e fficacy
of act and omi ions of an ao·pnt of a creditor corporation, ha\'ing
authority in th e premi ses. on the ~ n e hand, and the act and omision of the agent .J f an individual creditor, or of the individual
him elf, on th e other, in r e pect of condoning the defalcat ion of an
employe, omitting notice to the ernployc' sureties . a nd continu ing
him in the ervice, to pe rate a relea e of the ureti a to ubsequent deficit of the di hone t employe. ~ o doct rine of th e la,,i mor e familiar than th at notice to a n agent, within the co pe of
his agency, i notice to th ~ principal: and the doctr ine ha in no
connection been appiied more frequ ently and uni formly than to
corporation and thL'ir agent . Indeed, there is an abso lute nece sity in all ca e fo r it applicati'on to corporation , ince th ey act
and can be dealt with onl y throu g h agent . ~otice to one aaent
of a corporation with re pect to a matter coYered by hi agency
mu t be as efficaci c u as to it directors or to it pre id nt. ince
the e also are onl y agents, ,,·ith larg r pO\Yer and duties, it i , tru e,
but not more full y charged with respect to the particular thing
than he wh o e auth ·rity is confin erl to that one thing . In the ca e
<it bar, \ iVall had authority to make th e contract with Saint, ubject to the approval of an other agent of thei corporation. H e did
-in fact make it. Thi contract contained a provi ion for it termination b:· either party at plea ure. The evidence was that
\Vall had full uperv1 i n over aint, and over all matter embraced in the contract made f y aint. It wa at least a fair inft-rence to be drawn b.' ' the j ti ry that he could terminate th e employment, either tmc.ler th
tipulation in th e in trument, or fo r a
violation of it by aint, ul ject ~ o the approval of the oth er officer
or a o-ent rrf e n-.~ rl to. Th ere i no ground to doubt but that to
have given the uretie notic e of aint' default would hav been
in the line of hi duty and authority. Equally clear it mu t be
that their a ent to him to a continuance of aint' employment would have bound them for the ub equent defalcation;
an l on the other hand it mu t be that their di ent from uch
continuance, communicated to him, would have had th e ame
effect as had it been given to any oth er officer of the creditor com-
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])any. lie had notice of the default. He received it as represent-

ing the company. In that capacity, lie condoned it, made arrange-

mcnt.s with Saint to make it good, continued the employ-

ment, and tliereljy continued Saint's opportunities to eniliezzle

the company's funds, on ihe supposed security for its reim-

bursement afiforded l)y the obligation of the sureties, who

liad contracted on the assumption of Sanit's honesty, and

were entitled to know of his dishonesty, when it should de-

velop, as a condition to their subsequent liability. There is no

intimation of connivance ur conspiracy on the part of Walls with

Saint to defraud either the creditor or the sureties. What he did

was doubtless done in good faith, and for the interest, as he sup-

posed, of his employer. It was in the line of his employment. If

his further duty was to report his action to another officer of

the company, the presumption is that he made such report. There

is nothing in the record to rebut such presum])tion. We cannot

hesitate to affirm, on this state of the case, that what he did which

ought not to have been done, and what he failed to do which

ought to have been done, were the acts and omissions of the cor-
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poration, involving the same conse([uences, in all respects as if

the corporate entity had been capable of direct personal action,

so to speak, and had acted as he did, or as if he himself, and not

the Wheeler & Wilson ^Ifg. Co., had been the creditor. We sup-

pose it would not be contended in any (|uarter, that if these sure-

ties had in terms stipulated that, in case of Saint's default, notice

to them, and assent on their ])art, should be a condition precedent

to their liability for further defaults, they could be held, without

such notice and assent, and yet, under the doctrine announced

in the cases cited, such a stipulation would be entirely nugatory,

and the failure of i-very agent and officer, all w ith knowledge of

the sti])ulation and of the default, to notify the sureties thereof,

would avail them nothing. Yet it would manifestly be no more

the duty of the corporation to give a notice so stipulated for than

to give a notice made a part of the contract by the law of the

land. And such doctrine, carried to its legitimate results, would

defeat all corporate liability growing out of the contracts, acts,

and omissions of agents clothed with power and authoritv in the

premises. That it is unsound is demonstrated, not only in logic,

but upon analogous authority. As we have seen, the Englisli

court, in the leading case of Phillips v. Foxall, supra, — which has

never been called in question there or in this country, either as

pany. ll e had notice of th e de fault. J l e rece iYecl it a repre enting the compa ny. ln th at capac ity, he condoned it, made arra ngements wi th Sai nt to m ake it good , co ntinu ed th e employm ent . a nd the reby ' Ontinu ecl Saint' s opportuniti es to embezzle
the company's fund .' , 011 th l'. upposecl security fo r it re1mliur .·em ent affo rclecl hy th e obli g atio n of the s urcti c , who
hacl contracted on th e a. ·umption o i ~· amt' s honesty, a nd
\\Tre entitled to kn O\\. o f hi cl is hc ne ·ty, \\· hen it should d eYdop . a a conditi on to th eir subsequ ent liability. There i no
in ti mat ion of co nniYa n ' e o r co nspiracy on the part of \\'all s \\'ith
.'ai nt to de frau d ' ithe r th e c reditor or th e sureti e . \\ 'hat h e did
\Yas clo ubtles clone in good faith, ancl fo r the intere t, a h e upJKLed , of hi s employe r. 1t wa in the lin e of hi employment. If
hi furth er duty \·as to repo rt hi action to a nothe r offic er of
the compa n.\·, th e pr e ~ nmpti o n i that b e mad e such report. Ther e
i: nothin g in th e r eco rd to rebut such pres umption. \ \ ' e cannot
he. itate to affirm, on thi . . tate of th e case , tha t what he clid which
ught not to haYe bee n clone, and \\·bat he fail ed to do which
oug ht to ban· been clo ne, \\·ere the acL ancl omi ss ion of th e co rpora tion. i1wo lving th e same con cquence s, in a ll re pc' ts as if
th e corpora te entity hacl been capable of direct per onal a ction,
o to spea k, and had acted as he did, or a s if he him elf, ancl n ot
t he \\' heeler & \\ ' il. on :.\Hg . Co., had been th e creditor. \Ye suppose it would not he cont nd ed in any quarter , that if these suret ies ha cl in term s stipulated that, in case of ' aint' s default, notice
to th em , a ncl ass nt on th eir part, should be a conditi on precedent
to th eir liability fo r furth er ckfaults. th e.\· co ulcl be helcl. without
~ uch no tice an cl assent , and yet, und er th e doctrine announ ced
in t h· ca se · cited, such a stipulation \\·oulcl b e ntirely nug atory,
a nd the failure of v\'ery age nt ancl officer. all \vith knm\l edge of
the st ipula tion a ncl of th e cl d ault, to notify th s ureti es thereof ,
\Yo ulcl avail them nothing. Y ct it w ould manife tly be no more
th e d uty of the co rporati on to g iye a notice o tipulalecl f r than
to g ive a notice m a cl c a pa rt of the co11tract by th e law of the
Ja nel. . : \ml such doctrine, carried to it I g itimate re ults. w ould
cl f a t all co rpora. LI: lia bilit_\' g rowin g out of th co ntracts, act ,
_an d omi ssion of age nL clo th ed with pow er ancl authority in th e
premi es. That it ic.. un so nncl i dem on trat cl , not o nly in logic,
hut upon a nalog u s au thority. A s \\. hav
e n, th e Eng li h
co urt, in the leadin g ca c of Phillips v. Fa.raff, supra,- which ha
never been r all ccl in qu e. lion th ere or in thi co untry. either as

SA INT VS.

SAINT VS. WHEELER. 17

WHEELER.

17

to the result or the reasoning upon which it was reached, — sup-

ported the principle declared upon the same considerations which

underlie the doctrine that if an employer have knowledge of the

previous dishonesty of a servant, and accept a guaranty for his

future honesty without disclosing such knowledge to the surety,

this is a fraud upon the latter, and he is not bound. Now, sup-

pose an officer of a corporation, charged with the duty of finding

surety for another officer, knowing of such previous dishonesty

on the part of such other officer, takes bond for his faithful and

honest performance of the services contracted for, without giving

the surety notice of the prior dereliction. Would not that omis-

sion of duty on his part stand upon the same plane before the

law, and involve precisely the same consequences, as if the default

had occurred after the surety has bound himself, and the officer

had then failed to give him notice of it? If the corporation is

not prejudiced by the omission in one instance, can it be in the'

other? If the corporation is responsible for the dereliction of

its agent with respect to notice of a previous default, would it

not also be responsible for its agent's failure to give notice of the
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subsequent default ? There can, in our opinion, be but one answer

to these questions. There can be no possible difference in the

duty of the agent and the corporation's liability for its non-per-

formance in the two cases ; and the law is well-settled that the

failure of the agent of a corporation to give notice of such pre-

vious dishonesty avoids the obligation of the sureties for future

misconduct. Singularly enough, too, some of the cases holding

this doctrine distinctly and broadly were decided by courts — ■

those of Pennsylvania and Kentucky — which hold the contrary

view as to notice of after-occurring embezzlement.

Brandt, Sur. Sec. 365-368 ; JVaync v. Bank, 52 Pa. St. 344 ;;

Graves v. Bank, 10 Bush, 23; Bank v. Cooper, 36 Me. 179, 39,

Me. 542.

Our conclusion on this point is further supported by the^

cases of Railroad Co. v. Goic, and Telegraph Co. v. Barnes, supra^

which, without discussing this point, in effect hold that the omis-

sion of an officer of a corporation to notify a surety of the default

of his principal in a case like this, and the continuance by such

officer of the employment of the principal, will discharge the

surety as to all defaults arising during the subsequent service.

And in Nezvark v. Siout, 52 N. J. Law% 35, 18 Atl. 943, the New

Jersey court, while adhering generally to the doctrine we have

3

to the re ult or th e reasonin g upon \\·hich it was reachcd,-supported the prin ciple declared upon the ame considerations which
underlie the doct rin ~ that if an mployer hav e knowl edge of the
previou dishonesty of a rvant, and accept a guaranty fo i- his
future honesty without di closing uch knowl edge to the urety,
this is a fraud upon the latter, anc.l he is not bound . .:\ O \\· , uppo e an officer of a corporation, cha rged with the duty of findin g
su rety fo r another' officer, knowing of such previou di honesty
on the part of such other officer, takes bond for his faithful ancl
hone t performance of the se rvi ces contracted for, without giving
th e surety notice of th e prior dereliction. vVoul d not that omi ion of d uty on his part stand upon the same plane befo re th e
law, and involve p recisely th e arn e consequences, as if the default
had occurred after the surety has bound himself, and th e offi ce r
had then failed to g ive him notice of it ? If the co rporation is
not prejudiced by the omi sion in on in stan ce, can it be in th e:
other? If the corporation i responsible fo r th e dereliction of
its agent with re pect to notice of a prev iou defa ul t. woul l it
not also be responsibl e for it ao-ent's fai lure to give notice of the
ubsequent default ? There ca n, in our opinion, be but one an wer
to these questions. There can be no po sible difference in the
duty of the agent arid the corporation' s liabi lity for its non-performance in the two case ; and th e law i well- ettled that the
failure of the agent of a co rporation to give notice of uch previous dishon esty avoids th e obligation of th e sureties fo r futur e
in o·ul a rly enoug h, too, some of the cases holding
misconduct.
this doctrine distinctly and broadly w re decided by co urtsthose of Pennsylvania and Kentucky-w hirh hold th e contrary
view a to notice of after-occurring embezzlement.
Brandt, Sur. Sec. 365- 368; TVayne v. Bank, 52 Pa. t. 344 ;
Graves v. Bank, IO Bush, 23; Ballk v. Coo per, 36 Me. 179, 39,
Me. 542.
O ur conclu ion on thi point is further supported by the
ca es of Railroad Co. v. Gazer, and T elegraph Co. v. Eames, supra ,.
which, without discussing this point, in effect hold that th e omi ~
sion of an officer of a corporation to notify a surety of th e default
oi his principal in a case like this, and the continuance by such
officer of the employment of the principal, will di charge the
surety a to all defaults arising during the sub equent service.
A nd in N ewarh v. Stout, 52 N. J . Law, 35, 18 Atl. 943, the New
Jersey court, while adhering generall y to the doctrine we have
3
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l; L'.\R . . TY .\XO . CRETY. IIIP.

Ijccii criticising, yet held that if the default and dishonesty of a

municipal officer be brought to the attention of the city council,

which is clothed with the power to remove him, and he is allowed

to continue in the service without notice to and assent on the part

of the surety, the latter wdll be discharged from liability as to all

suljsequent defaults. It does not appear to have been so con-

sidered by that court; but it is manifest that this is a radical

departure from the doctrine held by the Pennsylvania, Kentucky,

Maryland, and other courts, and relied on l)y appellee here, and

goes strongly in support of the contrary rule, which we believe

to be the sound one. It is also to be noticed that much reliance

is had by the courts holding that a surety of one officer of a cor-

]X)ration is not discharged by the acts or omissions of another,

in the particulars under consideration, on cases decided by the

supreme court of the United States in respect of sureties of public

officers. Indeed, it would seem that this whole doctrine had its

inception in this class of cases. This can but be considered an

intirmative circumstance, going to the soundness as authority of

those cases which involve sureties of corporation officers. There
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is a palpable and manifest distinction between the two classes of

cases bearing directly upon this question, which, while reiiuiring

the application of diis rule to public officers on the grounds of

public policy, and that laches should not be imputed to the gov-

ernment, does not require its application to officers of corporations.

We hold that if Walls, while acting for the corporation and

in the capacity of its agent, w itli respect to the matters and things

involved in Saint's contract, received notice of such a conversion

of its funds by Samt as amounted to embezzlement or involved

dishonesty, and, without imparting this knowledge to the sureties

and receiving their assent thereto, continued him in the service,

the sureties are not liable for Saint's subse([uent defaults. Charges

5, 9 and 7, requested for defendants, when referred to the evi-

dence, were correct expositions of the law, as w^e understand, in

this connection. The refusal of the court to give them involved

error which must work a reversal of the case. Most of the other

assignments of error are covered by the points considered in the

first part of this opinion. Such of die assignments as are not

discussed have been considered, and found to be without merit.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

been criticising, : d held that if the defaull and Ii -hon "·,ty of a
municipal officer be brought to th' attention f the city council,
which is clothed \\·ith the pm\· r to remo\' him, and he i allowed
tu continue in the . en·ice without noti -e to and a -ent on the part
o i the ~ur ·ty. the latter will be di charged from lial ility a - to all
~ubsequcnt default . It doe - nut appear Lo have been
o considered by lint court; but it i manifest that thi i a radical
d 'parture fr om th ~ doctrine held by th P 1111 ylvania, Kentucky,
~laryland, and other courts, and relied on by appellee her , and
goe · ·trongly in uppo rt of the contrary rule, which we b liev
to be th e sound one. l t is al o to be noticed Lhat much relian e
i · had by the ourt holding that a sur ty of one fficer of a corp ration i not di charged by the act or mi -ion of anoth r,
in the particular unclcr con icleralion. on ca ~ e decided by th
upr me court of the "Cnitcd State in re ·pect f uretie f I ublic
officer . Indeed, it would eern that thi \\·hole doctrine ha l it
inception in thi c!a . of case . Thi can but he con idere I an
infirmatiYc cir umstance, g·oing: to the
unclne - a. authority of
tho e cases \\·hich im· lve suretie of corporation officer . Ther
i a palpable and manife t cli tincti on 1 t\\·ecn the t\YO cla -e of
ca e beari'ng directly upon this quc tion, \\·hich, while requirina
the application of thi rule to public officers on the around of
public policy, and that lache should not be im1 utecl to th aoyernment, d e not rcquir it application to offic r of c rporati n .
\Ye hold that if \ \'all , while acting for the corporation an l
in the capacity of it ao-ent, with re pect to the matter and thi1ia
i1wolYed in aint' contract, received notice of uch a conver ion
of it fund by amt a amounted to mbezzlement or inv lv d
di hone ty, an cl. without imparting thi know! li:-.e t the ur ti
and receiving th ir a cnt th reto, con ti nu cl him in th ., ervic
the uretie. are not liable for ~aint' ub equ nt default .
hara
5, 9 and 7, reque ted for defendant , when r f rrecl to th
cl nee, were corr t xpo itions f th law a \\' under tan 1, in
this conne:ction. The rcfu . al £ the court t t;ive th m inv lv l
error which mu t \\' rk a rev Lal of the 'a . ::-.Io t of the oth r
assignments f rr r are covered by the p int on iderecl in the
fir t part of thi
pm1 n.
u h of th a ignment a are not
di . cu eel hav b' 11
11 iderecl. and found to he without merit.
The j uclgment i - rever d, and th
au e rrmanded.
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CASS VS. SHEW MAN. 19

CASS \ '.. SHE\\':\[\:. .
Cass z'^\ Shew man (1891).

61 Hun. 472 ; 16 N. Y. Supp. 236.

Appeal from special term, Schuyler county.

C \ s vs.

HE\\':\L\N ( 1

91).

Action by Marcus M. Cass against James Shewman to recover

on a guaranty to fulfill the conditions of a lease not complied with

61 Hun. --1-72 ; 16 1\. Y.

upp. 236.

by the lessee. Plaintiff demurred to defendant's answer. The

demurrer being overruled, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

On the 3d April, 1888, the plaintiff' and one Jennie D. Shew-

Appeal from pecial term ,

chuyler county.

man entered into a written agreement, by which the plaintiff' leased

to said Shewman his farm of no acres for the term of three years

from April i, 1888, at the annual rent of $125, payable on the ist

of March of each year. It was, among other things, provided that

Shewman, the party of the second part, should have "firewood and

privilege to cut and use posts for fencing on said farm, but shall

not cut standing timber until down timber is used up;" and the

partv of the second part agreed to carry on the farm in a good and

farmer-like manner. Upon the same occasion and in connection

w^ith said lease, the defendant executed and delivered to plaintiff

an instrument, of which the following is a copy :
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"For a valuable consideration to me paid by M. M. Cass, the receipt

whereof is hereby acknowledged, I hereby agree to become security for

the fulfillment of the above lease l^y the party of the second part, hereby

agreeing to fulfill all the terms and conditions of said lease not fulfilled

by said party of the second part.

"Witness my hand this .3rd day of April, 1888.

"James Shewman."

In the complaint the lease and the guaranty of the defendant

are set out, and it is alleged that the lessee went into possession,

and that the year's rent of $125 that became due March i, 1891,

has not been paid. It is also alleged that the lessee has not carried

on the farm in a good and farmer-like manner, has committed

Action by 1Iarcus I. Cas again t Jam es She\\·man to recover
on a guaranty to fulfill the condition of a lea e not complied with
by th e le ee. Plaintiff demurred to defendant' s an wer. The
demurrer being overruled, plaintiff appeals. R ever ed .
On th e 3cl April, 1888, th e plaintiff ;ind one J en nie D. hewman entered into a written agreement, by which th e plaintiff leased
to aid hewman hi farm of l IO acre fo r the term of three years
from Apr il l, 1888, at the annual rent of $125, payable on the r t
o f March of each year. It was, among other thing , provided that
hewman , the party of the econd part, hould have ''firewood and
privilege to cut and u e post fo r fencing on aid farm, but shall
not cut standing timber until down timber i used up ;'' and the
party of the second part agreed to carry on the farm in a good and
farmer-like manner. Upon the same occa ion and in connection
with said lease, the rl efenclant executed and delivered to plaintiff
a n instrum ent, of which the following i a copy:

waste, has torn down and injured fences, has injured the buildings,

and has cut down and appropriated many standing trees, contrary

to the provisions of the agreement, thereby damaging the plaintiff

to the amount of $300, which, by the terms of the agreement, the

lessee is liable to pay, that in these respects the lessee has made

default, and has failed to fulfill the agreement. Judgment is de-

manded against the defendant for $425. In the fifth count or

"For a val uabl e con sideratio n to me paid by l\I. 1\1. Cass, the receipt
whereof is hereby acknowledged , I hereby agree to become security for
the fulfillm ent of th e aboYe lea e by the party of the second part, h ereby
ag reeing to fulfill al l th e te rm a nd condi tion of sa id lease not fulfilled
by said party of the second part.
''\Vitne
my hand thi 3rd day of April, 1888.
"J A ~:lE

SHEW:\IAN. "

In the compla int the lease and the gua ranty of the defendant
a re et out, and it is alleg d that the lessee went into possession,
and that the year' s rent of $125 that became due 1arch l, 1891,
ha not been paid. It is al o alleged that the lessee has not carried
on the farm in a good and farmer-like manner, has committed
waste, ha torn down and injured fences, ha injured the buildings,
and has cut down and appropriated many standing trees, contrary
to the provisions of the agreement, thereby damaging the plaintiff
t o the amount of $300, which, by the term of the agreement, the
le ee i liable to pay; that in these respects the le see ha made
default, and has failed to fulfill the agreement. Judgment is demanded again t the defendant for $--1-25. In the fifth count or

<: l " \ R \ _:.. LY . \ X D S L. RE T \ S ll l l' .
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defense in the answer il is alleged l)y the (k-l'cndanl Uiat no demand

was made by plaintiff before the coniniencenient of this action of

said lessee for the payment of said rent, or for the performance

on her part of the conditions and provisions in said lease contained,

alleged in the complaint to have been broken and violated by her,

or for compensation in damages for such alleged breach, or for the

injury as alleged to the real prc^pert}- ; that plaintiff had taken no

steps and resorted to no legal remedy against the lessee to recover

the said rent, and for damages for a breach of perfomiance of the

conditions of the agreement, and had not exhausted his remedies,

legal or otherwise, against the lessee, in the seventh count or

defense the defendant alleged that the lease or agreement set forth

in the complaint was void, for the reason that it was not sealed,

acknowledged or witnessed. The plaintiff dennn-red to the fifth

and seventh defenses in the answer on the ground that each of said

answers is insufficient in law upon the face thereof, and neither

contains sufficient facts nor allegations to constitute a defense. The

court in its decision sustained the dennu'rer to the seventh defense,

giving the defendant leave to amend on payment of costs of the
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demurrer, but overruled the demurrer to the fifth defense, and

directed an interlocutory judgment to that effect. The court at

the same term granted an order, which was entered July 2, i8yi,

directing that the demurrer to the fifth count Ije overruled, and that

"the defendant mav enter judgment herein, dismissing said com-

plaint with costs, which judgment shall stand upon the record until

the trial of the issue joined in this action, and, in case said action

shall be determined in favor of the defendant, said judgment, to-

gether with judgment for further costs, shall stand as the final

judgment in this action, otherwise to be of no force and effect."

This order and the judgment entered in pursuance thereof on

the 6th Jtily, 1891, are appealed from.

Argued before Hakdi.x, 1'. J., and .Martix and Mi:kwix, J. J.

M. M. Cass, Jr., for appellant.

Cole & BqIxcii, for respondent.

Merwin, J. No exceptions to the decisions of the court were

filed by the appellant, and the respondent therefore claims that the

appellant is not in a position to question the correctness of th'e

decision. The ca.ses cited to sustain this view of the practice relate

onlv to trials of issues of fact. 15y Sec. 992 of the Code of Civil

dd ' tLe in the a 1L wc r it is allege I by th ' d d ·ndanL that n o d em a nd
\\as made by plai nti ff b ·io r ' th ' ·urn mc nc ·m ent f thi s a ·ti un of
aid I '. sec for the paym ent o f . a id rent. or fo r th ' 1 ' rfo nna n c
1>11 h -r part oi the cond it io n. a nd pro ,· i ~ i o n . in a id I ·ase ·ontaincd,
alkgecl in th ' compl ai nt lo ha \'• be ·n bruk ·n and Yi ola t ·d by h er ,
m fo r rump ·nsa ti on in clam age. fo r such all •rr ' d br ·a -h. o r f r th e
injur~ a. a lleged lo the r eal p rop ·r ty; th a t pla inti ff ha d tak ·n n
. ll'ps and re ortecl lo no lega l rem edy ag~in t the le sec to r ' ·uv r
the said r en t. a nd fo r da m ages fu r a br •ac h f perf rm a nc
f th
conditions [ th agrcem ·nt , a n cl ha d nol ·x ha uslc 1 hi r m cli
lega l o r oth erwi s , aga in st the lessee. In th · ·cv nth c unt or
defense the cl ' fe nd a n ~ allege d th a t the leas ' or agr em ent el fo r th
in the com pla in t was \'oid. fo r the r ason that il wa - not calccl ,
ack nm\ ledgecl or \\"itn e sec!. Th J la intiff d emurred l th e fif th
and ·e,·enth cl ' fcnses in th e a n. w er on th e g r urn! tha t ach f a id
a n \\·ers i insufficien t in la " . upo n the fa ce th •r eo f. an l n ithcr
conta in .. uffici nt fac ts nor allc~ a ti o n lo con li t ut ' a cl 'fe n e. Th e
co urt in it. cl ' · is ion s usta in ed th d emurrer to th e seYc nth cl f ·n ·e,
giv in g th e defenda nt leave to am end on payment o f ·o t
f th
demurrer but ov rrulccl th e clemurr r t th e fifth c.l •f n e. a nd
d ir t ·cl a n interl oc utory jud o111ent to that eff ct. ] h cour t at
th e sa m e term g ra nt cl an o rder, whi ch wa s enl r cl Jul y 2 , 1 <J f ,
cl ir ct ing t ha t th e d emurrer to the fifth co unt be \' errul ecl. a nd that
'"the cl fe ncl a nt may nter judg m nt h T in , di mi in g· a id com pla int \\'ith c . ts, whi -h jucl g m nt ball tan 1 up n th r c rel until
th e tri a l o f th i sue j in I in thi s a cti n, ancl , in ca
aid acti on
. ha ll be l termin ecl in fav or of th cl f ndant, , ai l j ud 111ent. torrcth r with j ucl g m nt f r furth er co t , ha ll tancl a th fin a l
j uclgrn cn t in thi · acti on, oth rn·i c to be f no fo r e an cl 'ffect. ..
'T his ore! r and th j uclg-111 nt nt r cl in pur uanc' th reo f n
th e th Jul y 1 9 r, ar ai p ·al cl from .

• \rg ued b f r

H .\lWl

x . P. J. , an I

::\L\RT I X

ancl ::\ [ 1 ~ R\\ · 1x .

J. ].

J !. JI. Cass, Jr. , fo r appellant.
Cole cS- i3Qlyell, f r r 1 n l nt.
:\ lE R\\'JX, ]. - TO X pti 11
fi led by t h appellant, and th r , I n I nt th r
a p1 !! a nt i. n t in a p iti 11 t iu ti 11 th
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Procedure it is provided that "an exception may be taken to the

ruling of the court or of a referee upon a question of law arising

upon the trial of an issue of fact." The manner in which such ex-

ceptions sliall bo taken is regulated by sections 994 and 995. We

are referred to no provision of the Code, m- tn anv authority, which

requires exceptions to be taken to the decision of the court on the

trial of an issue of law. Under the former Code, the practice, as

understood, did not require exceptions in such a case. 3 Wait, Pr.

232. We think none were necessary.

Upon the merits of the demurrer, the claim of the respondent,

as indicated by his points, is that he is not liable until a demand

is made upon the principal debtor, and that "it must be shown that

she refused to fulfill the covenants, and the surety must have pre-

vious notice, and a demand must also be made on him, so that he

may have knowledge of the breach, and an opportunity to fulfill

himself." To sustain this view the cases of McMitrray v. Noyes,

72 N. Y. 523; Tolcs V. Adcc, 91 N. Y. 562; Bank v. Livingston, 2

Johns. Cas. 409; Ins. Co. v. Ogdcn, i Wend. 137, are cited. In

the McMurray case the defendant, upon an assignment of a bond
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and mortgage, covenanted that if, in case of foreclosure and sale

of the mortgaged premises, there should arise a deficiency, he

would pay the same on demand. In an action on this guaranty it

was held that the foreclosure and sale were conditions precedent,

to be performed with due diligence in order to establish the liability

of the guarantor. Tolcs v. Adcc was an action upon an undertak-

ing given upon the discharge of a defendant from an order of

arrest, and conditioned that the party discharged would at all times

hold himself amenable to process issued to enforce the judgment.

It was held that the entry of judgment and issuing of process

against the principal debtor were conditions precedent to the liabil-

ity of the surety, and that a neglect to perform such conditions with

due diligence discharged the surety. In Bank v. Livingston there

was an absolute guaranty of repayment of certain moneys advanced

to a committee. The only question raised was wdiether the commit-

tee should have been first sued, and it was held that this was not

necessary. In Ins. Co. v. Ogdcn the defendant had assigned to

plaintiff certain contracts, and covenanted that the sum set oppo-

site to each contract in a statement annexed was then justly due

thereon, and that "each and every sum should be well and truly

paid to the plaintifl;'s, with the interest on each respectively." It

was held that plaintiffs could not call on defendant for payment

Procedure it i provi led that ''an exception may be taken to the
ruling of the court or of a referee upon a qu tion of law ari ing
UJ on the trial of an i sue of fact." The manner in whi ·h such exceptions hall be taken is regulated by sections 99-+ and 995. \Ve
are r ferred to no provision of the Code. nr tn :rnv authority, which
requires exceptions to be tak n to the decision of the court on the
trial of an is ue of la\Y . Cnder th e former Code, th e practice, a
understood, did not require exceptions in such a case. 3 \Vait, Pr.
232. We think none \V ere necessary.
Upon th e merits of the demurrer, the claim of the resp ndent,
as indicated by his points, is that he i. not liable until a demand
i made upon the principal debtor, and that ''it mu t be shown that
he refused to fulfill the covenants, and the surety mu st have previou notice, and a demand must al o be made on him, so that he
may have knowledge of the breach, and an opportunity to fulfill
him elf." To sustain this view the case of ill cJJ 1trra31 v. N oyes
72 . Y. 523: Toles v. L'idec 91 N. Y. 562 ; Ban!~ v. Liv illgstoll 2
Johns. Cas. 409; Ills. Co . v. 0 gdell, 1 \Vend. 137, are cited. In
the Mc tf urray case the defendant, up n an assignment of a bond
and mortgage, covenanted that if, in case of foreclos ure and sale
of the mortgaged premises, there should arise a deficiency, he
would pay the same on demand. In an action 9n this guaranty it
was held that the foreclosur and ale were conditions precedent,
to be performed with clue diligence in ord er to establish the liability
of the guarantor. Toles v. Adee was an action upon an undertaking given upon the clischaro·e of a defendant from an order of
arre t, and conditioned that the party di charged would at all times
hold him elf amenable to process issued to enforce the judgment.
It was held that the entry of judgment and is uing of process
against the principal debtor were conditions precedent to the liability of the surety, and that a neglect to perform such conditions with
due diligence discharged the surety. In Ballk v. Liv ingston there
was an absolute guaranty of repayment of certain moneys advanced
to a committee. The only question raised was whether the committee hould have been first sued, and it was held that this was not
n eces ary. In Ins. Co. v. Ogden the defendant had assigned to
plaintiff certain contracts, and covenanted that the sum set oppoite to each contract in a tatement annexed was then justly clue
thereon, and that "each and every um hould be well and truly
paid to the plaintiffs, with the interest on each respectively.'' It
wa held that plaintiffs could not call on defendant for payment
1

1

1
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without first making demand of those who signed the contracts, hut

that it was not necessary to bring suit against them. The first two

cases are clearly distinguishable from the present. In those some-

thins: was to be done bv the creditor before the liability of the

surety was determined. Here the liability attached and was deter-

mined the moment the lessee failed to perform his duly, and the

without fir t making cl 'mand of tho e \\·ho i0 necl th contract , but
that it \\·a not nccc · ary to bring~ uit again ·t Lhcm. 'I he fir t t\vo
Ca"-C arc clearly cli · tino·ui hable from the pr nt. In tho e omcthing·
wa to be done bv- the creditor before the liability of the
'
~ urcty \Ya determined. Here the liability atla h d and wa clet rmincd the moment the le cc failed to perform hi duty, and th
liability of the urcty wa a. xten ivc a that f th le ee. Poth.
Obl. -to-+. The case in r \\.encl. u tain . . omc,,·hat the po ition
of the defendant, but other ca e are in a cliff r nt direction. ln
.·11/a11 v. Right111crc, 20 John . 365, there wa a guaranty by th
defendant of th payme11t of a note, and it \Va held not to be
ncce . ary to make a deman 1 of the maker before uing the def ndan t; it being aicl that the unclertakina of the clef ndant wa that
the maker houlcl pay the note \\·hen due, or that the defendant
would pay it him lf.
The doctrine of this ca e \vas folio-wed and stablished by
the court of appeal in Br07..un v. Curtiss) 2 Y. Y . 225. In Jfan11 v.
Ec!?ford's Exrs .. I 5 \\'end. 502, the obliaation ue<l on was a bond
of defendant' te tator, conditioned that one Gibbon " hould punctually satisfy and pay to the Aetna In . o." the amount of a certain bond and mortgage executed by Gibbons, and 1pon which the
company had advanced the money wilh interest a the ame hould
become due. It \Ya held not to be nece ary f r the plaintiff fo
prove a demand upon GibbC2.!_1s for payment of the money and notice
t the obliaator or to defendant , it being said that, if a per-on
make an unconclitional engagement for the act of a third per on
the contract will be broken if that per n fails to clo the act. In
Douglas v. II mvlalld) 24 \ Vend. 35, there wa ~ an aareem nt het\\·een plaintiff and one Bingham, where! y, among other thing ,
Pin 0 ·ham agre cl to pay the plaintiff such um a houl<l be found
clue upon an accounting provided for in the ao-r ement.
nderneath the agreement the clefcnclant executed an in trument by
which he coyenantecl that Dingham . houlcl "well and faithfully
perform on hi part tbc al ov agreement," it wa held that defendant wa nol entitled to· notice bef re action £ . ingham' default.
1\mong other ca e th re cited wa th ca c f Broo/?ba11k v. Taylor, ro. Jac. 6 - , wh re th promi e \Ya that the cl f nclant would
I ay the plaintiff th rent due from another, if the latter did not pay
it, ancl it wa held that the defendant mu t notic the non-payment
at hi peril.
~

liability of the surety was as extensive as that of the lesee. i*oth.

Obi. 404. The case in i Wend, sustains somewhat the position

of the defendant, but other cases are in a ditlerent direction. In

Allan V. Rightinere, 20 Johns. 365, there was a guaranty l)y the

defendant of the payment of a note, and it was held not to be

necessary to make a demand of the maker before suing the defend-

ant ; it being said that the undertaking of the defendant was that

the maker should pay the note when due, or that the defendant

would pay it himself.

The doctrine of this case was followed and established l)y

the court of appeals in Broivn v. Cnrtiss, 2 X. Y. 225. In Mann v.

Eckford's Exrs., 15 Wend. 502, the obligation sued on was a bond

of defendant's testator, conditioned that one Gibbons "should punc-
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tually satisfy and pay to the Aetna Ins. Co." the amount of a cer-

tain bond and mortgage executed by Gibbons, and upon which the

company had advanced the money, with interest as the same should

become due. It was held not to be necessary for the plaintiff fo

prove a demand upon Gibboiis for payment of the money and notice

to the obligator or to defendants, it being said that, if a person

make an unconditional engagement for the act of a third person,

the contract will be broken if that person fails to do the act. In

Douglas V. Hozi'land, 24 Wend. 35. there was an agreement be-

tween plaintifT and one Bingham, whereby, among other things,

Bingham agreed to pay the plaintiff such sum as should be found

due upon an accounting provided for in the agreement. Under-

neath the agreement the defendant executed an instrument by

which he covenanted that Bingham should "well and faithfully

perform on his part the above agreement," it was held that defend-

ant was not entitled to" notice before action of Bingham's default.

Among other cases there cited was the case of Brookbank v. Tay-

lor, Cro. Jac. 685, where the promise was that the defendant would

pay the plaintiff the rent due from another, if the latter did not pay

it, and it was held that the defendant must notice the non-payment

at his peril.

C\ S C. SIIE\\. :\I

. \~.

23

CASS VS. SHEW MAX.

23

In Bank v. Rogers, 7 Bosw. 493, the plaintiff made a loan to

one Chase, payahle in 60 days, and the defendant promised that,

if Chase failed to repay the amotmt, with interest, within 60 days,

"then and in such case the defendant will become answerable to the

plaintiffs for such repayment after 30 days' notice of such default."

It was held that a demand of the principal need not be made before

suit against the defendant.

In Clark v. Burdctt, 2 Hall, 217, there was a guaranty by

defendant of payment of bills of merchandise purchased or to be

purchased, and it was held that a demand of the purchaser and

notice to defendant were not necessary as conditions precedent to

the plaintiff's right of action.

In Tnrnurc v. Hohcnthal, 36 X. Y. Super. Ct. 79, where a

surety to a lease bound himself that, in case default should at any

time be made by his prhicipal in payment of rent and in the per-

formance of the conditions of the lease to be by him performed, he

would pay the rent in arrear. and all damages in consequence of the

non-perfomiance of the covenants, without requiring any notice of
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such default, it was held that no demand was necessary to be made

of the tenant by the landlord for the rent before proceeding against

the surety, and that the landlord was under no obligation to attempt

to collect the rent or enforce the covenants against the tenant. A

like view was taken in McKcnzie v. FarrcU, 4 Bosw. 204, and ifi

Ducker v. Rap[>, 41 X. Y. Super. Ct. 235.

In Cordicr v. Thompson, 8 Daly, 172, one Ferrero executed

an instrument by which she agreed to return to plaintift"s intestate

a certain amount of money at a certain time, and the obligation of

the defendant was in the following form: "I guaranty the above

obligation." This was held to be a guaranty of payment, and that

neither demand on the principal nor notice to the guarantor of

default were prerequisite to an action on the guaranty.

Volts V. Harris. 40 111. 155, was an action upon a guaranty of

a lease, by which the guarantor became "security" that the lessee

would do and perform all the covenants contained in the lease, and

promised to pay to the lessors all rents and damages the lessors

might sustain by reason of the non-compliance with or non-fulfill-

ment of the stipulations of the lease by the lessee. It was held that

the liability of the guarantor was primary, and that he was not

entitled to notice of the non-performance of the stipulations.

In Ashfon v. Bayard, 71 Pa. St. 139, the obligation against

the surety was: "I hereby become the surety of S. Coulter for the

In Bank v. Rogers, 7 Do w. -1-93. th plaintiff made a loan to
one Cha ~ e, payable in 60 clay~, and the defendant promi ~ ecl that,
if Cha e failed to repay th e amount, with interc t. within 60 days,
' 'then and in such ca e the defendant " ·ill become answ rable to tl1e
plaintiff for uch repayment after 30 days' notice of uch default."
It \Ya held that a demand of the principal need not be made before
uit again~t the defendant.
In Clari? \'. Burdett, 2 Hall, 217. there \Ya a guaranty by
defendant of payment of bills of merchandise purcha eel or to be
purcha eel. and it was held that a demand of the purcha er and
notice to defendant were not nece sary as condition precedent to
the plaintiff right of action.
In T11r1111rc Y. J-1 olzc11tlzal, 36 :\. Y. uper. Ct. 79, \Yhere a
urety to a lea e bound him elf that, in ca e default houlcl at any
time be made by hi principal in payment of r ent and in the perforn1anc:e of the condition of the lease to be by him performed, he
\Yould pay the rent in arrear. and all damage · in consequence of the
non-performance of the covenants, ,,·ithout requiring any notice of
uch default. it wa held that no demand \Ya nece ary to be made
of the tenant by the landlord for the rent before proceeding against
the urety, and that th e landlord \Yas under no obligation to attempt
to collect the rent or enforce the covenant against the tenant. A
like view wa taken in J/ cl{en:::ie v. Farrell, -1- Do \Y. 20-1-, and ifl
Ducker v. Rapp, ...J-I L\. Y. uper. Ct. 235.
In Cordier v. Tlzo111pson, 8 Daly, 172, one Ferrero executed
an instrument by which she aareed to return to plaintiff intestate
a certain amount of money at a certain time. and the obligation of
the defendant wa in the following form: "I guaranty the above
obliaation." Thi wa held to be a guaranty of payment. and that
neither demand on the principal nor notice to the guarantor of
default were pr requisite to an action on the guaranty.
Falt::: v. Harris_, -1-0 Ill. 155, \Ya an action upon a guaranty of
a lease. by which the guarantor became .. ecurity'' that the le ee
would do and perform all the covenants contained in the lea e, and
promi eel to pay to the le or all rent and damage the le sor
might ustain by rea on of the non-compliance \Yith or non-fulfillment of the tipulations of th e lea e by the le see. It wa held that
the liability of the guarantor wa primary, and that he \Ya not
entitled to notice of the non-performance of the tipulation .
In A /zton v. Bayard, 71 Pa. t. 139, the obliaation again t
oulter for the
the ~ urety \Ya : "I hereby become the urety of

24 Gl'ARAXTV AXn STRKTYSIIIP.
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fulfillment of the williin obligation.'" This referred to a dnc-bill

given by Coulter for certain shares of stock. This was held to be

an original undertaking by the surety, and a recovery iIktcou could

be had without proving diligence to pursue Coulicr. See also

Brandt, Sur. Sec. 86, 172.

In the present case, as against the lessee, no demand was

necessary. Jacksuii v. Biiiiis, 10 W'kly. Dig. 105; McMurphy v.

Minot, 4 N. H. 251.

His agreement was broken when ho failed to pay, and when

he violated the conditions of the lease. The defendant agreed to

fulfill all the terms and conditions not fulfilled by the tenant. This

was, in efifect, an agreement to pay if the lessee did not. When the

plaintiff shows a breach by the lessee, and udu-payment, or non-

fulfillment, then he shows all that by the terms of the contract he

is required to show in order to make the defendant liable. The

agreement of defendant was not that the lessee would pay on

demand or upon suit ])rought, Init it was absolute that he would

fulfill if the lessee did not. This, in substance, was a guaranty of

payment, and not of collection. The defendant, in his agreement,
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required no demand or notice or exhaustion of remedies against

the tenant. No duty was im]:)osed on the lessor in the first instance

to take any steps against the debtor, and that is said to be the test

in order to examine whether a guaranty of payment or collection

exists. Tolcs v. A dec, siil>ra.

The contracts of sureties are to be construed like other con-

tracts, so as to give etTect to the intention of the parties. People v.

Backus, 117 N. Y. 201, 22 N. E. 759.

It is hardly to be assumed here, in the absence of an express

stipulation to that eiTect. that the intention of the parties was that

the les.sor should ])ursue the lessee to the end of an execution before

calling upon the surety. In fact, that does not now seem to be

claimed by the respondent's counsel, but he relies on the question of

demand and notice. This the defendant did not require by his

agreement, and he was not entitled to it, any more than in case of

an absolute guaranty of payment. This view is. I tliinlK, in accord-

ance with the current of authority, as illustrated by the cases above

fulfillment of the within ubli;:,;ation." Tim, referred to a due-bill
g·iwn by ~ oultcr for certain -har . ui . tock. Thi . \\"a , held to 1 c
an orig·inal undertaking hy the sure ty , a nd a r ·cu,· ·ry th ereon coul d
h had without pnwing diligence tu pur uc 'o ult cr. Sec al o
Hrandt, 'ur. Sec. 8 , 17_ .
ln the prc:ent case, as again. t the le . cc, no cl ·mancl wa
necessary. Jac/,'.rn11 \'. Bi1111s, 10 \\' kly. J ig. LOS : JfcJJ11rphy \'.
Jli11ot. -t X. JI. -.)r.
llis agreement ,,·as broke n when h e failed to pay, ancl ,,·hen
he Yiolatcd th co nditi o ns of the lea c. The d ef nclant agreed to
fulfill a ll the terms and co nditions n ot fulfill ,d by th e tenant. Thi
wa. , in effect. an agreement to pay if the le. see clid not. \\' h en the
plaintiff . ho\\·s a breach by the le see , a ncl 11011-paym ·nt, or nonfulfillmcnt. then he sho\L all that hY th e term s of th e contract h e
i requ ired to ~ho ,,· in o rd er to mak e th e cl fcnclant liable. The
agreement of clcfcnclant ,,-a , not tha t th e Jc. sec w ould pay on
demand o r upon . uit bro ught. but it wa absolute that h e w o uld
fulfill if the Jc. sec clicl no t. Thi -, in substa nce, was a g ua ranty of
payment, ancl not of co ll ec tion . 'Th e defcnclant, in hi · acrrcement.
re 1uir cl no clcmancl or n oti ·e or exhau sti on of r em cl i a era in t
the tenant. 1\o cluty wa. impose d on th e le so r in th fir tin tance
to take any steps against the debtor, a nd that i aid to be the te t
in o rd er to xamin e whether a g uaranty of payment o r collection
exist.. Toles \' . •-Jdcc supra.
T he contracts of s ur ti s are to be con trued like othe r contra ·t., . o as to give effec t to th e intcnti l)n of th e partic . People v.

referred to. Judgment and order reversed, with costs of appeal,

and interlocutory judgment ordered for the plaintifif upon the

demurrer, with costs, with leave to the defendant to answer in 20

days upon the ])ayment of the costs of the denuu-rer and of the

appeal. All concur.

Baclrns, r 17 ::\. Y.

20 1 , 22

X. E. 7S0·

It i. h ard ly to be ass um ed h ere, in the absence of an exp re
wa that
. tipulation to th at effect . that the intention of the parti
the le :or should purs ue th ' le sc to the encl of an exec utio n before
calling upo n the s urety. In fact, that docs not nm \· seem to 1
claimed hy th r cs poncl cnt · co un el, but h e r li e o n th e 1ue tion of
clcmancl ancl noti ·c. This th
lcfenclant did not r quire by hi
ag reement, and h ' ,,·a . not ntill ccl to it, any m re than in ca e of
an ab olut guara nty of paym ent. Thi Y!cw i , I think, in accordance with th ' curr nt of authority, as illu st ra t d by th ' ·ase above
r ef err cl to. Juclg m cnt and onl r r cvc r cl, with osL f appeal,
and intcrloc11tory j url g:mcnt o r de r cl fo r the J laintiff upo n th e
demurrer. with co. L. ,,·ith lea,· , to the lcf ' ndant t an \\' r in 20
clays upon th payment of the ·o. ts of th e cl murrcr ancl of the
appeal. . \11 concur.
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CAMPBELL VS. STIER.MAN. 25

Campbell z'.!». Sherman (Hornet's Appeal) (1892).

. \:-rPDELL (. 'S.

Snrn:\L\:\'" (Hornet' s .\ppeal )

( r

92) .

151 Pa. St. 70: ,s. c. sub Jiom. in re Sherman's Estate (Appeal of

Hornet), 25 Atl. 35.

Appeal from eourt of eomnion pleas, Sullivan eounty ; Jubn

151 Pa.

t. 70:

. c. sub

11 0 111.

in re Sh erman' s E talc ( _\ppeal of

H orn et ) , ~5 At!. 35 .

A. Sittser, Judge.

Contest between J. A. Homet, claimant, and other lien cred-

itors of Adam Sherman, upon distribution of a fund arising from a

sheriff's sale of the real estate of said Sherman. From a judgment

allowing Hornet's claim in part only, he appeals. Reversed.

I. C. Scoiiicn, for appellant.

A.

..-\ ppeal fr om court of comm on plea _, Sul liyan co unty : J oh n
itt er, Judge.

E. M. Diiiihaiii, for appellee.

McCoLLUM, J. On the first of January, 1887, J. A. Homet,

the appellant, bought of Adam Sherman two judgments against

A. R. Robbins, on which there was then an unpaid balance of

$592.38. and they were duly assigned to him. At the same time he

loaned to Sherman $266.62. To secure the payment of the judg-

ments and the money loaned he received the bond of Sherman in

Contest bet\Ycen J. A . H orn et, clai111a11t, and oth er li en creditor of Adam Sherman, upon cli tribution of a fund ari ing fr urn a
heriff' ale of the real estate of said Sherman. From a j ucl o-m ent
allmYing H ornet' claim in part only, he appeal
R eyer eel.

the sum of $859, on, which, by virtue of the warrant of attorney
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contained therein, judgment was entered Jan. 3, 1887. On a dis-

tribution of the proceeds of a sale by the sheriff on the 13th of Sep-

tember, 1890, of the real estate of Sherman, the appellant claimed

J. G. Sco11trn, for appellant.
E . J/. Dzuzlialll, fo r appellee.

to apply on his judgment the fund remaining after paying costs and

prior liens. The subsequent lien creditors of Sherman admitted that

the appellant was entitled to receive the sum loaned, with interest

thereon, but contended that Sherman was released from liability as

to the balance because of the appellant's failure to revive the Rob-

bins judgments. To this the appellant answered that his omission

to revive these judgments did not release Sherman, and that, if it

did, the creditors could not take advantage of it on distribution. The

conclusion reached by the learned auditor was that he could not. at

the instance of the lien creditors, set aside or disregard the judg-

ment on the showing before him, but that Sherman might, in an

appropriate proceeding, rely on the appellant's negligence as a de-

fense to it. The learned president of the common pleas thought that

this defense could be successfully made before the auditor by the

lien creditors, and the fund was accordingly awarded to them.

M COLLU .M. J. On th ~ fir t of January, 1887, ] . A. H orn et,
the appellant, bought of Adam h erman t\\'O judgment against
A. R. Robbins, on \\·hich there \\'a s then an unpaid balance o f
592.38, and they were duly as ignecl to him. At th e arne time he
loaned to Sherman $266.62. T o s cure th e paym ent of the j udgment and the money loaned h e recei\'ecl th e bond of herman in
the sum of 859, on, \Yhich, by \'irtu e of the \Yarrant of attorn ey
contained therein, j udgme11t wa entered Jan. 3, 1887. On a distribution of the proceed of a ale by th e herift 011 the 13th of S eptember, 1890. of the real estate of Sherman , the appellant claim ed
to apply 011 his j ud9'ment th i: : funcl remaining after paying co ts and
prior lien . The sub equent lien creclitor. of herman admitted that
the appellant \Ya entitled to r ec('ive the sum loaned, with intere t
thereon, but contended that herrnan \Ya released from liability a
to the balance becau e of th e appellant': failur e to revi\'e the R obbin judgment . To thi the appellan: an werecl that his omi ion
to reYive the e j udg1n nts did not release ~herman, and that. if it
did, th e creditors could not take advan1-age of it on di tributi on. The
conclu ion reached by the learned auditor was that he could not, at
the in tance of the lien creditor , set a idc or cii reo·ard the j udgment on the shmYing before him, but that Sherman might, in an
appropriate proceeding, rely on the appellant' negligence a a defen e to it. The learned pre iJ.ent of th e common plea thmwht that
this defense could be uccessfully made before the auditor by the
lien creditor ' , and the fund \Yas accorclino-Jy a\Yardecl to th em.

Gl1 \R.\i:\TY .\:\D • L'RETYS JI IP.
-(3 GUARANTY AND SURIiTVSHIP.

In reviewing- the dccisiun cf the cuurt below, the lirst import-

ant inquiry is whether the ol)lig-ation of Sherman in respect to the

Rol)binsjuclg-menlswas that of a surety or of a guarantor. If he was

a surety, he was not released from liability by the negligence of the

appellant, and the contention concerning the powers of the auditor

has nothing to rest upon. It is well settled that mere forbearance,,

however prejudicial to a surety, will not discharge him, and that

the failure of a creditor to revive a judgment does not release the

surety, unless there was an express agreement that it should be

kept revived for his benefit. If'infoii v. Little, 94 Pa. St. 64; U. S.

V. Simpson, 3 Pen. & W. 437.

We think the undertaking of Sherman was that of a surety.

His bond included the money loaned and the balance due on the

Robbins judgments, and by its express terms was to remain in

force until the whole sum was i)aid. '["he written conditions in the

bond define the liability of the obligor, and we cannot add to them

by implication a condition which would render them nugatorv. The

written condition applicable to this contention is that, if the judg-

ments "shall be paid :n full by the said A. R. Robbins, his heirs

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

and assigns, to the said J. A. Hornet, then this obligation to be void,,

otherwise to be and remain in full force and virtue."

The appellant ]jurchased the judgments on the agreement of

his vendor to pay them if l^obbins did not. It was a contract of

suretyship, and not of technical guaranty, on which he parted with

his money. On the failure of Robbins to pay the judgments at

maturity, he was at lilierty to proceed directly against the surety.

He was not bound to resort to legal proceedings against Robbins

or to show that they would have been unavailing in order to sustain

process upon the bond. He was under no legal duty to the surety

to revive the judgments, unless requested to do so, and, as no such

request was made, negligence in this particular cannot be imputed

to him. The law on this subject is stated by Agnew, J., in Rcigart

V. ll'liilc, 52 Pa. St. 440, as follows:

"A contract of suretyshiji is a direct liability to the creditor

for the act to be performed l)y the debtor, and a guaranty is a

liability only for his ability to perform this act. In the former the

surety assumes to perform the contract of the principal debtor if he

should not, and in tlu' latter the guarantor undertakes that his

principal can perform — that he is able to do so. l^rom the nature

of the former, the undertaking is immediate and direct that the act

shall be done which if not done makes the surety responsible at

In re\'ic\\·ing th dcci:ion d th ' cimrt lJelo\\', the fir. t important inquiry is \\ hethcr the ohlio-atiun of Sherman in r 'spect to the
Pohhinsjuclg·mcnt \\'a that of a ur 'ly or of a g uarant r. If he wa
a ' llf 'ly. he ,,.a· not relea eel from liability by th e n ·ligencc of the
appellant. and th e contenti on co nce rnin g the pow r of th e auditor
ha nothing to rest upon. It i well cttlccl that m r fo rbeara nc ,
ho\\·c,·cr prcj ucli cia l to a urety, will not discharge bim, and that
the failure of a creditor to r evive a j ucl g m nt do not r I a , the
urcty, unle s ther wa an expre agreement that it hould i'Je
k pt revi,·ed f r hi benefit. TT 1 into11 v. Little, 9-+ Pa . ' t. 6-t ;
v. Sil/lf'SOll, 3 p 11. & \\'. 437.
\Ve think the undertakin g f ' herman wa that of a ur ty.
Hi bond includ e 1 th e m oney loa ned and th e balance due n the
Robbin judgment , an cl by it ex pres term \\·a to remain in
fo rce until the whole sum wa paicl. The written c ncliti n in the
bone! defi ne the liability of the obligor, and w e cannot add to them
by implication a condition whi ch would r ender th em nugat ry. Th e
written condition applicable to thi ontenti on i that, if the judgm ent " hall be paid :n full by th e.: sa id A . R. 1fobbin , hi h eir '
and a ign , to the saicl J. A. H ornet, then this obligation t b void,
otherwi e to be and remain in full fore an l virtu e."
The appellant purc h~ rel thr j ud g·m ents on th e agreem ent f
hi yendor to pay ~hem if l~obhins diet not. It wa a contract of
urctyship, and not of technical gua ranty, on whi h h e parte l with
his money. O n th e failure of Hobbins to pay the judgm nt at
maturity, h wa at liberty to l roceecl directly again t th e urety.
H e wa not bound to re ort t l gal proceeding a o-ainst l ol bins
or to how that they would have bren unava iling in or ler to u tain
proces upon th e bond . lle wa s uncl r no legal clut:· to th urety
to reyive the judgmen ts, unle reque t d to clo , and, a no uch
r equest \Ya made, n e~) i ge n c in this particular ca nn ot be irnput cl
to h im. 1 he law on thi ubj ect i stat d by 1\ 0-new, J., in Rcigart
v. lT 'lzite, 52 Pa. S t. 440, as fo ilows :
".\ c0ntract of urety. hip i a clir t lia bility t the.: er clitor
for the act to be performed 1 y th d 1 tor, and a guaranty i a
liability only fo r hi ability top d orm this act. In th e fo rm r the
surety a ume to perform th c ntra t of th e principal lebt r if he
, hould not, ancl in th latter the g uarantor uncl rtakes that hi
principal can 1 erform-that he i ahle to clo . o . ]' rom th e nature
f the fo rm r, th uncle1iaking is immccliat and lirect that th e act
hall be clone which if not clone make th
ur ty r e ponsible at

u·.
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once ; but, from the nature of the latter, non-abiUty, in other words

insolvency, must be shown."'

In Kraiiiph's Ex'x v. Hate's E.v'rs, Id. 525, Woodward, C. J.,

discussing the same subject said: "The contract of a guarantor iS'

to be carefully distinguished from that of a surety, for whilst both

are accessory contracts, and that of a surety in some sense condi-

tional, as that of a guarantor is strictly so, yet mere delay to sue

the principal debtor does not discharge a surety. The surety must

demand proceedings, with notice that he will not continue bound

unless they are instituted. Cupe v. Smith, 8 Serg. & R. 1 10.

By his contract he undertakes to pay if the debtor do not ;

the guarantor undertakes to pay if the debtor cannot. The one is

an insurer of the debt ; the other, an insurer of the solvency of the

debtor. It results as a matter of course out of the latter contract

that the creditor shall use diligence to make the debtor pay, and,,

failing this, he lets go the guarantor." The foregoing extracts

from the opinions of eminent Pennsylvania jurists draw with re-

markable clearness and precision the distinction between a contract

of suretyship and a contract of guaranty, and accurately define
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the respective rights and obligations of a surety and a guarantor.

There has been no departure by this court from the principles

announced in them, and they sustain the contention of the appellant

that his omission to revive the Robbins judgment did not affect

Sherman's liability on his bond. It follows that it was error to

award the fund to the subsequent lien creditors.

Decree reversed, and record remitted to the court below, with

direction to distribute the fund in accordance with this opinion ;

the costs of this appeal to be paid by the appellees.

Deobold i's. Opperman ct al (1888).

IH N. Y. 531, 19 N. E. 94-

Appeals from Supreme Court, general term, First Department.

Actions by Philip Deobold, executor of the will of Maria

Deobold, deceased, against Frederick Opperman, Jr., and anotlier,

sureties on the bond of Louisa Deobold (now Rausch), adminis-

tratrix of Henry Deobold, deceased. In both cases judgments were

once; but, from th natur of the ]alter, non-ability, in other word s
in olvency mu t be hown .. ,
In Era111 ph's Ex'x v. H al::;'s Ex'rs) Id. 525, \Voodward, ' . J.,
di cu ing the ame ubject said: "The contract of a guarantor i,
to be car fully di tin o·ui heel from that of a , urcty, for whiL t buth
are accessory contracts, and that of a surety in ome en e cornlitional, a that of a guarantor i trictly so, yet mere delay to sue
th principal debtor does n t discbarae a urcty. The urety mu . t
demand proceedings, with notice that he ·will not continue bound
unle s they are in tituted. Cope v. S111ith, 8 ~ erg. & R. 110.
By his contract he und rtakes to pay if the debtor do not;
the guarantor undertake to pay if the debtor cannot. The one i
an insurer of the debt; th e other, an in urer of the solvency of tlie
debtor. It re ults as a matter of cour e out of the latter contract
that the er clitor hall u e diligence to make the debtor pay, and,
failing thi , he lets go the guarantor.'' The foregoing extract
from the opinions of eminent Pennsylvania jurists dravv with remarkable clearne s and precision the distinction between a contract
of surety hip and a contract of guaranty, and accurately define
the re pective right and obligations of a surety and a guarantor.
There ha b en no departure by this court from the principle~
announced in them, and they su tain the contention of the appellant
that his omission to revive the Robbins judgment did not affect
Sherman's liability on his bond. It follow that it was error to
award the fund to the subsequent lien creditors.
Decree reversed, and record remitted to the court below, with
direction to di tribute the fund in accordance with this opinion ;
the cost of this appeal to be paid by the appellees.

DEODOLD <.'S. 0PPER..\L\x

H1
Appeal from

;.J. y.

53 I' T9

l

ct al ( 1888).
J. E. <)-J ..

upreme Court, geEeral t rm, Fir t Department.

Actions by Philip Deobolcl , executor of the will of Maria
Deobold, deceased, aga in t Frederick Opperman, Jr. , and another,
ureties on the bond of Loui a Deobold ( n w Rau ch), aclmini tratrix of Henry Deobold, decea eel. In both ca es j ucl arnent \\'ere
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rendered for l\\v plaintiri. and aftirnicd an appeal lu the general

term. DofendaiUs again ap])eal.

.-islibcl I'. Fitcli. for appellants.

George 1'. Laiigbeiii, fur respondent.

rrndcrccl fur the plai11tiff. and affirm ·cl o n appeal lo the gene ral
tnm. Def ·1iclanh agai11 appeal.

RrcKR, C.J. Tli's action was brought by the plaintiff as

•executor of the estate of his mother, Maria Deobokl, to recover

.lshbc/ P. Fitc/1, fo r appellants.

from the defendants as sureties upon the l)ond of Louisa Deobokl,

^iven upon her appointment as administratrix of the estate of her

(;corp:c fl. La11 gbci11 . for

re~po nclenl.

husband, Henry Deobokl, a sum of money ordered by the surrogate

to be paid to Maria Deobokl as mother and next of kin to the intes-

tate, but which the admini-Stratrix refused or neglected to pay. The

trial court directed a verdict for the ijlaintitif, and the judgment

entered thereon was affirmed upon a])peal. The supreme court

having granted leave to appeal to this court, the matter comes here

for review. The record presents the following facts, the evidence

being practically undisputed: Prior to January 16, 1880, Henry

Deobokl. a resident of the city of New N'ork, iVwd possessed of per-

sonal property of about the value of $3,300, and leaving him sur-

viving his widow, Louisa Deobokl, his mother, Maria Deobokl,
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and brother, I'hilip Deobokl, next of kin. On that day the surro-

gate of Xew York issued letters of administration upon the estate

to the widow, Louisa Deobokl, and tlie defendants became sureties

upon lier bond for the faithful performance of her duties as such.

On JJecember 9, 1882, upon a general accounting before the surro-

gate by the administratrix, he made a decree finally adjusting her

accounts, and discharging the administratrix and her sureties from

their bond. This decree purported to have been based u]X)n a writ-

ten waiver of notice of the settlement of the estate, signed by Maria

and Philip Deobokl, and a written assignment by them to the ad-

ministratrix of all their right, title and interest in the estate of the

deceased. Proceedings were thereafter begun by Maria and Philip

in the surrogate's court, on Jan. (), 1883 to set aside the decree ren-

dered on final accounting, u])on the ground that it was fraudulently

obtained, and that the assignment an<l waiver of citation were prb-

■cured from them b\ the administratrix through fraud and mis-

representation. Sucl; proceedings were thereupon had that the

surrogate, on i'cb. 20, 1883, made an order vacating, and in all

respects setting aside the decree, and the defendants were immedi-

ately thereafter served w ith a copy of such order. Subsequently,

Rl · t;rn,
·. J.
Th;.., acti n \\as brought by th ' plaintiff a·
l':\:cnllur of the e~tatc n f hi s m o th T, :.\I aria l 'obolcl, to r 'C ver
from the ddc11dants as sureti es upo n the bond o f L o ui a D ·ubuld,
~i\·c n upo n her appoi11t111c nt a ·· administratrix of th e stat o f h ' r
husband, I lcnry Deo bo lcl, a sum of m o ney on ! ·red by th · ur rogate
to lie paid to ~laria Dco bolcl as m o ther and 11 ext o f kin to th ' int ·tal c. but \\·hi ·h the ad111i?1istratrix refused or ncgl 'c tecl to pay. The
trial court directed a \'LTclict for th ' plaintiff. and the jud~111 nt
c11tcred thereo n \\"a s affi rm d upon appeal. The . uprcm
ourt
ha,·ing granted Jean~ lo appeal to this cou rt, the matter com ' h r e
for rcYie\\·. The re co rd pre ent. th' follo\\·ing facts, the ev i l ' 11
being practically undisputed: Pri or lo J a nu ary 16, 1 o, J J nry
D eolio ld. a rc. iclcnl o f th e c ity of :\cw Yo rk. died po e cd of I crso nal properly of abo ut th e Yetlue of $J .300, ancl 1 av in g him . ur\' iving hi s wido w, L o ui sa Deobolcl, hi s m o th ·r. )-!aria D eo b Id ,
and broth er, t>hilip Deo bold, 11 xt of kin. On that day tbe urrogate of \:" ew Y o rk issued lett ' r o f aclmini ~ trali o n upon the
tat
to the "·ido\\" . L o ui sa Deo bo lcl, a nd th e defe nda nt · became ureti
upon her bond for the faithful performan ·e of h er dutie as ~ U h.
< )n December 9, 18< 2. upon a gcn t>ra l a ·co untin g befo r e th ·urr gate by th ac lmini tratrix, he macl e a decree finally aclju tin~ b r
a c ·o unt . and cli . c harg ing the adminislralrix ancl h e r ur ti . from
th ei r bo nd . Thi ~ decree purpo rted to hav been ba. cl up n a writtcn \\°ai\· ' r o f noti · oft h e.ettlcrn nl ofl h es lat ·. ign dhy:.\faria
and Philip l eoholcl, a nd a wrill n a . signm ·nt by them t th ad1111111slra lrix f all their right, title and intere. l in the tat
f th
d ccea.ecl. Procc ·c lin gs \\"er thereafter begun by )-faria and Philip
in the urrngat 's ·ou rl, o n jan. 9. l( ( 3 t se t a . id th deer 'r ncl ·reel 0 11 final accounting, upon the ground that it wa frau lulently
obtained, a nd that th · ass ig nme nt a nd waiver o f citation w r pr' ·urecl fro m them ll\· the admini stratrix throut->·h frau 1 and mi . rcpre cntati o n. Such proc ding·s \\' ·r ' th e re u1 n had that th
s urrogate. o n F ·h. -O. i 883, made an o re! r a ·ating. ancl in all
re. p 'Ct . ·tt ing a. idc the dccre . and the cl f nclant w r imm c!tal ·ly thereafl r :.crn·d \Yilh a copy of suc h rel r .
ub s qucntl)"•,
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upon a further accounting-, the surrogate made an order directing

the administratrix to pay to Maria Deobold the sum of $200, aiid

she refusing to pay the same, the surrogate made a further order

directing tlie prosecution of the defendant's bond for the recovery

of the amount so ordered to be paid. This suit was brought in

pursuance of the latter order.

It further appeared that, before consenting to act as svireties

upon the bond of Louisa Deobold, the defendants recjuired her to

deposit with them the entire proceeds of the estate, to be retained

until they were discharged from liability upon the bond, and an

agreement to that effect was made between her and the defendants.

No security was given to the administratrix for the repayment "of

those moneys by the defendants, and by the understanding of the

parties they were to pay interest thereon, and were authorized to

use them in their business as brewers. Under this arrangement

the administratrix, at the time of the execution of the bond, depos-

ited with the defendants the sum of $3,300, the funds of the estate,,

which they employed in tbicir 1)usiness until Jan. 16, 1883, when it

was repaid by them, together with a loan of $2,900 and interest, to
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Louisa Deo1:)old. This payment was made by the defendants after

an examination of the decree of the surrogate of Dec. 9, 1882, dis-

charging them from liability on the bond, and after an inspection

of the papers upon which such decree was founded. It did not

appear that the defendants had actual notice of the proceedings

previously instituted by Philip and Maria Deobold to set aside such

decree for fraud, or that they were made parties thereto. It further

appeared that, in actions instituted on behalf of Philip and Maria

Deobold against the administratrix in the court of common pleas

of New York, judgments had lieen obtained by the plaintiffs,

respectively, vacating and setting aside the assiguiuents before

referred to as fraudulent and void.

Two questions are presented by the appellants as grounds for

the reversal of the judgment "below, which may be briefly stated as

follows : (T ) That the surrogate could not reinstate the defendants

in their liability as sureties upon their bond in proceedings to which

they were not parties; and (2) that the agreement by which they

were made the custodians of the funds of the estate was binding

and lawful, and authorized them to retain them until after the dis-

charge of such bond. As the corollary of the latter proposition, it

is urged that, having the right to retain them, and having paid

them out relying upon the assignment, and decree of the surrogate-

upon a further ace untin o-, th "' urr gate m ade a n order directi1w
the administratrix to 1 ay to ~ laria D eobold th e um of 200, a11d
h refu ing to pay the sam e, th e surrogate mad e a forth r order
directing the pr secution of the cl f nd a nt' bond fo r the reco\' ry
of the amount so ordered t be paid. Thi
uit \\'a · brought in
pur uance of th e latter orcl -r.
.lt further appeared that. befo re co n. en ting to act a · ·uretie
upon the bond of L oui sa D eobolcl , the defendant required her to
deposit \\·ith them the entire proceeds of the state, to he retain ed
until they were discharged fr om liability upon the bond. and an
agreement to that effect wa mad e b tween her and the defendants.
No security \\'as given to th e administratrix fo r th e repaym ent ·Of
tho e m oney by th e defendant , and by the und erstanding of the
partie they were to pay intere t th ereon, and were authorized to
use them in their 1 tL in e ~ s a bre\\·er s. Cncler this arrangement
the admini tratrix, at th e tim e of the xec ution of the bond, clepo ited with the defendant th e um of 3 .300, th e fund of the estate,
which th y employed in th eir husine until Jan. i6, 18 3, \\·h en it
\Ya S repaid by them, together \\·ith a loan of , 2.900 and interest . to
L oui sa Deobold. This payment wa mad e by the defendant after
an examination of the derree of the surrogate of D ec. 9, 1882, cli charging them from liabili ty on the bond , and after an in pection
of the paper. upon \\'bich uch decree \\'as founded. It did not
appear that the defendants had actual notic e of the proc eding
previou ly in tituted by Philip and -:\Iaria D eobold to se t a ide uch
decree for fraud, or that they were made parties thereto. It furth er
appeared that, in action in tituted on behalf of Philip and ~Iaria
Deobolcl again t the aclmini tratrix in the court of c rnmon plea
of New York, judgment had be n obtained by th plaintiff ,
re pectively, vacating and setting a id the a ssignment befo re
referred to a fraudulent and void.
Two question are presented by th e appellant a ground for·
the rever al of the judgment 'below. which may be briefly tated a
follow : ( r) That the urrogate could not rein tate the defendant
in their liability a ureti e upon their bond in proceedings to whicl1
they were not partie ; and ( 2) that the agreement by which they
were mad e the custodian
f th e funds of the estate was binding
and lawful. and authorized them to r tain them until after the di charge of uch bond. A the corollary of the latter propo ition. it
is urged that, having tbe right to retain them, and having paid
them out relying upon the a ignrnent, and decree of the urroga te
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bascxl ihcrccjii, the dclciK Units were relieved frum the obligation

of repaying the same moneys in this action.

We are of the opinion that the claims of the defendants are not

maintainable. No question is made but that the surrogate had

ample power to set aside his decree for fraud, and require a further

.accounting by the administratrix as to the estate (Sec. i, c. 359,

Laws 1870) ; but the claim is that the sureties were not bound by

the subsequent adjudications of the surrogate, for the reason that

they (lid not have notice of the proceeding. The claim is clearly

untenable. The decree discharging the administratrix and her

sureties was, when made, assailable by any party thereby aggrieved,

either by motion to set it aside or by proceedings on appeal. In

neither case was it necessarv that the sureties should have notice

of the proceeding. The sureties are the privies of the adminis-

tratrix, and are ])recluded from questioning any lawful order made

by the surrogate in a proceeding wherein she is a party, if obtained

without collusion between such administratrix and the next of kin

or creditors of the estate. Scofichi v. Churcliill, /2 N. Y. 565;

Gcroitld v. Wilson, 81 N. Y. 583.
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Their bond contemplates that they shall remain sureties as

long as the surrogate retains jurisdiction of the proceedings in

administration of the estate, and has power to make valid orders

therein affecting the property administered upon.

( )f course the sureties would not be bound by an order which

the surrogate had no jurisdiction to make; but so long as his

jurisdiction continues the liability of the sureties remains. The

very language of the bond provides for orders made in proceedings

i)itc)' alios and for the liability of the sureties for a non-perform-

ance by the administratrix of any decree or order made by the

surrogate's coiu't. The condition of the bond is that liability shall

follow her infidelity to her trust, or disobedience of any lawful

order or decree, whenever made in the proceedings. It was, w'e

think, never heard of in practice that sureties on an administrator's

bond should have notice of proceedings in the administration

of an intestate's estate. It could not be claimed that these sure-

ties were entitled to notice of an appeal from the surrogate's

decree, or that if an appeal was taken from a decree in favor of

an administrator, and the decree should be reversed, they would

not still remain liable upon their bond. Such bonds are similar

to those given in civil actions upon appeals and otherwise, and

have alwavs been held to abide the result of the action. * * * *

ba ed ther ' On, th e defendant , w ere r li eved from the obli o-ation
o f repay ing th e same 111011 ')::. in thi act io n.
\\ "e a rc of th e opini on th a t th e claim of th e d fenclant a r e not
mai nta in a bl e. X o Ju tion is mad but that th
urr a ate had
arnp!e j)O\\ er t
t as id e hi d ecr ee f r frau I, and r quir a furth er
accountin g by th aclmini tra tri x a to the e tate ( ' . I, c. '.')59,
L rn . I l 7 ) ; but the c la im i that th e ur ti w re not I ound by
th e rn b eq u 'nt adju<li atio ns o f th e urr g at , fo r th r ea o n that
th ey did n.ot hay noti ce o f th procee ding. Th claim i cl arly
un te nabl e. Th e d ecr ee Ii char ·ing th admini tratrix an<l h r
urct ic \\·a , wli n ma de, a ailabl e by any party ther eby a ·g rieved,
ith e r by m ti on to ct it a id e or by p roc e lino- on appeal. In
n eit her ca wa it n ces a ry that th
ureli e hould have n otice
of th e p roce ding. 'Ihe ureli s ar , th e 1 rivi e of th admini lra trix , and ar precluded fr om qu c tio ning an y lawful rder mad
by th ' urrogate in a proce din · wh rein h e i a party, if obtained
with o ut collu. i n between uch adrnini tratrix and the n ext o f kin
o r cr edito r s of th e es tate. Scofield \'. Churcliill 72 >!. Y. 565;
Gerould v. ff ' ilso ll, _ I ~ T. Y. 5 3.
Th eir bond contern1 latcs that th ey shall r main ur ti
a
urrogale r etain j uri clicti n f th e pro
cl in
in
lon g a th
aclmini . tration o f tb es tate, and ha p o w r lo mak valid order
ther ein affectin g the p ro perty aclmini st reel upo n.
Of cour . th uretie ,,·o uld not b b uncl I y an o r l r which
th , ' urrog at had n o j uri di ti n to mak ; hut
1 no- a hi
juri sdi ctio n continu
th liability f th
ur ti
r emain . The
ve ry la1wuage of th e bo nd provide for o rd er mad e in proc edi11a
i11 tcr alios and for the liability f th ur tie for a no11-p rfo rma nce by th e aclmini tralrix f any cl er
or o rder mad 1 ' the
~ ur rogat ' co urt.
The concliti n of th e 1 nd i that liability hall
fo ll o \\· h er infid lily to her tru t, o r d i ol di 11 e of any lawful
o r !er o r cl cr ee, wh nev r ma le in the pr ce ding . It wa , we
think, n ever h arcl f in practi e that ureti on an aclmini trator'
h ncl h uld hav 11 tice f pr
eding in th a !mini tration
o f a n int tat ' es tate. It
ulcl n t h claim l tbat th e ure·
tie w cr, entitl cl to n tic
f an app al fr m th
urro ate'
cl -r ec, o r that if an ai p al wa tak n fr m a d r
in fav r of
a n a dmini trato r , an I th I ree h ul I 1 r ev r cl , they would
n ot till r ' main liabl upon th ir 1 n I.
uch 1 011 I ar
imilar
to tho e o-i,·en in civil acti n up n apJ a l and oth rwi
and
haYe alway: 1 c n h ld t abid th r ult of th action. * * * *
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ing the persons interested in the property the achninistratrix was

about to receive, from an_\- loss which they might sustain through

her misconduct or dishonesty, and the defendants were well aware

of the character of the transaction. The defendants therel)y con-

tracted to become sureties for the faithful performance by her of

her duties as such administratrix, and the beneticiaries of the estate

thereupon became, under the theory of the law, entitled, not only

to the security afforded by the bond, but also to that of the funds

of the estate remaining in the hands of the administratrix. If

this transaction is sanctioned, one of the securities that the law

provides to such persons is entirely destroyed, and the funds of

the estate are merged in the personal responsibility of the sureties

alone, subject to the hazard and casualties which frequently attend

persons engaged in trade. -^ * * *

But it is claimed that the surrender, after the decree can

celing the administratrix's bond, of the funds of the estate held

by the defendants to the administratrix, operates as a defense

to this action. The principle upon which the appellants make
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this point is not very clearly presented in their points, and we are

unable to see the exact theory upon which it is based. They do

not claim that the plaintiff is estopped from alleging the invalid-

ity of the assignment, or of the decree upon the faith of which

the payment was made. They claim, how^ever, that "of tw^o inno-

cent parties that one must suffer who puts it in the power of the

third person to do the act which caused the injury." This con-

tention is probably based upon the familiar maxim that, "When

one of two innocent parties must sustain a loss from the fraud of

a third, such loss shall fall upon the one, if either, whose act has

enabled such fraud to be committed." 8 Abb. N. Y. Dig. "^lax-

ims," 84, and volume 4, "Maxims," 382.

This maxim has been applied and illustrated in numerous

cases in this state, among which are the following: Spraights v.

Hazi'lcy, 39 N. Y. 441 ; Moore v. Bank, 55 N. Y. 41 ; Griszvold v.

Haven, 25 N. Y. 595 ; Bank v. Monteath, 26 N. Y. 505 ; Sand ford

v. Handy, 23 Wend. 268; Root v. French, 13 Wend. 572; Voorliis

V. Olnistead, 66 X. Y. 116.

These cases generally relate to the authority of agents whose

right to deal with the property of their principals was in dispute,

and the maxim has been applied by reason of various peculiar

circumstances which were deemed sufficient to preclude the prin-

Th bond in que tion wa xecuted for the . ole purpo e of ccuring the per on inte r tcd in the pr perty the admini tratrix \Ya
about to receive, fr om a ny lo which they might u tain through
her mi -conduct or di hone ty, and the defendant were well aware
of the character of the transaction. The clcfenuant thereby contract 1 to become ur tie for the fa ithful performance by her of
h er dutie as uch adm ini tratrix, and the beneficiaric of the estate
thereupon became, und er the theory of the law, entitled, not only
to the security afforded by the bond, but al o to that of the funcl
of the estate r emaining in the hand of the admini tratrix. [ f
thi transaction i sanctioned, one of th sec untie that the law
provide to uch per ons i ntirely destroyed, and the fund s of
the estate are m erged in the personal re pon ibility of the ureti
alon e. subj ect to the hazar l and ca ualties which fr equ ntly attend
p r ons engaged in trade. * * * *
But it is claimed that the su rrender, after th e decree can
c:eling the administratrix's bond, of the fund of the e tate held
by the defendant to the admini tratrix, operates as a defen e
to thi action. The principle upon which the appellant make
thi point is not very clearly pres nted in their point , and we are
unabl e to ee th e exact th~o r y upon which it is ba ed . T hey do
not claim that the plaintiff is estopped from allegi1w th e invalidity of the a igi.1ment, or of the decree upon the fait h of which
the paym ent wa made. They claim, however, that " of two innocent parti e that one must suffer who puts it in the power of the
third p erson to do the act which ca used the injury." Thi con(en tion is probably based upon the familiar maxim that , ''\\' hen
one of two innocent parties mu st su stain a lo from the fraud of
a third, such loss shall fall upon tlw one, if either, whose act has
enabled such fraud to be committed. " 8 Abb. )J. Y. Dig. "::.\Iaxim , ' 84, and volume 4, '' l\Iaxim ," 382.
This maxim ha been appli~cl and illu trated in numerou .
ca es in thi state, among which a re the following: Spraiuhts Y.
H au1lcy, 39 . Y. -+41 ; 11! oore v. Bank, SS N . Y. -+I ; Griswold Y .

Haven, 2s r . Y. S95: Bani~ v. U ontcath, 26 )J. Y. sos; Sandford
v. Ha11dy, 23 v\ end. 268; R oot v. Fre11ch, 13 \Vend. s72 · Voorhis
v. Ollllstead, 66 T. Y. l 16.
These ca e generally r elate to the authority of agent " ·ho e
right to deal with the property of th eir principal wa in lisp ute.
and the maxim has been applied by rea on of va riou peculiar
circumstance which were leemed uffici ent to preclude the prin-
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cipal from availing himself from the agent's want of nctnal author-

ity; but the general principle involved has been applied in many

cases where a loss has followed from the negligence of one party

which enabled a fraud to be committed upon another. We are of

the opinion that the maxim has no apj^lication to the case in hand,

for the reason that no actionable fraud has been shown to nave

been committed upon the defendants in this transaction, nor lias

any loss accrued to them in conseciuence of the surrender of the

money referred to. It is probably true that the defendants would

not have surrendered to the administratrix the funds of the estate

in their possession, or have repaid to her the debt which they

owed her, except for the decree produced for their inspection ',

but it is also very clear that they had no right to retain such funds

by virtue of their contract with the administratrix, and there was

no intention to commit a fraud upon them by the administratrix

in obtaining possession of the property to which she was legally

entitled. She was entitled to the repayment of her loan as a

matter of course, for she held a ])romissory note, therefor payable

on demand, and no possible defense could be made against its
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collection. Neither as we have seen, could they have resisted a

claim made by her or others for the reclamation of the money of

the estate. They have done nothing -therefore in consequence

of the decree, except what they were itnder legal obligation to

do, and have therefore suffered no legal loss or injury from the

transaction.

The stu'render of the property in question would not even

have furnished a good consideration for a promise made by the

administratrix. Vandcrvilt v. Schreycr, 91 N. Y. 392.

It is of the ver\^ essence of an action of fraud or deceit that

the same should l)e accompanied by damage, and neither (ianimmt

absque injuria nor injuria absque daninuin by itself establishes a

good cause of action. Ihifcliins v. Ilufchins, 7 Ilill. 104: Michi-

gan V. Bank, 33 X. Y. 9.

Neither can a party claim to have been defrauded who has

been induced by artifice to do that which the law would have other-

wise compelled him to perform. Tlwnipson v. Menck, 41 N. Y.

82 : Story v. Conger, 36 N. ^'. 673 ; Randall v. Haaelton, 12 Allen,

412.

The defendants may jx)ssibly lose the money which they pay

in satisfaction of their bond, but this will result from their con-

tract, and the confidence reposed by them in their principal, and

cipal from a\·aili1w him elf fr om th ag nt \\'ant factual authority; but th e o-e nera l principle i1wolvccl ha b en appfiecl in many
ca ·cs ,,·here a Jos. ha ,· fo ll O\nxl from th e neo-!io-ence of one party
\\'hich enabled a fraud to be comrnittccl upon anoth r. \\ 'ea r of
the op ini on that th e maxim ha . no applicati n to th ca. e in hand ,
for the rea ~ a n that no act ionable fraud ha been h ,,-n lo nave
been comm itted upon the cl 'fc ndants in thi lran . action, nor has
any loss accrued lo them in co11 sec1ucnce of lb
urr ' ncler of the
m oney referred to. 1t is probably true that the d efe ndant would
not have surrencl crccl lo th e aclministratrix th funcl
f th
tate
in th eir po. sc ion. or have repaid to h r the cl cl t \\'hicll they
O\Yed her, exc pt fur th e dec r ee produced fo r the ir in I ect ion ;
hut it i aL o very clea r th al th ey ha cl no right to retain uch fun cl
by virtue o f their co ntra ct ,,·ith th e admini tratrix, and there wa
no intention to commit a fraud upon th m by the aclmini tratrix
in obtaining po. sess ion of the prop rty to \\'hicb he \\'a le ally
entitlecl. Sh e \Ya s entitl ed to the repayment o f her loa n a a
matter of cour c. fo r she held a pr mi
ry not , therefor payable
o n demand, ancl no po. siblc d efcn . e could be made ao-a in t it
colle·tion. ::\either a. ,,-e have een, could th ey hav re i ted a
claim macl e by her or other. for the reclamation o f the m ney of
th e estate. They have done nothing ther fore in c n . quence
of th e cl ec r e, except what they w ere und er Jeo-al obl igation to
do , ancl haYe therefore ufferecl no legal lo . r 111Jury fr om the
tran . acti on.
The surrencl r of th property in que ti on would n t ven
have furni heel a o-ood con iclerati n for a pr mi
made by the
aclmini ·tratrix. Vandcruilt v. Schre)'Cr, 91 _J. Y. 392.
l t i. of the very
encc o f an action of fraud or leceit that
th e am, . h ulcl be accompani ·cl by damage, ancl n ither danuwm
absq11 e i11j11ria nor i11juria absq11e da11uz7tn1 by it elf e ta! Ii he. a
good cau . e of action. H11tchi11s v. l!1Ltc!zi1Ls, 7 IIill, IO-+: Jfichicr aII \'. Ba 11 /?' 33 y. 9.
::\either can a part)· claim to have been cl frau l d who ha
bee n inclucecl by artific t clo that which th law w ul l hav
\\'i e c rnpell cl him to 1 erf rm. T/z Olllf' 011 v. 11fencl~ , 41
_:Story v. Conger, 36 _ Y. 673; Randall v. Ila.-::elto11, 12 li en,
T

•
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Th I fenclant may p . ibly lo the m on y which th y pay
in . ati facti n of their 1 ncl, 1 ut thi \\'ill r ult fr m th ir c ntract, ancl th c nficl nc repo eel 1y thc:m in th ir principal, ancl
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not at all from the surrender of the property held by them. It is

not probable, however, that they will lose anything, as, for all that

appears, their principal is perfectly responsible, and liable to

indemnify them for any sums they may be obliged to pay on her

account. It affirmatively appears that in January, 1883, she not

only had in her possession all the funds of the estate, but also the

additional sum of upwards of $3,000, the result of her own savings

during the preceding two or three years, and being an amount

largely exceeding the liability of the defendants on their bond.

The main question in the case really seems to be, who shall

pursue the administratrix for the moneys of the estate improperly

retained bv her? We think it is the duty of the defendants, as

the object of their bond was to relieve the next of kin from the

necessity of resorting to the personal liability of a dishonest, neg-

ligent, or absconding administrator. We are further of the opinion

that the defendants are precluded from the benefit of the prin-

cipal contained in the maxim by reason of the obligations of their

bond. They are the privies of their principal, and the guarantors

of her fidelity in the administration of her trust. The decree under
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which the defendants claim discharge from liability ^\•^s procured

by a fraud practiced upon the surrogate through the presenta-

tion of papers fraudulently obtained and used by her. It was

against the perpetration of such frauds that the defendant's bond

was intended to protect the beneficiaries of the estate. The de-

fendants had covenanted that the administratrix should faithfully

execute the trust reposed in her, and obey all lawful decrees and

orders of the surrogate's court. When she obtained, through

fraud, the order of the surrogate awarding the moneys of the

estate to her, and canceling her bond, she violated the obligations

of her trust, and the defendants became liable for the damages

flowing from such breach of duty. That the defendants were

deceived by the administratrix constituted no protection to them

for they had guarantied that she should deceive nobody in the

adminis'tration of her trust. The liability of the sureties is co-

extensive with that of the administratrix, and embraces the per-

formance of every duty she is called upon to perform in the course

of administration. It' is quite absurd to say that the very fact

which creates a cause of action against the sureties should also

operate as a defense to them. They cannot stand as innocent

parties in relation to an act which they have covenanted to the

plaintiff, and all others interested, should never be performed,.

not at all fr m the surrend r of th prop ·rty held by th rn. It i
not pro babl , hO\Y eve r. that th ey \\·ill lose a nythino-, a -, for all that
appear , their principal is perfectly respon ible, and liable to
indemnify th m fo r any urn s th ey may be obliged to pay on her
account. lt affirmatively app ar. that iu J a nuary, 18 3, he not
only had in h r po se ion all th e fund of the c ·tatc, but al o the
add itional um of upward of 3.000, the re ult of h -r o \\'n aving
during th pr cedin g two or three years, and being an am ount
largely exceed ing th e liability of the clef n !ant on their bond.
The main que tion. in th e case really seem to be, who hall
pur ue th e admini tratrix for th e moneys of the e tatc imprope rly
retained by h r ? \Ve think it is the duty of th e defendant , a
the object of their bond was to relieve the next of kin from the
nece ity of r e orting to th e per onal liability of a dishone t, neo-ligent, or absconding administrator. \\ ·e a re f urth er of the opinion
that th e defendants are precluded from the benefit of the principal contained in the m ax im by reason of th e ob li gation of their
bond . They are the privies of th eir principal , an d th e guaranto r
of her fid elity in the admini tration of her tru t. The decree und er
whi ch the defendant claim discharge fr om liability \\·as procured
by a fraud practiced upon the surrogate throu g h the p resemation of paper fraudul ently obtained and u eel by her. It was
against the perpetration of uch fraud that th e defendant" bond
wa intended to protect the beneficiarie of the estate. The defendant had covenanted that th e admini tratrix houlcl faithfully
execute the tru st reposed in her , and obey all lawful decrees and
order of the urrogate' court. \Vhen she obtained , throu gh
fraud , th e ord er of the surrogate awarding the m oneys of tii
e tate to h er , and canceling her bond, c;he violated the ob ligation
of her trust, and th e defendant becam e liable fo r th e damage,'.:,
flowing fr om uch breach of duty. That the defendant w ere
deceived by the admin[stratrix constituted no prote c tion to them

for they had guarantied that he should deceive nobody in the
admini stration of h er tru ~ t. 1 he liability of the ureties i coexten ive with that of the admini tratrix, and embrace the performance of eve ry duty he is called u pon to per fo rm iii the cour
of admini tration. It i quite absurd to say that th e ve ry fact
which creates a cau e of action again t the sureti e houl d al o
operate a a clefen e to them. They cannot tancl a innocent
partie in relation to an act which thev have covenanted to th
plaintiff. and all oth ers intere ted , hould n ever be per fo rm ed,
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and the}- have sustained no legal loss when subjected to a liability

which they agreed to assume in the event which is now alleged

as the cause of their misfortune. We are therefore of the opinion

that the judgments below should be affirmed, with costs.

The decision in action No. 2, between the same parties, is

necessarily controlled l)y the determination in action No. i, and

the judgment in that case must therefore also be affirmed, with

costs.

All concur, except Earl and Peckham, ]]., dissenting.

Note. — That part of the Court's opinion holding invalid the agreement by which

the defendants were made custodian.s of the funds of the estate is omitted.

S.MITII VS. SllF.I.DKX FT Al.. ([876).

35 Mich. 42 ; 24 Am. Rep. 529.

and they han? u~tai11cd nu legal lo - \\·h ·n ul j ct d to a lial ility
\\hi -h they ao-reecl to a sum' in the e\' nl which i - no w all
d
as tile -au o f their mi fortu ne. \\ 'c ar ' th r for
£ th op inion
that the jucl,~.;mcnt: helm\· should b affirm d, with c .- t -.
The clccisio n in action X o. -, b tw en the am partie , i
nee s.-arily -ontrollccl b\' the d ·termination in acti n ~ •o. I, an l
the j udo-ment in that ca:e mu t there fore al 'O be affirm cl \\·ith
costs.
_\ll concu r. cx-ept E\RL and l r:r'KIL\'.'.J, JJ., di ntin

C. & IV. N. Draper & C. I. IValkcr, for plaintiff in error.

Mcddaui^h & Driggs, for defendants in error.

Cuoi.EV, Ch. J. The legal questions in this case arise upon the

.'\oTE. That part of th'
o urt';; op ini o n h o ldin g im·alicl the agreement by which
t he defenrlanh \n:re made ci.1,.; t odians of th e funds of the 'S late is omitted.

following facts :

Prior to June, 1867, Eldad Smith, Isaac Place, and Francis

P). Owen were partners in trade under the firm name of Place,
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Smith & Owen, and as such became indebted to defendants in

error in the sum of $969 on book account.

In the month mentioned the firm was dissolved by mutual

~'~11T11 ·~·s. Sr1F.1 .DEX J ·~ T .\!..

r

76 ).

consent. Place purchasing the assets of his copartners and agree-

ing to pay ofif the partnership liabilities, including that to the

35 :.\Iich ...p; 2-1- Am. R p. 529.

defendants in error. On the second day of the following month

Place informed the defendants in error of this arrangement, and

that he had taken the assets and assumed the liabilities of the firm,

C. & TV. X. Draper & C. I. T!'alfwr, for plaintiff in e rror.

and tbev, without the consent or knowledge of Smith and Owen,

took from Place a note for the amount of the finn indebtedness

J !cdda11 gli (;_,. !Jri ergs, fo r ddenclant in err r.

to them, payable at one day with ten per centum interest. They

did not agree to receive this note in payment of the partnership

indebtedness, l)ut they kept it and continued their dealings with

Place, who made payments upon it. The payments, however, did

' OLEY, ' Ii.
following fact :

J.

The lega l que tion in thi ca

an

upon the

not keep down the interest. Place, in 1872, became insolvent and

Prior to Jun e, l 67, Eldacl mi th, I aac Place, and Franci
B. Owen w re partner in trade und r th firm name f Plac ,
' mith & wen, and a - uch became incl l ted to def nclant 111
rror in the um of 969 on bo k accou nt.
In the m o nt h m en tio nc 1 the firm wa di olv cl 1 \' mutual
o n ' ·nt, Place rrnrcha ing th as t of hi c partn r an l a 0 T ing to pay o ff the partner -hip liabiliti
including that t th
clcfenclanL in rro r. On the ·cco ncl clay of the f llowi ng montli
l lace informed the cl iendanL in err r of thi arrana m nt and
that he had tal ·en the ass t and a .. um cl th liabilities f the firm,
and they, with ul the c n ·cnt r kn o w! clg
f mi th an l w n,
t k from Pia. e a not f r th am u nt of th e finn in l bt In
t th ' 111. payable at nc ·lay with t n p r centum inter t. Th y
did not agr
to receive thi n t in J ayrnent of th partn r hip
ind I tedne , but th y k pt it and c ntinu d th ir d alin
with
lac , wh ma l paym nt up n it. Th payment , how ver Ii I
n t k ep down th int r e~ t. Place, in I 72, I ecam in lv nt and
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made an assignment, and Smith was then called upon to make

payment of the note. This was the first notice he had that he was

looked to for payment. On his declining to make payment, suit

was brought on the original indebtedness and judgment recov-

ered.

The position taken by the plaintiffs below was, that as they

had never received payment of their bill for merchandise they

were entitled to recover it of those who made the debt, the giving

of the note which still remained unpaid being immaterial.

On behalf of Smith it was contended that, by the arrange-

ment between Place and his copartners, the latter, as between the

three, became the principal debtor, and that from the time when

the creditors were informed of this arrangement they were bound

to regard Place as principal debtor and Smith and Owen as sure-

ties, and that any dealing of the creditors with the principal to the

injury of the sureties would have the eft'ect to release them from

liability. And it is further contended that the taking of the note

from Place, and thereby giving him time, however short, was in

law presumptively injurious.
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Upon this state of facts the following questions have been

argued in this court :

1. Was the note given by Place in the copartnership name

for the copartnership indebtedness, but given after the dissolution,

binding upon Smith and Owen?

2. If Smith and Owen were not bound by the note, were

they entitled to the rights of the sureties? And

3. Did the taking of the note given by Place discharge Smith

and Owen from their former liability?

On the first point it is argued in support of the judgment

that when a copartnership is dissolved the partner who is entrusted

with the settlement of the concern sht)uld be held to have implied

authority to give notes in settlement. On the other hand it is

insisted that in law he has no such authority, and that if he

assumes, as was done in this case, to give a note in the partnership

name, it will in law be his individual note only.

Whatever might be the case if the obligation which was given

had been a mere acknowledgment of the amount due, in the form

of a due bill or I O U, we are satisfied that there is no good rea-

son for recognizing iiijthe partner who is to adjust the business

of the concern any implied authority to execute such a note as was

o-iven in this case. This note was something more than a mere

made an a io-11111 nt, and mith wa th n called upon to make
payment of the ncte. Thi wa the fir l notice h had that he was
looked to for paymenl. On hi declining lo make payment, ' tut
was brotwht n the original indebtedn e s and j m] om ent recovered.
The po ition taken by the plaintiffs below was, that a th y
had nev r r ceived payment of their bill for mer han li e they
were ntitled to recover it of tho e who made the debt, the o-iving
of the note which till remained unpaid being immalerial.
On behalf of Smith it wa contended that, by the arran gement betvveen I lace and his copartners, the latter , as between the
three, b came the principal debtor, and that from the time when
the creditor were informed of thi arrangement th ey were bound
to regard Place a principal debtor and Smith and Owen a sureties, and that any dealing of the creditors with th principal to the
injury of the sureties would have the effect to relea e them from
liability. And it is further contended that the taking of th e note
from Place, and thereby giving him time, however short, wa in
law pre umptively injuriou .
Upon this state of facts the following questions have been
argued in this court:
r. Was the note given by Place in the copartnership name
for the copartnership indebtedness, but o-iven after the di solution,
binding upon Smith and Owen?
2. If
mith ·and Owen were not bound by the note, were
they entitled to the rights of the sureties? And
3. Did the taking of the note given by Place di charge Smith
and Owen from their former liability?
On the first point it is argued in upport of the judgment
that when a copartnership is dissolved the partner who is entrusted
with the settlement of the concern shtmld be held to have implied
authority to give n~tes in settlement. On the other hand it is
insisted that in law he ha no such authority, and that if he
as umes, as wa done in thi case, to give a note in the partnersfiip
name, it will in law be his individual note only.
Whatever rnig-ht be the case if the obligation which was given
had been a mere acknowledgment of the amount due, in the form
of a due bill or I 0 l.J, \Ve are satisfied that there is no good reaon for recognizing il}___the partner who i to adju t the business
of the concern any implied authority to execute such a note a was
given in thi ca~e. Thi note was something more than a mere
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acknou icd^mu'iit of iiulcbtcdness ; and il Injre interest at a large

rate. It was in every respect a new contract. The liability of the

parties ui)on their indcljtedness would be increased by it if valid,

and their rig-hts might be seriously compromised by the execution

of paper payable at a considerable time in the future if the partner

entrusted with the adjustment of their concerns were authorized

to make new contracts. It was assumed in J\ & M. Bank v. Kcr-

chcval, 2 Mich. 506-519, that the law was well settled that no such

implied authority existed, and we arc not aware that this has be-

fore been questioned in this state. See Pcnnoycr v. David, 8 Mich.

407. W'e think it much safer to require express authority when

such obligations are contemplated, than to leave one party at lib-

erty to execute at discretion new contracts of this nature, which

may postpone for an indefinite period the settlement of their con-

cerns, when a settlement is the very purpose for which he is to act

at all.

For a determination of the question whether Smith and Owen

were entitled to the rights of sureties, it seems only necessar>' to

point out the relative position of the several parties as regards
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the partnership debt. Place, by the arrangement, had agreed to

pav this debt, and as between himself and Smith and Owen, he

was legally bound to do so. But Smith and Owen were also liable

to the creditors equally with Place, and the latter might look to all

three together. Had thev done so and made collections from

Smith and Owen, these parties would have been entitled to de-

mand indemnity from Place. This we believe to be a correct state-

ment of the relative rights and obligations of all.

Now a surety, as we understand it, is a person who. being

liable to pay a d.cbt or perform an obligation, is entitled, if it is

enforced against liim, to be indcnmihed by some other i)erson,

who ought liimself to have made payment or performed before the

surety was compelled to do so. It is immafcrial in what form

the relation of principal and surety is estalilished. or whether the

creditor is or is not contracted with in the two capacities, as iS

often the case when notes are given or bonds taken ; the relation

is fixed by the arrangement and equities between the debtors or

obligors, and may be known to the creditor, or wholly unknown.

If it is unknown to him, his rights are in no manner affected by

it; but if he knows that one party is surety merely, it is only just

to require of him that in any -subsequent action he may take

regarding the debt, he shall not lose sight of the surety's equities.

ackno\\ ledg1m:nr of indcl>tedne ._,: and it bore inter t al a Iara
rat . It \\as in eYcry resp cl a ne\\. contract. Th' liability of the
parties upon their indehteclncs. "ould he in ·rea ·eel l>v it if valid,
and their rights might h ' ·eri u ·ly compromi d by the 'X cution
of paper payable at a cu 11 · iclcrable tim in the future if th partner
cntru · ted with the adj ustmcnl of their cone :-n w r authorized
to make nc\\ contracL. Jt ''a. a . urned in F. & JI. Ba11!? v. l\.crchct. ·al . 2 ~Iich . 506-51 <), that the law ,,-a well etllecl that no uch
impli 'cl auth rity cxi tcd. and we are not a\\·ar that thi ha b fore b'cn question cl in thi late.
ee Pc11lloycr v. l m.'id,
~Iich.
407. \ \ "e think it much a fer to r equir 'xpres au th rity when
such obligation arc contemplated, than to leave one party at liberty to execut at cli c retion n ew contracts of thi natur which
may po tpone for an indefinite period the ctt lernenl of th ir concern. , when a settl 'ment is the very purpos for which b i to act
al all.
For a dctcrminatio11 of the qu tion whether ~'mith an 1 \Yen
\\·ere entitled to the right. of . uretie.:; , it
m on ly n ece ary to
p int out the relative po_ition of the everal parties a reaard
th partner hip cl bt. Place, by the arrangement, hacl agr ed to
pay thi debt, and a . between him elf and Smith ancl Owen, he
\\"as legally hound t o clo so.
ut mith and Owen were al o liable
to the creditor. equally with Place, and the latt r might look to all
three together. IIacl they clone o and made coll ction from
~mith and O\\" n, th sc parti s would hav been
ntitl cl to d rnand indemnity from Plac . This w e believ to b a
rr ct tat ment of the' relativ right. and o bli 0 ati n
f a ll.
.:\o,,· a . urPty, as \\"e understand it. i. ;:i. per n who. being
liable to pay a debt r perform an obligati 11, i
ntitlccl, if it i
enfo rced again t him. to be imkmnifi cl by som
th r per on,
who ought him . l"lf to hav made f)aym nt or performed befor th
urety \Ya
mp 11 cl to do o. Tt i. immaf rial in what fo rm
the relation of principal and . urety i
tabli heel. o r \\"h th r th
creditor i or i not o ntracte l Yith in th two ca1 ac1t 1e , a i
often th ca. ' wh n not . ar giv n or bond tak n; the r lation
is fixed hy th arrangement and e 1uitie b tw n th clel t r or
obligor . and may b known to the er lit r, r wholly unkn own.
If it i unknown to him, his righL are in n rnann r aff ct d by
it; but if h kn ,,. that o n ' party i m ty m rely, it i only ju t
to requir of him that in any ub · qu nt acti n h may tak
r rrar ling th debt, h . hall n t ln. '"" ight f th
ur ty'
quitie ..

SMITH VS. SHELDEN. 37

S MITH

v ~.

37

SHELDEN .

That Smith and Dwen were sureties for Place, and the latter

was principal debtor after the dissolution of the copartnership,

seems to us unquestionable. It was then the duty of Place to pay

this debt and save them from being called upon for the amount.

But if the creditors, having a right to proceed against them all,

should take steps for that purpose, the duty of Place to indemnify,

and the right of Smith and Owen to demand indemnity, were

clear. Every element of suretyship is here present, as much as if,

in contracting an original indebtedness, the contract itself had

been made to show on its face that one of the obligors was surety

merely. As already stated, it is immaterial how the fact is estab-

lished, or whether the creditor is or is not a party to the arrange-

ment which establishes it.

This view of the position of the parties indicates clearly the

right of Smith and Owen to the ordinary rights and equities of

sureties. The cases which have held that retiring partners thus

situated are to be treated as sureties merely, have attempted no

change in the law. but are entirely in harmony with older author-

ities which have only applied the like principle to different states
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of facts, where the relative position of the parties as regards the

debt was precisely the same. We do not regard them as working

any innovation whatever. The cases we particularly refer to are

Oakclcy V. PashcUcr. 4 CI. & Fin., 207; Wilson v. Loyd, Law R.,

16 Eq.'Cas., 60; and Millcrd v. Tlwni, 56 N. Y., 402.

And it follows as a necessary result from what has been

stated, that Smith and Owen were discharged by the arrangement

made by the creditors wdth Place. They took his note on time, with

knowledge that Place had become the principal debtor, and without

the consent or knowledge of the sureties. They thereby endan-

gered the security of the sureties, and as the event has proved,

indulged Place until the security became of no value. True, they

gave "but very short time in the first instance; but, as remarked by

the vice chancellor in Wilson v. Loyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cas. 60. 71,

"the length of time makes no kind of difference." The time was

the same in Fellozvs v. Prentiss, 3 Denio, 512, where the surety

was also held discharged. And see Okie v. Spencer, 2 Whart.,

253. But that indulgence beyond the time fixed was contemplated

when the note was given is manifest from the fact that it was

made payable with interest. In a legal point of view this would

be immaterial, but it has a bearing on the equities, and it shows

that the creditors received or bargained for a consideration for the

That mith a n I Owen were suretie for Place, ancl the latter
was principal debtor after the di olution of the copa.rtner hip,
eem s to us unquestionable. ] t was ~ben the duty of P lace to pay
thi debt and sav th em from being called upon for the amount.
But if th e creditor , b ~v in g a rig ht tn procee:cl agai n t them all,
s hould take steps fo r tha t purpose, the du ty of P lace to indemnify.
a nd the ri b ht of mitli a nd 0 '.\·en to demand indemnity, were
clear. Every elem ent of surety hip i here present. a much as if.
in contracting an orig inal indeb ted nes . the contract it elf had
been mad e to how on it face that one of the ob li go r was surety
m er ely.
already stated, it is immate rial how the fact is e t:ibli shecl, o r whether the creditor is or is not a party to the arrang m ent which establi sh es it.
Thi v iew of th e position of the pa rties indicates clea rly the
rio·ht of ~ mi th and O wen to the ordina ry rig ht s a nd equities of
suretie . 1 he case \\·hich have h eld tha t retirin o- partners thu
ituated are to he trea ted as suretie m erely, have attempted no
chan g in the law , but are entirely in ha rm ony w ith older authorities which have onl y a ppli ed th e like principle to lifferent stat e
of fact s, where the relative position of the parties as rega rd the
debt \~r a precisely th e am e. \Ve do not regard th em a working
any innovation whatever. The case we particularly refer to a re
Oali:eley v. Pas!zcl!cr. -t I. & F in. , 207; TVi!so n v. Loyd, Law R.,
16 Eq. Ca ., 60 ; and Jli!!erd v. Thom , 56
Y., -t02.
A nd it follows a a nece sar y re ult from what ha been
stated, that Smith and O wen were discharged by th e arrano-ement
made by th e creditors ·w ith Place. They took hi note on tim e, with
knmvledge that Place had b com e the principal debtor. and without
the con ent or knowl edge of the suret ie . They thereby enclano-ered the security of the ureti e , and as the event has proved,
indulged Place until the ecnrity becam e f no value. True, they
gave but very short time in the fir st in sta nce ; but, as remarked by
the vice chancellor in TV ilson v. Loyd, L. R., 16 Eq. a . 60, 71,
"the Jen o-th of time make no kind of difference." The time was
the ame in Felfo7..c.1s v. Prentiss. 3 Denio, 512, where the surety
wa s also h eld discharged. And se 0 !?ie v. S pcncer, 2 \!Vhart.,
253. B ut that indulgence b yond the time fixed was contemplated
when the note wa given i manifest from the fact that it wa
made payable with int er e~ t. In a legal point of v iew thi would
be immaterial , but it ha a bearing on the eq uities, and it shovv
that the creditors received r I argained fo r a consideration fo r the
T .
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very indulgence which was granted, and which ended in the in-

solvency of Place. When they thus bargain for an advantage

which the sureties are not to share with them, it is neither right

nor lawful for them to turn over to the sureties all the risks. This

is the legal view of such a transaction, and in most cases it works

substantial justice.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial

ordered. The other Justices concurred.

KiXGSLAND, ct ah, rs. Koeppe, et al. (1891).

137 111. 344:28 N. E. 48-

Tenney, Hawlcy & Coif ecu, for appellants.

S. P. Douthart, for appellees.

,. ry in lu igcncc whi h wa errant cl, and whi h n I cl in th inlv ncv of Plac ' . \\·hen th y thu barrrain fo r an ad van tag
\\'hich th e , ur ti s ar n t to hare with th rn, it i n ith r ri ht
n r la\\'iul for th 111 to turn over to the ur ti
all th ri k . Thi
i th e lecra l vi \\' f uch a tran a ti n and in m t ca
it w rk
ub tantial ju ti .
Th j udgment mu t h r ver ed, \Yith co t and a n w trial
o rd red. Th ot h r Ju tic . c n cu rrecl .

Craig, J. This was an action brought by Kingsland Bros.

& Co., the appellants, against Koeppe, Schwuchon, Klinge, and

Loring, to recover a balance due on certain promissory notes exe-

cuted by the Lake View Electric Light Company, and payable

to the plaintiffs. At the date of the execution of the notes by

the corporation, the four defendants wrote their names across the

backs of the notes, and they were sued in this action as guarantors.
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On the trial in the circuit court, one of the defendants, Loring,

Krx,

L.\ XD, ct al., <.·s.

K

EPIE, et al.

2

. E.-1-.

( r 91) .

withdrew his pleas, and judg-ment was rendered against him by

default for the full amomU claimed by the plaintiffs. Nothing

I 37

Ill. 3-l-l ;

need therefore be said_as to him at present. The other defendants

claimed that they were not guarantors of the notes, and offered

parol evidence to show what the contract was between them and

appellants at the time they placed their names on the backs of

the notes. The comt admitted the evidence and, in the proposi-

Tc1111cy, Howle)' 6 Co!Tcc11, fo r appellant .
. P. Douthart, for ap1 li e .

tions of law submitted, held that it was competent to prove by

p:\vo\ evidence wdiat the real contract between the parties was ; and

this ruling was approved in the appellate court. 35 111. App. 81.

^^'here the payee of a note indorses it by j^lacing his name on

the back of the instrument, a contract of indorsement is created ;

the liability assumed by the payee being established by the writing.

'R,\ I ;, J. This wa an a ti on brou rrht by Kin g· land Dro .
. , the appellant again , t Yoeppe, chwuchon, Ylin , and
L oring, to r cove r a balance due n certain p romi ory not e:x--ecut 'cl by th Lake \ Tiew E l ctri Li;ht
mpany, and 1 ayable
to th e plaintiff . _\t the elate of the xecution of th note Gy
the co rp ration, th e four d fendant wr r th ir nam
a ro the
ha k, f th not . , ancl th y w er e , uecl in thi acti on a g uarant r .
11 th
tnal in the circuit
urt, one of th defe n !ant , L oring,
wi th cl r w hi pl a , and j1:de,111ent wa. r n 1 r cl again t him by
defau lt for th full amount claimed by th plaimiff. ::.JothinO'
need th erefor b . aicLa to him at pr
nt. The th r I f ndants
claim cl that th y w r n t g uarantor
f th not
an I ff r d
parol ev idenc to h " ' what th contract "a ~ b tw ' n th 111 and
appe ll ant at th tim th y pla d their na m e · 11 tb ba k of
th e note.. Th co urt ad mitt 1 the vid 11
an 1, in th propo iti on _ of Ja,,· . ubmitt cl, h Id that it wa
mp t nl L prove by
par I evi d ence what th r al c ntra t 1 tw 11 th e parti wa ; ~nd
thi ruling· wa appr v 1 in th e appcllat '
urt.
5 111. PI. r.
\\' her th p:ly
f a n t incl r
it hy placing hi. nam on
th b<>.ck f th in . trnm nt, a ·ontract f ind or 111 nt i. r at cl;
the liability a um cl hy th pay c I m g . tahli h ed I y th writing.

KINGSLAND VS. KOEPPE. 39

39

KINGSL\ND \ ' S. KOEPPE.

Parol evidence to change or vary the terms or conditions of a con-

tract is not admissible. Mason v. Burton, 54 111. 353; Johnson v.

Glover, 121 111. 283; 12 N. E. 257; Jones v. Albce, 70 111. 34;

IVoodivard v. Foster, 18 Grat. 200.

Parol evidence to change or vary the term or concliti ns of a contract is not admissible. 1llason v. Burton 54 Ill. 353; JohllsOIL v.
Glover 121 Ill. 283; i2 N. E . 257; Jones v. Lllbee 70 111. 34;
IVood1 ard v. Faster, J 8 Grat. 200.
But where a person who is not the payee of a promi ory note,
but a third party, place hi name on the back thereof, a different
que tion arise . In such ca c the rule long establi hed in this state
i that it may be show11 by parol evidence what liability wa intended to be as urn ed . In an early case ( C11slz111an v. Del/lent. 3
cam. 497) where a third party wrote his nam e acros the back of
a note, it wa held that the indor ement was prillla f acie evidence
of a liability in the capacity of a guarantor, but the legal pre umption wa liable to be rebutted by parol proof. In Boy1Lton v. Pierce
79 Ill. 145, where the obligation of a guarantor aro e, it was expre ly held that the pres umption that a party, not the I ayee, who
places his name on the back of a. note is a guarantor, may be rebutted by parol evidence. In Sto'te1ell v. Raymolld 83 Ill. 120,
where the question again aro e, the same rule wa declared. The
question again arose in Eberhart v. Page, 89 Ill. 550, and in deciding the case it i said: The indorsement of a note in blank by a
third party raises a pres umption only that it is intended thereby to
a um e the liability of g uarantor , which may be rebutted by proof
that the real agreement between the parties was different. From
the ca e cited it is apparent that thi court i fully committed to
the doctrine that, wheri a third party writes his name aero s the
back of a promissory note, the pre umption from the indorsement
is that he a sumed th e liability of guarantor; yet parol evidence
may be introduced to prove what liability was in fact assumed.
It is conceded in the argument of appellant that the ca e cited
fully establi h the rul e indicated; but it is in i tecl that these ca e
were Yirtually overruled hy Johnson v. Glover 121 Ill. 283, 12 T.
E. 257. This is a misapprehension of the fo rce and effect of that
decision. In that ca e, J ohnson, \vho wa the payee of a note, inclor ed it in blank, and the note ubsequently fell into the hands of
Glover, \Yho ued J ohn on as a g uarantor; and it was held that he
was n .t a gua rantor, but an indor er, and that parol evidence was
1

But where a person who is not the payee of a promissory note,

1

but a third party, places his name on the back thereof, a different

question arises. In such case the rule long established in this state

is that it may be shown by parol evidence what liability was in-

tended to be assumed. In an early case (Citshinaii v. Dement, 3

Scam. 497) where a third party wrote his name across the back of

a note, it was held that the indorsement w^as prima facie evidence

of a liability in the capacity of a guarantor, but the legal presump-

tion was liable to be rebutted by parol proof. In Boynton v. Pierce,

79 111. 145, where the obligation of a guarantor arose, it was ex-

pressly held that the presumption that a party, not the payee, who

places his name on the back of a note is a guarantor, may be re-

butted by parol evidence. In Stozcell v. Raymond, 83 111. 120,

where the question again arose, the same rule was declared. The

question again arose in Eberhart v. Page, 89 111. 550, and in decid-

1

1
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ing the case it is said : The indorsement of a note in blank by a

third party raises a presumption only that it is intended thereby to

assume the liability of guarantor, which may be rebutted by proof

that the real agreement between the parties was different. From

the cases cited it is apparent that this court is fully committed to

the doctrine that, when a third party writes his name across the

back of a promissory note, the presumption from the indorsement

is that he assumed the liability of guarantor; yet parol evidence

may be introduced to prove what liability was in fact assumed.

It is conceded in the argument of appellants that the cases cited

fully establish the rule indicated ; but it is insisted that these cases

were virtually overruled by Johnson v. Glover, 121 111. 283, 12 N.

E. 257. This is a misapprehension of the force and effect of that

decision. In that case, Johnson, wdio was the payee of a note, in-

dorsed it in blank, and the note subsequently fell into the hands of

Glover, who sued Johnson as a guarantor; and it was held that he

was not a guarantor, but an indorser, and that parol evidence was

not admissible to vary or change the character of the liability he

had assumed. It is there said : The general rule is that the name

of the payee appearing on the back of the instrument is evidence

that he is indorser, and proves that he has assumed the liability of

an indorser as fullv as if the agreement was written out in words

1

1

not admissible to vary or change the character of the liability he

had assumed. It is th ere aid: The general rule is that the name
of the payee appearing on the back of the instrument i evidence
that he i indor er and proves that he has assumed the liability of
an indor er a fully a if the agreement was written out in words

40 . GUARANTY AND SURETYSHIP.
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(citin<4 authorities). J'aro! evideiice is no more admissible to con-

tradict or vary this contract than any other written contract.

What was decided in this case, and whal was said, had. refer-

ence solely to the payee of a promissory note who had indorsed the

note in blank, and had no bearing whatever upon the rights or obli-

gations of a third party, who h.ad placed his name on the back of a

note. Moreover, it is manifest that there was no intention to over-

rule or modify the doctrine announced in Hoyiitoii v. Pierce, yg 111.

145 ; Stozvell v. Raymond, 83 111. 120; and liberhart v. Page, 89 111.

550, — from the ruling in Bank v. Nixon, 125 111. 618, 18 X. E! 203.

This case was heard and decided some time after Johnson v. Glover

had been decided, and the doctrine of Boynton. Stowell and Eber-

hart cases was approved, and those cases were cited as sustaining

the rule announced. We think therefore that the ruling of the cir-

cuit court, in tlie admission of evidence, that the defendants might

resort to j:)arol evidence to prove what contract was made between

the parties was correct. The signature of the defendants written

on the back of the notes was prima facie evidence that the defend-

ants assumed the liability of guarantors: but whether the evidence
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introduced was sufficient to remove llie legal ])resuniption of guar-

anty was a question of fact for the trial court, who heard the cause

without a jury, which does not arise here, and upon which we ex-

press no opinion. Whether the propositions of law held or refused

bv the court are technically accurate it will not be necessary to

determine as the judgment will have to be reversed on otlier

grounds. What has already been said may l)e regarded as suf-

ficient on another trial to obviate any supposed error in this regard.

As was said in the first part of this opinion, judgment was

rendered against one of the defendants by default, and in the trial

the court found in favor of the other defendants, and judgment

was rendered in their favor against the ])laintiffs. The ])laintififs

now assign as error the rendition of judgment in their favor against

one of the defendants. This error is well assigned. Thayer v.

Pinlcy, 36 111. 262.

The action was brought on a joint contract, and the general

rule in such cases is that judgment must be rendered against all

or none. Davidson v. Bond, 12 111. 84; Claflin v. Dunne, 129 111.

248, 21 X. E. 834.

The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts will be re-

versed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court.

(citing authur!ti•:s). I >arn~ vidence is no mor aclmi · ible to contradict or ,·a n-· this contract than am·
. other "ritten contract.
\\"hat \\as clceiclccl in th i ca - . and ,,·hat wa - aicl. hacl reference .o lely to the paye' uf a promi · ory note ,,·ho had indor-ecl the
nok in blank. and had no hearing \\'hale,·er upon the ri 0 ht - or oblio-ation.: of a third party, who had placed hi name on th hack of a
note. :.\lorccwer, it i, manifc -t that there \\'a n int ention to overrule or modify the cloctrinc announced in Boy11fol! v. Pierce, 7') Ill.
145: Stol.l ·c!! v. Ray111011d, 3 J 11. 120: ancl l~bcrhart v. Par;;c, 89 Ill.
550,-from the ruling in Rank v. Xi.ro11, 1-5 111. l , I X. . _03.
Thi .· ca. e \\·as heard and decided some time after Jolz11so11 v. G/01.•er
had been dcciclecl, and the doctrine of Boynton .•'t ,,·ell and Eberhart ca.:es ,,·a . approvecl. and tho e ca es were cited a
u tammg
the rule announced. \\'e think therefore that the ruli1w of th circuit court, in the aclmi ion of evide nce, that the clefenclant might
r e o rt to parnl evidence to prove \\.hat con tract \\'a made bet\\'een
the parties ,,.a correct. The ignaturc of the defendant \\'ritten
on the back of the note wa. prima facic e,·iclence that the defendants a ·surncd the liability of guarantor : hut whether the viclence
introducer! \\·a. sufficient to remm·e the I 'gal pre urnpti on of guaranty was a c1 uc tion of fact for the trial court, who heard th cau e
\\'ithout a jury. which ck1es not ari e here, and upon which \\·e ex.pre no op1mon . \ \ 'hcthc r the propo ition. of la,,. h !cl or refu ed
by the court arc tech nically accurate it will not be nece ary to
determine a the judgment wil l haYe to be rever eel on other
ground . \\ "hat ha - already been . aid may be regarcl cl a. ufficient on another trial to obv iate any uppo eel error in thi r gard.
_\ s was saicl in th" first part of thi· opinion, jucl!!'rnent wa
renclered again t one of the defendant by default, and in the trial
the court founcl in fayor of the other clef ndant , and j uclgment
wa. rendered in their favor again t the plaintiff . The plaintiff
now a _ign a error th rcnclition of juclo-ment in th ir favor again t
on of the deknclant . Thi error i well a ignecl. Thayer
Fi11!ey, 36 Ill. 262.
The action wa. brotwbt on a joint ontra t, and the general
rule in uch ca
i that judgment mu . t I r n I r cl again t all
or none. Da'i.•idson , .. Bo11d, r2 Ill. -t; Claflin v. Dwuze, L
J11.
2-t , _ I :\. E. 3-t·
The judgment. of th appellate and circuit ourt will be revcr ed, ancl the cau e remanded to the circuit ourt.
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weinberg vs. the regents. 41

\\'E lXDERr; '. ' . T H E RE ENT .
Weinberg z's. The Regents oe the University oe Michigan.

Impleaded, Etc. (1893),

97 Mich. 246; 56 N. W. 605.

Error to Washtenaw. (Kinne, J.)

Charles R. Whit man, for appellant.

WElXBERG 'LS. TH E R EGENTS OF TIIF

e XI\'ERSITY

OF

lrCIITC .\:'\,

lmpleacl ed, Etc. ( r893 ),

Bogle & Marquardt, for plaintifif.

Montgomery, J. The plaintitT hroug-ht suit against the Re-

97 l\Jich . 2+6; 56 N. \ V. 605.

gents of the University of Michigan, James B. Angell, James H.

Wade and Charles R. Whitman to recover the value of materials

furnished to one Lucas, a subcontractor in the building of the

E rror to \Va htenaw.

( Kr ~~E,

J. )

University Hospital. The right of action was claimed under Act

No. 94, Laws of 1883, as amended by Act No. 45, Laws of 1885

Clwrlcs R. TV/z if11la11, for appellant.

(3 How. Stat., Sec. 8411a). The declaration avers:

"That the Regents of the University of j\[ichigan is a public corpora-

Bogle & Jfarq11ardt1 fo r plaintiff.

tion organized and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan,

created for the government of the University of Michigan, which said

institution belongs to and is the property of the State of Michigan, and is

maintained at the expense of this State; that the. defendant James B.

Angell is President of the Regents of the University of ^Michigan and the
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executive head of the University of Michigan; that the defendant James

H Wade is the Secretary; that the defendant Charles R. Whitman is a mem-

ber of the Regents of the University of Michigan; that on or about the

months of July and August, A. D. 1890, the Regents of the University of

Michigan advertised for proposals for the erection and completion of a

hospital building for the University of Michigan, which said hospital

:i\IoKTGO :-IERY, J. The plaintiff brought uit agam t th e R egent of th e U nive rsity of l\Iichigan, James B. ngell. Jam e H.
Wade and Charles R. \Vhitman to recover the value of material
furnished to one Lucas, a subcontractor in the buil ling of th e
Un iver sity H ospital. The ri g ht of action \'Vas claimed under ct
o. 9+, Law of 1883, as amended by Act No . 45, Law of 1885
( 3 How. tat.. ec. 8-t 11a ) . The declaration aver :

building, so to be erected and completed, was to be and has been built at

the expense of this State; that afterwards, to-wit, on the first day of

October, A. D. 1890, in pursr.ance to said advertisement and proposals re-

ceived, the bid of one William Biggs, of the city of Ann Arbor, was accepted

and on or about the date aforesaid the Regents of the University of Mich-

igan entered into a contract with said William Biggs for the erection and

completion of said hospital, in consideration, of the sum of, lo-wit,

$78,556, which said contract was signed by the defendants James B. Angell,

James H. Wade, President and Secretary as aforesaid, and by said William

Biggs; that the defendant Charles R. Whitman was a member of the com-

mitee on buildings and grounds appointed by the Regents of the Univer-

sity of Michigan, which building committee was given full authority to act

for the said Regents of the University of Michigan until otherwise ordered;

that said Charles R. Whitman, as a member of said commitee, was prin-

cipally in charge of said undertaking of building said hospital ; that after-

"T hat th e R ege nt of the niYcr ity of :\[i chi ga n is a public co rpo rati on o rgani ze d and exi ting und er th e Jaw of th e State of '.\Iichigan,
niv ersity of Mi chi ga n, which sa id
c reated for th e goYernment of th e
in s tituti on belongs to a n d is t he pro perty o f th e State of i\Iichi gan, a nd i
tate: that th e. defendant J a m es B.
ma intain ed at th e ex pen e of thi
Angell i Pres id ent of th e R eg nts of the U niYer ity of i\Iichigan a nd the
executiYe head of th e Uni,·e t"" ity of i\Iichi ga n: that the defendant J ame
H \ Vade is the S ec reta ry; that the defend ant Cha rles R. vVhitm a n is a m em ber of th e R egents of th e U ni versity of :\[ichigan; that on o r abo ut the
m onths of Jul y and Augu t, A. D. 1890. th e R egents of the U nive rsity of
Michiga n a dv erti t•il for propo als for th e erection and completion of a
ho pita! building fo r th e University of :\Iichiga n, which said hospital
buildin g, o to be erected and completed, wa to be and has b een built at
th e ex pen e of t hi State : that afterwa rd s, to-w it, on the fir st day of
October, A . D. i 890, in pnrsm111 ce to sa id adYertisement and proposa l r eceiYed, t he b id o f one \:Villiam Biggs, of th e city of Ann Arbo r, wa accepted
a nd on o r about th e dat e afore ~ a id th e R egent s of the Univer ity of :\Iichiga n entered into a cont ract with aid \ Villiam Bigo· for the erect ion and
completion of · a id ho pita!, in con side ra tion of the urn of, to-wit,
$78,556, whic h aid cont ract was sign ed by the defendant Jam es B. Angell,
J ame H. Wad e, Pre id ent and S ecretary as afo re aid, and by said Willi am
Bigg s; that the defendant Charl es R. Whitm a n was a membe r of the commitee on buildii1gs a nd g round s ap point ed by th e R egents of the Univerity of l.Iichi ga n, which building committee was g iven foll authority to act
for th e sai d R egent s o i th e U ni ve r ity of l\Iichigan until oth erwise o rd ered;
th at a id Charles R. \ Vhitm an. as a m i:mber of sa id commitee, was principally in cha r<Yc of s,1 id un dertaking of building sa id hos pital ; that after-

42 (.UARAXTY AND SURETYSHIP.

wards the said William Biggs, by contract with one Jnhn Lucas, sublet a

portion of the job for the building and erection of said hospital; that the

plaintiff Julius Weinberg is a laborer and material man, engaged in the

business of buying, selling and furnishing stone, sand, and other material

to contractors and other persons engaged in bnihlini;, and other business

in which such materials are used ; that after the contract so made as afore-

said by the Regents to said Biggs, and by Biggs with said John Lucas,

said Lucas, subcontractor as aforesaid, applied to the plaintiff to furnish

stone for the use in said hospital building, for which said Lucas agreed

to pay plaintiff 85 cents for every 16 feet in length by one foot thick and

one foot high, as the same was laid in the wall of said building.

"And the plaintiff further says that the defendants, the Regents of

the L'nivcrsity of Michigan, James B. Angell, James IT. Wade and Charles

R. Whitman, were the board, officers and agents of the State of Michigan,

and made and entered into the contract for the erection of said hospital

for and on behalf of the State of Michigan, and had the same built at the

expense of this State; that it was the duty of said defendants as afore-

said, under Section S^iiia, as amended by Act No. 45, Public Acts of 1885,

and Sections 8411b and 8411c, Howell's Annotated Statutes, to require
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sufficient security by bond for the payment by the contractors and all sub-

contractors for all labor i)erformed and materials furnished in the erection,,

repairing, or ornamenting of said hospital building."

The declaration further avers that plaintilt furnished the

material in question, relying on such hond, and also avers that he

has not received his pay, and concludes :

"And plaintiff further says that said defendants, in disregard of their

duty aforesaid, negligently and carelessly, and in disregard of the rights

wards th e said \\'illi am igg ' , by contract with o n J hn Luca , ublet a
portion of th job for the building and e recti on f aid h ospital ; that the
plaintiff Juliu s \\ ' ei nh crg i a laborer and mat ri a l m a n, engag cl in the
hu ines of buying, selling and furni bing tone, a nd, and o th e r material
to contracto r · and ot her per ons n aaae cl in buildin g, and oth er bu iness
in which ' UCh m ateria l a r ' u eel; that after th c ntract so made a aforeaid by the R egent t
aid Biggs, and by Biggs with sa id J hn Luca ,
. aid Lu ca . ubcontractor a afo resaid, applied t the plaintiff to furni h
~tone for tlw use 111 said h pital building, for \\·hi ch aid Luca ag reed
to pay plaintiff S c nt f r Yery 16 f eet in length by one foot thick and
one foot hi g h, a th sa m e ·was laid in th e wall of aid building.
"And the plaintiff furth e r say that the d ef endants, the R gents of
the niy er si ty of ~Iichigan, Jame B. Ang 11, Jam e H . ·w ade and harles
R. \\'hitman. were the b a rc! , office r s and agents o f th e State of l\Iichigan,
a nd made and ·nt e r cl int o the contract fo r the e r ction of aid h o pital
for and on behalf of th State of Michigan, and had th e same built at the
ex p ense of this State; thJt it wa, th e duty of said d fendants as aforea id, und er S ect i n ~J.r Ia , a amend d by ct ~ o. 45, Public Act of r 5,
tatute , to r quire
a nd ectio n s 8-1-IIb a nd 841 rc, Howell 's Ann otat ed
s uffici ent sec urity by bo nd fo r the payment by th e ontracto r s and all s ubcontractors for all lab r pe r fo rmed and mat rial s furni shed in the erectionr
r epai rin g, u r o rn a m entin g of said ho s pital bu;Jdin g. "

of the plaintiff, neglected to require of said contractor the bond, aforesaid,

and permitted the said contractor to enter into said contract for the erec-

tion of said hospital building, and to enter upon the performance thereof,.

without giving security, by bond or otherwise, for the payinent by said

contractor and all subcontractors for the labor and materials furnished

The declaration further avers that plaintiff furni hed the
material in qu tion, relyinrr on such b n 1, and al o a er that he
ha not received bi. pay, and conclude. :

hiin or any subcontractor, as required by said statute."

To this declaration the defendants demurred, and the plaintiff

joined in demurrer, the demurrer was sustained as to the individ-

ual defendants, and overruled as to the Regents of the University,

and the plaintiff was ])ermilt.'(l to amend as to the individual de-

fendants. The defendant the Regents of the University of Mich-

igan brings error. The jilaintiff has, however, amended his

declaration as against both defendants, and it is requested by both

parties that the (piestion of liability be here determined.

It is contended on behalf of the defendant that the statute

does not apply to the Regents of the I'niversity of Michigan ; that

•· nd plaintiff further say. that ~aid defendant , in di rega rd of th eir
duty afo resa id , n egli ge ntly and carele s ly, and in di r gard of th e rights
of th e pl ai n t iff, n eglecte d to requir e o f aid contractor the bond. afor aid,
a nd p ermitt(.d th e aid contra cto r to ent e r into said contract for th e r cti n of said h spital building, a nd t o enter upo n the p rformance th e reof,
without giY 1ng sec urit y, by b o nd o r o th e nvi e, for th e payment by aid
cont r acto r :i ncl J ll sub ontract rs for th e lab o r and m a te rial s furni bed
him o r a n y subco ntrac t r, as required by . ::ti s latut ."

To thi cl clarali n the cl fenclant clcmurre l, and the plaintiff
joined in demurrer, th demurrer wa u tain cl a to the individual defendant , ancl overruled a to th Herrent of the Univer ity,
and the plaintiff wa p rmitt cl to am ~ ncl a to the individual def nclant . The cl f nclant the R g nL of th Univer ity of Michigan bring err r. Th plaintiff bas, howcv r, amen 1 cl hi
declaration a. again t 1 oth defenclanL, an 1 it i r qu sted by both
partie that th quc ti n f liability 1 her det rmin d .
It i cont nd ccl n b half of th lcf n lant that th
tatute
c1 e not apply to th e R g nt of th ~ niv r ity of ).Iichigan : that

WEINBERG VS. THE REGENTS. 43-

the University buildings are not built at the expense of the State^
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nor are they contracted for on behalf of the State, within the mean-

ing of this statute ; that they are constructed by a constitutional

corporation, which may sue and be sued, and has power to take and

hold real estate for any purpose which is calculated to promote the

interests of the University.

The section, as amended by Act No. 45, Laws of 1885, pro-

vides :

"That when public buildings or other public works or improvements

are about to be built, repaired or ornamented under contract, at the ex-

the Univer ity building ar not built at the expense of the State,.
nor are they contracted for on behalf of tbe tate, within the meaning of thi tatute; that they are constructed by a con titutional
corporation, which may sue and be sued, and ha power to take and
hold real e tate for any purpose which i calculated to promote the
intere t of the niversity.

pense of this state, or of any county, city, village, township, or school

district thereof, it shall be the duty of the board of officers, or agents, con-

tracting on behalf of the state, county, city, village, township or school

The ection, as amended by Act
vide :

o. 45, Laws of 1885, pro-

district, to require sufficient security by bond for the payment by the con-

tractor and all subcontractors for all labor performed or materials fur-

nished in the erection, repairing or ornamenting of such building, works

or improvements."^

We think the statute sufficiently broad to cover the contract •

in question. Act No. 145, Laws of 1889, appropriated —
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"For the purchase of a site for, and the erection of, a hospital, for

the year 1S89, the sum of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars, and for the

year 1890, the sum of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars : Provided, how-

ever, That no part of the above-named appropriations for the purchase ot

a site for and the erection of a hospital shall be paid out of the Treasury

until the City of Ann Arbor shall have bound itself to contribute the sum

''That wh en public buildings or other public w orks o r improvem ent~
are about to be built. repaired or ornamented und er contract, at the expen e of thi s tale, or of any co:mty. city. village. town hip, or school
district thereof, it hall be the duty of the board of office rs, or agents, contracting on behalf of the state, county, city, Yillage, township or school
district, to require sufficient ecurity by bond fo r the payment by th e contractor and all subcontractor for all lab or perform ed or mate rial s furnished in th e erection, repairing or o rnam enting o f such building, works
or improvement _m

of $25,000 for the same purpose."

Section 2 provides for the assessment of taxes to pay this

appropriation. Certainly, then, the undertaking was at the ex-

\Ve think the statute ufficiently broad to cover the contract •
m question. Act o. 145, Laws of 1889, appropriated-

pense of the State and of the City of Ann Arbor, the contribution

of the City of Ann Arbor, however, becoming State property upon

iThe statute (C. L. 1897 — 10743-10-45) quoted in pan. consists of three sections,

the second and third being as follow:

"(10744) Sec. 2. Such bond shall be executed by such contractor to the people

of the State of Michigan, in such amount, and with such sureties, as shall be approved

by the board, officers or agents acting on behalf of the state, county, city, village,

township or school district as aforesaid, and conditioned for the payment by such con-

tractor or any subcontractor as the same may become due and payable, of all indebted-

"For the purcha se of a ite for, and the erection of, a ho pital, for
the year 1889, th e sum of Twenty-Five Thou and D ollars, and for the
year 1890, th e um of Twenty-Five Thousand D ollars: Provided, however, That no part of the aboYe-named appropriation for the purcha e o!
a site for and the erection of :i. ho pita! shall be paid out of th e Treasury
until the City of Ann rbo r hall have bound it elf to contribute th e sum
of $25 ,000 for the sa me purpo. e."

ness which may accrue to any person, firm or corporation on account of any labor per-

formed or materials furnished in the erection, repairing or ornamenting of such

buildings or works. Such bond shall be .deposited with and held by such board, officer

or agent, for the use of anv party interested therein.'"

"(10745) Sec. 3. Such bond may be prosecuted, and recovery had, by any per-

son, firm or corporation to whom any money shall be due and payable on account of

having performed any labor, or furnished any materials, in the erection, repairing or

ornamenting of such building or works, in the name of the people of this state, for the

use and benefit of such person, firm or corporation: Provided, That the people of this-

state shall, in no case brought under the provisions of this act, be liable for costs."

Section 2 provides for the a e ment of taxes to pay thi
appropriation . Certainly, then, the un lertakina wa at the expense of the tate and of the City of Ann Arl or, the contribution
of the City of Ann Arbor, however, becoming State prop rty upon
1
The statu te CC. L. i897-107.i3-10745) quoted in part. consist of three sections,
th e second and third being as follow:
.. ( r 0744)
ec. 2. Such bond sha ll be xccuted by uch contractor to the people
of the tate of :\[ichigan, in . uch amount, and with c;uch uretie , as shall be approved
by the board. officers o r agents acting on behalf of the tate. county, city, village,
t ownship or chool di. trict as afo r esaid, and conditioned for th e payment by such contrac t or o r any subcontracto r as th e same may become due and payable, of all indebtedne s which may acc ru e t o any person, firm o r co r poration on acco unt of any labor performed o r materials furnished in the e rection . repairing o r ornamenting of such
buildings o r works.
uch bond sha ll be deposited with and held by such board, officer
o r agent, for the use of any party intere~•ted therein."
''( io74:;) Sec. 3. Such bond may be prosecuted . and rec ove r y had, by any person, fi rm o r corporation to \\·horn any money shall be due and payable on account of
having pe r fo rm ed any labor. o r furnished any mater ials, in the erection . repairing or
ornamenting of uch building o r works, in the name of the people o f this state, for the
use and benefi t of uch person. firm or corporation: Provided, That the people of thi
s tate sha ll, in no ca e brought under th e p rovi ions o f thi s rict, be li able fur cos ts."

44 GUARANTY AXD SI 'RIITVS 1 1 I P.

l;l \[{\ . T\

\:-,!)

SL' RETYS l!IL'.

its appropriation. W'c think it clear also thai the ive^ents who

actrd in the matter were agents contract inj^- on hehalf of the State.

They are otttcers elected hy the voters of the State, whose duties

relate to the control of ])ul)lic ])ro]iertv. It is altojj^ether tt:)0 tech-

nical to say that the Regents were contracting" on hehalf of the

University ; for, while this is in a sense true, it is also true that

they, hy the very contract in ([uestion, provided for the expendi-

ture of State money, and for the construction of a huilding which

it would. I think, he news to most residents of Michigan to learn

is not State ])ro])erty. This is as much so as in the case of a school

district. Amiitur General v. Reo^ents. 83 Mich. 467.

It is contended hv the defendant thai tlie liahility for neglect

to require this hond attaches to the individuals who represented

the State, county, city, village, township or school district in the

letting of the contract, and not to the State or county or coqiora-

tion of which they are directly the officers or agents. We think

the defendant is right in this contention. In Owen v. Hill, 67

Mich. 43, and Phnniner v. Kennedy. 72 id. 2^)=^, the action was

brought against the individuals composing the hoard. In Wells
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V. Board of Education, 78 Mich. 260, it was lield that the officers

were personally liahle for materials on failure to take the required

hond. (jur attention has not heen called to any case in which

the municii)ality. in the case of a townshi]) or school district, or a

])ul)lic or </;/(/.s-/'-pul)lic corporation, has heen held liahle as such,

and it seems to us that there are insu]>erable objections to so

holding. The duty rests upon the officers of the State, as well

as cities, counties and school districts. Can it be intended that

the State, which must act through its public officers, is to be held

liahle as for a tort for a mere neglect to take the bond re(|uired

bv this statute? It is UWv that it is urged that the Board of

Regents is an agent of the State. This may be true in a certain

sense, hut we think the lx>ard, as a hoard, is not the agent con-

tem])lated by this statute, but tliat the officers who act directly

are the ones who, as individuals, fall within the purview^ of the

Act. It may he doubtful to what extent the hoard of managers

of a hospital, which is a public institution, like the one in ques-

tion, can be made liable for negligence; as to which sec McDon-

ald V. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432; Glavin v. Hospital, 12 R. I. 411.

We do not deem it necessary to decide whether, under such cir-

cumstances as are involved in those two cases, the board of man-

.agers of the hospital, as a corporation, may not be liable. In

it. appru priatic in. \\ "e think it clear ::t!sll that th' R 'g·enL wh
a ·ted in the maltl'r \\ere agents co ntra ·ting .J n h half of th , . lat .
' I hey are o ffi ·c-rs ·le ·ted by the Yotl'rs of the .'tale, \\hose duti e
rdate lo the control of public properly. It is al tog ' tiler too i. 'chnical lo sa \ that th ' Regenb \\er' contra ·ting 0 11 h ' ha! f oi the
L' nin~ rsity: for. \\·hilc thi · is in a seme tru e, it i · also true that
they. by the \T ry con tract in qu ·sticrn, provicl cl for the c:x1 ncli lure of .·talc money, .a nd fo r th' ·onslru ·ti n uf a buildint"">· which
it \\ Oulcl. l think. he ne\\·s lo most r e idcnts of :\lichigan Lo learn:
i~ no t State pro perty . This is as mu ch so as in th ca. e of a · ·hoo t
district. .·I 11ditvr Cc11cral \'. !<cgc11ts, 3 :\Ii ·h . 4 7.
l t i · ·o ntcncl ·cl by the clcfrnclant th at the liability f r n gl cl
t o require thi bond =ittachcs to the incl'.\·icluaL \\·ho repre nt 'cl
th' Stat , co unty . city. village. t )\\' n ·hip o r schoo l cli trict in th
letti ng of th contra · t, a ncl no t lo th e Stat' o r co unty o r · rpo rati o n of which they a rc directly the officers or agent . \\' think
the clcfenclanl is ri g·ht in thi · o nt ' n tio n . In 0<.l'fll v. Hill, 7
:\Iich . ..tJ, a ncl P/11111111cr \'. f{c1111cd_\'. /- icl . - 95· the a ·tio n wa
brought again . t the incliviclual. ·ompo ing the ]) )arc!. In 1f 7 cll
Y. Hoard of J ~ d11catio11, 78 :\ I ich. 2
. it \\·as held that th
ffic r
\\·ere per. ana ll y li able fo r material : o n failure to take tb r iuir d
bond. Our a llenti n ha . not be ' 11 ca llccl t any ca c 111 which
th muni·ipa lity . in th ' ca o f a town hip o r . cha I cli tri t, r a
public o r quasi-p ubli c corporation, ha s bee n he ld lial 1 a . u h,
and it ecm s to u s th at there arc in up ' rabl obj
t
w 11
ho ldin g. Th' duty r est. upo n th' office r · of th e
a . c itic , counti e · and c h o1 di s trict .
'an it b
the .' tate, " ·hi ch rnu . l act through it publi · ffi r , i to b h ld
li=ihle a fr ·r a tort for a :11erc neglect ln tak the h ncl r 1uir l
hy thi . lat ul '? J t is t 1~u c that it i urge d that the
ar l f
R ·g ' nts i · a n age nt o f the Stale. Thi . m ay h Lru 111 a
rtain
se n : . hut \\'C think th h ar<I, as a boa rcl. i. 11 l th agT nl ontemplatccl by Lhi . . tat ul , but that th offic 'r. wh act dir tly
ar ' the on . \\'ho, a . inclivicluals, fall within th purYi \\' f the
, \ ·t. It may b doubtful to \\'hat ':xte nt th b arc! f rnana~ r
of a ho. pita!. \\'hich i. a publi · in s titution , lik th on in qu tion. can b mac! liahl fo r negli g n ee: a . t which
JI cf. 0 11 ald v. Hospital. L
~ [a .. . .+3-; G/w1 i11 v. f! ospital I- R. I. ..i-rr.
\ \ '' clo not cl ' Cm it ncce. ary to cl 'cicl \\'h th r , un I r · u ' h ci rumstanc s as ar' inYo lvcc! in thos tw
a s, th I arc! f man :ag ' r
f th h pita!, a a c q rati n, may n t I lial 1 . In

n

1
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, V . THE RE GEKTS.

such a case it might \\ell be contended that it has undertaken

to perform certain duties, and estabhshed relations toward the

patients which impose upon the body in control certain duties.

But the ground of the plaintiff's right to recover at all in this

case is that this property is State property, and further that the

building is being constructed at the expense of the State, and

that the members of the board were acting for and on liehalf of

the State in making the contract. It could not be contemplated

that the State or the public corporation is to be made liable. The

individual guilty of the wrong or neglect of duty is the one

against whom the action should be directed. Cooley, Torts, 621.

The wrong is in the nature of a tort consisting of neglect of duty

owing to the public generally, for which the public corporation as

such is not liable, unless made so by statute.

It follows from the views expressed that the judgment should

be reversed, and the case remanded, that the plaintiff may proceed

against the individuals named in the amended declaration.

McGrath, J., concurred with Montgomery, J.

Grant, J. I concur in the opinion of my brother Mont-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

gomery that under /\ct No. 94, Laws of 1883. as amended by Act

No. 45, Laws of 1885, the pulslic corporation cannot be made

liable, but only those officers or agents of such corporation to

whom is committed the duty of letting contracts for the erection

of public buildings or making public improvements. But I can-

uch a ca, e it might \\' ell be contended that it ha. undertaken
to perform c rtain duti es, and e tabli shed relation toward the
patients which impo e upon th e body i11 control certain d uti e .
B ut the gro und of the plaintiff' s ri ght t recover at all in thi
a e i that thi property i . tate property, and furth er that the
building i bein g con truct cl at the expen
of the ~tate, and
that the m ember of th e boa rd \\·ere act in o- fo r and on h half of
the tate in making th e contract. It co uld not be contempla ted
that the State or th e public corporation i · to be made liabl e. The
individual g uilty of th e wrong or neglect of d uty i the one
again t whom th e action hould be directed.
ooley, Torts. 62 1.
The wrong i in th e nature of a to rt con i tin o· of n ~gl ect of duty
owi1w to the publi c generally, for \\·hich th public corporation as
uch i not liable. unles mad e o by statute.
It fo ll ows frbm the views expressed that th e j uclg ment hould
be rever ec!, and th e ca e reman ded, that the plaintiff may proce cl
aaain t the individual s nam ed in th amended declarati on.

not concur in holding that the statute applies to the corporation

known as '"The Regents of the UniA^ersity of Michigan." The

::\IcGR.\TII ,

J.,

conc urred \\'ith

-:\ Io:\T

;o:-rnRY,

J.

grounds, buildings and other property of all the other State insti-

tutions, penal, reformatory, charitable and educational, belong to

the State. These institutions are the creations of the Legislature.

They are under the exclusive control and management of the

State. The State which created them, may at any time repeal the

laws bv which they were established and sell the property. The

public buildings, public works and public improvements mentioned

in the statute, mean those over which the State has control. This

is evident from the language of the statute, which says :

"It shall be the duty of the board of officers, or agents, contracting

on behalf of the State, ***** j^ require sufficient security by bond," etc.

The Regents make no contracts on behalf of the State, but

solelv on behalf of and for the benefit of the University. All the

GR.\ NT, J.
I co ncur in th e opinion of my brother ::\Iontrrom ery that unde r Act ;{ o . 9-.t.. La\\' of i283. a am ended by Act
No. 45 , L aw of 1885, th e public corporation cannot b made
liable, but only th o e officer s or agent of uch corporation to
whom i committed the duty of lettin rr contracts fo r the erect1011
of public buildings or making public irnpr \'em ent . Dut I ca nnot concur in holding that the tatute applie to th co rporation
known as "The R egents of th U niver ity of Michigan.'' The
groun 1 , building and other property of all th e other tate in titution , penal, refo rmatory. charitable a nd ed ucati onal, belong to
the tate. The e institution are th e er ation of th e L egi lature.
They are und er th e exclusive control and managem ent of the
tate. The ~ tate which created th em, may at any tim e repeal the
laws by which th e~· \\·ere tabli heJ and ell the property. The
public building , public \\·ork a nd public improvement mentioned
in the tatute, m an those over which the State ha control. This
i evident from the language of the tatute, which ay :

" It ha ll be the duty of th e board of office r , o r agent , contracting
o n beh alf of th e ta te, * * * * * tc req uir e · uffi cicnt ecurity by bond." etc.

The R egent make no contract on behalf of th e State, but
olely on behalf of and for th benefit of th U niver ity.
11 the
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Other public corporations mentioned in the Constitution, which

have occasion to erect pul)Hc l)uildin<2;s or to make pubHc improve-

ments, are expressly included in this statute. Expressio iiniiis

est cxchisifl altcriiis. It expressly enumerates the state, counties,

cities, villages, townships and school districts. If the University

were under the control and management of the legislature, it

would undoubtedly come within this statute, as do the Agri-

cultural College, Normal Schodl, State Public School, asylums,

prisons, reform schools, houses of correction, etc. But the general

supervision of the University is, by the Constitution, vested in the

Regents. Const. Art. 13, §§ 7, 8.

"Sec. 7. The Regents of the University, and their successors in

office, shall continue to constitute the body corporate known by the name

and title of 'The Regents of the University of Michigan.'

"Sec. 8. The Regents of the University shall, at their first annual

meeting, or as soon thereafter as may be, elect a President of the Univer-

othe r public
rpo rali u ns mentio n <l in th
'o n tiluti n , which
have occa: i n
r ct pul li e lrnildin~· or t mak public impr v mcnls, arc xpPs ly in c lucl 'd in Lhi
talut
Expre ·io 11nius
est c.rc/11sio altcri11s. lt xpn?s · ly num e ral th tat co untie ,
·itic, village , lo\\'11 hiJ and ch o l di tricl . If th Cn iv r ity
,,·e re u11d ' r th e o ntro l a11cl m a nagcm nl of lh I i lalur , it
,,·o ttlcl un 1 ul teclh· om ' \\'ithin thi
tatute, a d
th
cullural College . • rmal
ch ol, ~ tat Publi
pri . 11 , r f rm _ hoo L ho u >. of
rr
11, tc .
g n ral
~ up rv1
f th l-11iv r. ily i. , by th
11 titution, v t d in the
Rea n t
on t . • \rt. 13, g~ 7,
T

sity, who shall be ex-officio a member of their Board, with the privilege

of speaking, but not of voting. He shall preside at the meetings of the

Regents, and be the prin<-ipal executive officer of the University. The
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Board of Regents shall have the general supervision of the University,

and the direction and control of all expenditures from the University

interest fund."

Section 2, Art. 13, is as follows:

"The proceeds from the sales of all buds that liave been or here-

after may be granted by the United States to the State for educational

purposes, and the proceeds of all lands or other property given by individ-

uals or appropriated by the State for like purposes, shall be and remain a

perpetual fund, the interest and income of which, together with the rents

of all such lands as may remain unsold, shall be inviolably appropriated

and annually applied to the specific obiects of the original gift, grant, or

"'ec. 7. T h e R g ' nl s of th Unive r sity, and th eir
m
offic , sha ll conti nu e lo o nslitut th e body c rpo rale kn own
and titl e f 'Th e R eg nl o f th llniver ity of ).Jichirran .'
" ec. . Th R err nl c; of the UnivE>r ily ha ll, aL th eir fir t annu a l
me ' liner. o r a oo n -~ h e r afte r a may 1 e, elect a Pr idenl o f the Tni ve rity, wh o ~ h al l b ex-officio :i m emb er f th e ir Board, with th privil ege
o f pca kin o·, but no l of Yoti ng. He sh all pre i le at th e m clings f the
R eg nt s, a nd be th pri1wipal exl.'c uti,·e ffic r of th e U ni,·e r ity. T h e
B ard of R ege nt · hall ha Y th e ge nera l s up n ·i ion of th e l:niY r ity,
a n d th e direc ti on a nd a ntral of ~tll ex penditur e. fr om th U nive r ity
int re l fund ."

appropriation."

Under the Constitution, the State cannot control the action

: ctio11 2, • rt. r 3, I a

fo llow :

of the Regents. It cannot add to or take away from its property

without the consent of the Regents. In making appropriations

for its support, the Legislature may attach any conditions it may

deem expedient and wise, and the Regents cannot receive the

appropriation without complying with the conditions. This has

been done in several instances.

Property aggregating in value nearly or quite half a million

of dollars has been donated to the University by private individ-

uals. Such property is the property of the I'niversity. Tt is

"The proce cl from the a le o f a ll la nd that haYe be n r her eafl r m ay be g ra nt d by ~he T nit cd Stales lo the State f r ed u ·ational
purp . e , a n I th pr ce cl o f all land s o r ot her prop rty rriyen 1 y indiYidual o r ap pr priatccl by the S tate fo r lik purpo cs, ha ll b and r ma in a
perp tu a l fund, th inlcr l a nd inc me f whi ch, l rret h r with th e r nt
o f all s uch la nd a may r m a in un s Id , s ha ll be invi !ab ly appropriated
and annu a lly app l i d t o th e pecific 1 j ect s of lhe ri o·if1al rri ft, rrran t, or
a ppr priati on ."

ncl r th
on Lituti n, tb
tate annot o ntr 1 th a ti n
o f th R o- nt . It cann t acl l t
r take away from it pro] erty
wilh ut th c n nt f th l'-e - nt . In makin appr I riati on
f r il u1 po rt , th L gi latur may atta h any
nditi n it may
cl 111 x p Ii nt and wi , and th R o- nt cann t r ce1v the
appr priali n without
mplyino- with th cond iti n . Thi ha
h n d on in v ral in tan
r iu ite half a million
n1v r ity 1 y private individof
rty f th -.,. niv r ity. It is
ual .
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not under the control of the State when it acts through its execu-

tive or legislative departments, but of the Regents, who are di-

rectly responsible to the people for the execution of their trust.

So, when the State appropriates money to the University it passes

to the Regents and becomes the property of the University, to be

expended under the exclusive direction of the Regents, and passes

beyond the control of the State through its legislative department.

The University and the school district are both provided for

in the same article of the Constitution. Why should the Legis-

lature mention the school district in this statute and leave out

the University, if it was its intention to include the latter? The

University is the property of the people of the State, and in this

sense is State property, so as to be exempt from taxation. Audi-

tor-General V. Regents, 83 Mich. 467. But the people, wdio are

the corporators of this institution of learning, have, by their

Constitution, conferred the entire control and management of its

afi'airs and property upon the corporation designated as "The

Regents of the University of Michigan," and have thereby ex-

cluded all departments of the State government from any inter-
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ference therewith. The fact that it is State property does not

bring the Regents within the purview of the statute. The people

may, by their constitution, place any of its institutions or property

beyond the control of the Legislature.

This Court has refused to compel the Regents to comply with

certain provisions of acts of the legislature against their judgment

that they were not for the best interests of the L^niversity. Peo-

ple V. Regents, 4 Mich. 104; People v. Regents. 18 id. 469; People

V. Regejits, 30 id. 473. The Legislature w-as undoubtedly cog-

nizant of the above decisions, for the questions involved were of

considerable public interest.

These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the Re-

gents are not included in this act, and that the judgment should

be reversed, and judgment entered in this Court for the defendants.

Judgment entered accordingly.

Hooker, C. J., and Long, J., concurred with Grant, J.

not uncl r the control of the State when it act through its executive or 1 gislative departments, but of the Regent , who ar directly r espo n ~ ibl e to the people for the execution of their tru t.
So, when the State appropriates money to the University it pa se
to th e Regents and become the property of the University, to be
expended under the exclusive direction of the Regents, and pa se
beyond the control of the State through it legislative department.
The lJniversity and th e school district are both provided for
in the same article of the Constitution. Why should the Legislature mention the school district in this statute and leave out
the niver ity, if it wa its intention to include the latter ? The
niversity is the prop rty of the people of the State, and in this
sen e is State property, so a to be exempt from taxation. Auditor- General v. Rco-ents, 83 Mich. 467. But the people, who are
the corporators of thi institution of lea rning, have, by their
Con titution, conferred the entire control and management of its
affair and property upon th e cor.poration d sig nated a "The
Regents of the niver ity of Michigan," and have thereby excluded all department of the ~ tate government from any interference therewith. The fact that it i State property doe not
bring the Regents within the purview of the tatute. The people
may, by their constitution, place any of its in titutions or property
beyond the control of the L egi lature.
This ourt ha re fu ~ ed to compel th e Regents to compl y with
certain provi'sions of acts oi the L egislature against their judgment
that they were not for the best interests of the U niversity. P eople v. R egents, 4 Mich. IO...j.; People v. R egents; 18 id. 469; People
v. R egents, 30 id. 473. The L egislature was undoubtedly cognizant of the above decision , for the questions involved were of
considerable public intere t.
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the Regents are not included in this act, and that the judgment should
be rever'secJ, and judgment entered in thi s Court for th e defendant
Jud gment entered accordingly.
HooKER, C. ]., and Lo w:;, J. , concurred with GRANT, J.
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United States, to use of Annjstox I'ipk & Foundry Co., vs.

X ATIOXAL SuRFTV Co. (1899).

l.'.\TrED

,-T.\ TE.,

to u c

f

. \>: x 1 sT o~

P1PE

• Fo

' .\'DRY

'o., vs.

92 Fed. 549 (Fis^hth, C. C. A.)

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the

::\\ Tl(J.\'.\ L

'u~FT\'

'o .

9) .

(1

Eastern District of Missouri.

Tliis suit was l)rou|L^ht liv the Anniston Pipe & h'oundry Com-

pany, the ])laintifif in error, in the name of the United States,

9- F eel. 5-+9 ( Ei g hth,

'

. \. )

against the National Surety Company, the defendant in error,

on a hond executed hy the defendant on Jul}- 15, 1895, as surety

for T. J. I'rdsser. the hond having been executed pursuant to the

provisions of an act of congress approved August 13, 1894 (28

ln er ro r to th
' ircuit ourt o f th
E a tern D i tri ct o f ).Ji . o uri.

C' nit cl State

fo r th

Stat. 278, c. 280), which is as follows:

"An Act for the protection of persons furnishing materials and labor for

file construction of pnlilic i\.'orks.

"Be it enacted," etc.. "lh;U hereafter any person or persons entering

into a formal contract w ith the United States for the construction of any

public l)uilding, or tlie proseciuion and completion of any public work or

for repairs upon any public building or public work, shall be required

before commencing such, work to execute the usual penal bond, with good
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and sufficient sureties, with the additional obligations that such contractor

or contractors shall promptly make payments to all persons supplying him

Thi s uit \\·a bro ught by the .\nni ton Pipe & l· un lry 'om pa ny , th e plaintiff in error. in th e name of th Cnitecl tat
a g ain , t th e :\ a ti onal Surety Company, the defendant in rror,
on a boncl executed by th e cl ' f nclant on July 15, I 9'"' , a
urety
fo r T. J. P ro ·er, th e b nd having bee n ex ecuted pur uant t th
p rovi ions of an act of congre apprO\·ccl •\u a u t I 3. r 4 ( 2
.'ta t. 27 >, c. 280), \\·hi ch is a fo li o \\'. :

or them labor -ind materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in

such contract ; and any person or persons making application therefor, and

furnishing affidavit to the deiiartnuut under the direction of which said

work is being, or has been prosecuted, tliat labor or materials for the pros-

ecution of such work has 1)een su|)i)lied by him or them, and payment for

which has not been made, shall l^e furnished with a certified copy of said

contract and bond, upon which said person or persons supplying such labor

and materials shall have a right of action and shall be authorized to bring

suit in the name of the United States for his or their use and benefit

against said contractor and sureties and lo prosecute the same to final

judgment and execiuion : provided, that such action and its prosecution

shall involve the United .States in no expense."

1. J. I'rosser, the princi])al in the hond, had entered into a

contract with Charles U. Thompson, assistant quartermaster of the

United States army, who acted for and in l)ehalf of the United

States of America, fur the conslructicjn of a l)oikr and i)ump house,

pumping machinery, and connections, water mains, steel trestle,

and water tank, etc., for the water-supply system for the new

".•Ill .Jct for t/1c protcrtiu ll of perso ns (1 m1islz i11 g 111 at crials 011d la bor for
thL' cu11strnctio 11 ol /l !lblic 'i.•' .n· l,.s .
··n e it enac t eel ," et c .. "th at h e r a ft · r a ny pe r o n r p e r o n - nt ering
int o a fo rm <' I co ntract " ith th e U n ited la te · fo r th e con ::- lru cti o n o f any
publ ic h u ilcl ing . o r th e prmcc 1:ti o11 a nd co mple t io n o f a ny publi c w o rk o r
fo r r e pai r s up o n .tn) pu bli c b uildin g o r publi c w o rk . . ha ll be r quired
b efore co m men c in g . uch \\'O r k lo c" ec ul e th e u s ua l p n a l bo ncl, with g o d
a n d suftic iellt ure ti es, \\' ith th e ad d iti o n a i o bli <p ti o n s th a L s uch c ntracto r
o r cont rac to r ;: shall pro mptl y m a k e pay me nt s to a ll pe rso n s s uppl y in g h im
o r t h ' !11 bbo r ·t1 icl m ate ri :tl s in th ·~ p rnsec uti nn o f th e \\ o rk p roY icl ecl fo r in
'- ll ·h co ntract: a nd a ny p ' r so n o r pe r ..;on s m a k in g a ppli ca ti on th e refo r , a nd
furni sh in g aftidaY it to th e. ckpa rtm nt undC'r the dir ec ti o n f which said
\\'O r k is bcin ?", o r has b en p ro·;ec111 ecl. th at lab 0 r o r m a t · ri a ls fo r th p rosec ut io n of s uch w o rk h as bee n s uppli ed by him o r th em, a nd pa ym ent fo r
w hi ch has no t h ·en ni:td l', s ha ll J' c furni s h ed w ith a ce rtifi ed cory of said
co n tract a nd bo nd. upo n whi ch sa id p ' I"-. n o r p ' r o n s upplyin g u ch lab o r
a n d nn te r ials s ha ll ha\'C: a r ig h t or ac ti o n a nd -., h::i ll b a uth o ri z cl t o brin g
..;uit iii th e na m e o f th ' l'n it ccl St a tes fo r l1is o r th e ir u s a nd b en efit
agai n ... t . ai cl co n t r acto r a nd -;11rct ies a 11d lo prosec ut e th e sam e t o fin a l
judgmen t a n d exec uti o n : p ro \·ide cl . t h a~ uch a cti o n a ncl it s pr ecuti on
shall inYolYe th e l.: nil cd . late in no ex ;)(' n s ...

T. J. Pr
r, th e l rin -ipal in th e h ncl, ha I ent r cl into a
co ntract \\·ith ' harl e B. Th omp on, a . i Lant quarterma t -r f th
' nit ·d Stat : army, wh o a tecl f r and in b half f th Cnite l
.' tate. o f .\meri ca, fo r th e con. tru cti on of a I ii ran 1 pump h u e,
pumpin g machin ry . and connecti on , water main , te 1 tr tle,
ancl wat r tank, tc .. f r th wat r- upply y t m f r th new

U. S. \'S. NATlON,\L sirn.ETY CO.
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military post near Little Rock, Ark. ; and the bond contained a

condition, in substance, that if said Prosser, his heirs, executors,

and administrators, should in all respects duly and fully observe

and perform all and singular the covenants, conditions, and agree-

ments in and by said contract agreed to be observed and perfomied

by said Prosser, according to the true intent and meaning of said

contract, as well during any period of extension of said contract

as during the original term, and should make full pa^•ments to

all persons supplying him labor or materials in the prosecution

of the work provided for in said contract, then the obligation

should become void, but otherwise remain in full force and virtue.

The plaintiff company sued to recover of the defendant, as surety

in said bond, the sum of $842.98, with interest and costs, being

the value of certain water pipe which it had supplied to Prosser,

subsequent to the execution of the aforesaid bond and contract,

to enable him to execute the agreement with the government, and

which pipe so supplied he had actually used for that purpose,

but had not paid for. For a defense to the action the defendant

pleaded, and the trial court so found, that subsequent to the exe-
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cution of the aforesaid bond, and the contract which it w^as given

to secure, the government had entered into a further agreement

with Prosser, modifying the terms of the original contract, or,

more accurately, the specifications thereto attached, in such a

manner that Prosser was required to lay only 1,866 linear feet of

six-inch water pipe in place of 3,850 feet, as specified in the origi-

nal contract, and that this change in the terms of the original

contract, or rather the plans for its execution, was made without

the knowledge or consent of the surety company. In view of the

change in the plans for the execution of the contract which less-

ened the amount of water pipe necessary to be supplied and used,

the trial court ruled that the plaintiff' could not recover. It ac-

cordingly rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant, to

reverse which the record has been removed to this court 1)}- a writ

of error.

Tnimaii A. Post, for plaintiff in error.

/. E. McKcighau (Shcpard Barclay, M. F. JTatts, and G.

A. Vaudc-c'ccr, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before Caldwell, vSa?-juorn, and Tilwlr. Circuit Judges.

Thayer, C. J., after stating the case as above, delivered the

opinion of the court.

\

military po t near Litt\ R ock, Ark.; and th e bond contained a
condition, in ub tance, that if . aid Pros er, hi heirs, executors,
and administrators, should in all r spects duly and fully observe
and perform all and ingular the covenant , condition , and agreement in and by sa id contract agreed to be obse rved a nd per form ed
by said Prosser, according to th e true intent and meanin g of said
contract, as well during· any peri od of extension of said contract
as during the ori ginal term, and hould make full payments to
upplying him labor or material s in the pro ecutio n
all per on
of the wo rk provided for in sa id contract, then the obligation
should become void. but oth erwi se remain in full fo rce and vi r tue.
The plaintiff company ued to recover of the clefenclant, a urcty
in aid bond, the sum of $8. .p.98, with intere t and costs , being
the valu e of certain water pipe \\·hi ch it had supplied to Prosser,
subs quent to the execution of the aforesaid bond a nd contra ct,
to enable him to execute the agreement with the gove rnm ent, a nd
which pipe so uppliecl he hacl actually tL eel for that purpose,
but hacl not paid for. For a defense to the action the defendant
pleaded, and the trial court so found, that subsequent to the execution of the aforesaid bo!1d, and the contract which it wa given
to secure, the government hacl entered into a further agreement
with Prosse r, m odifying- the term s of the orig inal contract, or ,
more accurately, the sp ifications th ereto attached. in such a
manner that Prosser ·w as required to lay only i .866 linea r feet of
ix-inch water pipe in place of 3,850 feet, a specified in the or iginal contract, and that thi change in th e terms of the origi nal
contract, or rath er th e plan s fo r its execution . was made with0ut
the knowl edge or consent of th surety company. In view of the
change in the plan for th e execution of the contract which lessened the amount of water pipe nece sary to be supplied and used,
th e trial court rul ed that the plaintiff could not recover. It ace rdingly rendered a j udgm nt in favor of the clefenclant. to
reve rse which th e reco rd has be n removed to this co urt lw a writ
of error.
Tru/llall .-:1. Post. for plaintiff in error.

!. E. JlcKcigha11 (Shepard
Va11dc1.·ccr, on the brief), fo r
Defore C \LD\\ ' G:L L, S.\:.; UO]~'~
TIL\ YER, C. ]., after tating
opinion of th e court.

Burcla)', JI. F. {f 'atts, and C.
defendant in erro r.

_,-_1.

I
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the ca

e

as above, cleliYered the
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50 c;larantv and suretyship.

It is a familiar rule of law that the contract of a surety must

be strictly construed, and that it cannot be enlarged by construc-

tion, and that when a bond, with sureties, has been given to secure

the performance of a contract, and the principal in the Ijond and

the person for whose benefit it was given make a material change

in the contract without the consent of the surety, the latter is

thereby discharged, h'or present purposes, it may be conceded

that the finding of the lower court in the case at bar discloses

such a modification of the original contract between Prosser and

the United States as would fall within the rule last stated, and

release the defendant comi)any from its liability, if the United

States was suing for its own benefit for a breach of some provision

of the contract, the due performance of which the bond was in-

tended to secure. Such, however, is not the case. The suit is

not brought b\- the United States to recover any damage which

it has sustained ; neither is it brought to enforce any provision

of the contract which was entered into between the United States

and the principal in the bond. ( )n the contrary, the action is

one to enforce a stipulation found in the bond, and only in the
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bond, which was intended solely for the protection of laborers

and material men who might furnish labor and materials while

the contract was being executed by Prosser. The United States

is merely a nominal i)laintifi^, and as such, under the provisions of

the act of congress, it cannot be held liable even for costs. The

real plaintiff is the corporation for whose use the suit was brought,

and it sues to enforce an obligation which congress required to be

inserted in the bond for its protection and for the protection of

others who might furnish labor or materials while the work was

in progress.

The real question to be considered, therefore, is whether the

act of congress under which the bond in suit was taken constituted

the United States the agent or representative of the persons who

supplied labor and materials after the contract and ])()nd were

executed, in such a sense that its action in consenting to a modifi-

cation (if the contract with Prosser nuist be imputed to the labor-

ers and material men, and held to deprive them, as well as the

government, of all recourse against the surety.

The act of congress of August 13, i<S(j4, does not authorize

the United States to bring suits of its own motion against the

obligors in such bonds as are therein provided for, to recover what

is due to laborers and material men. It is not empowered to act

b'

It is a familiar rule of la\\' that the contract of a ur ty mu t
c 11 ' lru cl, and that it annot b ' nlarge<l by con tru -

~trictl)

tion, and that \\'h ' n a bond, \\'ilh s uret ie , ha be n o-iven t
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' uch, h \\' •v r. i n l th ca
The uit i
no t brought by th e l Tnit I tate to r c ver any <lama
which
it ha
u tain cl; n e ith ·r
it brou g ht to enf re any prov1 ion
of th e contract \\'hi ch \\·a
nter rl int betw en the Un it d tat
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in their behalf in that respect, but such actions can only be brought

at the instance of persons who furnish labor and materials, who

are authorized, without previous leave being obtained from any

executive department, to sue in the name of the United States,

and control the litigation precisely as they might control it if

the suits were brought in their own name. It is also noticeable

that in its title the act professes to be one for the benefit "of

persons furnishing materials and labor," and that in the body of

the act the form of the condition to be inserted in the bond for

the benefit of the United States is not in terms prescribed, the only

provision in that regard being that the bond shall be "the usual

penal bond" ; meaning, evidently, such an obligation for the gov-

ernment's own protection as it had long been in the habit of exact-

ing from those with whom contracts were made for the doing of

public work. On the other hand, the condition for the benefit of

persons who might furnish materials or labor is carefully pre-

scribed. Obviously, therefore, congress intended to afi^ord full

protection to all persons who supplied materials or labor in the

construction of public buildings or other public works, inasmuch
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as such persons could claim no lien thereon, whatever the local

law might be, for the labor and materials so supplied. There

was no occasion for legislation on the subject to which the act

relates, except for the protection of those who might furnish

materials or labor to persons having contracts with the govern-

ment. The bond which is provided for by the act was intended

to perform a double function, — in the first place, to secure to the

government, as before, the faithful performance of all obligations

which a contractor might assume towards it ; and, in the second

place, to protect third persons from whom the contractor obtained

materials or labor. Viewed in its latter aspect, the bond, by

virtue of the operation of the statute, contains an agreement be-

tween the obligors therein and such third parties that they shall

be paid for whatever labor or materials they may supply to enable

the principal in the bond to execute his contract with the United

States. The two agreements which the bond contains, the one

for the benefit of the government, and the one for the benefit of

third persons, are as distinct as if they were contained in separate

instruments, the government's name being used as obligee in the

latter agreement merely as a matter of convenience.

In view of these considerations, we are of opinion that the

sureties in a bond, executed under the act now in question, cannot

in their behalf in that re pect, but uch action can only be brought
at the instance of person who furnish labor and material , who
are authorized, without previous leave b ing obta in ed from any
ex cutive department, to sue in the name of the U nited States,
and control th e li tigation preci ely a th y might control it if
th e suit were bro ught in th ir own name. It i al o noticeable
that in it title th e act profe es to be one for the ben fit "of
persons furni bing material s and labor," and that in the body of
th act th e fo rm of the condition to be inserted in the bond for
the. benefit of the U nited States is not in terms pre cribed, the only
provision in that regard being that the bond shall be ''the u ual
penal bon l" ; meaning, evidently, such an obligation fo r the government' ow n protection a it had long been in the habit of exacting from tho e with whom contracts were made for the doing of
public work . O n the other hand, the condition for the benefit of
persons who might furni sh material or labor i carefull y precribed. Obviously, therefore, cong ress intended to afford full
protection to all person who supplied material or labor in the
construction of public buildings or oth er public work , inasmuch
as such p rsons could claim no lien thereon, whatever the local
law might be,. fo r th e labor and material so supplied. There
was no occa ion fo r legislation on th e subj ect to which the act
relates, except for the protection of those who might furnish
materials or labor to persons having contracts with the governm ent. The bond which is provided fo r by the act was intended
to per fo rm a doubl e function, -in the first place, to ecure to the
government, a before, the faithful perf rmance of all obligations
which a contractor might assume toward it ; and, in the second
place, to protect third per ons from whom the contractor obtained
materials or labor. V iewed in its latter a pect, th e bond, by
virtue of th e operation of th e statute, contains an agreement betw een th e obligors therein and such third parties that they shall
be paid for \Yhatever labor or materials they may supply to enable
the principal in the bond to execute hi contract with the U nited
States. Th e two agreements which the bond contains, the one
for the benefit of th e government, and the one for the benefit of
third persons. are as distinct as if th ey were contained in separate
instruments, the government's name being used as obligee in the
latter agreement merely a a matter of convenience.
In view of these considerations, we are of opinion that the
sureties in a bond executed under th e act now in que tion, cannot
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claim cxcnipiiiin from lial)ilitv U) persons who have suppHcd labor

or materials to their principal to enable him to execute his con-

tract with the I'nited States, simply because the government and

the contractor, without the surety's knowledge, have made some

changes in the contract, subsequent to the execution of the bond

given to secure its performance, which do not alter the general

character of the work' contemi)lated 1)\- the contract or the general

character of the materials uhich are necessary for its execution.

When the government has executed the contract and taken and

approved the bond, it ceases to be the agent of third parties whom

the contractor em|)loys in the execution of the work or from whom

he obtains materials, and tlie rights of such persons under the

bond are unatfected by subsequent transactions between the gov-

ernment and the contractor. If ^uch were not the case, it would

be possible for the contractor and some officer of the United States,

by making some change in the contract or specifications, to deprive

laborers and material men of all recourse against the sureties

in the bond after they iiad supplied materials and labor of great

value in reliance upon its provisions, it is not probable that
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such a result was contem])!ated 1)y the lawmaker. On the con-

trary, the act bears every evidence that it was intended to provide

a securitv for laborers and material men on which they could rely

confidently for protection, unless they saw fit, by their own deal-

ings with the contractor, to relin(|nish the benefit of the security.

We are confirmed in these views by the following authorities:

Dczvcy V. State 91 Ind. 173; Conn. v. Slate. 125 Tnd. 514, 25 N.

E. 443; Doll V. Cnime, 41 Neb. 655, 50 X. W. 806; Kaiifmaiiii v.

Cooper, 46 Neb. 644, 65 N. W. 796; Stetfcs v. Leiiikc, 40 Minn.

27. 41 \. W. 302. The first two of these cases are \-er_\- nuich

in point. Uonds were given to the state of Indiana as obligee for

the doing of public work, in i^ursuance of a statute of that state,

which bonds contained conditions rec|uiring — First, the faithful

performance and execution of the work undertaken by the con-

tractor; and. second, the |)rompl payment by the contractor of

all debts incurred b\- him in the prosecution of the work for labor

and materials supplied by third j^arties. It was held, in sub-

stance, that for any breach of the second condition of the bond by

the contractor the right of action was in the laborer or the mate-

rial man, and -that such right of action could not be defeated or

prejudiced by any act done by ihc obligee in the l)ond after the

bond had been taken and approved. It was accordingly rulcfl

daim cxcmptinn frum liability tn per ·e n s \\'h have suppli 'd labor
or materials to their principal tu enabl' him to execut' his contract \Yith the l ' nitcd States, simply bccaus' the g \'e rnrncnt and
the contractor, without the surety's knowledge, have made ·ome
change. in the contract, s ub cqucnt to the ,x 'CUtion of the bond
g·iyen to :,cc11-c its pcrformanc \ which do not alter the g- >rn.: ral
·haracter oi the \\·o rk c·o nternplatecl by the ·ontract or the gen ' ral
character of the mate rials \\·hich arc necessary for its execution.
\\ 'he n the gov '.r nm 'nt ha executed the contract and tak ·n and
approved the bond, it ceases to be the agent of third parties \\'h orn
the contractor employs in the execution of the ,,·o rk or from \\·h0111
he o btains materials, and the rights of such person s un l ' r the
bond are unaffected by subsequent transacti o n between th ' gU\'ernm ' nt ancl the contractor. lf ~uch \\·ere nut the ca. c. it \\·ould
be possible for the contractor and some o !ilccr o f th l ' nitccl States,
by making some change in the contract o r specifications, to clq rive
laborers and material men of all r eco Lirsc against the ureti
in the bond after they liacl supplied materials and labo r of great
value in reliance upo n it. prov-isio n s. l t is no t probable that
such a result was contemp1atf'cl by th e lawmaker. Un th' contrary, the act hears every eYiclcnce that it wa . intendccl lo provide
a ·ecurity for labo rers and material m en on which th e~· co uld rely
confidently for protection. unl ess they saw ht, hy their own deal ings ,,·ith th e contractor. to rclinq11i s h the benefit of the security.
\\·c are o nfirmecl in these vic\\·s hy the follm\·ing authorities:
lJc<l'CY v. Stale C) I [ncl. 17 ); Co1111. v. Stale, 125 lncl. 5q. -5 N.
I~. -t-~3; Doll v. Cru111c. 4 1 Keh . 655, 59 1\1. \\ '. 806; A'a11/lllw111 v.
Cooper, -t6 .i\'eb. 6-t-J.. 65 N. \V. 796: Std/cs v. Lelli kc. -~O ~\ Linn.
27, -tI ::\. \\'. :)02. The first two o[ th ese cases arc ,·c ry much
in point. I ~on els \\·ere giv n to the slate o f l ncliana as ohl ig 'C for
the doing of puhli· work. in pursuancr.: o f a tatute o [ that . tate,
\\·hich boncls containccl conclitions rcq11iring-First. the faithful
performance :rncl execution o f tl1 e w o rk uncl rtaken by the contracto r: ancl, s 'CO nrl, th prompt paym ent by th e co ntract r f
all debt s incurred by him in th' pro. ecution of the work for labor
and materials supplied hy third parties. It was h -lcl, in substance, th at for any breach o f th second c nclition of th bond by
the contractor tl1 ' right of action was in th e labo rer o r th e material man, ancl ·that such right of a ·tio n co uld n ot be cl 'fcatccl 01prcjudicecl by any act cl on e by th e nbl ig-cc in the honcl after the
bond had b ee n taken ancl appn~ Ycd. 1t wa. accordingly rul ed
0
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that changes made in the contract 1»\- the parties thereto, to wit,

the contractor and the puhUc authorities, after the l)()nds had been

executed and accepted, would not deprive material men of their

right to recover against the sureties in the bond. It resuhsi from

what has Ijeen said that the judgment of the circuit court was

erroneous upon the facts found Ijy that court, and should be

reversed. It is so ordered, and that the case be remanded for a

new trial.

Griffith cf al. z's. Ruxdle ct al. (1900).

23 Wash. 4^3:55 L. R. A. 381 ; 63 P. 199.

Appeal In- defendants from a judgment of the Superior Court

for Spokane county in favor of plaintiffs in an action brought

that change made in the contract hy the partie thereto. to wit,
the contractor and the public authoritie . after the h ncl had been
executed and accepted, w uld not deprive material m n of their
rig ht to recover again t lhe suret ie in th bond. It re ult from
what ha been aid that the judgment of the circuit court wa
erroneou · upon the facts fo un d by that court, and houlcl be
reversed . It i o ord ered. an cl that the ca e be remanded for a
new trial.

to hold sureties on a contractor's bond liable for unpaid labor

and materials which went into the construction of the building.

Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Hciilcy, KcUam, & Lindslcy and A. G. Avery, for

appellants.

Messrs. Lewis & Leicis, for respondents.
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Reavis, J., delivered the opinion of the court :

GRIFFITH ct

al. 'L'S. RcxDLE ct al. ( 1900).

23 \\Tash . 4.53 :s;) L. R. A. 381; 63 P. i99.

In July, 1897, defendant Rundle entered into a contract with

the United States for the construction of certain buildings at the

army post near Spokane. At the time the contract was executed,

a bond was duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the

act of Congress approved August 13, 1894 (28 Stat, at L. p. 278,

chap. 280). The law is entitled "An x\ct for the Protection of

Persons Furnishing Materials and Labor for the Construction of

Public Works." Its provisions are substantially that any person

entering into a formal contract with the United States for the

by defendant from a judgm ent of the S uperior Co urt
for pokan e county in favor of plaintiffs in an action brought
to hold uretie on a contractor' bond liable fo r unpaid labor
and materials \Yhich \Y ent into the co nst ru ction of the building.
ffirm ed.
The fact are stated in the opinion.
APPE ,\L

construction of any public building shall be required, before com-

mencing, to execute the usual penal bond with good and sufficient

sureties, with the additional obligations that the contractor shall

promptly make payments to all persons supphdng him labor and

materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in the con-

tract; that any persons performing labor or furnishing materials

I e rs. H c11/cy, K eila Ill. & Linds/C'J' and A. G.
appellants .

A 'i.!Cl')',

for

.:\Ies rs. Lccvis & L c:l is, fo r re ponclents.
1

R E.wrs,

J., delivered

the opi nion of the court:

In Jul y. 1897, defendant Rundle entered into a co ntract with
the U nited State fo r tli construction of ce rtain building at the
army po t near Spokane.
t the time th e contract was executed,
a bond \Vas duly executed in accordance with th e provision of the
act of Co1io-ress approved August 13, 189-1- (28 tat. at L. p. 278,
chap. 280). Th e law i entitled .. n ct fo r the Prat ction of
Person Furni bing Iaterial s and Labor fo r the Co nstru ction of
Public \York ... Its provisions are sub tantially that any per on
entering into a formal contract \Vith the G nited State for the
constructi on of any public building slnll be required, b fo r e comm encing, to execute th e u ual penai bond with good and sufficient
sureties, with the additional obligation that the contractor hall
promptly make payment to all per on upplying him labor and
material in the pro ecution of the work provided fo r in the contract ; that any per ons p rforming labor or furni hing material
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for such work shall Ijc furnished on application with a certified
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copy of the contract and lx)nd upon which the person supplying

labor and materials shall have a right of action, and be authorized

to bring suit in the name of the United States against the con-

tractor and sureties, provided that such action shall involve the

United States in no expense. The defendants Henley and Snod-

grass were sureties upon the bond, the penal sum of which was

$10,000. While the contractor, Rundle, was engaged in the con-

struction of the buildings under his contract, materials were fur-

nished by plaintiffs to the contractor, and used by him in the work

of construction. Sulxsequently. and while the buildings were but

partially completed, the United States, in the exercise of the right

reserved in the contract, took the work out of the hands of Rundle,

and at the same time notified the sureties, Henley and Snodgrass,

of its action. Thereupon the sureties took up the work of con-

struction, and completed the buildings -according to l^undle's con-

tract, and the United States accepted their work as full perform-

ance of the contract. For defense to the action, after some denials,

the sureties set up the fact that Rundle did not complete the con-
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tract, but the sureties, under its terms, made full perfomiance,

wdiich was duly accepted by the United States, and that in their

completion of the contract they were necessarily compelled to

expend sums in excess of $10,000, the amount of the penalty

in the bond.

I. The several assignments of error made by the appellants

may be grouped together, and stated as the refusal of the superior

court to admit testimony under the affirmative defense set forth

in the answer. The court excluded any evidence with reference

to the United States having demanded of the sureties the per-

formance of the contract or the payment of damages. It is main-

tained by counsel for appellants that the limit of iho liability of

the sureties was the penalty stated in the bond, $10,000; that, if

the sureties had not undertaken the perfonnance of the contract

of their principal, the entire damages to both the government

and the respondents and all of the other claimants for labor and

materials would have been liiiuidalcd by the payment of $10,000;

that the fact that the sureties necessarily expended more than that

sum in the completion of the contract, and over the contract price,

relieves them from further liability. It is also maintained that,

if the contract had not been completed, the government is a pre-

ferred creditor, and its claim would exhaust the penalty, and there

for u h work hall b furni h 1 on application wilh a c rtified
copy of th ' ontract an l bon I upon \\'hich the l er < n upplyin
labor and mat rial hall hav a rio-ht f aclion, and b authoriz d
nit l tale a ·ain t th
ont bring uit in th nam of the
tractor an l ur ti . provided that u h acti n hall involve the
nited tale in no xp n ~- Tb def ndant Il nl y and n dgra w re ureti
upon the bond, th penal um f which was
$10,000.
\Vhil the contractor, Rund! , wa, ngaged in the contruction of the 1 uilding under bi c ntract, mat rial w r furni hed by plaintiff, to th ontractor, and u eel by him in the work
of con tru ti n. Sub eq uently, and \Yhil th building wer 1 ut
partially comp! t cl, the 1-:nited tat
in th exerci of the right
re erved in the contract, took the work out of the hand of Rundle,
and at the ame time notified the ureti , Henley and nodgra ,
of it acti n. Th reupon the ureti
took up the work of contruction, and completed the building ·according to undle' ontract, and the nited tate accepted their work a full p rformance of the contract. For defen e to the action, after some denial ,
the sureti
t up the fact that Rundle did not complete th ontract, but the uretie , under it term , made full perfom1ance,
which "'a duly accepted by the U nited tates, and that in their
completion of the contract they were nece sarily compelled to
expend urn in exce
of ro,ooo, the amount f th p nalty
in the bond.
r. The s v ral a ignments of err r mad e by the appellants
may be group d together, and tatecl a the refu al of the up rior
court to admit te timony uncl r tbe a.:f:firmative d fen e
t forth
in the ·an wer. The court excluded any evidence with ref r nee
to the
nit cl tate having cl manded of the ur tie the performanc of th contract or the payment of damage . It i maintained by c un el for app llant that th limit of the liability of
the ureti wa the penalty tated in th bond
LO, o ; that, if
the uretie had not unclertak n the performanc of the c ntra t
of their principal, the ntire lamag
to 1 th th government
an l the re pond nt and all of the oth r claimant for lab r and
material w ulcl hav 1 en liquiclat d by th paym nt of IO, o ;
that the fact that the uretie n ce~ arily e.'p nd d mor than that
um in the comp! tion f the contract, an I ov r th c ntract price,
relieve th m fr m further liability. It i al o maintained that,
if the contract ha l not been compl te 1, the o- v rnm nt is a pr f rred er ditor, and it claim would xhau t th p nalty, and th r
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would be no funds left for the satisfaction of plaintiffs and other

claimants of like character; and counsel maintain that it is neces-

sar\- to detemiine the question of priority of rights as between

the government and these claimants. In a case involving these

facts, — United States use of Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Rundle, — in

the United States circuit court, judgment was entered in con-

formity with the contention of counsel here. But the cause was

afterwards reversed by the United States circuit court of appeals

(40 C. C. A. 450, 100 Fed. 400), and the appellate court observed:

"The undisputed facts of the present case are such that it is not

necessary to consider the question presented in the court below,

and argued here, whether if the United States had any cause of

action upon the bond in suit, its claim should be preferred to that

of the laborers and material men ; for, as has already been observed,

the United States received full performance of the contract, and

therefore has no cause of complaint." In the case of United States

use of Anniston Pipe & Foundry Co. v. National Surety Co., 34

C. C. A. 526, 92 Fed. 549, such a bond was under consideration

by the court, and it was there adjudged that the bond was intended

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

to perform a double function : First, to secure the faithful per-

fomiance of the contract to the government ; and, second, to pro-

tect third persons from whom the contractor might obtain labor

or materials in the prosecution of the work. In its second aspect,

the bond, by virtue of the statute, contains a separate and distinct

agreement between the obligors and such third persons as to which

the agency of the government ceases when the bond is given and

approved, and subsequent changes in the contract, agreed upon

between the government and the contractor, though without the

knowledge or consent of the surety, will not release the surety

from liability to persons who supply labor or materials thereunder.

The court observed of the statute under which the bond is exe-

cuted : "It is also noticeable that in its title the act professes to be

one for the benefit 'of persons furnishing materials and labor,'

and that in the body of the act the form of the condition to be

inserted in the bond for the benefit of the United States is not in

terms prescribed, the only provision in that regard being that the

bond shall be 'the usual penal bond :' meaning, evidently, such an

obligation for the government's own protection as it had long

been in the habit of exacting from those with whom contracts were

made for the doing of public work. On the other hand, the con-

dition for the benefit of persons who might furnish materials or

would be no fund left fo r the ati faction of plaintiff ancl other
claimant of like character; and coun el maintain that it i. 11 ce sary to determine the questi n of priority of rights a bctw en
the government and the e claimant . In a case involvino- the e
fact ,-U11ited States 11 e of Fidelity Nat. Ballk v. Rwid/e)-in
the
nited tate
ircuit court, judgment was entered in conformity with the contention of counsel here. B ut the cau ~e wa
afterwards reverse 1 by the U nited States circuit court of appea ls
( 40 . C. A . ..+SO, 100 Fed . ..J.Oo), and the appellate court ob ervecl:
''The undi puted facts of th pre nt ca e are such that it i not
nece sary to consider the qu tion present d in the co urt below,
and argued here, whether if the U nited tates had any cau e of
action upon the bond in uit, its claim hould be preferred to that
of the laborers and material men ; for, as has already been observed ,
the U nited tates received full performance of the contract, and
therefor e ha no cau e of complaint." In the ca e of U llitcd States
use of Annisto n Pipe & Foundry Co. v. National Surct3 Co., 3-t
C. . A. 526, 92 Fed. 549, uch a bond wa under consideration
by th e court, and it was there adjudged that the bond was intended
cure the faithful perto p rform a double functi on: First, to
formance of the contract to the government ; and, seco nd, t protect third persons from whom th e contractor might obtain labor
or material in the pro ecution of the work. In it econd a pect,
the bond, by virtue of th statute, contain a eparate and di tinct
agr ement between th e obligors and such third persons a to which
the ao-ency of the government cea e when the bond is given and
approved, and subsequent change in th e contract, agr eel upon
bet,,·een the government and th e contractor , thOLto-h with nt the
knowledge or consent of the surety, will not relea e the urety
from liability to persons who supply labor or materials thereunder.
The court ob erved of the statute und er which th e bond i execute 1: ' 'It i also noticeabl e that in it title the act profe e to he
one fo r the benefit 'of per ons furni hing material and labor,'
and that in the body of the act the fo rm of the condition to be
inserted in the bond for the benefit of the Tnited tates i not in
term prescribed, the only provision in that r gard 1 eing that the
bond hall be 'the u ual penal bond;' meaning, evid ntly. uch an
obligation fo r th e governm ent' O\Yn protection a it had long
been in the habit of exacting from those with whom contracts were
made for the doing of public work. O n the other hand, the condition for the ben fit of per on who might furni sh material or
1
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labor is carefully prescribed. ( 'hxiwusly, therefore, Congress in-

tended to afford full protection to all persons who supplied mate-

rials of labor in the construction of i)ul)lic buildings or other

public works, iuasnuich as such persons could claim no lien thereon,

whatever the lucal law might be, for the labor and materials so

supplied. There was no occasion for legislation on the subject to

which the act relates, except for the protection of those who might

furliish materials t)r labor to persons having contracts with the

government. * * * Viewed in its latter aspect, the bond, by virtue

of the operation c^f the statute, contains an agreement betw^een the

obligors therein and such third parties that they shall be paid

for whatever labor or materials they may sujjply to enable the

principal in the bond to execute his contract with the United

States. The two agreements wliich the bond contains — the one

for the beneht of the government, and the one for the benefit of

third persons — are as distinct as if they were contained in sepa-

rate instruments, the government's name being used as obligee in

the latter agreement merely as a matter of convenience." In the

case of Dczi'cy v. Stale c.v rcl. McCoIhiiii, 91 Ind. 173, it was sub-
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stantially held that for any breach of the second condition of such

a bond by the contractor the right of action was in the laborer

or the material man. and that such right of action could not be

defeated or abridged by anv act done by the obligee in the bond

after the bond had l)een taken and approved; and it was ruled

that changes made in the contract bv iIk- parties thereto — that is,

the contractor and the juiblic authorities — after the bonds had been

accepted would not deprive material ukmi of their rights to recover

against sureties in the bond. To the same eff'ect is Conn v.

State ex rel. StnlsiiKin. 125 ind. 514, 25 X. E. 443, and the same

principle is affirmed in Doll v. Cniiiie, 41 Neb. 655, 59 X. W. 806;

Kanfniann v. Cooper, 46 Xel). 644, 65 N. W. 796; Steffes v.

Leuike, 40 Minn. 27, 41 X. W. 302. Ilie practical eft'ect of the

statute, and others of similar character in a number of the states,

seems to be to confer a special lien in favor of such persons who

furnish labor and material, and to sul)stilute the l)ond in ])lace

of the public building as a thing upon which Uu- lien is to be

charged. Such liens evidently a])]iear, from an nispe;:tion of the

current legislation, to be favored, and the courts have usually

adopted a liberal rule of constructitoi in their enforcement.

2. It is ])ertinenl to suggest that in the i>erformance of the

unfinished contract by the sureties, if they had expended less than

labor is cardulh p rescribed. ( Jin ·iuus l) , th erefo r '. Cu n gTes: in te nded tu affo rd iull protection lo all pe!-:un s \\' ho · upp lied m a ter ials uf labor i11 tlw cunst ruction of p ubli c lm ild in o-s o r o thtr
p ublic \\·urks , ina . much as. uch per. o n: co uld cla im no lien th e r ·on ,
"hatevcr the luca l lc:l\\ mi gh t be, fo r th' la bor a nd m a te r ials
s u ppli ·cl. The r e ,,·as no ccas io n fo r 1 ·g is lati n o n th e u bject to
\\ hich the act relate . . exce pt fo r th e p rotectio n f th o e \Y ho mi g ht
f u r~1iJ1 materials o r labo r to pe r son : ha vin g· contract \\'ith the
gU\·c rnm cnt. :;: :;: ::: \ ·icw cd in it - la tter c:L p ·ct , th bo nd , by v irtu
of the ope ra tio n o f th e s ta tute . contain . an a:-.;reem ent betw en th
o bli cror s t he rein and s u -h third parties th a t th ey hall b pa id
fo r ,,·ha tever la bo r o r material th 'Y m ay · uppl y to enabl th
prin -ipal in th e bo nd to ex ec ute hi s co ntrac t \\'ith the Tnitcd
S tate . T he t\\'O agreem ent whi ch th e bo nd conta in - th e o n :>
fo r th e ben efit o f th e gove rnment, and th ' on e fo r the b n fit f
third p e r on - ar c a s di s tin c t a if th ey w e re c ntain ed in er ara tc in trurn c nts, th ' g o vernment' s nam e be ing u ed a obli · e in
the la tte r agreem ent m er ely a a matter o f con ve ni nee. " In th
a e o f De'Ll1ey ,._S tate ex rel. Jlc Co /111 111, 9 t ln cl. 173, it wa u l ta ntiall y h elcl th a t fo r an v b reach o f th ' seco nd conditio n f -u -h
a bond by th e contrac to r th e ri crht o f action w a in the lal r r
o r th e material m a n, ancl that su ·h ri g ht o f ac tion co uld n ot b
clcfcatecl or a brid ged by anv a ct clone by the o bli g e in th bond
a fte r th e bo nd had bee n taken a ncl appr vecl; ancl it \Ya rule 1
that changes m a d e in th e contract by lh par ti e the ret - th a t i · ,
th e contrac tor a nd lh e publi c autho riti c ·- aft r th bond hacl be n
acce pted w o uld no t cl cpriv material m en f th eir rights to recov r
again t s ureti 'S in th bond . T o the sam e ff ect i Co 1111 v.
'tatc ex rel. S ti: ts111a 11 . 1 2 5 Incl. 51 .cJ., 25 ~. E. 443, and th e am e
prin ciple i. affirm ed in Doll v. Cru11 1c, 41 Ne! . 55 , 59 I\ . \ V.
/{ uuf11ia11 11 v. Coo per, -1-6 .:\eb. 6-1--1-. 65 ~. \\' . 796 ; S teffes v .
L c111 lec, -1-0 .:\linn . 27 . ...j.l ~. \\ '. 302. T h ' prac tical eff ect of th '
, ta tute , a ncl o th er. o f similar character in a number o f the ta te: .
ccm to he to ·o n f ' r a s p ' ·ia l li en in fav o r o f . u ch per n wh o
furni sh la bo r an cl mat rial , ancl t
ub, titutc the bond in pl;i ·e
o f th e publi c builcli1io- a s a thin g- upon " ·hi ch th e lien i to be
h a 1-gcd . S uc h lie n s ' Yiclently a pp ear, f ro rn an in p~tio n o f th "
o urt hav n ually
curren t 1 g i,:;la ti o n . to h favo red . a ncl 1h
a dopted a lib ra l ml ' of con tructi n in th ir e n fo rcem ent.
2 . It is pe rtin ent to s ug-ge t th a t in th
l r fo rman ce f th e
uretie. , if th 'Y hacl x pencl cl le lha n
u nfini h eel contrac t by th
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the amount to be paid by the goveniniont on the completion of tlie

contract, the excess or profit would have belonged to them, and,

if they undertook the completion of the contract and sustained a

loss, it would seem that it should fall upon them. As sureties

under the terms of the contract, they might elect to complete it

upon default of their principal, but such completion was not the

full performance of the contract by the principal himself. It sat-

isfied the sureties' contract with the government, but, as observed

bv the circuit court of appeals in United States use of Fidelity

Nat. Bank v. Riindle, 40 C. C. A. 450, 100 Fed. 400, the United

States is not a claimant here, and the question of priority of claims

to the amount due from the sureties under the terms of the bond

is not involved in this case.

The judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.

Dunbar, Ch. J., and Fullerton and Anders, J J., concur.

Union Bank of Louisiana z'j. Coster's Executors (1850).

3 N. Y. 203.

On the 29th of May, 1841, Heckscher & Coster, merchants

of the city of New York, executed and sent to Kohn, Daron &

the am unt to b paid by the o-o\'Crnm cnt on th e compl etion of the
contract, th e exce or profit wo uld ha\'' b longed to them. and,
if they undertook th e compl etion of the contract and . u tainecl a
lo , it would seem that it should fall upon them. ~ \ . urctics
under the t rm of the contract. they mig ht elect to complete it
upon default of th eir principal , but ·uch completion wa not the
full performance of th e contract by the principal him elf. It sati fied the ureti e · contract with the go\'ernment, hut, a ob en-eel
by the circuit court of appeal in United States use of Fidelity
at. Ba11k v. R1111dlc, -+O
. A. -+SO. ioo Feel . .+OO, the Cnited
tate i not a claimant here, and the que tion of priority of claim
to the amount clue from the uretie und er the term of the bond
not i1wolvecl in thi ca e.
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Co., merchants in New Orleans, a letter of credit as follows:

The juc\ o-m ent of the Superio1- Co urt mu t be affirmed.

'•New York, 29 May, 1841.

D uxD.\R, Ch.]., ancl

"Sir: We hereby agree to accept and pay at maturity any draft or

F uL LERTOX

and

AxDER , ]] .,

concur .

drafts on us at sixty days' sight, issued by Messrs. Kohn, Daron & Co. of

your city, to the extent of twenty-five thousand dollars, and negotiated

through your bank. We are respectfully, sir, your obd't serv'ts,

"Heckscher & Coster."

At the foot of the letter of credit was a guaranty executed at

the same time by John G. Co.ster, as follows :

"I hereby guarantee the due acceptance and payment of any draft

CNrox

B.\KK OF

Lom · r.\X .\

't'..).

CosH:R·s

ExE CLJTO RS

(1850).

issued in pursuance of the above credit.

3 X. Y.

"John G. Coster."

203.

On the faith of the above letter of credit and guaranty, the

Union Bank of Louisiana, in January, 1842, purchased two drafts

drawn by Kohn, Daron & Co. on Heckscher & Coster, amounting

to about $9,000, which were accepted and paid by the latter accord-

On the 29th of ::\fay, 18.+1, H eck cher & Co ter , m erchant
of the city of New Y ork, executed and ent to K ohn, Daron &
Co., merchants in ":\ ew Orleans, a letter of credit a follow :
'"NE\\' Y oRK, 29 ~lay, 18-tr.

e h ereby ag ree to accept a n d pay at maturity any draft or
drafts o n u at · ixty day · sight, iss ued by ~le r . Kohn, Daron & Co. of
your city, to t he extent of twenty-five thou a nd dollar , and n egotiated
through your ba nk. \\' e a re respectfu lly, sir, your obd 't se rv' ts,
"HECK SC HER & CO STER."
''

IR: \\

At the foot of the 1 tter of credit wa a guaranty executed at
the ame tim e 1 y J ohn G. Co. ter, as fo ll c w :
'"I hereby gua rantee rh e due acceptance and payment of any draft
ued in pur uan ce of the above credit.
' ' J OH
G. COSTER."

On the faith of the above letter of credit and g uaranty, the
U nion Bank of L oui iana, in January, 18.+2, purcha eel two draft
drawn by K olm , Daron & Co. on Heck cher & Co ter, amountinoto about $9,000, which ,,·ere accepted and paid by the latter accord-
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ing to their agreement. Un tlie 14th of February, 1842. the bank,

under the same letter of credit, purchased another draft for $4,000,

at sixty days' sight, drawn l)y and upon the same parties; and on

the 26th of that month lliis draft was presented to lieckscher &

Coster, in New York, for acceptance, which they refused. On

the 9th of April, 1842, the attorney for the Union IJank gave

notice to John G. Coster that he had received the draft for col-

lection, and on the 2d of May, 1842, formal notice of the protest

incr to their agr menl.
n th qth of Feb ruary, l -t-. the bank,
unc.ler th ame Jett 'r of er <lit, pur ha e l an th r draft fo r -t,OOO,
at ~ ixty d~rys' sight, drawn by a ncl u1 n th am 1 arli ; and on
the - th of tha m nth tl-:.i draft wa pr ent <l t II ck her &
·o. ler, in x e\\
ork, f r acceptan ' which th y r £u d .
n
th 9th of .. \pril, Ir -t2, th attorn y fo r the LJni n Dank o-ave
notice to John G. ~o t r that h had rec iv cl th draft fo r coll ction , and on th 2cl f :i\Iay, r 42, fo rmal 11 tic
f th pr te t
of th draft fo r 11 011-1 aym nt wa. se rv cl n ~Ir. · t r. In
Augu t, T -+4: J oh n
o ter died, a nd th e ni n Bank ub eq uentl y brOLwht this ui t in th e uperi r ourt of th city of ... w
rork, again t hi ex cut rs, upon the o-uaranty al ve
t fo rth,
fo r the purpo · of r cove ring th am unt f the draft.
n the
trial, in aclditi n t th fact already stat cl, it app ared that prior
to any of the ab ve m ntioned tran acti n with th 'C"nion Bank,
the said 1 'tte r of er clit and g uaranty had been h ld by the ity
Bank of ::\" w rlean , which, upon th e faith th r of, in D ec mber, 1841, had purcha l a draft of · J o,ooo drawn by Kohn,
Daron & o. upon H ecks h er & Co ter. Th lett r and g uaranty
wer not adclre · ed to any particular p r n or bank.
r

of the draft for non-payment was served on Mr. Coster. In

August, 1844, John G. Coster died, and the Union Bank subse-

quently brought this suit in the superior court of the city of New

York, against his executors, upon the guaranty above set forth,

for the purpose of recovering the amount of the draft. On the

trial, in addition, to llie facts already stated, it appeared that prior

to any of the above mentioned transactions with the Union Bank,

the said letter of credit and guaranty had Ijeen held l)y the Cily

Bank of Xew Orleans, v/hich, upon the faith thereof, in Decem-

ber, 1841, had purchased a draft of $10,000 drawn by Kolin,.

Daron & Co. ui^n Heckscher & Coster. The letter and guaranty
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were not addressed to any ])articular person or l)ank.

//';//. .1/. livarts, for appellants.

B. JV. Bonney, for respondents.

Pratt, J., delivered the opinion of the court. Contracts of

guaranty differ from other ordinary simple contracts only in the

nature of the evidence required to establish their validity. The

statute requires every special promise to answer for the deljt,

default or miscarriage of another, to be in writing subscriljed

by the party to be charged thereby, and expressing therein tlie

consideration; and no parol evidence will be allowed as a sub-

stitute for these requirements of the statute. But in other respects

the same rules of construction and evidence apply to contracts of

IV1ll . J1f . Evarts, for app llant .

this character which apply to other ordinary contracts. Hence

the consideration, which will support a contract of this character,

B . TV. Bo1uzcJ

1

•

for r e pondent .

as in other cases, may consist in some benefit to the promisor, or

some other per.son at his request, or some trouble or detriment to

the promisee. (20 Wend. 184, 201; Theobald on Pr. & Surety,

3, 4; 2 H. Bl. 312.) Nor is any particular form of words neces-

sary to be used for expressing the consideration ; but it is enough

if from the whole instrument the consideration expressly or l)y

P RATT , J., delivered the opinion of the ourt.
ntract s of
g uaranty cliffer from oth er ordinary imp] contra t
nl y in the
nature of the ev idence requir cl to e tabli~ h th ir validitr. The
tatute require eve ry . pecial prnmi e to an w r fo r the d bt,
default r mi ca rri:ige ,f another, t be in writino- ub cribed
by the party to be barge rl ther eby, and xpre ing ther in foe
con iclerati n ; and n o 1 a rol videnc will be all w d a a ubtit ute f r th e c r quirelllcnt of t he sta tut . But in ther r e p ect
the ame rules f con trnction and evicl nc apply to contract of
thi character ·whi h ap1 ly to othe r ordinary contract . H ence
th con id ration which "ill upport a
ntract f thi character,
a in othe r a es, may on i t in som , bcn fit to th promi or , or
om
ther per n at hi . r eque t, or om c tr ul 1 r detriment to
th promi e. ( 20 \V ncl . 1R.4, 20 1 · Th bald n I r.
urety,
3, ..+; 2 I I. Bl. 3 r 2.) No r i any particular { rm f word neces~ ary to be u eel f r ex1 re in o- th con. id rati on; but it i enough
if from th wh le in. trument th e c n .. d rati n ~ Ir sly or by
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necessary inference appears ; so that it be clear that such and no

other was the consideration upon which the promise was made.

(24 Wend. 35 ; 21 id. 628; 4 Hill, 200; 8 Ad. & El. 846; 5 Barn.

& Ad. 1 109.) And the rule allowing two or more instruments

given at the same time and relating to the same subject matter to

be construed together as one instrument, applies also to this class

of contracts ; so that when a guaranty is given at the same time

with the principal contract and forms a part of the entire transac-

tion, if the consideration be stated in the principal contract, though

none be stated in the guaranty, it will suffice. 8 John. 35 ; 9

Wend. 218; 18 id. 114. So also as in other cases, parol evidence

of the circumstances under which the contract was made may be

given, to aid the court in giving a true construction to ambiguous

terms therein, or to shov/ that separate contracts relate to the same

subject matter.

It should also be observed here, that our statute in terms only

requires the contract to express therein what it had been well

settled the statute of Elizabeth required it to contain, and the same
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rules of construction should therefore be applied in cases under

both statutes. 24 Wend. 35.

With these observations in relation to the law governing cases

of this kind, we come to the consideration of the contract in ques-

tion.

The letter of credit of Heckscher & Coster is an original un-

dertaking on the face of it to accept any drafts to be drawn upon

them at sixty days by Kohn, Daron & Co. to the extent of $25,000,

and negotiated by the bank to v/hom it is addressed. The con-

sideration of their undertaking appears very plainly from the

instrument. It is an open proposition to the bank to wdiich it is

addressed, that if it will purchase the drafts drawn by Kohn,

Daron & Co. they will accept and pay the same. As soon there-

fore as the bank complied with the proposition the contract was

closed, and the rights and liabilities of the parties became fixed.

Upon this part of the contract there can be no question that a suffi-

cient consideration appears upon the face of the contract to

uphold it. But it requires no greater or different consideration

to support a guaranty than to support an original promise. The

only differenc'e in the two cases consists in the former requiring

the consideration to appear upon the contract itself, whereas the

consideration to support the latter may be proved by parol. The

question therefore in this case is whether the consideration of the

nee ary infer nc app a ; o that il be clear that uch and no
other wa th c n iderati on upon which lhc promi
wa made.
(24 \i\Tend. 35; 21 id. 628; -t Hill, 2 o; 8 Ad. & El. 46; S Darn.
& Ad. r 109.)
nd th rul allowing two or more in trum ent
o-iven at the ame tim and relating to th . ame ubj ect matter tv
be con tmed together a, one in trument, appli s al o t thi cla
of contract ; o that wh n a o·uaranty i given at the ame time
with th e principal contra-t an I form a part of the entire transaction, if the cqnsideration be .stat d in th principal co ntract, though
none be tatecl in the guaranty, it will uffice. 8 John. 35 ; 9
Wend. 218; r8 id. rq..
o al o a in other ca es, parol evidence
of the circum tances und er which the contract wa made may be
given, to a id th e court in giving a true con truction to ambiguous
terms therein, or to how that eparate contracts relate to the arne
ubj ect matter.
It should also be ob erved here, that our statute in term only
requires the contract to exores therein what it had been well
ettled the tatute of Elizabeth req uired it to contain, and the ame
rules of construction should therefore be applied in cases under
both statute . 2.:J. \Vend . 35.
With these observations in relation to th e law governin g ca e
of this kind, we come to th e considerati n of the co ntract in que tion.
The Jetter of credit of H eckscher & Coster is an original undertaking on th e face of it to accept any draft to be drawn upon
them at sixty day by K ohn , Daron & Co. to the extent of $z5,ooo,
and negotiated by the bank t0 whom it is addre sed . Th conideration of their undertaking appears very plainly from the
in trument. It is an open proposition to the bank to which it i
addressed, that if it will purchase the draft drawn by K ohn,
Daron & Co. they will ace pt and pay the same.
soon th erefore as the bank complied w ith the proposition the contract wa
clo eel, and the rights and liabilitie of the parties became fixed .
'pon this part of the contract there can b no que tion that a ufficient con ideration appear upon the face of the contract to
uphold it. Bu•_ it require no greater or different con ideration
to suppor~ a g uaranty than to upport an orig inal promi . The
only difference in the two ca e consi ..t in the former requirinoth e consideration to appear upon the con tract itself, wherea the
consideration to upport th e latt r may b proved by parol. The
question th erefore in thi ca e is whether th e con icleration of the
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iindertakiiii; t)f iIk- ikfcudants" tcstatdr appears upon the instru-

iiKiit itself, or rather whether the two instruments may lie read

tui^ether so that the -ame consideration shall support hoth.

The i^uaranty is without date and at the foot of the letter

of credit. Independent of the parol testimony it should he deemed

to have heen made at the same time. It is addressed U) the same

person and relates to the same suhject matter. It should there-

fore, within every rule of construction, he deemed ])art of the

same transaction, and the two instruments should he read together

as one contract. The two would read thus: ""In consideration

that you, the L'nion liank of Louisiana, will ])urchase any draft

or drafts to lie issued hy Kohn, Daron & Co. upon Heckscher &

Coster, at sixty days, not exceeding $25,000. we the said Heck-

scher & Coster will accept and pay the same; and I the said John

G. Coster agree that Heckscher & Coster shall accept and pay

the same." Xow it seems to me clear that such is the fair read-

ing of the two contracts taken together ; and although the con-

tract of John (i. Coster ma\- he deemed collateral, yet had the two

been drawn in the al)ove form no (|uestion could ha\-e heen raised
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upon the statute of frauds. Hut what may he fairly inferred from

the terms of a contract .should he considered, for the purpose of

giving it effect, as contained in it ; and this rule applies as well

to collateral as to original undertakings. 5 I I ill, 147.

There is a wide difference between the guaranty of an exist-

inir debt and the guarantv of a debt to he contracted u])on the

credit of the guaranty. It is the difference between a i)ast and

future consideration. A ])ast consideration, unless done at the

re([uest of the j^romisor, is not sufficient to support any prom-

ise. ]*)Ut a ]:)romise to do an act in consideration of some act to

be done 1)\- the i>roiuisee implies a reipiest. and a compliance

on the part of thr latter closes the contract and makes it bind-

ing. And although it may he necessary from the nature of

the case to jjrove ])erformance b\ parol, yet such evidence is no

violation of the statute re(|uiring the consideration to he in writ-

ing. The consideration of the i)romise is expressed, and the

parol evidence is onlv u^■>^:^\ to show, not what the consideration

is, but that the act which constitutes that consideration has been

perfomied. Any other rule would i-eciuire every person to whom

a letter of credit is directed to accept the same in writing before

the drawer would he bound. For instance, a letter drawn in the

countrv and addressed to a merchant in the city, guaranteeing

unckrtaking 1>i till' cldl'nilant · 1c-...tate>r appear-... upc>11 the instrullll'nt it-...L·lf, <>r rather \\hl·tlier th· t\\< > in-...trurnL·nts ma,: l>l' read
tl igl'lhl'r sci that the . . alllL' cci11sicl1 rati1i11 . hall suppCJrt both.
Thl' guara11t\ i-... \\ iLlwut elate a11cl at the foot of the kttl:r
<>i credit. I11<kprncl ·nt ()i the parnl tc-...ti11H1ny it sho uld lie del'11ll'cl
to han· liee11 mad · at the same time. It is aclcl res'>ecl to the same
pcr-...un and relate-... to the -...ame -...uhjcct matter. It should thn 'i<>re, '' ithi11 L'\' ·r,: ruk ui construction . be cl Tmed part of th e
same transaction. ancl the t\\O instru111e11h . lmuld h<: r ·ad together
a-... one contract. Th<: t '' o '' cndd reacl thus: "In ·on id ·ration
that you. the L'nion l\a :1k of L oui s iana, " ·ill purcha c any drafl
or clrafts lo he issu<:d ll\· l(CJ!111, I )arnn ~ ·o. upon 11 cksch<:r J•
'oster, al sixty cla,: . . nut exceed ing . 25 .000, ,,. • the aid Il ecksche r i.:.' · 'oste r ,,·ill a ·cept and pay the sa me : a n cl J th aic\ J ohn
(~.
'ostc r ag ree that 11 ·cksc her '· ·uste r shall acce pt and pay
the same. " X m,· it see ms to me clea r th<lt such is th e fair reading of the t\\·o ·ontracls ta ken together: and althoLwh th e - ntract of J ohn (;. 'os ter may be de ' mecl coll ateral, ye t bad th' t\\'O
been clra\\·n in th e ahm·e fl rm no question co uld ha \'e bee n rai d
upon the stat ut · o f fraud s. But \\'hat may Ii · fairly inf ' rr ·cl from
the terms of a co ntract sho uld he consid ered , fo r th e i urpo e f
gi ,·in g it eff ·c t. as contain ed in it: and thi s rul applie as w It
to collatcra! as to or ig·inal undertaking-.. .::, f I ill, q.7.
There is a \\'id e difference bet\\'ee n th e g uaranty f an cx i tin g debt and the g uara nt y of a cl eht to be ·ontracted upon the
credit of the g uarant y. lt is th e difference h twee n a past and
future ro n: icl cration.
\ pas t co nsiderat ion. unl 'S . done al the
reqmst of the prnlllisor. is not suffi cie nt to suppo rt any p rom ise. Ihit a promise to do a n act in co nsi cl cration of som ' act t
he done hy th e p ro mi ~l'L' impl il's a n ·qu es t, ancl a colllplian
011 the part nf tlw latte r close. the co ntract and mak '. it hincling.
\ncl although it lllay he rn.:ce~sary f rorn th' nature of
the case to prove p<:rformance by pa re 1, y 'l such ev id n ·e is no
,·iolation of th' statute requiring- tlw co nsid erat ion to h in \\'rit111 g. Th<: co ns ick ration o{ th e promise is ex pr ·s ~ cl. and th e
parol evick nc · is onh· 11~; ccl to sh<rn , not what th ' con id ra tion
i.._, hut that the act \\'hi -h constitut ,..., that co nsicl ' rati on has bee n
pcrfom1<:cl. .\11 _: othe r rule \\'Ould req uire every p ·r on to \\'ht1111
a lctt<:r of credit is clir<:cted to accept the . am' in writin g hcfo r
the ' Ira'' er ''mild he ])l)unc l. Fur in tan ·c. a I 'll r dra,,·n in tb
country and add res-.,ccl to a mcrchan~ 111 th' city, g uarant '' ina
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the responsibility of the person for whose benefit the same was

drawn for a i^iven bih of o-oods to be sold to him, would require

a written acceptance by the city merchant before it w-ould be bind-

ing upon the drawer. No such strict rule can be found sup-

ported by ail}- adjudication. I am therefore satisfied that the

consideration of the guaranty in the case at bar sufficiently appears

in the contract, and that the same was valid and binding upon

the defendants" testator. 1 have not been able to find a case in

our own or the English courts which would conflict with the doc-

trine above advanced; but on the contrary, the l)ooks are full

of cases similar in their circumstances to this case, where the

guaranty has been sustained. 8 John. 35; 11 id. 221 : 10 Wend.

218; S. C. in error, 13 id. 114; 12 id. 218; 24 id. 35; 4 Hill, 200;

4 Denio, 559; i Ad. & E. 57 ; 5 Bligh's N. R. i ; 7 Mees. & Wels.

410; 9 East, 348; I Camp. 242; 3 Brod. & Bing. 211 ; 4 C. & P.

N. P. 59 ; 8 Dowl. & Ryl. 62.

The next question raised in the case is as to notice of ac-

ceptance. We must hold the law to he settled in this state that

where the guaranty is absolute no notice of acceptance is neces-
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sary. Judge Cowen in Douglass v. Hozviand (24 Wend. 35),

and Judge Bronson, in Suiith v. Dann (6 Hill, 543), examined

the cases at length upon this question, and they showed conclu-

sivelv that bv the common law no notice of the acceptance of any

contract was necessary to make it binding, unless it be made a

condition of the contract itself, and that contracts of guaranty

do not differ in that respect from other contracts. In this case the

only condition of Coster's undertaking w-as that the bank should

purchase the drafts to be issued by Kohn, Daron & Co.. and upon

complying with that condition the rights of the parties became

fixed, and the contract binding. There is nothing in the contract

from which we can infer that it was the intention of the parties

that notice should be given in order to fix the guarantor. No

more is required to make tine guarantor liable than to make

Heckscher & Coster, and the only notice to them necessary was

the presentment of the drafts for their acceptance within a rea-

sonable time. Allen v. Riglitmeir, 20 John. 365 ; Clark v. Bur-

dett, 2 Hall, 197; Cro. Jac. 287, 685; 2 Salk. 457; Vin. Ab.

Notice. A. 3: Com. Dig. Plead. C. 75 ; 2 Chitty, 403.

As to notice of non-acceptance and non-payment of the bills

by the d.rawees, that can only involve the subject of laches on the

part of the holders of the drafts, and all the cases, both in Eng-

th re pon ibility of the per o n fo r "ho ·c benefit th ' same \\a
drawn for a g-iv n bill o~ good · lo b' so ld tu him, would require
a writt n acceptance by the city m erc hant before it \\'oulcl h bincl incr upon the dra\\'er. 1\u such trict rul e ca n be found . upp rtecl 1 y any adj uclicati o n. l am th er efor e ati. ficcl that the
c n iclerali n of th e g uaranty in the casc at bar ufficien tly appears
in th e contract, and that the same was Yalid and binding up in
the d efendant ' te tator. l have n l been able to find a case in
o ur own o r th e English co urt s \\·hich \\·o uld conflic t with the d octrine abO\·e advanced: but on the ·o ntra ry, the hooks are ful1
of case si milar in th e ir circuni. tances to this ca ·c, where the
guaranty ha. been sustai 1 ~e:-d. ~ J oh n. 35: 11 id. 22 r : IO \\renc l.
21 ; ~. C. in erro r. J 3 id . 1 q: 12 id. 2 18 : 2-!- id. 35: -1- Hill, 208:
4 D enio . 559: 1 Ad. & E. 57: 5 Bligh's 1\. H.. I; 7 l\Ices. & \\'els.
-Po: 9 Ea t, :)-t8: I Camp. 2 ..p; 3 Hrocl. & Ding. 2 1 1 : -+ C. & P.
N. P. 59: 8 DO\Y l. & R}·i. 62 .
The next que ·tio n ra ised in the ca e is as to notice of acceptance. \\'e mu t ho ld the la\,. to he ettlecl in this state tkit
wher e the g uaranty is absolu te no notice of acceptance is necesary. Jud ge Co w en in Douglass\'. !-Jm_Lla11d (2-t \ Vend. 35),
and Judge Uran on, in Sl/litli \'. Dann (6 Hill, 5-+3), exammen
th e ca e at length upon thi _ que tion. and they sh m \·ed concluively that by tb.e commo n la\,. no notice of the acceptance of any
contract was n ece sary to make it binding. unl es it be made a
condition of the contract itself, a nd that contracts f guaranty
do not differ in that r e pect fr om oth e r contracts. In thi s ca. e th e
only condition of Co ter' undertak in g \\·a that the hank houlcl
purcha e the drafts to he issu ed by Kohn, Daron & Co., and upon
complying " ·ith that con dition the right · o f the partie became
fix ed , and th e contract bin di ng. There i. no thing in the contract
from which \Y e can in fe r that it \Ya th e intentio n of the parti es
that noti ce should be givtn in o r de r to fix the g uarantor. ~ o
m or e i r eq uired to m z~ke th e guaranto r li able than to ma ke
Heck cher & Co ter. ancl the onh·
. notice to them nece an
. \\·as
th e pre entm ent of the drafts for their acceptance within a reasona.bl e time. .ll/rn v. Riglzllllcrr. 20 _lnhn. '.)65: Clarie v. Bitrdctt. 2 IIall, 197: C ro. Jae. 287 . 685: 2
alk. -157: \ Tin. Ab.
l Totic , :\. 3 :
om. Dig. l'lcac!. c_· . 7:;: - Ch itty , .+03.
As to not ice of no n-acceptance and non-paymen t of the bilL
by the dra\\·ees. that can on ly invoh·c the uhj ect of lache on the
part of th hold e r s of th e draft , and all the ca e , both in Eng1
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land and in this country, concur in holding that this defense can

only be set up to an action against the surety in cases where he

has suffered damage thereby, and then only to the extent of

5uch damage. 7 I'eters, 117; 12 id. ^nj ; 1 Mason, 323, 368;

I Story, 22; 13 Conn. 28; 5 Man. & Granj 559; 13 Mees. &

Wels. 452; 3 Kent's Com. 122. If, therefore, it were neces-

sary in this case to give any notice, no evidence has been given

showing that the defendants, or the guarantor, suffered any loss

in consequence of the want of such notice.

The only remaining question, therefore, worthy of consid-

eration in this case, arises out of the fact that another l)ank had

previously purchased drafts drawn in pursuance of the letter of

credit and guaranty. It is claimed that by such purchase the

contract became a fixed and binding contract ])etween stich bank

and the promisor, and thereby lost its negotial)le character, and

became located so that no other person or l)ank could purchase

drafts upon the credit of it.

The guaranty, in this case, was manifestly intended to accom-

pany the letter of credit, and is subject, in this respect, to the
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same construction. If, therefore, it was competent for Kohn,

Daron & Co. to draw several drafts not exceeding the linnt in the

bill of credit specified, and to negotiate them at dift'erent banks,

and lleckscher & Coster would be bound by their letter of credit

to accept and pay them, the guarantor would also be liable to the

same extent. As a general rule the surety is liable to the same

extent as the principal, unless he expressly limits his liability.

(Theol)old on Prin. and Surety, 46.) it therefore only becomes

necessarv to examine the letter of credit, and ascertain whether

it was intended to be limited to one particular bank, or is a general

letter of credit to any anrl all persons who may advance money

upon it. It is somewhat singular that we find so few adjudica-

tions in our courts upon a class of commercial instruments which

enter so largely into the commerce and business of this country,

and of the world.

In England it seems to be at this time questionable whether

a party who advances money upon a general letter of credit can

.sustain an action upon it. Russell ct al. v. U'iggius, 2 Story,

214; Bank of Ireland v. Archer, 2 Mees. & Welsby. 383. The

reason assigned is that there is no privity of contract between

them. It is there assumed that it is only a contract between the

x:lrawer of the letter and the person for whose Iienefit it is drawn.

lane! and in thi " co untry, ·uncur in h ldinb that thi · dcfen
an
cinl_> he . l'l up tu an actiun again ' t th ' ur ty in ca ,
\\·h re h
ha. .· uffrrcd damage th ·reby and th ·n only to th ext nt of
u·h damage.
7 Peter-", i17: L icl. -107: 1 :.\fa on, -3· 36
L
tor), 22; 13 'o nn. - ; 5 ::\lan.
ran 5-l ; i3 ::\I e .
\ \ ' cJ.·. r 2;
1( ' 11l° '
lll. L2.
If, th ref r , it W re n '
~ar_> in thi · ca ·c to o·iv any n tic , n
vidence ha 1 en iv n
!:>bowing that th' 1 fendant o r the guarantor uff r d any lo
rn ·on eq uenc o f the \\' nt of uch notic .
The only remaining qu e tion, th refor worthy of
n ~i<lerati n in thi ca , arise· ut f the fact that an th r bank had
pr \'io u ly purcha ed draft Ira wn in pur uance o f th I tt r f
ere lit and guaranty. It i '}aim d that I y uch l urcha e th
contract became a fixed and 1 indinontra t betw n uch bank
and th e promi or, and th r by lo t it n crotiable ·haracter, and
be am lo atecl
that 11 0 oth r per n r I ank oulcl pur ha
draft upon the credit of it.
Th guaranty, in thi a e, wa manife tly intend cl to accompany the Jetter f credit, and i
ubj ct in thi r p ct, t the
am c n trncti n. lf, th r f r e, it wa comp t ~ nt f r Kohn,
Dar n
o. t draw eve ral drafts not exc ecling th limit in th
bill f credit pecifiecl an I to negotiat th m at differ nt bank ,
and Heck ch r & o ter w ulcl 1 b und I y th ir I tt r f r dit
t accept and pay them the o·uarantor would al o 1 e liabl t the
am ext nt. A a gen ral rul th
urety i lial l to the ame
ext nt a th principal, uni
he xpre ly limit hi liability.
(Th b lei on Prin. and ur ty, 46.
lt th refor only b c m ~
n c ary to xamine th Jett r f er dit and a certain wh th r
it \ra intended t I limit d t
ne parti ular bank r i a o-en ral
l tt r f ere lit t any and all p rson wh may advan e m n y
upon it. It i omewhat in ·ular that we find
few adjudi ati n in our c urt upon a la of c mm r ial in trument which
ent r o larg ly int th
omm rce and bu 111
of thi c untry
and of th worl 1.
In England it eem
b at thi tim iu
a party who advance mon y up n a eneral I tter
u tain an a ti n upon it.
R11s eil ct al. v. TT i~(Ti11s,.
-r.+: Bani.: of Irell'lld . _- lrcher 2 ~1 .. ' \\el I y, . 3.
r a n a ign d i tbat th r i no privity of c ntra t I tw n
nly a contra t I twe n the
th m. l t i th r a um cl that it i
.drawe r f th lett rand th p r n f r wh se b n fit it i. lrawn.
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But in this country the contrary doctrine is well settled. Letters

of credit are of two kinds, general and special. iV special letter

of credit is addressed to a particular individual by name, and is

confined to him, and gives no other person a right to act upon it.

A general, letter, on the contrary, is addressed to any and every

person, and therefore gives any person to whom it may be shown

authority to advance upon its credit. A privity of contract springs

up between him and the drawer of the letter, and it becomes in

legal effect the same as if addressed to him by name. Russell v.

Wiggins, 2 Story's Rep. 214; 12 Mass. 154; 2 Metcalf, 381; 12

Wend. 393 ; 12 Peters, 207 ; Burkhead v. Browii^ 5 Hill, 641 ;

Story on Bills ; See Beames' Lex. Mer. 444.

But these general letters of credit may be subdivided into

two kinds, those that contemplate a single transaction, and those

that contemplate an open and continued credit, embracing sev-

eral transactions. In the latter case they are not generally con-

fined to transactions with a single individual, but if the nature

of the business which the letter of credit was intended to facilitate,

requires it, different individuals are authorized to make advances
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upon it, and it then becomes a several contract with each indi-

vidual to the amount advanced by him. Thus a general letter of

credit may be issued to a person to enable him to purchase goods

in the city of New York, for a country store. The very nature

of the business requires him to deal with different individuals

and houses in order to obtain the necessary assortment. It has

never, as I am aware, been questioned that the guarantor might

be bound to several persons who should furnish goods upon

the credit of the letter.

So letters are issued by commission houses in the city, to

enable persons to purchase produce in the western states. The

money is obtained from the local banks in those states by drafts

drawn upon those houses, and upon the faith of the letters of

credit. It may often happen that a single bank can not furnish

the requisite amount, or it may be necessary to use money in

different and distant localities. I am not aware of any question

ever having been raised as to the authority of different banks

to act upon the same letter of credit. It is absolutely necessary

that such should be the effect of them in order to facilitate the

commerce of the country, and to carry out the object of the parties

in issuing the letters of credit. Burkhead v. BroiKii. 5 Hill, 641 :

2 Story's Rep. 214.

But in thi ountry th c ntrary loctrine i well ettl d. L etter
of credit ar
f two kind ' , o-eneral and pecial.
\ pecial letter
of er lit i add re ed t a particular individual by name, and i
confin d t him, and o- i ve ~ no oth r l r n a right to act upon it.
A gen ral. l tt r, on th contrary, i addr s d to any an 1 every
per on, an 1 therefore g iv any p r on to \Vhom it may b hown
authority to advance upon it credit. A privity of contract pring
up betw n him and the drawer of the letter, and it becom
in
legal eff ct tl1 ame as if addre. eel to him by name. Russell v.
Wiggins . 2 Story' Rep. 214; 12 Ma . 154; 2 Metcalf, 381; 12
Wend. 393; 12 Pete r , 207; Burkhead v. Brown, 5 Hill, 641:
tory on B ill ; St>e Beam es' Lex. 1\Ier. 4-1--1··
But the e general letter of er clit may be ubd ivided into
two kinds , those that contemplate a sing le transaction, and tho e
that contemplate an open and continu ed cr edit, embracing sev, eral transactions. In the latter case they are not generally confin ed to transaction with a ingle individual, but if the natur
of the bu ine which the letter of credit wa intended to facilitate,
requires it, d ifferent individ ual are authorized to m ake advance
upon it, and it then becomes a several contract wi th each individual to the amount advanced by him. Thus a gen ral letter of
credit may be i ued to a person to enable him to purcha e goods
in the city of ew York, fo r a country tore. The very nature
of the bu ine s requires him to deal with different individual
and houses in order to obtain th e necessary as ortm nt. It ha
never, as I am aware, been questioned that the guarantor mig ht
be bound to everal per on who should furni sh goods upon
the credit of th e letter.
o letter are i sueJ by commis ion houses in the city, to
enabl e person to purchase produce in the western states. The
money is obtained from th e local banks in those states by draft
d raw n upon tho e houses, and upon th e faith of th e letters of
credit. It may often h:ippen that a sing le bank can not furni h
money in
the requi site amount, or it may be neces ary to u
different and distant locaiities . I am not aware of any que tion
eY r havin g been raised a to the authority of different bank
to act upon the ame letter of credit. 1t is absolutely necessary
that such should be the effect of them in ord er to facilitate the
commerce of th e co untry, and to carry out the ob ject of the partie
in issuing the letter of credit.
B urklzead v. B r07~'11. S Hill. 6..p :
• 2
tory' R ep. 2 q .
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The letter of credit in this case was evidently intended to be

jil^eneral : it did not conten;plate a sini^le transaction, or draft for

the whole amount. Init several drafts limited in the ag^r^R^te to

twenty-five thousand dollars. Although the address "sir," and

"vour hank." is in the singular nunil)er, yet I think it was intended

to he used in a distrihutive sense, and a|)ply to an\- hank or hanks

who should jHU-chasc the drafts. J can see no ohject which the

drawers .should have for liiuiting the party for whose benefit

the letter was issued to a single hank. It is said that it would

enable them more readily to revoke the authority. l>ut these let-

ters are not issued without either undoubted confidence in the

persons for whose benefit they are drawn, or ui)on ample security.

The idea of giving notice of revocation to any party but that for

whose benefit they are drawn, is never entertained by the guaran-

tors in cases of general letters. When they wash to provide

for any such contingency the letters are framed accordingly. Again,

in this case the parties themselves have treated this letter as not

limited to a single bank, for they accepted bills which had been

discounted by the plaintiffs.
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I am, therefore, satisfied that the plaintifi:s were authorized

to purchase bills upon the faith of the letter and accompanying

guarantv, and that the previous purchase of bills by another bank

is no defense.

Whether the letters had been revoked with the knowledge

of the plaintiffs before the draft was discounted by them, was a

question of fact for the jurv. It would clearly constitute no de-

fense unless the plaintifl's liad notice of it. The judgment of

the su])erior coiu't must therefore he affirmed with costs.

Judgment affirmed.

The EvANSvii-Li-: Xatiox \i Hxxk of I-a-ansvillk. Ixdiama,

Respondent, 7',?. Adoi.imi Kaii- m.\.\x cl ai. .Vppellants (1883).

03 ^'- '^'- 2/,^

Appkai, from order of the General Term of the Su])reme

Court, in the first judicial (lei)artment, made May 25, 1881, which

reversed a judgment in favor of defendants, entered upon a re]:)ort

of a referee. Reported below, 2J, linn. 612.

l'hc IL'ltcr lli credit in thi . ease· \\as C\'iclcnth intended ti> h
g-cncral: ii did n!1t cunt ·n~platc a singk transactil)n, or draft for
the \\ IHik amllttnt. ln1t sc\Tral drafts limited in th' aggregate to
\!though the address .. sir." and
t\\ cnt~ -fi\c tliuu . and dnllars.
.. _\'tlttr hank." is in the singular number. yll I think it \\'a · intrnd d
to lie used in a cl istrilmtin· sense. and apply tn any hank ur hanks
"h<l ...,hnuld purchase the drafts. I can sec nu ohj '·t \\'hich th·
dra\\ ers shuulcl han~ fur limiting tlw party for- whose 1> ·ncfit
the ktter \\·as issued to a single hank. It is .aid that it \\nulcl
cnalilc them more readily tn revoke the authority. lh1 thc"L' letters arc not issued without either undoubted confidence in the
pcrsn ns for wlwse benefit th 'Y arc drawn. or upon ampl ccurity.
The idea nf giving notice of re\'ocation to any party hut that for
\\·hose hrncfit they are drawn. is never cnlcrtainecl by the guarantor" in cases () f general Jett TS. \\'hen they \\·ish lo prm·idc
for any su h contingency the lette rs arc framed accordingly. Again,
in this case the parties them . eh·cs have treated this letter a~ not
limited tu a single hank, for they accept d hill "·hich had been
disrnunlecl by the plain ti fis.
I am. thcr ·fore, satisfied th<1.t the plaintiffs were authorized
to purchase bills upon the faith of the letter and accornpanyinrr
guaranty. and that the previous purcln, c of bills by another hank
i. 110 clden. e.
\ \'hcther the letter.' had been rc,·oked "·ith the knO\Yl ·clgc
of the plaintiffs before th' clr~1ft was discounted by them. \\'a. a
que~tiun of fact for the jl1n-.
It " ·n uld clearly 'On...,tilute nn ckfens ' 1111ks" the plaintiffs had notice of it. The judgment of
the 1.,ttpcrim court must thcrciore be affirmed \\·ith costs.
Judg-ment affirmed.

TllE

E\·.\'\'S\'lJ.U:

l~e1.,p,~1v!cnt. "i'S.

. \1·1·1 ~.\1,

:\. \Tf(J'\'\I

n \ .' K

\DrJLL'Ir T~.\l'F\l.\S'\'

lJF'

EV.\i'\'S\· rr.u:.

lXDI\~\,

ct al .. . \pp llants (1RR)) .

frnm order ()f the Ccneral Term of the

'upremc
'nurt, in the fi'rsl judicial clcparlmcnt, macl ·{\Jay -S. 1g81, which
re\ LT1.,uJ a judgment in fanlr nf cldcndants, rntcrccl upon a r 'port
nf a r fer"':. lfrpmtcd liclcm, 2 I l I1111. () 12.
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This action was broug-ht to recover the amount of two drafts

drawn by Bingham Bros., of Evansville, Ind., on A. Feigelstock,

of the city of New York, which were discounted by plaintiff at

Evansvihe, and forwarded to New York for acceptance and pay-

ment by the drawee, by whom they were dishonored.

Defendants were sought to be made hable under the follow-

ing letter of credit, which was delivered, to and left with defend-

ants, and upon the security of which they discounted the paper :

"New York, December 29, 1874.

"Messrs. Bingham Bros., Evansville, Ind. :

"Dear Sirs — Any drafts that you may draw on Mr. A. Feigelstock. of

our city, we guarantee to be paid at maturity.

Thi action wa brought to recov r th am ount of two drafts
drawn by Dingham Bro ., of Evan ville, Incl., n . Feigel tock,
of the city of N w Y ork, which wer di sco unted by plaintiff at
Evan viii , and forwarded to New York fo r acceptance and paym nt by th e draw e, by whom they were di honored.
D efendant were oug ht to be made liable und er the followin o- 1 tter of cred it, which wa deliv red. to and lef t with defendant , and upon the ecurity of which they di co unted the paper:

"Truly yours,

"Kaufmann & Blun."

The further facts appear in the opinion.

Charles Edivard Souther, for appellants.

E. B. Crozvell and Asa Iglehart, for respondents.

RuGER, Ch. J. Guaranties are distinguished in the law as

being either general or special. Special guaranties being those

•· EW YoRK, Decemb er 29, 1874-.
"Me r . Br GI-IAl\I BROS., Evan sv ill e, Ind. :
"Dear Sirs-Any draft that yo u may draw on .'.\Ir. A. Feigel tock. of
our city, we guarantee to be paid at maturity.
'·Truly your ,
'" KAl:HIANN & BLUN."
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which operate in favor of the particular persons only to whom

they are addressed, while general guaranties are open for accept-

ance by the public generally. They are sometimes further classi-

fied into those limited to a single transaction and those embracing^

continuous or successive dealings. Gates v. McKee, 13 N. Y.

232; Church v. Brozvn, 21 id. 329.

The liability of the defendants in this case depends upon thc'

solution of the question to which of these classes the guaranty

in suit belongs. If it be regarded as a general guaranty, there

is no just defense to this action. If, however, it is a mere special

guaranty, although continuous in its character, other c[uestions

will arise for consideration. Many of the earlier cases arising

upon guaranties, both here and in England, were largely con-

trolled by the question of their negotiability ; and it was uniformly

held that no action would lie at the suit of an assignee upon a

special guaranty because no privity existed between such assignee

and the guarantor. Rohbius v. Buiglinin. 4 Johns. 476; IValsh v.

Bailie, 10 id. 180; Chitty on Bills, 2Jt^, 308 (ed. 1839) ; N'ezv-

coiiib V. Clark, i Denio, 226 : Birckhead v. Brozvn, 5 Hill, 634.

This obstacle was removed in this state by the Code of Porcedure,

which authorized any party acquiring an interest in a guaranty

to bring his action and recover thereon, provided a cause of action.

The furth er facts appear in th e opinion.
Charles Ediuard Souther, for app llant .
E . B . Crowell and £':1.sa I glelzart, fo r r e pondents.
R UGER Ch. J.
G uaranti e are di tingui bed in the law as
being either general or pecial. Special guaranties being tho_e
which operate in favor of th e particular per on only to whom
they are addres eel, while ge neral guarantie are open for acceptance by the public generally . They are ometim e further cla . ifi ed into tho e limited to a ~ i1io-l e tran. action and tho e emb racing
continuou or ucce sive dealing. Gates v. Jfcl\.cc, 13 "0:. Y.
232; Church v. Brown, 21 id . 329.
The liability of th e defe ndants in this case dep nd s upon the
olution of the qu estion to whi ch of these clas e the g uaranty
in suit belongs. If it be r gard ed as a general g uaranty, there
is no ju t defen e to thi action. If, however , it is a m ere pecial
guaranty, although continuous in it cl~aracter, oth er que tions
will arise for con ideration. l\Iany f th e ea rlier cases ari ing
upon guarantie , both here and in England, were laro-ely controlled by the que tion of th eir neo·otiability; and it was uni fo rml y
held that no action would lie at the uit of an a signee upon a
pecial g uaranty because no privity exi ted betw een uch a ig nee
and the guarantor. R obbins v. Rill,u!uw1. 4 J ohns . 476; 1Valsh v.
Bailie, IO id. 180; Chitty on Bills, 273, 308 (ed. 1839) : Newcol/lb v. Clari<, 1 D enio, 226; Birclihead v. Bro'l 111 , 5 Hill, 634.
Thi ob tacl e wa r emoved in thi tate by the Code of Porcedure,
which authorized any party acquiring an intere t in a g uaranty
to bring hi action and recover th ereon , provided a cau e of action
6

66 GUARANTY AND SURETYSHIP.

G '. \R \:\ T Y . \.:'\J

. C.: RETY !III.

previously existed u])on the contract in favor of his assignor.

Tlic real party in interest in such contracts is now entitled to

maintain an action for damages arising from a breach of such

contract in his own name, although he was not originally privy

to it.

In other words the same effect is now given to an equitable

that forrtierly pertained to a legal assignment, and they are now

both equally cognizable in a court of law.

It follows that Bingham Brothers could assign to the plaintiff"

and the latter recover upon any cause of action accruing to them

under the letter of credit iii question existing against the defend-

ants at the time of the discount of the drafts in suit.

The true distinction between general and special guaranties,

as contained in letters of credit, is that upon the faith of a general

guaranty any person is entitled to advance money, or incur lia-

bility, upon complying with its terms, and can recover thereon the

same as though specially named therein. Union Bank of Louisi-

ana V. Coster^ 3 N. Y. 203.

In the case of a special guaranty, however, the liberty of
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accepting its terms is confined to the persons to whom it is ad-

dressed, and no cause of action can arise thereon except by their

action in complving w'ith its conditions.

Such a guaranty contemplates a trust in the person of the

promisee, and from its very nature is not assignable until a right

of action has arisen thereon, w^hich may, like any other cause of

action arising upon contract, be then assigned.

The authority of the cases holding that no privity exi.'^ts

between the assignee of a guaranty and the guarantor sufficient

to enable the former to maintain an action thereon has thus

ceased by force of the provisions of the Code.

Though this be so, the common-law rule applies to contracts

of guaranty as w-ell as to other contracts ; that a consideration is

necessary to render them valid ; and that, unless such consideration

be acknowledged by the contract itself, it is still necessary to

prove one in order to recover thereon. Leonard v. Vrcdcnbnrgh,

8 Johns. 29; Bailey v. Freeman. 4 id. 280; Brandt on Surety-

ship, 7.

It was formerlv held that such contracts were void by the

statute of frauds unless their consideration was also expressed

upon the face of the instrument itself. Union Bank v. Coster,

Ex'r, 3 N. Y. 211 ; Nczveoinb v. Clark, i Denio, 226.

pr ' viously exi ·tl'd upon th
011tract in favor o f hi a 1 nor.
Th e real party in intere· t in uch contra ·t i now entitl d to
maintain an acti on f r damag : ari inn- from a I r a h f uch
·ontract in hi own name, alth ouo-h he \\'a ~ not oribinally pri y
t it.
In oth r w rel the am eff cl i now gi en to an equitable
that fo rmerly p rtain cd to :.t 1 gal a ignrnent, and th y ar now
b th qually oo-nizabl in a court of la\Y.
It foll ow that ing-ham Brother could a icrn to th plaintiff
and th latter r ecove r upon any cau e of action accrumb to th m
under the 1 tt r f er dit in qu tion xi ting a ain t th defendants at the tim of th di count f th draft in uit.
1 he true di tinction bet\\' en g n ral and pecial guaranti
a contained in Jett r of credit, i that upon th faith of a a- neral
a-uaranty any per n i entitled to advanc mon y, or in ur liability, upon complying with it term and can r cover ther n the
ame a though pecially named th r in. Union Balli? of Louisiana v. Caster) 3 IT . . 203.
In th
a
of a pecial gua rant , hO\ ev r, the lib rty of
ace ptino- it term - i con.fin d to th per on to whom it i addre eel, and no cau of action can ari e thereon exc pt by their
a tion in C'Omplying with it condition .
uch a guaranty contemplate a tru t in the p r on of the
promi e, and fr m it
ery nature i not a irrnable until a right
of action ha ari n th reon, which may, like any other au
of
action arisina up n ontract, be then a si n d.
The authority of th ca e ho lding that no privity , xi~t
b twe n th a i;ne
f a g ua ranty and the o-uarant r uffici nt
t
nable the form r to maintain an acti n th r on ha thu
ca d by f re
f th provi ion f th
o le.
Though thi b o, th common-law rul applie to c ntract
of a-uaranty a w 11 a to ther c ntra t ; that a c n i l rati n i
n e ary to r n l r th m valid; and that, unl
uch on id ration
b acknowleda- l l y tbe
ntract it If, it i
till n ce ary to
pr v one in or ! r t recov r thereon. Leo/lard v. Vrcdc!lburgh
John . 2 _ ; Bailey v. Free111a11, 4 i l. 2 o; Brandt n ur tyhip, 7.
It wa f rm rlY h lcl that uch ontract w r void b th
tatut of frau L unl
th ir con iderati n wa al o expre ed
upon th face f th in trument it lf. Union Banll . Coster,
Ex'r) 3 N. Y. _ 11 : X C7. rcolllb
far/? r D nio 226 .
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Ikit this rule was modified by other cases holding that where

the nature of the consideration was fairly inferable from the con-

tract sued upon, or was contained in a written instrument con-

temporaneously executed and forming a part of the transaction,

it would satisfy the requirement of the statute. Gates v. McKee,

supra; Church v. Brozvn, 21 N. Y. 315; Douglass v. Hozvland, 24

Wend. 35 ; Leonard v. Vredenburgh, supra; Rogers v. Kneeland,

10 Wend. 218.

The cases of Brezvster v. Silence (8 N. Y. 207) and Draper v.

Snoiv (20 id. 331), holding a contrary doctrine, have been much

shaken, as authority upon this question, by the later cases above

cited.

The statute of frauds was amended in this State by chapter

464 of the Laws of 1863, omitting in its re-enactment the pro-

vision requiring the consideration of a promise to answer for

the debt, default or miscarriage of another, to be expressed in

the writing containing such promise.

The effect of this amendment was to dispense with the neces-

sity of such statement in the instrument itself (Speyers v. Lam-
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bert, 6 Abb. Pr. [X. S.] 309), but it left it still indispensable that

a consideration in fact for the promise should exist in order to

entitle the promisee to recover thereon. Brandt on Suretyship, 90.

Regarding this case, therefore, as unaffected by the questions

referred to, its solution seems to depend upon the answer to be

made to these two propositions : First, as to whether the guaranty

in question is general or special ; and second, if -it be found to be

a special guaranty, whether any good cause of action arose there-

on in favor of the persons to whom it was addressed, wdiich has

been assigned to the plaintiff in this action. Besides a considera-

tion, it is essential tha<- a contract of this kind should be between

proper parties, viz. : a promisor or guarantor ; a principal and a

promisee ; and it is just as essential that such contracts should

describe or refer to these parties so as to identify them, either

individually or as a cla<?s.

It is always competent for a guarantor to limit his liability,

either as to time, amount or parties, by the terms' of his contract,

and if any such limitation be disregarded by the party who claims

under it the guarantor is not bound. It follows that no one can

accept its propositions or acquire any advantage therefrom unless

he is expressly referred to or necessarily embraced in the descrip-

tion of the persons to v/hom the offer of guaranty is addressed.

Dut thi rul e ,,.a modifi ed 1 y oth r a
holdin g that \\'h ere
th nature of the con ideration \\'a fairl y inferal I ' from th contract u d upon or wa contain d in a written in trument contemporaneou ly xecuted and forming a part of th tran action,
it would ati fy the requir ment of the tatute.
ates v. JI cK.ee,
supra ,· hurch v . Brow n, 21 l\. Y. 315; D ouglass v. Howland , 24
end. 35; Leonard v. Vredenburg h, supra ; R ogers v. Kneeland ,
ro v end . 21 .
The ca e of Brewster v. ilcnre ( 8 N. Y. 207 ) and Draper v.
now ( 20 id. 33 I), holding a c ntrary doctrine, have been much
haken, a authority upon this que tion, by the later ca e above
cited.
The tatute of frau ls wa amended in thi
tate by chapter
464 of the La\Y of 1863_, omitting in its re-enactment the provi ion requirin a- the rnns ideration of a promi e to an wer fo r
the debt, default or mi ca rriage of another, to be expre ed in
the writing containing ~ uch promi e.
Th effect of thi amendment was to di pen e with the nece ity of such statement in the in strum ent it elf ( S peyers v. Lambert, 6 Abb. Pr. [ T. . ] 309 ), but it left it till indispensable that
a con ideration in fact fo r th e promi e hould exi t in order to
entitle the promi ee to recover thereon. B randt on urety hip, 90.
R eo-a rding this ca e, therefore, a unaffected by the qu e tions
referred to, its solution seems to depend upon the answer to be
made to these two propositions: F irst, a to whether the guaranty
in que tion is general or special; and econd, if ·it 1 e found to be
a special guaranty, whether any good cau e of action arose th ereon in favor of the person to whom it wa addre ed, which has
been a igned to the plaintiff in thi action. Beside a con ideration, it is essential that a contract of this kind should be between
proper parties, viz.: a promisor or guarantor; a principal and a
promi ee; and it i just as e ential that uch contracts should
describe or refer to these parties o as to identify them, either
individually or as a cla c::. ~.
It i alway competent fo r a g uarantor to limit his liability,
either a to time, amount or parties, by the term ·of his contract,
and if any uch limitat~ o n be disrega rded by the party who claims
under it the guarantor i not bound. It follow that no one can
accept it propo ition or acquire any advantage therefrom unless
he i expressly referred to or neces arily embraced in the de cription of the per on · to \•: horn the offer of guaranty is addre ed.
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Robbiiis V. Biiighaiii, supra; I'nion Bank v. Coster, supra;

Church V. Bronni, supra: Walsh v. Bailie, supra; Dodge v. Lean,

i^ Johns. 508; Brandt on Surci\ ship, 88; Bailey v. Ogden, 3

Johns. 3yy.

In the case of a special guaranty the consideration necessary

to support the promise may l)e either one furnished Ijy the prin-

cipal to the guarantor, or hy the promisee to either the principal

or some third person, according t(j the terms of the guaranty.

A general letter of credit is addressed to and invites people

generally to advance money, give credit, or sell property in reliance

upon it, and when this is done the contract is complete, and the

acceptor hecomes a part}' to it and may enforce it for his own

benefit.

In such case the ])romisee has, upon the re(|uest of the guar-

antor, furnished the consideration contemplated hy tlie guaranty

and brought himself v, ithin its terms and the re(|uirements of

law. Uiiiun Bank v. Coster, supra; Church v. Browii, supra;

Birckhead v. Bruwii, supra.

To come to the case in liand it will ])e foiuid that the guaranty
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neither in its address n(.r contents refers either directly or indi-

rectly to any other persons than the immediate parties thereto.

Tliese ])arties are Kaufmann & Ulun. the guarantors, Feigelstock,

the princi])al, and Bingham Bros., the ]ir(jmisees.

It has been said that the allusion in the letter to the word

"drafts" implies the negotiation of these instruments to third

persons. This idea we think is not necessarily or generally con-

veyed by this expression.

Drafts, as used in the collection of debts, are not usually

negotiable. The ofhce of a draft is to collect for the drawer from

the drawee, residing in another ]:)lace, money to which the former

may be entitled, either (ju acctjunt of balances due or advances

upon consignments, ar.d although they may sometimes be used

for raising money, that is not the necessary or ordinary ])nr])ose

for whicli they are emj^loyed.

We might, therefore, well hold that no such doubt or uncer-

tainty appears u]x)n the face of this guaranty as entitles the plain-

tiff to furnish extrinsic evidence to determine its signification.

The plaintiff, however, claims the right to resort to such

evidence to show that the defendants intended or that it had tlie

right to infer that their guarant\- was intended for such per.sons

as should advance money upon liingham Bros.' drafts before their

acceptance by beigelstock.

Rvb/J111s v. J3i11glrn111, 'll j>ra; L'11iv11 Bc111!? \'. 'osier, .supra;
Cliurc!t \'. Bru7.1.. 11, supra: // 'a/sit \'. Bailie, supra; Doc/ere v. L allr
1

13 J ohns. jOl); nrandt on .'urety hip, ~ ); Bailey \'. 0 crdcn, 3
Jolrn s. 3t t 1.
In th · ·asc o f a 1 cial guara nty th e c 11 id ' rati n 11 '
ar
to : upp rt th · prumi e may be eith ' r 11 furni h cl by th principal to th o-uarantor, r by th ' pr mi c t
ith r th e prin ' il al
or omc third p ' r s n, a 'ro rclin g to th t ' rm
f th e o-uaranty .
•\ g ' 11 ·ral 1 ttcr of r lit i adclrc. d t a n l invit peopl
o- n ' rally t aclvan ·' mor.ey, o-iv r lit, or . II pro1 rty in relia nc
up n it, a nd when thi . i ~ d ne th c ntract i 'Ompl te, and th
ac ptor becom
a part y t it ancl may 'nf r- e it f r hi
\\· n
b n fit.
Jn u -h ca th ' promi
ba , up n th requ t f th g uarnt 'mplate 1 by the g uaranty
a nt r. furni h I th ' com:id rati n
and l ro ug ht him •If \•. ithin it t '-rm an l th · r 1uir m nt of
la\L L'nion Ban/, v. Co' Lcr, supra ; Church v. Brown , upra ;
Bircl?lzcad v. BrO'i.L'll , s upra.
T o com to th ' casr in hand it will b fo un l that th ~; uarant
neither in its acldrc
11 r c ntent
r f r eith r lir lly r indi rectly to any oth r p ' r::on. th a n the imm diate partic. thcr t .
The. e parties are Ka ufmann & Blun, th e guarantor , F ig I t -k,
th e pri11 cipa l. and niri g hc:.!11 Bros., th e pr mi
lt ha. bee n aid t 11a l the allu ion in th Jett r to th ' w rd
"dr:i.fl .. impli c th ne,....,otiat ion of th es in trum ' nL to third
per ons. Thi idea we think i not necc arily r g n rally c n\'eyccl hy thi cx prc ion.
Drafts, as u. cl in th coll cti n f I ht.. are n l u uall y
neg tiabl e. Th offic ' o [ a <lr:ift is t -olle 'l fo r th ' clraw cr fr om
th ' clra\\·c . r ' iclin t; in a n th r plac . mon y to whi -b the fo rm r
may b ' ntitl cdJ cith ,,. on acco unt f balan c s du ' o r aclvan -e
up n
n ig nm nts, ac.cl althou:-,h th ey may ., m tim
b u. d
fo r rai ~ in g- money , that i not th n , ary r rclinary puq e
fo r whi h th 'Y a r ' mpl oyccl.
\ \' might. th ' ref r -, \\. '11 h lei that n
u -h cl uht r un c rtainty a1 p ·ars upon th fac
f thi cruaranty a ntitlc th plaintiff t furni sh xtrin . i ,,·icl n t cl t rm in
i~;nifi ati n .
Th ' plaintiff, h w ' V r, laim . th
r
rt t . u h
vi ten
t • h \\' that th cl 'f nclant
r thal it ha I th ._
ri ght to inf r that th ir g uarant y wa int nd I f r u h
r. on
a. h ulcl acl anc m n ·y up n Bin'"'ham Br ' !raft 1 f r th ir
ac J tan , by ' ig I t k.
J
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Some controversy appears by the cases to have formerly ex-

isted in respect to the rii! : governing the courts in the construction

of guaranties, whether that should apply which entitled a surety to

have his contract strictly construed, or that imposing upon a party

using the language the liability of having it interpreted most

strongly against him, l)ut the weight of authority now seems to

favor that construction which shall accord with the apparent in-

tention of the parties, in conformity with the rule governing the

construction of contracts generally. Riiidgc v. Jiidson, 24 N. Y.

70: Gates V. McKcc, supra: Dobbin v. Bradley, 17 Wend. 422.

But when the meanmg of the language used in a guaranty

is ascertained, the surety is entitled to the application of the strict

rule of construction and cannot be held beyond the precise terms

of his contract. Gates v. McKec, 13 N. Y. 232; People v. Chal-

mers, 60 id. 158; Kingsbury v. Westfall, 61 id. 356.

When, therefore, the language of a guaranty is ambiguous

and does not furnish conclusive evidence of its meaning, we

are entitled to look at all of the circumstances of the case and

arrive at the intention of the parties from these sources of inform-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ation. Agawavi Bank v. Strever, 18 N. Y. 502; Brandt on Sure-

tyship, 106; JValrath v. Thouipsou, 4 Hill, 200; Fell's Law of

Guaranty. 43; Gates v. McKee, supra; Keate v. Temple, i B. &

P. 158; Springsteen v. Samson, 32 N. Y. 703; Karuiuller v.

Krots, 18 Iowa, 352; Hasbrook v. Paddock, i Barb. 637.

Assuming, therefore, that there is an ambiguity in this letter

requiring explanation, we will examine the case in the light of

the general principles which have been stated.

The action is based upon two drafts made by Bingham Bros.,

of Evansville, Ind., upon A. Feigelstock, of New York, and pay-

able respectively, one for $5,000 sixty days after date, and one

for $2,500 fifteen days after sight. These drafts were discounted

by the plaintiff at its bank in Evansville, at their respective dates,

and the proceeds duly paid to Bingham Bros. Each of them was

afterward duly protested for non-acceptance and non-payment

by Feigelstock. These drafts belonged to a series of similar char-

acter discounted by the plaintiff for Bingham Bros., and were the

only ones remaining unpaid by Feigelstock at their maturity.

At the commencement of this course of business Bingham

Bros, produced to and left with the plaintiff the letter of credit

upon which this action is founded, and it was delivered as security

for the amount intended to be loaned upon such drafts. •

m controver y oppear by the ca
to hav f rm rly ·xi ted in r pect to the ru! ~ governing the court in the con truction
of g uaranti e , whether that houlcl apply which entitl cl a urety to
have hi - contract trictly con trued, r that impo ing upon a party
u ing the lan o-ua o-e th e liability of having it interp reted m t
trono-Jy ao·ain t him, l ul the weight of authority now seem to
favor that con truction which hall accord with the appar nt intention of the parti s. in conformity with the rule gov rnin g th
construction of contract ge nerally. Rilldge v. ]11dsou) 24 N. Y.
70; Gates v. 11JcKee, supra; Dobbin v. Bradley, 17 \Vend . 422.
But when the m eani ng of the language u eel in a g uaranty
i a certainecl. the urety is entitled to the applicati n of the strict
rule of con truction and cannot be hel 1 beyond the precise term
of hi s contract. Gates v. Jl! cl\.ee, 13 · N. Y. 232; People v. Challllers, 60 id. l 58: Kin f2:sb 1wy v. TV cstfall) 61 id . 356.
\tVhen, therefore, th e lan o·uage f a o-uaranty i ambiguous
and doe not furni h conclusive evidence of its m eanin g, we
are entitl cl to look at all of the circum tances of the case and
arrive at th e intention f the parties from the e ources of in formation. Agm a1n Bani? v. Strcuer, 18 N. Y. 502; Brandt on Suretyship, 106; TT 7 alrath v. Tho111 psoll, 4 Hill, 200; Fell ' Law of
G uarant ', -t3; Gates v ..U cKee, supra; Keate v. Temple, l B. &
P. 158 · Sprillgstee!l v. Salllson, 32 N. Y. 703; Kannuller v.
!\.rot::, 18 Iowa, 352; Hasbrook v. Paddocl?, l Barb. 637.
As urning, th erefore, that there is an ambiguity in this letter
requiring explanation, w will examine the case in the lig ht of
the general principles which have been tatecl.
The action is based upon two drafts made by Bingham Bro .,
of Eva1Fville, Incl., upon A . Feigel tock, of New Yo rk, and payable re p ctively, one fo r $5.000 sixty clays after date, and one
for $2,500 fift een day after sig ht. These drafts were di counted
by the plaintiff at it bank in Evansvi ll e, at thei r re pective dates,
and the proceeds duly paid to Bino-ham Bro . Each of them wa
afterward duly prate tecl for non-acceptance and non-payment
by Feio-el tock. The drafts belonged to a serie of similar character discounted by the plaintiff for B ingham Bros., and were the
only ones remainino· unpaid by Feigel tock at their maturity.
At the commencem ent of thi. c urse of bu iness Bino·ham
Bros. produced to and left with the plaintiff the letter of credit
upon which thi. action i founded, and it wa delivered as ecurity
for th amount intend cl to be loa n cl upon such draft .
1
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Xo bills of lading or consignments of property by Bingham

Bros, to Feigelstock accompanied the drafts, and that for $5,000

appeared upon its face to be an accommodation draft. No notice

of these transactions was ever given to the defendants, and it did

not appear that they had any knowledge of the several discounts.

The letter expressing the guaranty upon which the action is

brought is as follows :

"New York, December 29, 1874.

"Messrs. Bingham Bros., Evansville, Ind. :

"Dear Sirs — Any drafts that you may draw on Mr. A. Feigelstock, of

our city, we guarantee to be paid at maturity.

"Yours truly,

"Kaufmann & Blun."

While the letter will be seen to be couched in broad and

indefinite terms with respect to the number, amount and char-

acter of the drafts referred to, Bingham Bros, alone are addressed.

However general may be the description of the subjects guaran-

X o bill: )f lacling or con · icrnm nt of property by Bin<Yham
Dro -. to FeigeLtock accompani cl the draft ancl that f r 5,000
appeared upon it fa c to be an accommodation draft. Xo notice
of the e tran acti n \Ya eyer criyen to the defendant , and it lid
n t appear that th ey had any knowl dge of the v ral di count .
The letter ex pre si1w the guaranty upon which the action i
brotwht i a follow :
''XEw YORK, D ecember 29, 187-1-.
r . BINGHA~r BRO ., EYan Yill e, Ind.:
"Dear irs-Any draft that you may draw on ~Ir. A. F eigel tock, of
our city, \\'e guarantee lo be paid at maturity.
"Your truly,

· ·~r e

teed, the number of persons authorized to accept its terms is not

"KAUFMANN

&

BLUN ."

thereby enlarged.
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The letter is subject to all of the limitations expressed there-

in, and also to such as may fairly be implied from its language,

and the natural course of business transactions between its sev-

eral parties. General letters of credit are, from necessity, deliv-

ered to the persons who expect to profit by their aid, and are

intended to be exhibited by them wherever and whenever assist-

ance is required. The fact of the possession of a letter of credit

by a person froin whom credit is sought militates against its gen-

erality. The absence in this letter of any assurance that the drafts

specified should be accepted on presentation seems to imply that

sight drafts alone were contemplated by the parties.

So too the absence of any reference to the consideration of

this guaranty is significant, and would seem to suggest to a

prttdent man the propriety of an incjuiry into the situation of

the parties, and the nature of the business in which the guaranty

was to be used before advancing largely upon the faith thereof.

Such an investigation would have enabled the plaintiff to see that

it was not justified in drawing the inference which it claims to

have done from the language of this instrument.

Bingham Bros, resided and were manufacturers of spirits at

Evansville, in the State of Indiana, remote from the guarantors

and the 'drawee of the drafts. Feigelstock was a merchant resid-

\ \ ' hile the letter \vill be een to be couched in broad and
indefinite term with re pect to the number, amount and character of the draft referred to, Bingham Dro . alone are addre ed.
However general may be th de cription of the ubject guaranteed, the number of p r on authorized to accept it term i not
thereby enlarged.
The Jett r i subject to all of the limitation expre ed therein, and al o to uch a may fairly be implied from it language,
and the natural cour e of bu ine tran action betwe n it
everal partie . General letter of credit are, from nece ity, delivred to the per on who expect to profit by their aid, and are
int nded to be exhibit d by them wherever and whenever as i tance i required. The fact of the po e ion of a letter of credit
by a person from vd1om credit i sought militate again t it g nerality. The ab ence in thi letter of any a urance that the drafts
pecified -hould be accepted on pre entation eem to imply that
i<Yht draft alon \Yer contemplated by the partie .
o too the al cnce of any ref rence to the con ideration f
thi guaranty i
ignificant, and would eem to ucrcre t to a
prudent man the propriety of an inquiry into the ituation of
th parties, and th nature of the bu in
in which the guaranty
\Ya to be u eel bef re advancing larg- ly upon the faith th n.:of.
uch an inve tigation would hav . nab! d the plaintiff to
that
it wa not ju tificd in Ira wing the inf rence which it claim to
have done fr om the languag of thi in trum nt.
Bingham Dro . r idecl an l w er manufacturer of pirit at
Evan ville, in the tat of Indiana, r mote from the cruarantors
and the ·dra\Ye f the drafts. F i<Y 1 tock wa a merchant re id-
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ing in New York engaged in the business of receiving and selling

on commission, goods consigned to him by third parties.

The plaintiff was a bank doing business in the State of In-

diana, and the defendants were merchants in the city of New

York. At the date of the guaranty these various parties were

strangers to each other, except that the plaintiff and Bingham

Bros, resided at the same place, and had previously had business

transactions together. There is no evidence as to the relations

existing between the defendants and Feigelstock, but it is claimed

in the answer and was offered to be proved on the trial that they

were strangers to each other, and that the guaranty was given

by the defendants as a favor to a person who was in their empl6y,

and who was a relative of Feigelstock.

There would seem to be no motive reasonably inferable from

such a situation and relationship sufficiently powerful to induce

the defendants to lend their unlimited credit for the benefit and

advantage of Bingham Bros, alone. The contention of the plain-

tiff leads to the proposition that it had a right to infer that Bing-

ham Bros, were authorized by the defendants to go to any place
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and with any person contract to bind the defendants for unlim-

ited sums. Under such a construction the defendants could never

revoke this authority, for it would be practicelly impossible to

reach by notice all of the persons who might be applied to for

advances vipon this letter.

To uphold this judgment we are required to hold that the

plaintiff had the right to infer from the language of the letter,

and the circumstances of the case, that the defendants, without

any apparent motive for so doing, had clothed Bingham Bros,

with irrevocable authority to use their names in borrowing money

at remote and multiplied points, for unlimited amounts and unre-

stricted periods of credit.

Certainly, if the plaintiff' believed this, it was not justified

in placing much reliance upon the continued responsibility of per-

sons transacting business in so reckless a manner.

A transaction of such a character would be so improvident

and unnatural that to establish it in any case should require the

strongest evidence, but especially so when it is claimed that such

powers have been conferred upon entire strangers.

The unnatural confidence in others, and the careless assump-

tion of obligations which such a course of business w^ould im-

ply, is so unusual as to justify the requirement that if such an

ing in ew Y rk engag d in the bu ine of receivina a ncl elling
on commi ion, good con ia ned to him by third pa rtie .
The plai11tiff was a bank doing bu ine in th
ta t of Indiana, an d the lefendant \\ ere merchant in the city of
ew
York. A t the date of the guaranty the e variou pa rties were
tranger to each oth r, xcept th at th e plaintiff a nd Bin g ham
Bro . re ided at the am '- place, and had previously had bu iness
tran action together. There i no evidence as to the relation
existing between the defendan t and F eigel tock, but it i claimed
in the an wer and ·was offered to b proved on the trial that they
were trangers to each oth r , and that th e gu a ~a nty wa g iven
by the defendant as a favo r to a per on wh o wa s in their emp16y,
and \Vho was a relative i Feigel tock.
There would seem to be no motive reasonably inferable from
uch a ituation and relation hip ufficiently powerful to induce
the defendants to lend their unlimited credit for th e benefit and
advantage of Bingham B ro . alone. T he contention of the plaintiff lead to th e proposition that it had a rig ht to infer that B ingham Bros. were authorized by the cl fendants to go to any place
and with any person contract to bind the defendant for unlimited sum . U nder such a con truction the defendant could never
revoke this authority, fo r it would be practicelly impossibl e to
reach by notice all of the persons who mig ht be applied to fo r
advance upon this letter.
T o uphold thi s judgment we are r equired to hold that th e
plaintiff had the right to infer from the lang uage of the 1 tter ,
and the circum tance of the ca e, that the defendant , without
any apparent motive fo r so doing, had clothed Bingham B ros.
with irrevocabl e authority to use their name in borrowing money
at remote and multiplied points, fo r urdimited amounts and unretricted periods of credit.
Certainly, if the plaintiff believed thi , it was not ju tified
in placin a much r eliance t~ p o n th e continued responsibility of persons tran acting bu ine in o reckle a manner.
A tran action of uch a character would be so improvident
and unnatural that to stablish it in any case houlcl require the
tronge t evi dence, but especially o w hen it is claimed that such
power have been conferred upon entire stranger .
The unnatural confidence in other , a nd the carele a umpti on of obligation which uch a cour e of busine wo uld impl y, i so unu ual as to ju tify the requirement th at if uch an
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authority was inimded to be conferred it should have l)een ex-

pressed in clear and unequivocal language.

It is obvious that neither Feigelstock nor Kaufmann & Bhm

could have derived any benefit or advantage from tlie discount

of bills whose proceeds were, as appears from the face of the

transaction, intended for the sole use of Ihngliam IJros.

Even if the relation of consignor and consignee existed

between Bingham Bros, and Feigelstock, we do not think the

usual course of business between such ])arties justifies the assump-

tion that the use of accommodation paper for either limited or

unlimited amounts is the necessary or usual accompaniment of

such a connection. ( )n the other hand, if we consider this letter

as intended to furnish a credit to Feigelstock with the manufac-

turers and consignors of property in which he dealt, it would sat-

isfy the apparent object of the letter, an.d the transaction would

assume a natural and reasonable character such as pertains to the

ordinary and usual course of business among commercial men.

There would necessarily be a limit to such a course of busi-

ness, and the liability of the defendants would be modified by
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the transfer of property to correspond with the amount of tiie

obligation assumed, and creating a liability which might be safely

and reasonably incurred. Of course, if the defendants have

signed a guaranty, either general or special, upon a sufficient con-

sideration, by which thev have uncpialifiedly promised to become

liable for the ])ayment of all such drafts as Bingham Bros, might

thereafter draw on Feigelstock, their liabilty, however compre-

hensive, would not be aft'ected by its imprudence. But such is

not the contract under consideration.

We are, therefore, of the opinion, from the fact that the letter

was addressed to I'ingham Bros, alone, the absence of any allusion

to its consideration or the negotiability of the drafts therein re-

ferred to, and a consideration of the situation and relation of the

parties, that the intention could not fairly be imputed to the

defendants of making the guaranty contained in the letter general

and open for acceptance by any one who might choose to comply

with its terms.

We have been unable to find any case which cither requires

or authorizes the classification of this letter as a general guar-

anty. In each of the numerous cases cited in which the instru-

ment considered was held to be a general guaranty, it w^as either'

addressed generally or the guaranty contained inherent evidence

authoril\· \\a: inlcndccl w be conferred it ' ho ul l ha\· be n exprc. sec.I in clear and un cqu i\·oca l lan 0 uage.
It is obviou th at n e ither Feigel s to kn r Kaufmann
Blun
could h:.w ' dcrin?cl a ny bcn fit r ach·anlag· fr m the di co unt
of hilL' \\'ho~c pro 'cc cl s \\'Cr >, a appear fr m th ' fac e of the
lran .,action. inl cncl ccl for the .olc use o f Bingham Bro .
En~ n if th· r elat io n of con ign or and
n s1gn e xi t <l
h t\\-een l\ingharn Bros. and Feigel toc k, \\'
lo 11 t thin k the
LL ual 'Oursc of bu sines. lH.twee n s uch partie ' ju tifi
th a . umpf ac 'ommodati n pa p ' r for e ith r limited r
tio n that th , u s
unl imited a mo unt is th ' n ecc ' ary o r u sua l a ompanim ent o f
uch a co nn ct io n . O n th o ther hand , if \\·c ' On ici er thi lett r
as int ncl ed lo furni . h a credi t to Feigel t ck with th manufa ·lnrers a n cl on ig no r s of propert_,. in wh i h h e cleall, it w o uld ati fy th e appa r nt object of th e lett r , and th e tran acti on w ul I
a . um e a natura l a nd r 'aso nahl e ba ra ctc r . uch a. perta in t th
o rdinary a nd u s ual co ur:e of hu sine am n cr c mmer cial m n .
Th r e \\·m ild necc. sa rily be a limit to uch a c ur c of bu in . s, ancl th ' liability oi th cl ef nclants w o uld b m odified by
the tran. fe r of p rope rty to corre po nd with th e a m ount f t:1e
obligatio n as. urned. a nd c reat in g a liability which mi g ht b af ly
a n cl r a. o na bl y in 'urrecl.
Of o urse. if th
cl f nclant have
s ign ed a guaran ty , eit her ~· nera l or . pec ial, upon a • uffici nt cons id rati o n. by which th cv have unqualifi edl y promi e l to be om
li able f r th e l ayment of all s uch drafts a . Bingham Dro . mio·bt
th e reaft r dra\\' o n F e ige lsto ·k. th eir liahilty, h \\' " r compr h n s iv , w ulcl not he a ffectecl by its imprucl enc . Dut u h i
not the co ntract und er con. icl r ra ti n.
\\ 'ea r . th erefo re. {the pini n, fr om th fact th at th e le tt er
wa. aclclrcs.,cd to 11ing lum nro ' . a lon e , th ab.en o f any allu 1 n
to its co ns icl crat io11 o r th e negot iabilit y o f th clrafts therein r fer r ecl to, a nd a ·onsi d r:it io n f th , ituati n an l r lation f th
partic . . tha t th e intenti on could n t fairly b imputed to the
defe ndant s of making the g ua ra nty co ntai n d in th I tt r g neral
and oprn for a 'Cc ptan ce by any o n \\·ho mi g ht choo
t o compl y
with its term s.
\\'e haY be n unahl to find any ca. whi h ith r r eq uire
la ifi at i n f thi I tt r a a g n ra l g uaror author izes th
anty. In ca h o f th e num ero u. a
·i t cl in whi ch th in tru111 nt co n. id ' reel \\"'lS h le! to be a g n ·r a l g uaranty, it wa
ith er
aclclre . cl ge nera lly r th g ua ranty · ntain e<l inh r nt Yickn e
T
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that it was intended to be used in obtaining credit wherever it was

needed.

We have thus seen that no cause of action accrued to the

plaintiff upon the g-uaranty, for the reason that it is a special

guaranty upon which the party addressed alone could act and

acquire a cause of action. Some confusion has arisen in the

consideration of this case from an omission to regard the obvi-

ous distinction existing between a cause of action accruing to the

plaintiff in its own right, upon the discount by them of such

drafts, and one arising in favor of Bingham Bros, either prior

to or simultaneous with svich discount of which the plaintiff now

seeks to avail itself as their equitable assignee. Different consid-

erations are required to support these different contracts. The

court below reversed the judgment entered upon the report of

the referee in favor of the defendants upon the grounds stated in

the opinion as follows : "In the view insisted upon by the respond-

ent the letter of credit in question in this case was a special letter

or promise to Bingham Bros. In that view it was a valid contract,

for it would be so read by the law as to supply the consideration
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so far as. necessary under the former statute of frauds. Tf you

will draw on him I will guarantee that any draft you may draw

on Mr. A. Feigelstock of our city will be paid at maturity,' or it

would be regarded an original promise under the case of Gates v.

McKee, 13 N. Y. 235, and the defendants held to the established

construction of such instruments."

The court here seems to imply that there are two grounds

upon which the action could be maintained, viz. : Ijecause the

promise was an original as distinguished from a collateral one,

and secondly, because a cause of action accrued to Bingham Bros,

upon making the drafts in suit, and that cause of action passed

to the plaintiff as their equitable assignee by the delivery of the

letter to them, and their discount of the drafts. We do not think

that either of these grounds can be sustained.

It is entirely immaterial whether this guaranty be regarded

as an original or collateral contract. Both equally required a

consideration to support them, and the distinction between theln

is important only as affected by the statute of frauds, a collateral

contract to pay the debt of another being required by that statute

to be in writing, while an original undertaking is valid even if

made l)y parol. No question arises respecting the validity of this

that it was intended to be u ed in obtai nin g er dit wher ver it wa
needed.

*

*

*

*

*

*

.*

*

\Ve have thu
een that no cau e of action a cru cl to the
plaintiff upon the g uaranty, for the r a on that it i a pecial
o-uaranty upon whi ch th party aclclre , eel alone cou l l act and
acq uire a cau e of action. Som e confu ion has ari en in the
on icleration of thi ca e from an omi ion to r gard the obviou di tinction xi ·ting between a cau e of act ion acc ruin g to the
plaintiff in it own right, upon the Ii co unt by them of such
draft , and one arising in favor of B ingham Bros. either prior
to or imultaneou with uch di coun t of which the plaintiff now
eek to ava il itself a their equitabl e a ignee. Different con ideration are required to upport the e different contracts . The
ourt below reversed the jud gm ent entered upon th r eport of
the referee in favor of the defendants upon the gro und stated in
the opinion a fo llow : "In the view in isted upon by th e respondent the letter of cred it in que tion in thi ca e wa a special letter
or promis to Bingham Bro . In that view it \\·as a valid contract,
fo r it would be o read by the law as to upply the con ideration
o far as nece ary under the fo rmer statute of fraud . 'If you
will draw on him I will g ua rantee that any draft yo u may draw
on J\Ir. . Feigelstock of our city will be paid at maturity,' or it
would be rega rd ed an orig inal promi e under the ca e of Gates v.
JJ1 cKee, I 3 N . Y. 235, and the defendant held to the e tablishecl
construction of such instrument ."
The court here eem to imply that there are two gro und ~
upon which th e action could be maintained, viz.: because the
promi e wa an orio·ina l as di tingui bed from a collateral one,
and econd ly, becau e a ca u e of action accrued to Bingham Bro .
upon making th e draft in suit, and that cau e of action passe 1
to the plaintiff as their quitable as ig nee by the delivery of the
letter to them. and their di count of the draft . \ Ve do not think
that either of the e groun l can be u tained.
It i entirely immaterial whether thi guaranty be regarded
a an orig inal or collateral contract. Both equally r equired a
considerati on to upport them, and the di tinction between them
i important only a. affected by the statute of frau d , a collateral
contract to pay the debt of another beino- r equired by that statute
to be in writing, whil e an ori o·inal undertaking i valid even if
made by parol. No qu tion ari es respecting the validity of thi
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promise, except in regard to its want of consideration. If, there-

fore, we could call this an original undertaking, the promise hav-

ing, as we have seen, been made to Bingham Bros, alone, it still

lacks the indispensable requirement of a consideration to sup-

port it.

This consideration must be proved, and a presumption of its

existence can no more be indulged in to support the action than

the presumption of any other fact material to the existence of

a cause of action. Commercial and business paper generally

specifies a consiaeration upon its face, and a defense thereto on

the ground of a want of consideration must be supported by

affirmative proof of such fact, but when the paper itself does not

state a consideration the omission must be supplied by affirmative

proof on the part of the holder, or he cannot recover thereon.

(I Parsons on Contracts, 175.) No consideration is referred to

in this letter, and tlie drafts are the act of Bingham Bros, alone,

and are evidence of no fact stated therein as against any one,

except the drav.ers. But even the drafts do not purport to be

drawn for value.
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Jn ever}' aspect in which this transaction can be regarded

Bingham Bros, appear as the makers of the drafts for their own

accommodation, and as such personally liable to all who thereafter

become parties thereto.

We have no difficulty in regarding the plaintilT as the equi-

table assignee of any cause of action existing against the defend-

ants in favor of Bingham Bros. As has been already stated, if

any such cause of action arose, it was assignable and must be con-

sidered to have passed to the plaintiff by the delivery of the guar-

anty and the payment by it of the proceeds of the drafts to Bing-

ham Bros. It thereby became the equitable owner of such cause

of action and of such an interest in the letter of credit as would

enable it, under our Code, to maintain an action against the

defendants. But the question is presented, did any such cause of

action ever arise? We have been unable to discover any ground

upon which such a claim can be plausibly sustained. The letter

certainly contains no reference to any consideration received by its

writers, and the proof shows none advanced by Feigelstock to

them or by Bingham Bros, to either Feigelstock or the guarantors.

Upon the very face of the transaction Bingham Bros, drew

their drafts for their own benefit and contemplated the acceptance

by Feigelstock for their accommodation. Taking the strongest-

promi e, except in rcgarJ to iL want of on ideration. If, ther fore we could rall thi zin original undertaking, the pr mi e havincr, a we hav een, been made to Bingham Bro . alon , it till
lacks the incli pen able r quircm nt of a con id rati n to upport it.
Thi con i 1 ration mu t be pr v d, an 1 a pre umption of its
exi tence can no more b indulged in t
u1 port the action than
the pre umption of any other fact material to the exi tence of
a cau e of action. Commercial and bu ine
paper generally
pecifies a con ·iaeration upon it face, and a def en e thereto on
th ground of a ,,.aJ1t of con ideration mu t b
upported by
affirmative proof of such fact, but when the paper it elf doe not
tate a con i leration the omi sion must be supplied by affinnativ
proof on the part of tlie holder, or he cannot recov r thereon.
(I Par on on Contracts, 175.) No con ideration i r £erred to
in thi letter, and the draft are the act of ingharn Bro . alon -,
and are evidence of no fact tated therein a again t any one,
except the drawer . But even the drafts do n t purport to be
drawn for value.
In every a pcct in which this transaction can be regard <l
Bingham Bro . appear a the maker of the draft for their own
accommodation, and a such per onally liable to all who thereaft r
become partie thereto.
V/ e have no difficulty in regarding the plaintiff a the equitable a signce of any cau e of action exi ting again t the def ndant in favor of Bingham Bro . A has been already tat d, if
any such cau e of action aro e, it wa a ignable and mu t b conidered to have pa ed to the plaintiff by the deliv ry f the o-uaranty and the payment by it of the pro eel of th draft to Bin ham Bro . It th reby became the cquitabl owner of uch cau e
of action and of uch an int re t in the 1 tter of credit a would
nable it, und r our Cod , to maintain an action aaain t the
cl f nclants. But the que tion is pre ent cl, did any uch cau e f
action ver arise? \Ve have been unabl to di cov r any ground
upon which uch a claim can be plau ibly u tain cl. The lett r
certainly contains no refer 1.ce t any con ideration r c ived by its
writer , and th proof show. none advanced by F io-el tock to
th m or by Bingham Br . to ither Feio- I tock or the uarantor .
pon th very face f th tran action Bingham ro . dr w
their draft for their own b nefit and cont mplat d th acceptance·
by Feigel tock for their accommodation. Taking the tronge t
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view against the defendants which the case is susceptible of, they

occupied simply the position of proposed accommodation guar-

antors of the contemplated accommodation acceptor of Bingham

Bros." drafts; and it certainly cannot be claimed that they thereby

incurred any liability to the party for whose accommodation they

had guaranteed such obligations. Atkinson v. Manks, i Cow.

692; I Parsons on Contracts, 184; Tliuniiaii v. Van Brunt, 19

Barb. 409 ; Daniel's Negotiable Instruments, § 189. Even if the

letter of credit be read as paraphrased by the court below, it falls

far short of establishing a consideration moving to the defendants.

It cannot be seriously claimed that a proposition, either writ-

ten or oral, made by one person to another, agreeing to guarantee

the payment of any draft which the other might draw, furnished

a sufficient consideration for the promise. Such a request is im-

plied in all accommodation papers as between the parties thereto,

and if this were held to import a sufficient consideration, it would

destroy all distinction between accommodation and genuine busi-

ness obligations. But this letter of credit, as read by the court

below, would not confer a cause of action upon third parties, even
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if it had been addressed to them, without proof that they had

parted with value upon its faith. In all of the cases cited where

guarantors have been held liable, even to third persons, upon such

instruments, the letter embraces either an express or implied re-

quest to such persons to advance value upon the faith of the paper

therein descrilDed, and it is because they have parted with value

upon such request that the liability of the promisor to them is

predicated. If no liability is incurrred in favor of a third party

unless he has parted with value, much less can it be claimed that

it is in favor of an original party to the contract, from whom, as

is shown affirmatively, no consideration whatever proceeded. We

are, therefore, of the opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to

maintain this action.

The order of the General Term should be reversed, and the

judgment rendered upon the report of the referee affirmed.

All concur, except Danfortpi, J., not voting.

Order reversed, and judgment affirmed.

Note. — That part of the opinion commenting upon and distinguishing certain cases

is omitted.

view again t the defendant which th ca i u c plibl of, they
occupied imply the po ition of prop d accommodation guarantor of the contemplated accommodation acceptor f Bingham
Bro .' drafts· and it c rtainly cann t b' claimed that they thereby
incurred any liability to the party for wh
accommodation they
had guaranteed uch obligations. At/n.JZson v. Jfank , l Cow.
692; l Par ons on Contracts, 184; Thurnwn v. Van Brunt, 19
arb. 409; Dani l' Neg tiable Instrument , § 189. Even if the
letter of credit be read as paraphrased by the court b low, it falls
far hort of tablishing a con icleration moving to the defendants.
It cannot b - seriously claimed that a proposition , eith r written or oral, made by one IJer on to another, agreeing to guarantee
the payment of any draft ·which the other might draw, furnished
a ufficient consideration for tlle promi e. ~ uch a request is implied in all accommodation papers as between the parties theretor
and if this were held to import a sufficient consideration, it would
destroy all Ii tinction between accommodation and genuine bu iness obligation . But this letter of credit, as read by the court
below, would not confer a cause of action upon third partie , even
if it had been addressed to them, without proof that they had
parted with value upon its faith. In all of the ca es cited where
guarantors have been held liable, even to third person , upon such
in trument , the letter embrace eith r an express or implied reque t to such per on to advance value upon the faith of the paper
therein described, and it is becau e they have parted with value
upon such request that the liability of t.he promisor to them i
predicated. If no liability is incurrred in favor of a third party
unless he ha parted with value, much less can it be claimed that
it i in favor of an original party to the contract, from whom, a
is shown affirmatively, no consideration whatever proceed cl. 'vV e
are, therefore, of the opinion that th plaintiff is not entitled to
maintain thi action.
The order of the General Term ·hould be reversed, and the
judgment rendered upon the report of the referee affirmed.
All concur, except

DANFORTH,

J., not

voting.

Order rever eel, and judgment affirmed.
1 OTE.-That part of the opinion commenting upon and dis tin guishing certain cases
is omitted.
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Singer Man'fc. Co. i's. Litti.kr ct al. (1881).

56 la. 601 : 9 X. W. 905.

~· 1xcER

:\l.\:-:'n;

~u. 'L'S.

L1 TT1.rn et al. (r

r ).

Api^cal from Wapello circuit court.

5 Ia .

Action at Law. The cause was tried to the court below

i: 9 X. \\' . 905.

without a jury, and judgment was rendered for defendants.

Plaintiff a|)peals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

, \pp al from \\'apcll

cir ·uit

ourt .

/;. F. Miller ixnd II. />. J IcwJrrshott, for appellant.

//'///. McXctf. for appellees.

Beck, j. 1. The action is upt)n a bond executed by Littler

as principal, and the other defendants as sureties, conditioned

that Littler shall pay to plaintiff all his indebtedness to it, existing

•\ cT1ux .\T L\\\·. ] h ·a u e ,,·a tried to the
urt 1 low
" ·ithout a jury, and juclg m ' nt wa rendered fo r clef ndant .
Plaintiff appea l . The fac t of th ' ca e app ar in the opinion.

or afterwards to exist, whether upon notes, accounts, or in any

other manner. The petition alleges that Litder became agent of

plaintiff for the sale of sewing machines, and the bond in suit was

executed when he was appointed, to secure plaintiff from loss that

D. P. Jf illcr and H. B. H rndcrshott, fo r app llant.
If '111.

~11 cXc tt,

fo r appellee.

might accrue on account of his employment. The petition alleges

that Littler became delinquent in his payments and executed a

note to ])laintiff, uj^on which a judgment was aftenvard rendered

for the amount of his indebtedness. The sureties answered the
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petition, alleging that Littler and the plaintiff entered into an

agreement whereby Littler became plaintiffs agent, and became

bound to pay to plaintiff money upon the sales of sewing machines,

or upon the indorsement of paper taken upon such sales, as stipu-

lated in the agreement. The agreement provides diat either party

may terminate the contract at their pleasure. Other conditions

need not be set out.

The answer further alleges that i)laintiif had terminated

Littler 's agency before the note was executed by him, and that

the defendants had no notice at any time that Littler was in de-

fault, or that any claim was made by plaintiff against them upon

the bond. Upon a demurrer to this answer, the court held that

the defendants were entitled to notice of the amount due from

Littler within a reasonal)le time after the settlement between him

and plaintiff. The court found iipnn the trial that no such notice

was given to the defendants, wherefore they suffered loss, and

that plaintiff', therefore, is not entitled to recover.

2. The controlling question in the case, and the only one

argued by counsel, involves the correctness of the court's ruling

DE · K, ]. r. The action i up n a bond execut d by ittler
a principal, and the oth er defendant a
ureti , conditi ned
that Littl er ball pa.r to plaintiff all his indebt.edne to it, ex1 tmg
or afterwards to e.·i t, wheth r upon notes, account , or in any
other manner. The petition all eo-c that Litt! r became ag nt of
plaintiff fo r th e ale of ewing ma hine , and th e b nd in uit wa
executed wh en he ,,.a appointed, to ecure plaintiff from lo that
might accru e on ac ount f hi employm ent. Th e petition all ge
that Littl er becarn , delinquent in hi s paymenL and executed a
note to plaintiff, upon which a judg ment wa afterward ren 1 rel
f r the amount of hi indebteclne. . . The ureti e an wer d the
peti tion, alleging that Littler ancl the plaintiff ent r eel into an
agreern nt whereby Littler becam plaintiff ag nt, and b came
houncl to pay to plaintiff m oney upon th e ale of ewing ma hin ,
or '...lpon the inclor sement of paper tak en upon such al , a tipulate'd in th agreement. 'The agre ment provide that ither r arty
may terminate th e contract at their pleasure. 0th r con lition
n eed not be et out.
Th an wer forth er allege that plaintiff had terminated
Littlc r' s agency befor th e note wa execut cl by him, an I that
th e cl fc nrlant had no noti ce at any tim that Litt! r was in d fault, or that any claim wa mad by plaintiff again t them upon .
the hon cl.
1 on a cl m urr r to th i ans\Yer, the
urt h lcl that
th def ndan t w ere entitl cl t notic of th am unt du from
Lit.ti er w ithin a r ea onabl e tirn a ftcr th e ttlement b tw n him
1

and plaintiff.

The

ourt founci 11pon the trial that n o such notice
to the cl f nclant . wh refo re they uff reel los , and

was g iv ' 11
that plaintiff, theref r . i n t ntitlcd to rec v r.
~ . The control lin
1u tion in th
a , ancl th e nly on
argued by coun 1. inv Ive th c rrectne of th
ourt' ruling
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in holding that defendants are not hable for the reason that notice

was not given them of the extent of Littler's hability within a

reasonable time after his agency was terminated, and his indebt-

edness fixed by his settlement with plaintiff. The ruling of the

court, we think, is correct, and in accord with Davis Sczviiig

Machine Co. v. Mills, 8 N. W. 356. We held in that case, "where

the guaranty is a continuing one, and the parties must have under-

stood their liability thereunder would be increased and diminished

from time to time, and the guaranty is uncertain as to when it

will cease to be binding upon the guarantor, and when the party

indemnified has the power at pleasure to annul and put an end

to the contract guarantied, without the knowledge of the guaran-

tor, he is entitled to notice, within a reasonable time after the

transactions guarantied are closed, of the amount of his liability

thereunder." It will be observed, upon considering the statement

of the terms of the contract guarantied as above set out, that they

are within this rule, and diat under it the defendants in this case

are not liable, in the absence of the notice contemplated therein.

3. But counsel for plaintiff, in an ingenious argument, at-
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tempt to distinguish this case from Davis Scicing Machuic Co. v.

Mills. They insist that while the contract in that case was a guar-

anty, in this case defendants are not guarantors, but are sureties

for Littler, and are jointly liable with him upon an original con-

tract. The error of this position is apparent. Littler was or

was about to become indebted to plaintiff" upon the coutract under

which he was appointed agent. Defendants were not bound upon

that contract. Neither were they bound upon the notes, accounts,

acceptances, or upon any contract upon which Littler became in-

debted to plaintiff'. They became first and only bound upon the

bond, whereb}- they guarantied that Littler would pay his indel^t-

edness to plaintiff' in whatever form it assumed. A guarantor

becomes bound for the performance of a prior or collateral con-

tract upon which the principal is alone indebted. A surety is

bound with the principal upon the contract under which the prin-

cipal's indebtedness arises. This is a familiar doctrine of the law.

Upon applying it to the facts of the case, it will be seen that de-

fendants are guarantors, and not sureties, for the performance of

the contract upon which Littler's indebtedness to plaintiff' arose,

Thev were therefore entitled to notice under the rule of Davis

Sewing Machine Co. v. Mills.

in holdino- that defendant are n t liabl f r th e rea n that notice
wa not gi en th m of the ext nt of Littler' liability within a
rea onable time after hi agency wa terminated, and hi in<lebtedn s fixed by hi ettl em nt with plaintiff. The rulin g of the
court, we think, i corr t, and in accord with Dm•is S ez •ing
U achille Co . v. Uil/s, 8 >l. \ V. 356. \Y held in that ca e, " where
th o-uaranty i a continuin g one, and th partie mu t have und ertood their liability th ereunder would be increased and dimini hed
from tim to tim e, and the guaranty i unce rtain a to wh en it
will cea e to be binding upon th e guarantor, and wh en th party
in lemnified ha th e power at plea ure to annul and put an end
to the contract g uarantied, without th knowl edge of the g ua ra ntor, he i entitl ed to noti ce, within a rea onabl e tim e after th e
tran actions g uarantied are clo ed, of th e am ount of hi liability
thereunder. " I t will be ob erved, upon considering the tatement
of the term of the contract guarantied a above et out, that th ey
are within thi rule, and that under it th e defendant in thi case
are not liabl e, in th e ab ence of the notice contemplated therein.
3. But coun sel for plaintiff, in an ing nious arg um ent, attempt to di tingui h thi ca e from Da7. •is S e"Loing Jfa clzin e Co. v.
lif ills. They in ist that whil e th e contract in that case was a g uaranty, in thi ca e defendant are not ; uarantor s, but a re sureties
for Littler, and are jointly liable with him upon an original conLittler was or
tract. The error of thi po ition is apparent.
wa about to becom e indebted to plaintiff upon the contract under
which he was appointed age nt. D ef ndant \Y ere not bound upon
that contract. N either were they bound upon the note , accoun L,
acceptance , or upon any co ntract upon which Littler became indebted to plaintiff. They became first an 1 only bound upon th e
bond , wher by they guaranti ed that Littler would pay his indebtg uarantor
edne to plaintiff in whatever fo rm it a urn ed.
become I ound for th e per fo rmance of 0.. prior or collateral co ntract upon which the principal i alone indebted.
urety i
bound \Yith the principal upon th e contra ct und er whic;h the principal' indebtedn s ari e . Thi is a familiar doctrine of the law.
Upon appl ying it to the facts of the ca se, it will be seen that defendant are g uarantor , and not ureti e , for the performan ce of
the contract upon which Littler' indebtedne to plaintiff a ro e.
Thev ,,-ere th erefo re ntitl ed to notice under the rul e of Da<.'is
~

Sew ing Jlaclzill c Co . v. JTills.
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Jt nvAV be observed tbat guarantors are often called sureties.

We use the term "sureties" in ihe foregoing discussion, to describe

one who is bound by a contract with his principal — who joins

with his principal in the execution of the contract, and becomes

pecuniarly liable thereon. But, as we have seen, a guarantor —

the suretv in a contract of guaranty — is not primarily liable upon

the principal's contracts, and only becomes liable upon his default.

A guarantor, under this rule, is entitled to notice of the amount of

his liability within a reasonable time after that liability is deter-

mined by the transaction between the original debtor and creditor.

It is our opinion that the judgment of the circuit court ought

to be affirmed.

Tayt.or et al. z>s. Wl•.T^roRK et al. (1841),

10 Ohio 491.

This is an action of assumpsit from the county of Portage.

The declaration contains two special counts. In tlie first, it is

averred that one C. D. Farrar, on November 26, 1836, being

1l may be ob e n ·ccl that

o ft n ca ll d ur Li
li c u io n, to d c rib
um: who i · bo un d by a co ntract wi th hi prin ipa l- who join
ntra -t, a nd b
m
\\ ith h i · 1 rin ipal in Lh ' x c u ti n o f th e
pecuniarly liabl Lh ' r n . Du t a w e hav' e n , a ua ra n to rth · ~ure ty in a co n t ra t f g ua r a nty-i not primarily liabl up n
the principa l' contra t , and o nl y 1 com
liabl up n hi d fault.
g ua, ra n t r , ullCI r Lhi rul , i ntitl d to noti
f th a m o unt of
hi . lia bility within a r a nab! tim aft r that lial ility i
min cl ])y th t ra n ac ti n I twe · n th e ri inal d bt r and r li t r.
lt i o ur pini n that th e jud om cnt of th c ircuit c urt u crht
to be affirm cl .
•
b

ua rant r · a r

\\'e u ·e the Lc m1 .. uret ie , " in Lh ' fo r

111

desirous of purchasing a general assortment of goods in the city of

Pittsburg, for a retail country store, on a credit, and being unknown
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to the business men of said city, applied to the defendants, Messrs.

Wetmores, then doing business at Cuyahoga Falls, in Portage

county, for a general letter of credit, directed to some one or more

of their correspondents in the said city of Pittsburg, by means of

which the said Farrar might be enabled to make his purchases ; and

T .wL

the said defendants upon such application, made and delivered to

R ET .\L.

vs. \YEnIOR1._

ET ,\L. (

r8 ..p ,

Mr. Farrar a letter of credit, or written guaranty, addressed to

IO

Messrs. A. D. McBride & Co., merchants in Pittsburg, in the w^ords

hi o -t9I.

following : .

"CuvAHOG.A. Falls, November 26, 1836.

Thi. i an acti n of a

"Messrs. A. D. McBkioe & Co.

ump it fr om the

unty

f P rta cr .

"Gentlemen: Mr. C. D. Farrar has concluded to purchase a few

goods; we have that confidence in Mr. l'"arrar, that we will say that we

will be responsible to the amount of $2,000 for goods delivered him.

"We are truly,

"C. W. & S. D. Wetmore."

The cl clarati n c ntain tw
p cial
In th fir t, it i
. D. i::. arrar, on
veml r _ , r 36 bein
a v rre l that one
d ir u of purcha ino- a
ne ral a o rtrn nt f er d in th city of
Pitt buro-, for a r etail c untry t r o n a credit, and b ino- unknown
to th bu in e m n f . aid city, applier! to th d f ndant :..I
rs.
\ Vetmore , then do ing 1 u in
at
uyah ·a Fall , in
ortag
c unty, fo r a g n ral I tt r f credit, dir ct d to orn e ne or mor
of th ir co rre pond nt in the aid city f Pitt 1 urcr, 1 y m an of
whi h th e aid arrar mio-ht b nabl d t mak hi pur ha
· and
th aid def ndant up n uch applicati n, ma I and d !iv r d t
1Ir. Farrar a Jett r o f r dit1 r writt n guaranty, addr
d t
M .r .
. M Bri le &
., m r hant in itt buro-, in thew r l
fo ll win o- :
" C U YAil
A FALL )
vemb r 26, I 6.
. D . ~I BRIDE & Co.
•· en t lc:m n: ~rr .
. D . F a rrar ha c ncluded to purcha e a few
.i.

I ; we hav that c nfid n e in ~l r . F a rra r, that w will ay that we
w ill be r p n ibl t th a m unt of $2 ,000 for g d d liv r d him.
"W ar truly,

<YOO

,, . W . &

. D.

v ET

fOR E."
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And which said letter^ the plaintiffs aver was taken by Mr.

Farrar, and presented to Messrs. McBride & Co. at Pittsburg, who

retained it, as security for themselves and such other merchants in

the said city, as should, at that time and on the faith of said guar-

anty, sell goods on a credit to the said Farrar.

It is also averred that jMr. Farrar was unable to obtain a gen-

eral assortment of goods from the house of the Messrs. McBrides,

whose business was confined to that of grocers, and therefore he

made application to the plaintiffs, upon the strength of the said

guaranty, then in the hands of McBride & Co. referring the plain-

tiffs to the house of McBride & Co. and to the said guaranty ; that

the plaintiffs did in fact call upon McBride & Co., examined the

letter of credit, and being satisfied with their statements in regard

to the responsibility of the defendants, and of the guaranty, in con-

sideration thereof, sold and delivered to Mr. Farrar, upon a credit

of six months, a bill of dry goods, amounting to $760.75 ; of all

which the defendants had due and timely notice. The plaintiffs

then aver that the credit has expired, and that Farrar has omitted

to pay, etc.
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The second count states that on November 6, 1836, etc., in con-

sideration that the plaintiff's at the special instance and request of

the defendants, would sell to said Farrar, on credit, all such goods

as said Farrar should have occasion for and require of said plain-

tiffs in their trade and business of wholesale dry goods merchants,

they, the defendants, undertook and promised to pay the plaintiffs

therefor ; this count then avers the sale and delivery of goods to the

amount of $760.75. on a certain credit, agreed upon between the

parties, that the credit had expired, that Farrar had not paid, of

wdiich the defendants had notice ; avers their liability, and breach

in the non-payment.

To this declaration the defendants filed tb.eir plea of the gen-

eral issue.

The testimony submitted on the part of the plaintiff's, proves :

I. The execution and delivery of this mercantile guaranty, as set

forth in the first count of the declaration ; and 2. That a few days

after its date, it was handed to the firm of McBride & Company,

who not being dealers in dry goods, the witness (who was a part-

ner of the last mentioned firm), went with Mr. Farrar to the plain-

tiffs, and the said guaranty was shown to ^Ir. Taylor, one of the

plaintiffs ; the witness stated to Mr. Taylor, that he had sold a bill

of groceries on the strength of the letter, and Mr. Taylor then said

And whi h ai I I it rJ the plaintiff aver wa taken by 1\Ir.
Farrar, and pr nted to \t1e r . l\IcBrid & ·o. at Pitt buro-, who
retained it, a ecurity f r th mselve and uch ot her merchants in
the said city, a sh uld, at that tim and n the faith f aid g uaranty, ell good on a er dit to the said Farrar.
It i also averred that Mr. Farrar was unable to obtain a general a ortment of goods from the hous of the l\Iessr . McBrides,
who e bu.' ine s was confined to that f groce rs, and th r fore he
made application to the plaintiffs, upc:m the 5trength of the said
guaranty, th n in the hands of McBride & o. refe rrin g the plaintiffs to the house of Mc B ri de & Co. and to the said guaranty; that
the plaintiffs did in fact call upon McBride & Co., examined the
letter of crc:>dit, and being satisfied with their tatements in regard
to the responsibility of the defendants, and of the g ua ranty, in consideration thereof, sold and delivered to M r. Farrar, upon a credit
of six month , a bill of dry goods, amounting to $760.75; of all
which the defendants had d ue and timely notice. The plaintiff
then aver that the cr::!dit has expi red, aml that Fa rra r has omitted
to pay, etc.
The econd count state that on November 6, 1836, etc., in consideration that th e plaintiffs at the sp cial in tance and request of
the de fendants, would sell to aid Fa r ra r, on credit, all uch goods
as said Farrar .should have occasion fo r and require of said plaintiffs in their trade and busine of wholesale Jry goods merchants,
they, the defendants, undertook and promi eel to pay the plaintiff
th erefor; this count then aver th e sale an l delivery of goods to the
amount of $760.75 . on a certain credit, ao-reed upon betw een the
parties, that tbe credit had expired, that Fa rrar had not paid, of
v.rhich the defendants had noti ce; avers their liability, and breach
in the non-payment.
To this declaration th defenda nts fil cl their plea of the general issue.
The testimony submitted on th part of the plaintiffs, proves:
r. The execution· and delivery of thi mercanti le g uaranty, as t
fo rth in the first count of tb e declarati n: and 2 . That a few day
after its date, it was hand ed to the firm of McBride & Company,
who not being dealers in dry goods, th ·w itness (w ho was a partner of the last mentioned firm), went with M r. Farrar to the plaintiff , and the aid guaranty wa show n to Mr. Taylor, one of the
1..hat he had sold a bill
Plaintiffs '· the witness ~ tated to M r. Tavlor.
_,
of grocerie on the strength of th e Jetter , and ~Ir. Taylor th en aid
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he would sell a bill of j^oods on the strength dt the same, and Mr.

Farrar accordingly obtained the goods, 'ihe clerk and salesman

of the plaintiffs prove tlie amount of the goods sold to be $760.75,

and on a credit of six months.

The evidence on the part of the defendants proves that Farrar

was in business at Cuyahoga Falls from December, 1836, until

April or May, 1837, when he transferred all his goods to the de-

fendants, and closed his store. That he paid none of his debts n.

Pittsburg. That in September. 1837, the witness was present at a

conversation between Taylor, one of the plaintiffs, and C W. Wet-

more, one of the defendants, in which the defendant asked Taylor,

if he considered him responsible, either legally, morally, or honor-

ably, for the goods h^arrar had purchased of him. To which Taylor

replied he did not, but that the defendants had more goods in their

possession, received of Farrar, than they were holden to the house

of Mc Bride for; that the goods would amount to $500 or $700.

To this the defendant replied he did not know how that was ; that

there was also left with them, l)y b^arrar. notes and accounts to

the amount of about $200, and what they could not make up out
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of them, must be made up out of the goods; and if there was any

balance, so far as he was concerned, that should go to the plain-

tiffs.

Richard, for the ])laintitls.

Wood. J. Under the averments in the declaration, and the

testimony submitted, are the jilaintiffs entitled to judgment? — and

I may here remark, in the outset, in ibis case, that 1 know of no

arbitrarv rule applicable to actions ft)unde(l ui)on mercantile guar-

anties, w hich creates obligations between the parties to w hich they

have neither expressly nor impliedly assented. Tn all actions

founded in contract, the agreement as set forth nnist be proved, or

the circumstances existing between the parties must be such as to

h ,,. ulcl ell a bill f go cl on th e slrenath f the
Farrar accorcli1wly ob tain d th rroocl.. The 1 rk an 1 ale man
of the plaintiff prove th amount f th
old to be 760.75,
and on a crccl il of ix m onth .
The e\'idence on th part of th e cld nclant · pro\' that Farrar
\\·a in bu _in c at 'uyahoga Fall fr 111 D ec mb r, I 36, until
. \pril r =---ray, r837, whrn he tran . £erred all bi ;o Is to the le£ ndant a nd clo eel hi ~ to re. That he paid n ne f hi d bt · 11,
Pittsburo-. That in 'cpl ' mb r, r837, the witn
wa 1 r ent at a
conv r ation between Tay! r, one of the pla intiff , and ' . \\'. \\' tmore, on of the defentb.nts, in which the defendant a ked Tavl r,
if h e con icl er cl him respon ible, it.her lerra ll y . rn rally, or h norably , fo r th e good Fa rrar had purcha eel of him . To which Taylor
replied he did not, but that th e defendant had m re good in their
po ession , received of Farrar, than they w ere holden to the h ou e
o f :\lcBride fo r; that th e good \\·oui l amount to 500 or 700.
To this the defendant r eplied he did not kno\\· how that wa ; that
there wa al o left with them, by Farrar, note and account to
the amount of about )200, and what th y oulcl not rnak up out
of th em, mu t be macl e up out of the good ; and if ther wa any
babn ·c, so far a he \\'a: concern ed, that hau l 1 go t the plaintiff

leave it clearly to be inferred. In enforcing them, courts of justice,

though thcv may sometimes be confined l)y technical rules, always

endeavor to ascertain ihe understandings and intentions of the

parties, and these are considered as the essence of their agreements

in carrving them into execution. Mercantile guaranties are either

general or special ; though a single letter of credit may bear upon

its face both of these distinctions. It may be general, as to the

whole world, to whom the bearer may be accredited, and to any

portion of whom, at his own option, he may make the guarantor

Hichard. for th e plaintiffs.
\Yocm, J. Cnder ~h a\·erm nt in th e declarati n , an 1 th
tc timon:· ubmittecl, arc th e plaintiffs entitl ed to juclgment?-and
I may her remark, in the out t. in Lhi
a c. that l know o f no
arbitrar:· rul e applicable to actiom fo und ed upon m e rca ntile guarantic , ,,·hi ch creat obligatic ns b ' tw1.:e11 th e parti to which they
haY neither exp re_ sly no r impliecll y a , ent cl.
J 11 all a ti on
f uncl ccl in c ntract, the a:-:;reernent a _ "t forth mu t be proYecl. or
the circum tance ex isting between tb e parti c~ mu t be uch a to
lea Ye it clearly to be inf rred. In nforcint-..· th em, court f ju tice,
th oug h th y may om tim . be onfinecl by t hnical rul , alway
nd eaYo r to a ce rtain th und er. tancling- ancl intention. o f th
parties, anc\ th e e arc co n icl erecl a. th e e ~e n c of their agre m nt
in ca rryin g th em int
x cuti on. :\] r ~ antil guaranti ar
ither
gene ral o r _p ial: th ouh·h a - in~.:l Jett r of r t clit may bear upon
iL fac both f the c di tincti 11 . It may I ;eneral, a to th
whole world, to wh rn th bearer may be ac r li te 1, and to any
porti n of wh m. at hi · wn option, Ii may make the buarantor

L\l~K
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a debtor, and special, as to the amount of the credit; or unlimited

or general in the amount, and special as to the parties.

The first inquiry which arises here, is, whether the guaranty

in question is not special as to persons. It is directed to the house

of McBride & Co., in the city of Pittsburg, and nothing upon its

face evincing an intention to give Farrar credit, or to incur respon-

sibility with any other house.

The counsel for the plaintiff here admit, that a surety can not

be held beyond the terms of his engagement, but they insist that|

although it is addressed only to AIcBride & Co. as it does not say

"we will be responsible to you/' it is a letter of credit to any other,

who will advance the goods. It seems to us, this reasoning is more

ingenious than sound. The guaranty being addressed to A. D.

A'IcBride & Co., it is to them the defendants speak when they sa\-,

"zve zvill be responsible to the amount of $2,000," and it contains

no general terms, by which either Farrar, or the house of McBride,

had the authority to transfer it to the plaintiffs, and they to make

the defendants their guarantors, without their assent, express or

implied.
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Judgment for the defendants.'^

Clark et al. z's. Kellogg (1893).

96 Mich. 171 ; 55 N. W. 676.

Thomas A. IVilson, for appellants.

Blair & Wilson and Parkinson & Day, for defendant.

Montgomery, J. The plaintiff's sued the defendant, counting-

upon a breach of an agreement given on the occasion, and in con-

sideration, of the purchase by the plaintiffs from the defendant of

a debtor, 2.nd p cial, a to the amount of tli . credit; or unlimited
or gen ral in th am u11t. and pc ial a to the partie .
The fir t in iuiry which ari e here, i ·, whether the g ua ranty
in que tion i not special a to pe1--o n . lt i directed to the house
of McBride c' Co., in the city of Pittsburg, and noth ing upon its

fac vincin o- an intenti n to give Farrar er clit, or to incur re ponibility with any other house.
The coun l fo r the plaintiff here admit, that a . urety an not
be held b yond the term of hi enaagement, but they in i t tha~
althotwh it is addre eel only to }.[cBricle c' 'o. a it doe not ay
''\ e will be re pon ible to ·y ou," it is a letter of credit to any othe r,
who will a lvance the good . 1t seems to u , this rea oning i more
ingeniou than ~ o und. The guaranty b ing addre ed to A. D.
McBride & Co., it is to them th e defendant . peak when they , ay,
''we w ill be rcspollsiblc to the a11w1l!lt of 2,000,' and it contain
no aeneral term -, by whi ch either Farrar, or th e house of ~\Ic Bride,
ha l the authGrity to transfer it to th plaintiff ~, and they to make
the defendant their guarantor , without th eir a ent, exp ress or
im,olicd.

a stock of goods and a quantity of notes and accounts. That por-

Judgment for the defendants. 1

tion of the agreement material to be considered in determining the

questions involved reads as follows :

"The said party of the first part * * * does covenant and agree * * *

that the annexed invoice is a true statement of the amount and value of

stock, merchandise, and property, and also guarantee, represent, and war-

'The other points touched upon in the opinion are omitted.

7

CL\RK et al. -z.ts.

KELLOGG (

1893).

96 Mich. 171; SS N. W. 676.

Tho111as A. TV if son, for appellant .
Blair & Wilson and Parkinson & Da-:y for defendant.
1,

Io:-JTGO:.IERY , J. The plaintiffs ued the defendant. counting·
upon a breach of an agreement given on the occasion, an l in consideration, of th purcha e by the plaintiffs from th defendant of
a stock of good and a quantity of note and account . That portion of th agreement material to be c n idered in determinin o- the
que tion in olved read ~ a follow :

"The a id party of the fir t pa rt * * * does CO\'enant and agree * * *
that the ann exed inYoice i. a true tatement of th e amount and va lu e of
stock, merchandi e, and property, and also guarantee, repre ent, and war1

T he othe r point
7

touched upon in th e opinion are omi tted .
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rant that there is in said stock goods to the value of $14,709.68; also that

the amount of $29,702.54 net shall be realized, without charging for the

personal services of the parties of the second part, nor other charges of

second parties, except incurred in suits, by the parties of the second part,

upon the accounts and notes herein conveyed. Tlie parties of the second

part shall use due diligence in their collection."

The declaration counted upon this agreement, and set out no

subsc([uent modification or waiver of its terms. On the trial the

rant that there i-; in -;aid stock goocJ-; to the Yalue oi q,70 .68; abo that
the amount of 29,7 2.5-J nll . hall be r ·alizccl, without charcring fur th
pcr-.nnal sen ice-; of the panic-, of the second part, n r th · r ·ha rg • f
second parties, except in ·urrcd in 'iUits, by the 1 arti , of the -.c ·o n<l part,
upon the account· and n tcs h ere in co nyeyecl. Th' parti ' of the · cond
part shall u-.c lu e cliligen ·e in th •ir
llccti n. ·

plaintiffs sought to recover by showing that they had dealt with

the accounts as men of ordinary business judgment would, and also

sought to show that the defendant had, as to a large portion of the

accounts, directed the plaintiffs as to what he would require as

evidence of due diligence, and that the plaintiffs had C()m])licd with

the demands of the defendant in this regartl.

1. The circuit judge construed the original contract as amount-

ing to a guaranty of collection, and held that no showing of dili-

gence was sufficient whicli did not inchide ])r()of that the accounts

had each l)een put in judgment, and execution had been taken out,

and returned unsatisfied. This ruling was unquestionably right,
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if the proper construction was placed on the contract. Bosnian v.

Alceley, 39 Mich. 710: Schcrincrhorn v. Conner, 41 Id. 374.

It is contended, however, that the contract in (picstion should

not l)e construed as a guaranty of collection of each individual

accottnt, reqtiiring resort to legal process in the collection of each,

but amounted to a warranty and representation that there should

be realized $29,702.54 from the total of the accounts ; and that the

fact that the amount guaranteed to be realized was much less than

the face of the accotmls negatives the idea that resort should be

had to suit np^m each account^ The infirmity of this con-

struction is that it ignores the sul)se(|uent language, "The parties

of the second part sliall use due diligence in their collection," or

accords to this language a meaning at variance with the settled sig-

nificance of the terms emi^loyed. What constitutes due diligence

is settled b\- the cases of Bosnian v. .Ikclcy and Sclwnncrlioni v.

Conner, snpra.

In the case of Kalfh v. Jildrcdgc, 58 Hun. 203, a similar qties-

tion was presented. Plaintiff and defendant were co-partners.

Defendant conveyed his interest to the ])laintiff' in the notes,

accounts and demands owing to the firm. The defendant at the

'Counsel cited Taylor v. Solder. 53 Midi. 06; Koch v. Mclhorn. 25 Penn. St. 89;

Stntthers v. Clark, 30 Id. _mo.

The cl chration counted upo n thi ao-reement, a nd ·ct out no
. ub ·cqu ·nt m oclificati n or waiv r of it t rm . O n th trial th e
plaintiff
ought lo r ec ver by h \\'ing that th ey ha l l a lt with
the ac ·o un t a men of ord in ary bu in
j ud o-111 nt w o ul l and al o
o ught to ho\\" that the cl de ncla nt hacl, a t a larg' porti n of th
acounts, clir ct cl the plaintiff as t what he w o uld r eq uire a
evidcnc
f due d ili o-e ncc, and that th e plaintiff h a d compli c l \\"ith
tl1c clcma nd o f th cldenclant in thi r ega rd.
1 . The ci rc uit judge co n ·trued th
riginal contract a am unting to a guara nty of co llec ti o n, ancl helcl that n
how in o- f dilige nce wa uffi · ient whi ch did not i11clu le Ir of that the a a unt
had a · h h en l ut in juclg111cnt, and x c ution had 1 e n tak n ut,
a ncl r et urn cl un a ti fi ecl. Thi rulin cr wa unque ti nably right
if th ~ p rop er con tru ction \Ya . placed 11 the c ntract. Boslllan v.
,~l!?clc_)', 39 :\Ii h. 7 L : Sc/1cr11lcr/10 m v.
Olllt cr, ..p Id. 37-1-·
It i 011te11clecl, h ow ever. that th contract in que ti n h uld
nGt 1c c 11 tru d a a guaranty of c 11 ction f ach individual
acco unt, rcc1uiring r e o r7- to lc:ga l p rocc
in th
ll ecti n f a h
but a m o untecl to a warranty and r epre ntati n that th er
hould
h realiz cl 29, 7 -· S-1- from th e to tal of th a c unt ; and that the
fac t that the amount g uaranteed to be r ea li zed \\'a much 1
than
the face f the a co unt. nega tive th id ea that r ort b uld 1
hacl l
uit np,) n each :iccc unt 1 Th infirmity
f thi cont ru ctio n is th:it it ig no r e, th
ub equ nt lan o-uag , "Th I arti
o f the s co nd part hall LL clu e clili nee in th ir coll cti n,' ' r
accord to thi lan g ua g' a m ea n in at va ri a nc with th ' e ttl cl ignificance of th e terms empl oyed . \Vhat c n titut
clu e diligence
1
cttl ' cl IJy th e ca . . of Ros/11011 v. , lk efey and chcrlllcrhorn v.
Co1111cr, su pra .

In the a e of Half'lz " · n ldrcdgc S< Hun . 203, a imilar qu L laintiff and defendant w r
-partner .
tio n \\'a pr s nt cl.
J ' f enclant co nvey cl hi s int ' r est t th e 1 laintiff in th n t ,
ace un t. a ncl clcmancl. win t the firm. Th l f ndant at th
1

'o un<;cl citcrl Ta:,•l or ' '· .'>o f'cr . 53 \I 1ch. 96; I\ oc h v. ,1[cl/1 orn, 25 P

Str11thers v. Clark. 30 Id

2 10 .

1111.

t . 89;
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same time executed to the plaintiff a bond with the condition tliat

defendant should pay to the plaintiff" one-half of the amount of the

notes, accounts, and claims of the late firm assigned by defendant

to plaintiff that should prove to be uncollectible, if any such there

should be. The court say :

"It seems to be settled in this state that a guaranty of collec-

tion is an undertaking to pay the sum of money guaranteed, pro-

vided the principal debtor is prosecuted to judgment and execution

with due diligence, and the same cannot be collected of him. * * *

The plaintiff' urges that the bond does not guarantee the collection

of these claims, but is only a contract to pay plaintiff one-half of

the amount of those which should turn out bad. But the bond

uses the word 'uncollectible,' and the question must be, what is

the legal meaning of that word? That word has a definite mean-

ing, as decided in the cases above cited ; and that meaning should

be here enforced."

The legal signification of the term "due diligence," as applied

to a guaranteed note or account, is well understood, and the parties

must be assumed to have contracted with reference to that meaning-.
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2. The court rightly held that the alleged subsequent waiver

could not be shown under the pleadings in this cause. The con-

tract itself having fixed upon the plaintiffs a specific duty, the aver-

ment in the declaration that the plaintiff's did use due diligence

amounted, in effect, to an averment that they had pursued the

■course which the law imposes upon them in order to charge the

guarantor. If they relied on any excuse for failing to use due

diligence, this should have been counted upon in the declaration.

Aldrich v. Chubb, 35 Mich. 350.

Judgment afiirmed, with costs.

The other Justices concurred.

Dover Stamping Co. z's. Noyes (1890).

151 Mass. 342; 24 N. E. 53.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk county.

Action by Dover Stamping Company against B. B. Noyes to

recover $210.20 and interest for goods sold and delivered by plain-

am tim x cutecl to th - plaintiff a b nd with th condition that
defendant houl cl pay t th plaintiff one-half of th am unt of the
not , ace unt , a nd cla ims f th e late firm a ia n d by l f ndant
to plaintiff th c:t hould 1 r v t0 he uncoll ectible, if any uch th ere
hould 1 e. Th e co urt ay:
"I t c:em to he ~ ttl l in thi tate that a g uaranty f coll ction i an un l rtaking to pay the um of m oney o·uarant ed, provided the principal debtor i pro ecuted to j udg111ent and execution
with due diligence, and th e ame cannot 1 e collected of him. * * *
The plaintiff urge that the bond do s not g uarantee th e collecti n
of th e e claim , but is only a contract to pay plaintiff one-half of
the amount of tho e wh ich hou!d turn out bad . Dut the bond
u e th e word 'uncoll ectible,' an l th e q ue. tion mu t he, what is
the lega l m eaning- of that word ? That word has a definite m eaning, a s d cided in th e cases above cited ; and that m eaning should
be her e enforceu. "
The legal ignification of the term " clue diligence,'' as applied
to a guaranteed note or acco unt. is w 11 understood, and the parti
mu t be a urned to hav e contracted with reference to that meaning.
2. The court rig htly held that the alleged subs qu ent waiver
could not be hown under the pleading in this cau e. The contract it elf having fixed upon the plaintiff a pecific duty, the averment in the declaration t11at the plaintiffs did u se due diligence
amounted, in effect, to an averment that they had pursued the
-cour e which the la\Y impo es upon th em in order to charge the
guarantor. If they relied on any excu e for failing to use due
diligence, this should have been counted upon in the declaration .
A ldrich v . Chubb, 35 Mich. 350.
Judoment affirmed, with costs.
The other Ju tice concurred .

D ovER

Appeal from

Co. vs.

NOYES (

151 Ma s. 342; 24

. E. 53.

ST.\ MPIN" ,

1890).

uperior Court, Suffolk county.

ction by D over tamping Company again t B. B. oyes to
recover $210.20 and intere t for good ol l and delivered by plain-
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tiffs to ¥. W Field & Co., the payment of which plaintiffs claim

was guarantied by defendant. The guaranty relied on is contained

in the following correspondence:

"Boston, Mass., U. S. A., Nov. i8, 1887.

"Messrs. B. B. Noyes & Co.

tiff to F. P. Field
., the paym nt of whi h plaintiff claim
wa - guarantie l by def nclant. The uaranty reli cl on i contained
in the following corr pondenc :

"Gentlemen : We liave recently become acquainted and opened trade

with Messrs. 1\ P. Field & Co., who seem to be good fellows, without

much money, but claim to be backed by you. Will you kindly tell us if

this is so, — if we can consider you as having responsibility for their debts,

or intending to see that they are paid. Your truly.

"Dover St.ami'ing Co. C. D. F."

"BOSTON, ).fAss., C. . A., 1\ov. 1 , I 7.
":\lE sR . B. B. Toms & Co.
"Gentlemen: \Y e have recently become acquainted and opened trade
with :\le srs. F. P. I'ielcl
o., who ecm to be go d fellow , without
much money, but claim to b backed by you. \\ ill you kindly tell u if
this is o,-if we can con sider you as haYing re ponsibility for their debt ,
or intending to ee that they :ire paicl.
Y ur truly,
"I OYER ST.\ \ll'ING 0. c. D. F."
0

"Greenfield, Mass., Nov. 21, 1887.

"The Dover Stamping Co., Boston, Mass.

"Gentlemen : We have your favor of the eighteenth instant, relating

to the firm of F. P. Field & Co. As Mr. Noyes is away, writer cannot

say what arrangement he has made with them as to being responsible for

their bills, but should presume they would not misrepresent any arrange-

ment they may have with him. ^Ir. Noyes has helped this firm some in

starting, and considers them good, honest, hard-working fellows, who
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will be likely to meet their bills. Yours respectfully,

"B. B. Noyes & Co. Jones."

"Boston, Mass., U. S. A., Nov. 22, 1887.

"Messrs. B. B. Noyes & Co.

"Gentlemen : Your favor of the twenty-first instant is at hand. We

are obliged to you for your attention to our request, and glad to hear

that Alessrs. F. P. Field & Co. stand so well with you. We would, how-

ever, like to hear from Mr Noyes on his return. It is needful for us to

know whether the statement of the young men is correct or not, as, leav-

ing out the question of misrepresentation, they evidently have not enough

of the 'sinews of war,' of their own, to carry on business successfully,

however competent and energetic they may be. Your truly,

"Dover .Stampixg Co. C. D. F."

"Greenfield, AIass., Nov. 28, 1887.

"Dover Stamping Co., Boston, Mass., North Street.

"Dear Sirs : Answering yours of 22d, I am assisting F. P. Field & Co.

in a small waj', financially, and in a measure directing their efiforts ; and

1 have advised them to pay their bills promptly at maturity, and. if they

find they are unable to do so at any time, to let me know. I think they

will follow my advice in your case. If they fail to. jilcase let me know,

and I will see that you are taken care of. B. B. Noyes."

"Boston, Mass., U. S. A., Nov. 29, 1887.

"GREE TFIELD,

:\L\

., Nov. 21,

I

7.

"THE Do\'ER STA:\rP1xc Co., Boston, ":\Ia s.

''Gentlemen: 'vV e have your fav r of the eighteenth in tant, r lating
to the firm of F. P. Field & Co. A 1Ir. . oyes i away, writer cannot
ay what arranrrement he has made with them a to being re pon ible for
their bill , but houlcl presume they would not mi r present any arrangement they may have with him. :\lr. :>royes has helped this firm ome in
sta rtin g, and considers them good, hone t, hard-working f llows, who
will be likely to meet their bi 11 .
Your re pectfully,
'·B. B. NOYES & Co.
Jone ."
"BosTON, :\!Ass., U. S . . . , o'·· 22, 1887.
"1\IE sRs. B. B. NOYES & Co.
''Gentlem n: Your fayor of the t\'.renty-first in Lant is at hand. We
arc obliged to you fo r you1· c:ttention to our reque t, and rrlad to hear
that :\fes r . F. P. Field & 'o. stand so well with you. \Ve would, howe,·er, like to hear from Mr Noyes on hi s retu rn. It i nee lful f r u to
know whether the tatement of the young men i correct or n t, a , leaving out the question of misr pre cntation, they evidently have n ot nough
of the 'sinew of war,' of thei r ow n, to carry on bu sines
ucce fully,
however cornpet nt and energetic they may be.
Your truly,
"Do\'ER STAM PL ·c Co.
. D. F.n

"Messrs. B. B. Noyes & Co.

"Gentlemen: Your esteemed favor from Mr. B. B. Noyes, in person,

is received. We are much obliged for x\u- assurance given us regarding

''GREENFIELD, l\lA S.,
OV. 28, I 87.
"DOVER TAMPI ' G Co., Boslon, ~Ia ., orth Street.
"Dear Sirs: An wering yours of 22d, I am as isting F. P. Field & Co.
in a small way, financially, and in a meas ure dircclinrr their effort ; and
I haYe aclYised them to pay their 1 ill promptly at maturity, a nd . if they
find lhey a rc unable l do so at any time, to let me know. 1 think they
will follow my advice in yo ur case. If they fa]l t , plea e I t m know,
and I will ee that you ar taken care of.
B. B. NOYE "

"BOSTON, MASS.,
OY. 29, 18 7.
"i\IE SR . B. B. KoYEs & Co.
" entl m n : Your
teemed fayor from :\Ir. B. B. Noy , in per on.
receiYecl. 'vVe are much ohliged for the assu ran
gwen u - regarding
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Messrs. F. P. Field & Co., and, on the strength of it, will be glad to con-

DO\'ER ST \:-I PI:NG

0. V .

" O\E: .

tinue the trade. Yours truly,

"Dover Stamping Co. C. D. F."

There was judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

E. Mcnvin, for plaintiff.

Me r . F. P. Field &
tinu the trade.

o., a nd, on the trcngth
Y urs truly,

''DornR

f it, will be gla:d to con-

TAMPI NG

Co.

C. D. F."

Greene & Griszvold, for defendants.

Knowlton, J. The decision of this case depends on the

proper interpretation of the correspondence relied on hy the plain-

tiff corporation as showing a continuing guaranty by the defend-

Th re wa judgment f r plaintiff.
E. JI en. in, for plaintiff.

D ef nclant appeal .

ant that F. P. Field & Co. would pay at maturity any debts they

might contract in their dealings with the plaintiff'. If these letters,

fairly construed, authorized the plaintiff" to sell goods to Field &

Co. from time to time, to be paid for by the defendant if not paid

for by the purchasers, the plaintiff" is entitled to recover. The

plaintiff's first letter was manifestly written in reference to pos-

sible future transactions. It says that the corporation has recently

"opened trade" with Field & Co., and refers to their representation,

apparently made with a view to obtaining credit. The inquiry

relates to the subject of legal liability. The defendant is asked
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whether he will be responsible for their debts, or will see that the

debts are paid. Upon receiving the letter of November 21st, writ-

ten by the defendant's clerk, in his absence, and containing a

recommendation of Field & Co., the plaintiff", by its letter of

November 22d, said, in effect, that it was not content with a recom-

mendation! but wanted an explicit answer to its former letter.

Thereupon the defendant wrote the letter of November 28th, stat-

ing that he was financially assisting Field & Co., and promising

to see that the plaintiff" was "taken care of," if notified that Field

& Co. failed to pay their bills promptly at maturity. This can

hardly be construed as anything less than a promise to pay if the

principal debtor did not. It also had reference to bills to be con-

tracted in the future ; for it was written in answer to the plaintiff's

questions, and Field & Co.'s possible inability to pay promptly was

spoken of as something which they might discover "at any time."

If it was necessary to give notice of the acceptance of a guaranty

g-iven in this way, which we do not intimate, the plaintiff by its

letter of .November 29th accepted it, and notified the defendant

that it would continue the trade on the strength of it. Here we

find all the elements of a valid, continuing guaranty ; and it is

agreed that on the faith of it the plaintiff' sold goods which never

GrC'Cnc & Griswold for defendant
K TO\ LTO r , J. The cleci ion f th i ca e depend on the
proper interpr tation of the correspondence relied on by the plaintiff corporation a hawing a continuing g uaranty by the defendant that F. P. Field & Co . would pay at maturity any de! t they
mibht contract in th eir dealing with the plaintiff. If the e letter ,
fairl y con trued, auth riz d the plaintiff to ell goods to F ield &
Co. from time to time, to be paid for by the defendant if not paid
for by the purcha er , th plaintiff i entitled to recover. The
plaintiff' fir t letter was manife tly written in reference to po ible future tran sactions. It ays that the corporation ha recently
''opened trade' ' with Field & o., and refers to their representation,
apparently made with a view to obtaining credit. The inquiry
relate to the ubj ect of legal liability. The defendant is a keel
whether he will be r ponsible fo r their debt , or will ee that the
debts are paid. U pon receiving the letter of November 21st, written by the defendant's cl rk, in his absence and containing a
recommendation of Field & o., the plaintiff, by its letter of
November 22d, aid, in effect, that it was not content with a recommendation; but wanted an explicit answ er to its former letter.
Thereupon the defendant wrote th e letter of November 28th, tating that he was financially assi ting Field & Co., and promising
to see that the plaintiff wa "taken care of," if notified that Field
& o. failed to pay their bill promptly at maturity. Thi can
hardly be construed a anything less than a promise to pay if the
principal debtor did not. It also had reference ta bills to be contracted in the future; for it was written in answer to the plaintiff'
qu tion , and Field & Co.'s possible inability to pay promptly wa
poken of a omething which they might di cover " at any tim e."
If it wa necessary to give notice of the acceptance of a guaranty
given in this way, which we do not intimate, the plaintiff by it
letter of .L ovember 29th accepted it, and notified the defendant
that it would continue the trade on the trength of it. Here we
fin l all th e elements of a valid, continuing guaranty; and it i
agr eel that on the faith of it th plaintiff old goods which never
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have been paid for, of which the defendant has had due notice.

A R A ~ TTY

A_ D SU R ETY HIP.

Upon the ai;-reed facts, the plaintiff's case is made out. Paige v.

Parker. 8 Ciray, 211; Beitt v. Hartsliorji, 1 Mete. 24; Jordan v.

Dobbins, 122 Mass. 170.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

E. A. Sherburnr vs. ]. W. Buti-F-k P.nprr Co. (i8gi).

40 Illinois App. 383.

have b en paid fo r. £ " ·hich th cl £ n lant ha had lu n tic
Tpon the a T eel fa ct. the plaintiff a
i macl
ut. Paige v .
Parker.
G ray, ~ l r ; B eJLf v . H artslz nrn , r ::\I etc. 24 ; Jordan v.
Dobbin ' , L - :i\Ia . 17 0 .

E. A. Sherburne, pro sc.

Messrs. McClcUan fr Cummins and Lemuel II. Poster, for

Ju dg111

nt f r th e 1 laintiff.

E. A.

H E RBCR:\' E

appellee.

Waterman, J. The evidence in this case was that appellant

gave to appellee the following guaranty :

GUARANTY.

"In consideration of one dollar ($1.00) to me in hand paid by the

J. W. Butler Paper Company, of Chicago, Illinois, the receipt whereof is

z·s.

J.

\V.

D c T LE R P .\ PER

o.

( r

9 1) .

hereby acknowledged, and for other good and valuable considerations, I

.fO Illinoi Arp . 383.

hereby guarantee to the said J. W. Butler Company the payment, at

maturity, of any bills of account due them for merchandise hereafter

E . A . Sh erburn e, pro se.

from time to time sold ami delivered by them to the Eureka Roofing
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Company, of Chicago, whether sold on open account or on notes to the

:0.Ie r . JI cC!cllan fr C 11 n1111 i11s ancl I e11 w el H . F oster, fo r

amount of $30, on twenty days' time.

"And 1 hereby authorize the said J. W. Butler Paper Company to

extend the time of payment in any manner that may be agreed upon be-

appell ee.

tween them and the said Eureka Roofing Company, without any notice

to me, and no such extension of time of payment shall affect my liability

on this guaranty.

The evidence in tbi case wa that ap1 ellant
crave to appellcc.: th e fo llowing guaranty :
\:\1.\TE R 11' N, ].

"This said guaranty to remain in full force and effect until revoked

GUARA N TY.

by me in writing.

"Witness my hand and seal at Chicago, this 9th day of December,

A. D. 1884.

(Signed) • "E. A. Sherburne, [seal]

"lis Monroe St."

That thereafter appellee deliveixd roofing fell lo the luireka

Roofing Co., and charged to it upon its books such goods to the

amount of $51.40.

Appellee also introduced, without objection, a letter, purport-

ing to be signed by a])pellant, stating that he had a note from Mr.

" In co n id e r a ti o n o f on d oll a r ( $r .oo ) lo m e in h a nd pa id by th e
\ V. Butl e r P a pe r Co mp a ny. o f Chi cago , Illin i , th e receipt wh e r eo f is
h er eby a cknow ledge d, an l f r th e r goo d a nd v a lu able con side rati on , I
h r eby crua ra nt ee t o th e said J. Vv . Butl e r
o mp a ny th e paym nt, at
ma turity. of a ny bill s f acco unt du e th em fo r m e rch a ndi
h r a ft er
from t im e to t im e s lei a nd d elive re d by th em to th e Eureka R oofing
Co mp a ny, f C hi cago, wh eth e r sa id o n o p en ace unt o r o n n tes to the
a m o tint o f $JO, o n t wenty cl ays ' tim e.
" ncl 1 h e r eby a uth o ri ze t h e a id J. \ V. Butl e r P a per Co mpa ny to
ex t end t h tim o f f)ay m nt in a ny m a nn er th a t m ay b e ag r e cl up n b etween t hem a nd t h e sa id E ureka R oo fin g
mpa n y, with ut a ny n o tice
to me, a n d n o su ch exten sio n of t im e of pay m nt h a ll a ff ect m y li a bility
on th is cr uara n ty.
"Th i sa id 0 ua ra nly t r em a in in full fo rce a nd eff t until r evo k d
by me in w ri t ing.
" \ Vi tn ss m y h a nd a nd sea l at C hi cago, thi s 9th day f D ece m.ber ,

J.

A. D. 1884.
(S ig n ed )

" E.

.

SIIERBU R E,

"ns Mo nr

fs eal]
St. "

That th ereaft r app ,Jlee cleliv r "cl r fino· f lt to th ~ ureka
R oofin g
., and cha rged to it up n it 1 k
uch g d to th
am ount of $ 5 r. 40 .
1\1 p 11 e al o in troclu cl. with ut bj tion, a 1 tter, purporting t b i a n cl by a1 p llant, tatin g that h e had a not fr m Mr.

7
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Fuller of the Roofing Co.. "to the effect that he had arranged that

$27.65 of the J. W. Butler Paper Co." The original entry book

of the Paper Company, showing the charges, was introduced with-

out objection. The bill had been repeatedly presented to the Roof-

ing Company.

The guaranty was a continuing one. It distinctly guarantees

the payment, not of one bill or specified bills, but of any bills to

the amount of $30. Brandt on Suretyship and Guaranty Sec. 130;

Loive V. Beckzvith, 14 B. Monroe (Ky. ) 150; Murray v. Raynor,

22 Pick. 223.

The only evidence of the payment of anything l)y the Roofing

Company was contained in the bill presented to it for payment.

The finding and judgment for $27.50 of the court below was

in accordance with the law and the evidence, and the judgment is

affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Smith et al., Appellant, vs. Van Wvck, Respondent., (1890),

40 Mo. App. 522.
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Jcitkiiis & J Veils, for appellant.

C. O. Tichenor, for respondent.

Smith, P.J. * * * The plaintiffs sued defendant upon this

undertaking :

Fuller of th Ro fing o., "to the effect that he had arranged that
$27.65 of the J. \V. Bull r Paper
" The riginal entry book
of the Pap r Company, showing the charge , wa introduced without objection. Th bill had 1 en r p atedly pre ent cl to the Roofing ornpany.
Th rruaranty wa a c ntinuing one. It distinctly guarant c
the payment, not of one bill or specified bills, but of any bill to
the amoun t of $30. Brandt on Surety hip and Guaranty Sec. I 30;
Lmc:e v. Becl~with, q B. Monroe (Ky.) 150; .Uurra'y v. Raynor,
22 Pick. 223.
The only evidence of the payment of anything by the Roofing
ompany wa contained in the bill pre ented to it f r payment.
The finding and judgment for $27.50 of the court below was
in accordance with th e law and the evidence, and th e judgment i
affirmed.
Judo111ent affirm d.

"Kansas City, Mo.. July, 1885.

"I hereby guarantee the payment of bills as they mature, purchased

by E. S. Mendenhall, of R. P. Smith & Sons, of Bloomington, Illinois,

to the amount of thirteen hundred dollars ($1,300).

"T. C. Van Wyck,

"1501 East Eighteenth Street."

SMITH ET

,\L. ,

Appellant,

'L'S.

VAN \VYCK, Respondent., ( 1890),

For a bill of goods amounting to $1,240.60, sold by plaintiffs to

40

said Mendenhall. The facts and circumstances surrounding the

1o. App. 522.

execution of the said undertaking, and the relation of the parties

thereto, and to each other, may be summarized thus: Defendant

had rented to Mendenhall a store and business house. Menden-

hall had placed with one of the plaintiff's, who were ^\•holesale

Jc11!?ills & TV ells, for appellant.
C. 0. Tichenor, for re pondent.

merchants, an order for goods amounting from thirteen hundred

to seventeen hundred dollars. The plaintiffs hesitated about fill-

:-.IITH, P. ].
undertakina:

The p laintiffs sued defendant upon this

"KA SAS CITY, l\Io., July, 1885.
"I hereby guarantee th payment of biJls as they mature, purchased
by E. S. l\Iendenhall, of R. P. Smith & Sons, of Bloomington, Illinois,
to th e amount of thirteen hundred dollar ($r,300).

"T.

c.

VAN WYCK,

"1501 Ea t Eighteenth Street."

For a bill of goo ls amounting w $1,2-to.60, sold by plaintiff to
said :\I ndenhall. The fact and circum tances surroundino- the
execution of the said undertaking, and the relation of the parties
thereto, and to each other, may be ummarizecl thu s : Defendant
had rented to M enclenhal l a store ancl 1 usine hou e. l\Ienclenhall had placed with on of the plaintiffs, who were whole ale
merchant , an order for goods amounting from thirteen hundred
to eventeen hundred dollar . The plaintiffs he itated about fill-

88 GUARANTY AND SURETYSHIP.

GlJ.\R,\. "TY .\XD

"RETY ' HIP.

ing the order, and one of them went to defendant and told him

that Alendenhall had placed with them an order for goods to

the amount stated, and that they did not like to fill the same

imless defendant would guarantee the payment thereof ; that if

defendant would give his guaranty for thirteen hundred dollars,

and if they sold Mendenhall more goods than that, on such excess

they would take their chances for collecting. That thereupon the

defendant signed the undertaking sued on. The plaintiffs deliv-

ered Mendenhall goods to the amount of the defendant's guaranty,

for the payment of which the defendant furnished part of the;

money. The plaintiffs thereafter continued to sell goods to Men-

denhall for ahout two years, amounting in the total to several

thousand dollars. Finally Mendenhall failed, owing the plaintiffs

on account of such sales the amount sued for. It may be well'

doubted whether any question of interpretation of the said under-

taking properly arises on the abstract of the record before us,

and at which alone we can look. But, waiving the consideratibn of

that question for the present, we may state that it appears to us

that if we interpret the language of the said undertaking in the
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light of a knowledge of the relation of the parties, their antecedent

acts, and of the subject-matter of the same, as we have the right

to do; 2 Parsons on Contracts [7 Ed.] top p. 564; Edzvards v.

Sinifli, Adm'r, 63 Mo. 119; Bnnce, Adm'r, v. Bick's Ex'r, 43 Mo.

266 ; Hutchinson v. Bowkcr, 5 Mees. & W. 535 ; Black River

L. Co. V. IVarner, 93 Mo. 374, it l)ecomes quite obvious that it

cannot be held to be a continuing one, and this, too, in view of

the maxim, verba fortius accipiuntur contra proferenieui. It is

held in this state that when it is doubtful from the language con-

tained in the contract, whether the guaranty was for a single deal-

ing or a continuous one, the true principle of sound ethics is not

to set up a presumption for or against the guarantor, l)ut to give

the contract the sense in which the per.son making the promise

believed the other party to have accepted it, if, in fact, he did

accept it. Bochne et al. v. Murphy, 46 Mo. 57; Sliinc's Adm'r

V. Bank, 70 Mo. 524. Extrinsic evidence cannot be received to

contradict, add to, subtract from or var)- the terms of a guaranty,

but, as has been stated, when its meaning is doubtful, or obscurely

expressed, parol testimony in relation thereto, requisite to a clear

understanding of its j)urport, is admissible. The very language

of the instrument sued on negatives the idea that it was intended

to be a continuing guaranty. When the relation of the parties,

in the order, and one of them went to defen lant and t ld him
that ~lenclenhall had placecl with them an order f r g; d to·
the amount tatlCI. an· l that the) did n t lik t fill tb
am
unless cldrndant \\·milcl guarantc' th payment th r f: that if
defendant \\ oulcl give hi · guaranty for thirteen lrnnclr cl l llar ,
and if the\· !::>Olcl ~Iencl 't ilrnll mor ' good~ than that, on uch x e
they '' nulcl take their chan~e: f r collecting. That thcr up n the
defendant , igned th undertaking· su d on. Th plaintiff d li,·r d ).Iencl nhall good to the amount 0f the def nclant' guaranty,
for th paym ' nt of which th defendant forni ·hed part f the;
m o nev. The plaintiff · ther<'after continued to ell go cl to )-1 nclenhall for about two ;. ear., amounting in the total to
v ral
tho u ::mcl dollar · . Finally :\Iendenhall failed. owing th plaintiff
on account o f :::;uch al
th amount ucd for. 1t may be well'
cloubtecl wheth r any qu , ti on of interpretation of th
aid uncl rtaking properly ari. e. o n the ab. tract of th r cord b f re u ,
and at which alone \Ye can 1 ok. Dut. \\"ai,·ing th con. icl ratibn of
that que. tion for the pre. ent, \Ye may . tate that it app ar to u
that if " ·c interpret the language of the . aid unclertaki1io- in the
light of a knowledge of th rebtion of the partie , their antccedentl
act . and of the ubj ect-matter of the _ame, a w have the ri ·ht
to do: 2 Par on. on on tract. [ 7 Ecl.1 top p. 56-1 : Ed1crards v.
111ith. Adm 'r, 6~ ~Io . I 19: Bunce, ~ \clm 'r, v . B icli~ 's Ex'r, 43 Io.
266; Hutchinson v . Bo; •lwr, 5 :\Tc . & \ . 535; Blacll River
L. Co. \'. fT 'a rncr, 93 ).Jo. :)/-!-, it h come. 1u it ol viou that it
cannot be h ld to 1 e a ontinuing one, and thi ' too, in v i w or
the maxim, 'ue rba lorti us accipi1111fur co ntra proferc11te111. It i
h Id in thi
tate that when it i doubtful fr m the languao-e ontained in the contract, whether the o-uaranty wa for a ingl d a ling or a continuou
nc. the true principle of
uncl ethi
i not
to ct u1 a pr umption f r or again t the g u arantor hut to ~, i ve
th contract the en. e in which th p rson rnakino- th promi e
hcli v cl th other party to have ace ptecl it. if, in fact, he did
accept it. Boehne et al. v. Jlurphy, -1-6 ~1o. 57: !zinc's Adm'r
v. Bani?, 70 Mo. 52-1-. Extrin ic \'iclencc cannot 1 received t
contradict. acid to, , ubtract fr m or ·ary the t rm of a guaranty,
1 ut, a ha been tat cl, wh n it rncanin 0 · i doubtful, r b cur ly
x1 re . eel. parol tc timony in relation th r to r iui it l a cl ar
uncl r tancling of it purport, i aclmi s il le. The v r y Ian ·uage
of th in trurnent uecl n n e-ati\'c h idea that it wa int n l d
to b a continuing guaranty. \Yhen the: relation of th pa r ti ,

II E"N" RY M
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H AKE

'O. ·: .

P , \D L\ ~ .

-and the circumstances under which the guaranty in question was

entered into, are considered, its meaning becomes quite apparent.

The fact that plaintiifs had sold Mendenhall goods amounting to

thirteen hundred dollars, and that they would not deliver the

same to him without defendant would guarantee the payment

thereof, coupled with the further fact that this amount was in-

serted in the instrument, for which defendant bound himself for

"bills as they mature, purchased" — not to be purchased — con-

clusively shows that the transaction and undertaking related solelv

and entirely to the unfilled order, or orders, for goods plaintiff

had received of Mendenhall, at the time of the execution of the

contract, and not to subsequent sales and purchases. We think-

that upon the record before us the judgment of the circuit court

was for the right party. The exceptions to the rulings of the

court in respect to the introduction of evidence were not preserved

by a motion for a new trial, as appears by the abstract. But,

whether this is so or not. it is quite evident that none of these

adverse rulings of the court to the plaintiffs materially aft'ected

the merits of the case. Indeed, the plaintiffs, in their brief, make
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no point in respect to th.at matter.

The judgment, with the concurrence of Judge Ellison,

Judge Gill not sitting, will be afhrmed.

Henry McShane Co., L't'd., vs. Padian (1894).

142 N. Y. 207 ; 36 N. E. 880.

Appeal from common pleas of New York city and county,

general term.

Action by the Henry McShane Company, Limited, against

William Padian. From a judgment of the general term affirm-

ing a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Thos. C. Ennever, for appellant.

IViUiaui J. Fanning, for respondent.

Lin I r which th ' g ua ranty in q uc ·ti n wa~
enter I int , arc con i lcr I, it m a nin g bccom
quite appa rent.
The fact that i laintitf ha l
Id l\I nrl r- nhall g ods am untin g to
thirt n hundr cl dollar ,. a nd that th 'Y w uld n t deliv r t h e
ame to him with out defendant would g uaran tee the payrn nt
thereof , c u1 l cl with th furth er fact that thi amount wa inrted in th in trum ent. fo r whi ch d fenclant bound him elf for
'bill a they ma ture, purcha ecl"- not to be purcha eel-conclusively show that the tran action and undertaking relat d solelv
and entirel ' to th e unfilled order, or order , fo r goods pla intiff
had r eceived of l\I endenhall , at the tim e f the execution of the
contract, an d not to ub equ ent al es and purcha es. \ Ve think
that upon th e record before u the j uclgm ent of the circuit co urt
wa fo r the ri o·ht party. The ex ceptions to the rulings of t he
court in r espect to th e introduction of evidence w er e not preserved
by a motion fo r a nc,,- trial, a appears by the ab tract. But,
wh eth er thi i o or no t. it i quite evident that none of the e
adver e ruling of the court to the plaintiffs materially affec ted
the m erit of the case. Inclceu, the pla intiffs , in their brief, rna l. ;: e
no point in re p ct to that matter.
The j uclgrn ent, with the concurrence of J uclge E u .1so:-.r,
Judge GILL not itting, will be affirm d .

and th e circum la nce

Bartlett, J. The plaintiff seeks to recover of the defend-

ant upon the following guaranty: "I, William Padian, hereby

euarantv to the Henrv McShane Company, Limited, the payment

H EX RY M c Sn .\ XE

o., L 't'd. , vs.

P ADIA 1

(

1894 ).

142 N. Y. 207; 36 N . E . 880.
PPEAL
o-

from common pleas of

ew York city an d county,

neral term.

Action by the Henry 1c bane ompany, Limited. acrain
Vv illiam Pa lian . From a judgm ent of th e general term affi rmm o- a judgment fo r cl fendant, plaintiff appeal . R ever ed.

Th os. C. E w le7. er, for appellant.
!Villia11 1 !. Fa 11n ill cr, for r espondent.
1

B.\ RTLETT, J.
T he plaintiff seek to recover of the defend.ant upon th e fo llowing o-uaranty : " [, \ illiam Padian, hereby
guaranty to the H enry i\Ic. bane Company, Limited th payment
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by Jolin r. Wiegers, plumber, to thcni for any and all materials

wbicb they may deliver to John T. Wiegers, 1 not to be liable

for any balance exceeding five hundred dollars which may be-

come due. William Padian. Witness : Wm. H. Barth. Dated

New York, March 31st, '00." This case was tried before a referee,

who held that the guaranty was susceptible of two constructions,

and admitted, to quote from his opinion, "oral evidence of the

res gestae so as to arrive at the probable intention of the parties."

The evidence was admitted against the objection and exception

of plaintiff. Upon conflicting evidence, the referee found, sub-

stantially, that the guaranty had reference to certain goods sold

by plaintiff' to Johri P. WTegers, to be used in the performance

of a contract named, and that, before the commencement of this

action, Wiegers had paid for them. He further found that said

guaranty was not intended 1)\- the parties thereto as a running or

continuing guaranty, other than for the goods already referred to,

and dismissed the complaint, with costs. The general term of

the court of common pleas for the city and county of New York

affirmed a judgment for the defendant entered upon the report
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of the referee. The (|uestion i)resented on this appeal is whether

the language of the guaranty is so ambiguous as not to furnish

conclusive evidence of its meaning, and entitles the defendant to

prove the circumstances under which it was executed, so that the

court can construe it in the light of all the facts. If this ambiguity

exists, the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execu-

tion of this guaranty was properly admitted (Bivik v. Kaufman, 93.

N. Y. 281, and cases cited; Bank v. Myles, 73 N. Y. 341), and,

as the findings of the referee were made on conflicting evidence,

they are not reviewable in this court {Slicrn'ood v. Haiiser, 94 N.

Y. 626; fire Department of Nczc York v. Atlas S. S. Co., 106

X. Y. 578. 13 X. E. 329: Crim v. Starkzceather, 136 X. Y. 635. 32

X. E. 701 ). We are, however, unable to agree with the learned

court below in its construction of this guaranty. We regard its

language as clear, presenting no ambiguity, and as creating a con-

tinuing guaranty, which, by its terms, limits defendant's lial)ility

to any balance, not exceeding $500, which may become due, but

does not undertake to regulate the amount of John \\ Wiegers'

future transactions with the plaintiff'. The cases are numerous,

construing instruments of this character, and it is not always an

easy task to determine on which side of the line separating con-

tinuous from limited lial)ility they belong. In IVhitney v. Groot,.

l>y J ohn I'. \\ . icger ~ , plumber. to th m for any and all mat rial
"hich th y may deliver to John P. \Yi gcr , l n l to be liable
for any balance exce ding five hun Ired dollar whi h may b com due. \\'illiam Padian. \\'itn
: \\·111. II. Darth. Dat d
X w r rk, . far h ji st, 'o ." This ca
who h Id that the guaranty wa su c ptible of two con tru tion ,
and admitted. to quot fr m hi opinion. "oral evid nc
f the
res O'Cstae
a to arrive at th probable intention of tb partie ."
Th
vid nee \Ya aclmitt cl a;ain . t the obj cti n and xception
f plaintiff. L' pon conflictina vidence, the r f ree f und, ubtantially, that the ;uaranty hacl ref rence to c rtain o cl
o1d
by plaintiff to J oh!i P. \\'ieo-er , to be u eel in th I rformance
of a contract named, and that, bdore the commencem nt of thi
action, \ \'ieg·er hacl paid for them. He further foun l that aid
guaranty ,,.a not intend cl by the parties thcr to a a running r
continuinb· guaranty, other than for the good already referred to,
and di mi
cl the complaint, with co t . The o- neral term of
the court f common plea for the city and county of . . J w ork
affirmed a judgment for the defendant entered upon th report
of the referee. The question pre nted on thi appeal i wh ther
th language of the ::::uaran ty i o am biguou a not t furni h
conclu ive evidence of it meaning, and entitle the defendant to
prove the circum tance under which it wa executed, o that the
court can con true it in th light of all the fa L. If thi ambio-uity
urrouncling the e.'e uxi t , th evidence of tbe circum tance
ti n of thi guaranty wa properly admitted (Bani? v. KaufJJ1a11, 93
~. Y. 281, and case citecl; Ba11/? v. 111yles, 73 N. Y. 3+1), and,
a the finding of the referee were made on conflicting vid n e,
they ar not reviewablc in tbi court (Slzerzc ood v. Hauser, 4 1 .
1

Y. 626; Fire Dcpart111cnt of ~\rc·~l' }'ork v . .!ltlas ·
o., io6
:\. Y. 578, 13 :\. E. 329; rilll v . .'i'tarli7.c cathcr 13 X. Y. 635, 32
.T . E. 701).
\Ve are, how ver, unable to agre with th 1 arned
1

1

ourt below in it co1L trncti on of thi o·uaranty. \\ e re ar l its
language a. clear, pr entino- n ambiguity, an cl a reatino- a ontinuing guaranty. whi h, 1 y it terms, limit clef ndant' lial i1ity
to any balance, not e.. · ceding $5 , which may be om clu , 1 ut
do . not undertake to r gulatc the amount f John P. \ \ ' ieger '
futur tran . a tion \Yi th tb plaintiff. The ca
ar nurnerou ,
con. truing in . trument
f thi haracter, and it i n t always an
ca. y task to cl termine n which ide of the lin
l arating c ntinuou . fr om Jimitecl liability they b lon?". Tn TVhit11e3• v. Groot,
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24 Wend., at page 84, Chief Justice Nelson remarks: "It is, in

most of these cases, a nice and difificiiU question to determine

whether the guaranty is a continuing one or not. The intent of

the party, to be derived from the words, is the only sure guide ; and

therefore very little aid is to be derived from the adjudged cases,

as they turn upon the peculiar phraseology of the guaranty." In

Bank V. Myles, 73 N. Y., at page 341, Judge Earl says: "Pre-

cedents do not help much in the construction of such instruments."

In Gates v. McKee, 13 N. Y., at page 234, Judge Denio says : "The

cases are not entirely harmonious as to the principles of construc-

tion which ought to govern in this class of cases, but the weight of

authority is altogether in favor of construing guaranties by rules

at least as favorable to the creditor as those which courts apply to

other written instruments, irrespective of the consideration that

the guarantor is a surety." In the leading English case of Mason

V. Prit chard, 12 East, 227, the court said the words were to be

taken as strongly against the party giving the guaranty as the sense

of them would admit. The supreme court of the United States has

also expressed the same views. Dnimmond v. Frcstjiiaii, 12 Wheat.
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515: Douglass V. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 113, 122; Latvrcncc v. McCal-

mont, 2 How. 426.

Applying these principles to the guaranty now under con-

sideration, it leads to the construction we have already indicated.

The usual and ordinary import of its language discloses an intent

on the part of the defendant to guaranty the purchases of Wiegers

from plaintiff of any and all materials, provided his liability was

not to exceed $500. or any balance which might become due. To

place upon this instrument the construction contended for by

defendant is to ignore its plain provisions, and import into the case

an entirely new contract. The defendant contends he was only

guarantying payment of $395 worth of specific materials which

were to be used in the performance of a certain building contract.

On the other hand, the plaintiff states that Wiegers was a young

man starting in business, and it was customary to require a guar-

anty in such cases. The evidence in the case shows that Wiegers,

after the execution of the guaranty, made purchases of plaintiff

aggregating between six and seven thousand dollars, and made

pa\ments of between four or five thousand dollars, and owed plain-

tiff a balance of twenty-two hundred dollars w^hen this action was

commenced. Wc hold, however, that parol evidence was inad-

missible as to surrounding circumstances to aid in construing this

-4 \ ' nd. , at pacr
._i.,
hi i J u ti e . . Tel on remark
'' Jt i , in
ca e , a me and difficu lt qu tion t determin e
m o t of the
wh th r the g uaranty i a c ntinuin o- one r not. Th int nt of
th party, to be cl ri ved fr om tbe w rd , i the only ur gu ide; and
th refor e v ry little aid i to be dcriv d from the adj ucl - d ca e ,
a they turn upon th e peculiar phraseology of the g ua ranty." In
Bank v. JI yles. 73 N. Y., at page 341, Jucl ge Ea rl ay : "Precedent clo not help mu ch in th e con struction of uch instrument ."
In Gates v. JfcK.cc. 13 1\. Y .. at page 234, Judge Denio ays: " The
ca e are not enti rely ha rmoni us as to the principles of construction whi b oug ht to govern in th1 class of ca , but the weight of
authority i altogeth er ;n favor of construing guarantie by rul e
at lea t a favorable to th e creditor as tho e which co urts appl y to
other written in trum ents, irre pective of the con ideration that
the guarantor i a ur ty." In the leading English case of Mason
v. Pritchard, 12 Ea t, 22 7 : the court said the word were to be
taken as trono-ly again t the pa rty giving the g uaranty a the en e
of them would admit. The supreme court of the U nite l States ha
al o e:X:pre ed th e sam e vievvs . Dnw1111ond v. Prcst11za1L, 12 Wheat.
515; D ouglass v. R eyiwlds, 7 Pet. 113, 122; Law rrnc e v. McCal71l07lt, 2 H ow. 426.
Applying th e e principles to the guaranty now under coniderati on. it leads to the con truction w hav e alrea ly indicated.
The u ual and ordinary import of its lang uage di clo es an intent
on the part of the d fendan'. to g uaranty the purcha e of \ !\Tieger
from plaintiff of any and ail m ate rial , provided hi s liability wa
not to exc eel 500. o r a ny balance \vhich might become due. To
place upon thi s in trument th e construction contended for by
defendant i to io-nor it plain provi ion , and import into the ca e
an entir ly n w contract. The defendant contend he wa only
o-uarantyin g payment of . 395 worth of specific material s which
were to be u ed in the performance of a certain building contract.
On the other hand , the plaintiff tate that \Vieger was a yo un g
man tarting in bu ine , and it was customar y to require a guaranty in uch ca e. . The ev idenc in the ca e how that \ Viegcr ,
after th e execution of the o-uara nty, mad purchase of plaintiff
ao-gregating between six ancl . even thousand dolla r , and made
payment of l etween fo ur or fiv thou and dollars, and owed plaintiff a balanc of t\\ enty-two hundred dollar when thi action wa
commenc cl. \V c hold, hov ev r, that parol evid ence was inadmi ible a to urr un lino- circum tance to aid in con truing thi
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guaraniy, and rest our decision upon the language of the instru-

ment solely. The answer *>t the defendant alleges that he was

induced to sign the guaranty l)y the false and fraudulent repre-

sentations of i)laintiff, made through its agents. The prooi failed

to establish this defense, and the referee matle no such linding.

The judgment appealed from must be reversed, and a new trial

ordered, with costs to abide tlie event. .Ml concur.

Judgment reversed.

Ar.iK)TT rs. Brown (1889),

131 III. to8, 22 X. E. 813.

Appeal from Appellate Court. First District.

AssmrpsiT by 1 lenry G. Abbott against John J_'>. Brown. The

o·uaranty, and re ·t our dcci .- i0n upon the Ian ua c of th m trument o lely. T he a n .- ,, n ~ f th e cl ·fenclanl allerres lhat h wa
induc ·d to sign the: ·u ar~lllt ) by th ' f al c an I frau lul ent r pr sc ntat i n s of plaintiff, mac! · thrnu~.;11 iL age nt . Th I roof fail d
t c:tahl i ·h hi · cl f .n s , ancl tlw rdcr ·e mad e no u h fin !in ·.
Th' judgment appc~ll ed from must he r ver eel , and a n w trial
o rder d. with co t to a lJicle the C\ 'C nl. • \11 co ncur.
Jud g-me nt rev r cl.

circuit court rendered judgment for defendant, and the appellate

courr aftirnicd the judgment. Plaintiff appeals.

Osborne Bros. & Bnrgctt, for appellant.

Oshiint cr Lyiidc. for appellee.

Craig, J. On the ist day of July, 1876, Kirk B. Xewell,

AnnoTT

being indebted to H. G. Abbott, the appellant, executed his ])rom-

·z•s.

BHO\\' X

is.sory note as follows :

13 L Ill. ro , __ • ~.
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"Chicago, Ills., July i, 1876.

9),
E. 8 13 .
( 1

"One day after date 1 promise to pay to the order of H. G. Abbott

two thousand dollars, with interest at the rate of ten per cent, per annum,

. \p peal from ..\ppellate

o urt. Fi r l District.

at First National Bank of Chicago. Value received.

(Signed) "Kirk B. Newell."

Indorsed on the back cjf the note was the following guaranty:

"For value received,. I hereby guaranty tlic payment of tlie within

'note at maturity, or at any time thereafter, with interest at ten per cent,

. \ SSL' ~ri'S I T

by J lenry G . •-\bb ll a;ain.t J ohn B. Drown. The
ci rcuit cou rt r nclerecl j uclg m ent f r clefendri.nt, and the app llate
co ur: affirmed the _iuclg111 nt. Plaintiff a ppeal

per annum until paid, and agree to pay all costs and expenses paid or

incurred in collecting the same, including attorney's fees.

(Signed) ^ "J. B. Brown."

Osborne Bros. & Rurgctt, fo r app !!ant.
Osburn & Ly11rlc, fo r appellce.

This action was lirought by H. G. Abbott against Brown to

recover certain costs and attorney's fees which he paid out and

expended in the collection of the amount named in the note in an

action against Brown on his guaranty. The costs and attorney's

lees which the plaintiff sought to recover in the action w'ere not

O n t he I t day of July , J 76, I irk B. 1 well,
l 1c in g ind eb ted to II. G. Abbott, th appellant, execut d hi promi .. on- note a follow :
r ·R :\lC,

].

July I , 1876.
rd er of H. G.
bbotl
tw o thou an I dollar , with interest al th rate of ten per cent. per annum,
a t Fir t National Bank of h icago. Value rec iYed.
"KIRK B.
EWELL."
( 'ignecl)
"

l IICAGO, ILLS.,

"One day after elate I pro mi e to pay to the

J ndor eel on tbe back of th e not ' wa

th

fo ll wing g uaranty :

"11 or Ya lu e r eceiv d, , I h reby o-uara nly the paym nl f lh within
·n ote at maturity, or at any timC' thereafter. with inte rest al ten p r cent.
p ·r annum until paid, and agree to pay all co t a nd expen es paid or
incurred in collecting the . am , including att o rn ey's fees.
"J. B. BROW ."
( ' ign d)

This a -Lion wa brought 1 y l T. G. 1\1 bott a ain t rown to
r cov r ce rtain cost a ncl att rn y ' fee which h e paid o ut and
expend ed in the coll ·tion of the amount named in th n ote in an
a lion ao-ainst Brow n o n hi buaranty. Th e o t and att rney'
k ~ which the plaintiff s ug ht t r ov r in the a ti n w r not
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expended in attempting to collect the note which was executed by

Kirk B. Newell. No suit was ever brought on the note against

the maker, nor was any evidence offered to prove that any costs

or expenses were ever incurred in an attempt to collect the note.

But on the trial of the cause Abbott, who is appellant here, put in

evidence, showing that on July 3, 1882, he brought an action in

assumpsit against Brown "on the guaranty signed by him, indorsed

on the note, whereby he guarantied payment of the note," in which

he recovered judgment for the amount due on the note, $3,338.34;

that an appeal was taken by Brown to the appellate court, and

to the supreme court from the judgment of the appellate court

atfirming the judgment of the circuit court, and that upon the

affirmance thereof by the supreme court Brown paid appellant the

amount of the judgment ; that the firm of which witness was a

member was employed as attorneys to conduct this action, and ren-

dered services therein of the value of $1,500, and they had been paid

that sum by appellant for said services ; and, also, in the prosecution

of this action, appellant expended for printing and other neces-

sary expenses the sum of $26. On this evidence the circuit court
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held, as a matter of law, "that the guaranty on which this suit

was brought is not an agreement to pay the costs or expenses or

attorney's fees, paid or incurred in a suit against Brown upon

said guaranty,'' and rendered judgment for the defendant.

There is no ambiguity in the contract of guaranty executed

by Brown. The terms of the contract are plain and easily imder-

srood. By the contract Brown agreed that the note should be

paid with interest at ten per cent, and he also agreed to pay all

costs and expenses incurred or paid, including attorney's fees, in

collecting the note. Obviously the meaning of the language used

was, if costs and expenses and attorney's fees were incurred in

the collection of the note and interest from the maker, then such

costs, expenses, and attorney's fees should be paid by Brown. If

the contract of Newell, the maker of the note, and the contract of

guaranty by Brown, was but one contract, the position of appel-

lant that the action on the guaranty was an action on the note

might be regarded more plausible ; but such is not the case. Dan-

iel, Neg. Tnst. § 1752, defines a contract of guaranty as fol-

lows : "A 'guaranty' is defined to be a promise to answer for the

payment of some debt or the performance of some duty in case

of the failure of another person who is in the first instance liable

to such payment or performance." 2 Pars. Cont. 3, says : "Guar-

expend d in att mptin 0 · lo co ll t th n t w hi h was ex uted 1 y
I irk B. N w 11. No uit wa ever 1 r Lio-ht on th n tc a;ain l
th maker, n r wa ri.ny ev icl nee offered to prove that any co ts
ver in curred in an at tempt to c llect the note.
or x pen e w r
B ut on the trial of th cau e bb tt , who i appellant h r , put in
videncc, h win a that on Jul y 3. 1882, he brought an action in
rt. ump it again , t Brown " on the g uaran ty ignecl I y him, ind r eel
on the note, wher by h e auarantied payment of the n t ,'' in wh ich
he r ecov red judo·ment fo r the amount d u on th note, 3.338.3-+ ;
that an appeal was tak n 1 y Brown to the appell ate court, and
to th e upreme court from the j udgment of the appellate court
affirming the jud om ent of the circuit court, and that upon the
affirman ce ther of by the upreme court Brown paid appellant the
amo unt of the judgment; that the firm of which witness wa a
member was employed a atto rneys to cond uct this action, and rendered services th rein of the valu e of . r,500,and they had been paid
that um by appellant for a i l se rvices; and, a l o, in the prosecution
of thi acti n, appellan t xpe nded fo r printing and ther necessa ry expens the sum of $26. On thi s evidence th e circuit court
he!d, as a matt r of law, "that the g uaranty on which thi s uit
wa~ brought is not an agreement to pay the costs or expenses r
attorney's f , paid or incurr cl in a uit against Bro wn upon
aid g uaranty," and rendered j ud!Ym ent for the defendant.
There i. no ambiguity in th e contract of guaranty executed
l~y Brown.
The term s of the contract are plain and easily undersrood. By th e contract Brovm agreed that the note should be·
pa.id with intere t at ten per cent, and he also agreed to pay all
co t and e ·pense incurr l or paid, including attorney' fees, in
c ·llecting the note. O bviou ly the m ea nin g of the lang uage used·
wa , if costs and expense and attorney's fees were in curred in
t h collection of th e note and intere t from the maker , then such
costs, expen e , and att rn y' fee hould be paid by Drown. If
th e contra ct of Newell, th e maker of the note, and th e contract of
a uaranty by Brown, wa bu t one contract , the position of appellant that the action on th e g uaranty wa an action on the note
might be r garded m ore plau ihle : but such is not the ca e. Dani 1, Neg. In st. § 1752, iefin e a contract of guaranty as follow : ''A 'gua ranty' i defined to 1 e a promis to answer fo r the
paym ent of om debt r th e performan ce of some duty in ca e·
0f th e failure of another per on who i in the fir t in tance liable
to uch payment or perfo rman ce ." 2 Par . Cont. 3, av : "Guar--
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anty is held to lie the contract h\- which one person is hound to an-

other for the ckie fulliUnient of a pnjinise or engag-ement of a third

party." Story, Prom. Notes, § 457. says: "A guaranty, in its

legal and cc^iimercial sense, is an undertakini; l)y one person to he

answerahle for the payment of some debt, or the due performance

of some contract or duty, by another person, who himself remains

lialile to pay or perfomi tlic same." In Dickcrson v. Derricksoii, 39

111. 574, this court, in speaking of a guaranty, says: "The contract

of an absolute guaranty is that if the principal fails to pay, the guar-

antor will. If it were not so. it would not he a guaranty, but an in-

dependent undertaking." See, also. Rich v. UiillhVK'ay, 18 111. 548.

Here, Newell, as maker of the promissory note, agreed to pay a

certain sum of money at a certain time. By his contract he be-

came liable on the note ; but Urovvn, as guarantor, was not liable

with him. No joint liability existed. In Baylies. Sur. 389, the

author says: "In an action to enforce a contract of guaranty the

guarantor is the proper party defendant, and the principal debtor

should not be joined. As has been shown, all the parties to a

contract of suretyship may be joined as defendants ; but a guar-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

antor cannot be sued with his ])rinci])al. for his engagement is

strictly an individual contract, and not an engagement jointly

with his principal."

Here Brown's engagement as guarantor was his individual

contract, under which he became liound to pay in case the maker

of the note failed to do so. When the maker of the note failed

to pay at maturity of the insirunient. the guarantor then, and not

before, became lial)le, on his contract of guaranty, to an action.

The liability of the maker of tlie note and the guarantor were

separate and distinct. To enforce the liability of the maker an

action should be brought on the note against him, while to enforce

the liabilitv of the guarantor an action could only ])e lirought on

the contract of guaranty ; and it seems jilain that an agreement to

pay costs and attorney's fees which might be incurred in one action

does not include costs and attorney's fees incurred in the other.

Here Brown, by the terms of his guaranty, l)ound himself to pay

costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, which might be in-

curred in an action to collect the note, but he .saw proper not to

ao-ree to jiay such cost'^ and expenses as might be incurred in an

action brought on the contract of guaranty: and in the absence of

such an agreement we are aware of no princii)le which would make

him liable. Had a suit liecMi hroughi on the note against the

:inty i held to b th e con t racl hy \\' h ich one pcr ::-o n is b ' uncl t anther for th' clue fulfillm ent f a promi se r engagem ent of a third
party." Sto ry, Pr m. :\ote ·, ' -1-.; 7, ay : " .\ o-uaranty in it
1 ·rral and comme r cial ens', i an undertakin g hy one per on t be
anS\\·cralJl ' fo r the payment of som e debt, or th lu p rformance
of sumc co ntract r duty , 1 y an th ' r per n , wh him lf r mains
liable to pay or perform th ' amc ... l n f.Jicl~crso11 \'. Dcrricl~ ·0 11 , 39
111. -;-1-, thi CO L!rt , in p ak in g- of a g uara n ty, ay : "Th ' ntract
o f ~ n :i.b o lute o·u1ra nty i that if the principal fail to pa y, th e 0 uaranto r will. If it wcr not s . it " ·o uld not be a uaranty. but an ind ·pend enl unclertak in ._ .. Sec, alsn. Hiclt v. llatlz mL'lZ)', L 111. 54?.
l l ere, i\ e\\'e ll , a maker o f the pro m is ory note, agr 'eel to pay a
certa in um of m one · at a ce rta in tim e. Dy hi · contract h b cam e li a bl e on the note; but Dro\\'n , a guarant r , \\·a not liabl
with him. l\o joint liability ex isted. ln naylie, . ' ur. 3 9 the
a uthor ay : "In an acti on to e nf r · a ·ontract f g uaranty the
gua ranto r i the p rop r party defendant. and the principal d btor
to a
, ho uld not be join ed. . \ ha be n sho\\'n , a ll th e parti
co ntract of . m ety hip m ay be jo in ed a · defendant ; but a rruaranto r cann ot be uecl with hi s principa l, fo r hi s engagem nt i
·tri ct ly an individu a l co ntract. a ncl not an engagem nt j intly
\\'ith hi principal."
H er e Brown'
ngagernent a · g uarantor \\'a hi indiv i luai
contract, und er whi -h he becam e ho und to pay in ca ·e th maker
of the note fail ed to cl so. \ \ ' hen the maker of th n t fail d
to pay at maturity o f th e in ~ trum e nt. th e g uaranto r th n, ancl not
befo re, b 'ram li able, on hi · co ntract o f g uaranty , to an action.
T he liability o f the mak e r of th e no te and the guaranto r wer e
epa rate a nd cli . tinct. T o en fo r ·e th e liability of the mak r an
action -houlcl be bro u~ l 1t on the not' aga in t him. \\·hil e to enfo rce
th e kdJility o f th e g u:ira nto r an a ·tion cn ulcl o nly be br ll:::;ht n
th e co ntr a · t of g ua ra n ty; a nd it see m s plain that an agr m cnt to
pay cost a nd fltt rney '_, fee: \\·hi ch mi g ht h incurr cl in on a tion
do s not in cl ud e co ts a nd atto rn ey's f ·e incurred in th oth r.
J l TC BrO\rn, 1 y the te rm s of hi s g·ua ra nty, bound him elf t pay
co t. a ncl 'x pen. c , in cl udin g attorney' s fee , \\'hi h might b m ·urrecl in a n act i n to ·ollcct the note . but h saw prop r 11 t to
agr 'C to pay . uch co t · an 1 exp ' nsc;; as might b in curr cl in an
acti n 1 rm g ht on th e contract o [ g ua ra nty: an cl in th e ab en
of
. u h a n agr ' 111 nt \\' 'a rc a\\·a rc o f no prin c ipl e which\\' ul l m a k
h im liabl" l lacl a :;uit bee n hrnug ht ci n th not aga m t the

g-

:;u ' ~URR . \Y \ ' .NOYE.
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maker, under the contract of guaranty, Brown would have been

Hable for such costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, as

might have been incurred in that action ; but no such action was

brought, and there has been no breach of his contract so far as

costs and expenses are concerned.

One other question remains to be considered : On the trial

the appellant offered to show that he employed counsel to "watch

Brown from 1878 to 1882. and the business operations in which

he was engaged, to see when there was a reasonable prospect for

collecting the note out of him." Also that in April, May, June,

and July, 1882, his attorney had rxCgotiations widi Brown for the

settlement of his liability on the guaranty for which the services

of counsel were worth $50, and which sum appellant had paid. x\s

to those services the appellate court held if they were a proper

charge against appellee, they should have been included in the

former suit. \\> concur in the view of the appellate court, if any

maker, 11ncler th e contract of gua ra nty, Brown wou ld have been
liable for uch co t a n 1 expen e , in ·luding attorney' fee , a
might ha
been in urrtd in that acti on; bul no uch action \\·a
brought, and th er e has been no breach f hi contract so far a
co t and expen e are concern ed .
O ne ther que tion remain to be con. iclerecl: On th e trial
the appellant offe red t c:; ho\Y that he employ cl coun el to ··\Yatch
Brown from i878 to 1 ' 2, and the bu ine s operation in which
he wa s n1::;aged, to ee wh en there wa a rea onabl c prospect fo r
collecting the note out of him." Al o that in April, ~Ia y, Jun e,
and July, i882, hi attorn ey ha d r1egoti::i.tion with Drown fo r th e
settlement of his liability on the guaranty for which th e se rvic es

liabilitv existed for those services, as they had been rendered be-

fore appellee was sued on die guaranty, they should have been em-

braced in that action. The judgment of the appellate court will
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be affimied.

McMuRRAY ct al. vs. NovES (1878).

72 N. Y. 523.

Esck Coxvcn, for appellant.

Irz'iiicr Brozoie, for resoondent.

Rappallo. J. The guaranty on which this action is brought is

contained in an assignment of a bond and mortgage, and is in the

following form :

of coun l wer worth 50 and ,,·hich um appellant had paid. ".\.
to tho e ervices th appellate co urt held if th ey \\' re a proper
charge aaain t appell . th ey should have been included in th e
former uit. \~ r e conc ur in th e view of the appellate court, if any
liability e:xi t cl for tho
ervice , a th y had been rendered before appellee wa ued on the guaranty, they should have been embraced in that action. The juda ment of the appellate court will
be affirmed.

"I hereby covenant * * * that in case of foreclosure and sale of the

mortgaged premises described in said mortgage, if the proceeds of such

sale shall be insufficient to satisfy the same, with the costs of foreclosure,

I will pay the amount of such deficiency to the said party of the second

part, or its assigns, on demand.'"

"'..\Ic:\I uRR.~.Y

ct al.

'Z..'S . NOYES

(187 ) .

On the part of the appellants, it is contended that this guar-

72 :N. Y. 523.

anty is subject to the rules applicable to guaranties of collection,

and thus laches in foreclosing the mortgage, after default, is a

defense. The respondents insist that it is a guaranty of payment,

Esek Cmvc11 , for appe!lant.

I r ·v i 11 g B r0<.( 1ze, for respondent.
1

J.

The a uaranty on which thi action i brought i
contained in an assignment of a bond and mortgage, and i in the
fo llow ing fo rm:
R APP.\LLO .

"I hereby coYenant * * * that in ca e of foreclosure and ale of the
mo rtgaged prerni es de cribed in aid m o rtgage. if the pr ceeds of uch
a le hall be in ufficient to ati -fy the ame . with th e co t of fo reclo ure.
I will pay th e a mount of . uch deficiency to the . a id party of the econd
part, o r it as igns, on demand .''

On the pan of the appellant , it i contended that thi guaranty i ubj ct to the rnl e applicable to guarantie of collection,
and thu !ache in foreclo ing the morta aae, after defa ult, is a
defense. The re pondent in i t that it i_ a g uaranty f payment,
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GC.\l~ _ \:\T\'

.\.'\U

' L' l~ETY

IIIP.

and that tlicx were umU'r no ol)ligation to use diligence in endeav-

oring- to collect the mortgage debt by foreclosure.

The fundamental distinction between a guaranty of payment

and one of collection is, that in the first case the guarantor under-

takes unconditionally that the debtor will pay, and the creditor

may, upon default, proceed directly against the guarantor, without

taking any steps to collect of the principal debtor, and the omission

or neglect to proceed against him is not (except under special cir-

cumstances) any defense to the guarantor; w'hile in the second case

the undertaking is that if the demand cannot be collected by legal

proceedings the guarantor will |)ay. and consequently legal pro-

ceedings against the principal debtor, and a failure to collect of

him by those means are conditions precedent to the liability of the

guarantor ; and to these the law, as established by numerous deci-

sions, attaches the further condition that due diligence be exercised

by the creditor in enforcing his legal remedies against the debtor.

These rules are well settled and are not controverted, and the

only question is to which class of guaranties the one now before

us belongs.
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It is apparent upon the face of the instrument that the under-

taking of the defendant was not an unconditional one that the

mortgagor should pay, or that the guarantor would pay on default

of the mortgagor, but only that the guarantor would pay, in case

of a deficiency arising on a foreclosure and sale. The foreclosure

and sale were consequently conditions precedent, and the general

principle is, that wherever a condition precedent is to be performed

for the purpose of establishing the liability of a surety or guaran-

tor, such condition must be performed in good faith and with due

diligence. It is upon this principle that, in case of a guaranty of

collection, diligence is required of the creditor.

I am unable to see why this principle is not applicable to the

guaranty now in controversy. The respondents claim that it is an

undertaking to pav any deficiency which may arise, and is, there-

fore, a guaranty of payment of the mortgage debt to that extent,

and to be governed by the same rules as if it had been a guaranty

of payment of the whole mortgage. lUit the fallacy of this reason-

ing is that it is not an unconditional guaranty that the mortgagor

will pay the mortgage debt, or any part of it, but only that after

the remedy against the land has been exhausted, and the deficiency

ascertained bv foreclosure and sale, the guarantor will pay such

deficiencv. The only difiference l)etween this and an ordinary

ancl that tl1 ' \ were und er n ob li gati n t u clili o- "n - ' 111 end avring- to co llect the murt age cl ht by f r clo ur .
Th f unclamental cli tinction b tw n a i::,-uaranty of payment
and on e of .,JI ti n i -, that in th fir t ca th o-uara nt r und rtake unconcliti na ll y that the de btor will pay, a n l th
r dit r
may upon cl fau lt, pr ·c cl dir ctly again t th cruarantor , without
taking· a ny t ps t c . ii , ·t f the princi1 al d I t r an l th om i i n
r negle t t proc e l again . t him i not (except und er pecial circum tanc' ) any cl fen e to the guarantor; whil in the ec nd ca e
the unclertakincr i that if th e clemancl ca nn ot I c
ll ected I y 1 gal
proceeding th g uarant r will pay, and con iu ntly leo-a l proeed ing ab·a in t the principal debt r, and a failur to c 11 ct f
him by th e mean are c ndition pr c dent to the liability of the
g uarantor ; and to th
the law, a
tabli h d I y numer u d iion , attache th furth r condition that du diligence be xerci sed
by the er clitor in cnf rcing hi s lei::,al r m edi
ao-ain t the debtor.
T h e rule ar well ettled and ar n ot co ntroverted, and the
only que tion i to which cla of guarantie the on no\ before
u belongs.
It i a ppar'"nt upon the fac of the in trunPnt that th und ertaking of the defendant wa n ot an unconditi nal on that the
mortcragor houlcl pay, or that the guarantor would pay on d efault
of the mortgao- r, but onl y that the guarantor would pay, in ca e
of a deficiency ari in o-- on a fo r eclo ure and sal . Th forecl ure
and ale w re co n quently conditions precedent, and th e g n ral
principle is , that wh r ever a CQndition prec dent i to be p erform e l
fo r the purpo e of e tabli hin o- the liability of a urety or uarantor, uch c ndition mu t 1 e p rform d in go cl faith and ' ith lue
cliligen
Tt i upon tbi principl that , in ca e f a g uaranty of
11 ct ion , diligence i r equired of th
r editor.
T :1111 unabl ' to ' wh y thi . I rincipl i n t applicab l to th e
g uaranty n w in contr vcr y . Th r e ~ ] oncl nt ]aim that it i an
unclcrtakinb· to pay :iny defic iency wbi h may ari , and i , th r f re, a g uaranty of paym nt f t!i m nrtgage cl 1 t to that xt nt,
an d to be g vern ed by th sam rul e. a . if it had 1 en a guaranty
of payment f th whol m rto-at-> . But th falla y f thi r a ning- i. that it is not an un onditi nal g uaranty that th m ortgag r
w ill I ay th m rto-ag cl 1 t, or any pa rt of it, but onl y that after
th rem cly aga in . t th lan I ha. he n x hau t cl, an I th cl fici n y
a c rtain 'cl lw for cc los m and . ·Li >, the g uara nt r will pay u h
1 tw en t hi . and an rclin ary
d fici ncY. Th ' nl y differ ' 11

:M'~l
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guaranty of collection is, that in the latter case the undertaking is

that after it has been ascertained by all such legal proceedings as

the case admits of. that the demand cannot be collected, the guar-

antor will pay ; while in the present case the only proceedings which

the creditor is bound to adopt are a foreclosure of the mortgage and

sale of the mortgaged lands. To that extent the condition prece-

dent exists alike in both cases, and the duty of exercising due dili-

gence attaches, there being nothing in the instrument qualifying

or dispensing with it.

The case of Goldsniifh v. Brozcii (35 I)arl). 484) is relied upon

by the respondents as sustaining their position. In that case the

covenant was, as construed by the court, to pay the deficiency upon

the mortgage debt whcncz'cr the remedy against the lands mort-

gaged should have been exhausted and the deficiency ascertained.

The decision in that case can only he sustained by construing the

covenant as waiving diligence in foreclosing, and binding the cov-

enanter to pay the deficiency without regard to the time of the fore-

closure. Nothing in the covenant now under examination has any

o-uaranty of collecti n i , that in the latter ca c th undertaking is
that after it ha be n asc rtained by all u h leo-al proc e lin o- a
the ca e admit of, that the demand cannot be collected, the o·uarantor ·will pay; while in th e pre ent ca e the only proceeding which
th creditor i bound to adopt are a for closur f th m rtgao-e and
al e of th m ortgag cl Ian l . To that extent the co ndition precedent xist alike in both ca , and the duty of exerci ing due cliiigenc attach , there being nothing in the in trurnent qualifying
or di pen ing \\·ith it.
The ca e of Golds111itlz v. Bro<.L'll ( 35 Darb. -1-8-1- ) is relied upon
by th respondent a sustaining their position. ln that ca e the
covenant wa s, a construed by the court, to pay the deficiency upon
the m ortga ge d bt 7.L'lic11cc. cr the r em edy again t the land mortgag d should have been exha usted and the deficiency ascertained.
The deci ion in that case ca n only be sustain ed by constru in g the
covenant as waiving diligence in fo reclo in g, and binding th covenanter to pay the d ficiency without rega rd to th e time of th e fo reclos ure. Nothing in th e covenant now und er examination ha s any
r elation to th e time of th e fo reclosure, or can be con trued a waiv ing liligenc required by th e general rul es of law in performing
the condition.
The delay in fo reclosin g in the pre ent cas was fo urteen
m onth after th e m ortgage debt b cae1e Jue. During upward of
ten m onth. of thi time the prop rty was a ufficient ecurity, but
afterward th e building thereon were de troyed by fire, and the
value was reduced below the amount of th m ortgage debt. It
cannot be que tioned that thi delay wa suffici nt to constitute
lachc . In Craig v. Parf?is, 40 N. Y. i8r , a delay of ix m onth
in foreclosino· a bond and mortgage was h Id to be lachc which
di charged a o-uaranty of its collection.
1

relation to the time of the foreclosure, or can be construed as waiv-
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ing diligence required by the general rules of law in performing

the condition.

The delay in foreclosing in the present case was fourteen

months after the mortgage debt became due. During upward of

ten months of this time the property was a sufficient security, but

afterward the buildings thereon were destroyed by fire, and the

value was reduced below the amount of the mortgage debt. It

cannot be questioned that this delay was sufficient to constitute

laches. In Craig v. Parkis, 40 N. Y. 181, a delay of six months

in foreclosing a bond and mortgage was held to be laches which

discharged a guaranty of its collection.

The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered,,

with costs to abide the event. All concur.

Judgment reversed.

The judgment should b revers cl, and a new trial ordered,
with co t to abid e the event. All concur.
Judgm ent rever ed .
8
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Roberts vs. Hawkins (1888).

. 70 Mich. 566; 38 N. W. 575.

Rou ERT ·

Error to Superior Court of Grand Rapids. Assumpsit.

c.•s. H .\ \\' KI ~s ( r

70 . . Ii ch. 566 : 3

Norris & Norris, for appellant.

J. C. FitcGcrald {Charles CliainUcr, of counsel), for plaintiff.

).

N. \V. 575 .

Long, J. January 12, 1884, one Lyman D. FoUett made his

Err r t

promissory note as follows :

' up ri r 'o urt

f

~ran

l Rapid. .

Assulllpsit .

"$i,ooo.

Grand Rapids, Mich., January 12, 1884.

..Y orris {7' .i.\ ' orris , fo r appella nt.

One year after date, I promise to pay to the order of Helen M.

J . . Fit:::Gerald (C harles

Roljcrts one thousand dollars, with interest at eight per cent, per annum.

Value received. Lyman D. Follett."

handler, of co un I), fo r plaintiff .

And defendant signed an indorsement on the back thereof,

as follows :

"For value received, I hereby guarantee the payment of the within

Lox , J . January 12, l
pr rn1
ry n t a fo ll \\' :

4, one Lyman D. F 11 tt mad hi

Value received. L. E. Hawkins."

On the delivery of this note to plaintiff, she paid Follett

$1,000. January 8, 1885, seven days before this note became due,

Follett paid one year's interest ; and neither at that time, nor at
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the maturity of the note, was the same presented to Follett or

defendant for payment. No notice of non-payment was given

defendant then or at any time prior to June 8, 1887. January 15,

"

T,OOLl.

GRAND RAPID S, Mr H ., J a nu a ry I-, I
-+·
ne yea r a ft r dat , I promi c tn pay to th e o rd er o f Helen i.
.1:<.olJc rt s on e th usa nd lo ll a r , w ith int eres t at eig ht pe r c nt. pe r a nnum.
alue rec iYed.
LY l\'IAN D. FOLLETT."

1886, Follett paid the interest for the next year, and January 17,

1887, for the year following. About June 8, 1887, the note being

then two years and five months overdue, it was first presented to

a

A nd I fe ncl a nt ·ig ned an inclor m ent on th
fo llow :

back th reof,

defendant, and payment demanded and refused. August 13 this

suit was brought.

On the trial, plaintiff, having proved the note and guaranty,

Va lu

"Fo r value re
received.

- jy

d, 1 he reby o- uarantee th e pay m n t o f th e with in
L. E. H WKINS."

and its non-payment, rested. Defendant then sought to make his

defense as pleaded, and offered to show —

T. That he was an accoinmodation guarantor, without con-

sideration or security.

2. That, at or about the maturity of the note, he incjuired of

the maker of the note if it was paid, and was told it was.

3. That neither at the niattn-it_\' of the note, nor at any sub-

sequent time, prior to June 8, 1887, was, any notice of the non-

O n the cl li very f this note to plaintiff, he paid F oll tu
$1,000. J a nuary 8, l 85, even clay before thi note b ca me due,
Fol lett paid one yea r· intere ~ t; and neith r at that time, nor at
th e maturity of th e note . wa the ame pre nted to Follett or
defend ant fo r paym ent. No notice of non- paym nt wa given
cl fendant th en rat any time prior to Jun e 8, 1887. January 15,
1 ' 6, Foll tt paid the intere t fo r the n x t year, and January 17,
l 87, fo r th y ar fo llowino-.
A bout June 8, 1887, th note b ing
th n two y ar a nd fiv month overclu , it \Va fir t pre ent d to
cl fe nclant, a ncl payment 1 manded and r fu ed . A ug u t 13 this
suit \\·a brought.
n th tri al, plaintiff, havi ng proved th e n t and a uaranty,
and it non-paym nt , re tecl . D f .nclant th n
twht t make his
def 11 c a 1 Jcad 1, and ff red to h wr. That h wa an accomm dati n
sid ' rat ion or curity.

-· That, at

0

uarant r , without c n-

r al ut th e maturity f th e n te, h inquir d of
pai l, a nd wa told it wa .

th , mak r of the n t if it wa

3. That neith r at th maturity f th note, n r at any ub, qu nt tim pri r t Jun
, r 7, wa _ any notic of the non-
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payment of this note given to defendant, nor any demand made

on him for the payment thereof.

4. That at the maturity of this note, and for some consider-

able time thereafter — at least a year — P'oUett, the maker of the

paym nt of thi note giv n to defendant, nor any demand made
on him for the paym ent th ereof.

note, was solvent, and had property out of which defendant could

have procured him to pay the note or obtained security.

5. That when defendant, on June 8, 1887, learned of the non-

payment of this note, the maker was insolvent, out of the jurisdic-

tion, and that he could then obtain no security or payment.

The court directed a general verdict for plaintiff on all the

4. That at the maturity of this note, and f r ome consid rable time th ereafter- at lea t a year-Follett, the maker of the
note, was solvent, and had property out of which defendant could
have procured him to pay the note or obtained security.

counts of the declaration. Judgment being entered on the verdict

in favor of plaintiff for the amount of the note and interest,

defendant brings the case into this Court by writ of error.

The declaration contains three counts. The first alleges the

5. That when defendant, on June 8, 1887, learn ed of the nonpayment of thi note, the maker wa insolvent, out of the j urisdiction, and that he could then obtain no security or payment.

guaranty, demand of the maker at maturity, non-payment, and

^ notice of said demand and non-payment to defendant at maturity.

O The second alleges the guaranty, the refusal by maker to

(^ pay at maturity, and notice to defendant, at maturity, of maker's

refusal.
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The third is the common counts in assitiiipsit, with copy of

note annexed, and an alleged indorsement on back of L. E. Haw-

kins, without any guaranty over it.

The plea is the general issue, with notice of the defense of

release by plaintiff's failure to give notice of non-payment to

defendant, and the consequent damage and loss to him thereby.

It is claimed that the court erred in receiving the note and

guaranty in evidence under the third count in plaintiff's declara-

tion, for the reason that the note and guaranty offered were not

the note and guaranty set forth in that count ; that the contract set

out in plaintiff's third count was that defendant had indorsed his

name in blank on the back of the note, not payable to his order ;

and that this would make him a maker of the note, and liable as

such, while the note offered had a guaranty of payment indorsed

thereon. Defendant claimed that this was a variance, and that

the court should have excluded the guaranty under this third

count, and confined the verdict to a recovery under the first two

counts.

As we view the case, however, this objection has no force.

The plaintiff being entitled to recover under the first and second

counts of the declaration, the defendant was not prejudiced in the

>3

£?

rt

The court directed a general verdict for plaintiff on all the
counts of the declaration. Judgment being entered on the verdict
in favor of plaintiff for the amount of the note and interest,
defendant brings the case into thi Court by writ of error.
The declaration contain three count . The first alleges the
guaranty, demand of the maker at maturity, non-payment, and
notice of said demand and non-payment to defendant at maturity.
The second alleges th e guaranty, the refusal by maker to
pay at maturity, and notice to defendant, at maturity, of maker's
refusal.
The third is the common counts in asswnpsit) with copy of
note annexed, and an alleged indorsement on back of L. E. Hawkins, without any guaranty over it.
The plea is the general issue, with notice of the defense of
release by plaintiff's failure to give notice of non-payment to
defendant, and the consequent damage and loss to him thereby.
It is claimed that the court erred in receiving the note and
o-uaranty in evidence under the third count in plaintiff's declaration, for the reason that the note and guaranty offered were not
the note and guaranty set forth in that count; that the contract set
out in plaintiff's third count was that defendant had indorsed his
name in blank on the back of the note, not payable to his order;
and that thi would make him a mak~ r of the note, and liable as
such, \vhile the note offered had a guaranty of payment indorsed
thereon. Defendant claimed that this was a variance, and that
the court should have excluded the guaranty under this third
count, and confined the verdict to a recovery under the first two
counts.
A we view the case, however, this objection has no force.
The plaintiff being enti_rj_ed to recover under the first and second
count of the declaration, the defendant was not prejudiced in the
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course taken hy the court in not witlulrawing- all consideration of

the case under the third cnunt. 'Die declarati.m wa'^ sufficient

in the first two counts to allow a recovery thereunder.

The chief error complained of is the exclusion of the entire

defense, and the direction of a verdict for plaintiff. On the trial

the plaintiff' proved hy a witness the application for the loan, the

loaning of the nu)ney. the S^iving of the note and guaranty, and,

after reading the note and guaranty in evidence, rested. The

defendant was then called and sworn as a witness in his own

behalf, and was asked by his coiunsel :

"Q. When that note became due. in January, 1885, — January 15, —

was any notice given you of ilie fad tliat it remained unpaid?"

To this question counsel for plaintiff' ol)jected, that the same

was irrelevant and immaterial ; that the defendant was not an

indorser nor guarantor of collection, but uf payment of the note.

cours · taken hy th e court in n t withdr~rn· in o- all c nsidcration f
th e ca ·e under th ' third co unt. The ck ·laration ,,·a-; sufficient
in the first t '' o cou nb to allow a r cco\' ·n · thereunder.
The chief error complained of is tl~ e excltL ion of th ' ntir
defense, and th e direction of a \'C rcli ·t fo r plaintiff. On th trial
the plaintiff p ron'cl l>y a witn 'SS th e application f r tli> 1 an the
loaning of th e money . th e gi,·ing· o f th note and o-uarant\-, ancl,
after reading th e note ancl g uaranty in ev id ence, r ', t ct'. Th
defendant wa s th en callecl and s \\·o rn a . a witnc ~ in hi , wn
b ·half. and wa a. keel by hi ·oun . cl:

Counsel for the defendant then offered to show by the witness

that he had no notice of the non-payment of the note prior to

June 8, 1887; that he was an accommodation guarantor without

'"Q. \\h en that note becarn ' dlle. in J anuary. 1' 5.-January
\\·a-; any notice 0 1,·en you of ihe fact that it remained unp aid?''

1-,-

security ; that, at or near the maturity of the note, he inquired
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of the maker, and w'as informed that it was paid ; that, at the time,

the maker of the note was solvent, and for some considerable time

thereafter — ])robably a year — and that the defendant could, if he

had any knowledge of its non-payment, have secured himself, or

procured the maker to pay it ; that, when the defendant learned

of the non-payment of the note, the maker was insolvent, and out

of the State, and no security could have been obtained by the

defendant , ilie counsel then saying —

"That this, of course, is the line of defense marked out l>y the notice

in the pleadings. It is all covered by my brother'.s argument ; and, if we

have no right to show that defense, then, of course, there remains nothing

lint for the court to direct a verdict for the amount of the note, and

interest."

The court sustained the objection, and directed a verdict for

plaintiff'.

In considering the case, the defendant's offer to prove this

state of facts must be taken as true. Cloy, etc., Iiis. Co. v. Manu-

facturing Co., 31 Mich. 356. Under this offer by the defendant,

the issue is made: Is a person not being a party to a promissory

note, who at its date and before delivery, and for the purpose of

To thi question co un el fo r plaintiff objcc tecl , that the ·ame
was irrelevant ancl immaterial; that the clck nclant wa · not an
inclor r no r guarant r of ·oil ct ion, but o f payment o f th e n te.
'oun~cl for th clcfenclant th n off ered to , h w by th witn that he had no notice of th , non-paym ent of th e note prior to
Jun e . Lg 7: that he \\·a . a 11 accomrnoclation guarantor without
,ec urity: that, at o r n ea r th maturity of the note , h inquired
of the maker, and wa, informed that it \Ya paid: that. at the tim ,
th e maker of the note wa o lvent, ancl for . om c con. id er3hle time
th e reafte r- probably a year-and that th e cl denclant co uld, if he
had any kn owl edge of its non-payment, have , e ·urecl him lf, r
procured th e mak r to pay it: that, wh n the def ndant I am I
o f the non-payment f the note. th maker was in olvcnt, and out
of th e • tat , an 1 no . rcurity could hav been obtain cl by the
clef '1Hla11t : th e c un sel th n sa"111g-

having a loan made upon the strength of his guaranty, guarantees

"Thal thi-., of co ur se, i-; th Jin of cldcnsc mark ed Ollt hy th n lice
in the pl eadin gs. lt is a ll co,·er cl by my brother's argum nl; and, if we
ha' c no ri rrht to show that clcf e n ~c . th en, of co llr ~e. th ere rema in s 11 thing
hllt for the court to direct a ,. reli ct f r the amou nt of the note, and
inl ·rest."

Th

court

LL

tainecl th

ction, and directed a verdict f r

r laintiff.
In ·on , icl ring th CC\ e, th cl fendant'
ff r t J r v thi
f fact mu t I ' tak n a tru .
lay) etc ., ills. o. v. Jf a11ufacl11ri11e; Co .. 31 :\Iich. 356.
Tn lcr thi
ff r by th d f n lant,
th i . ue i mad : L a p r n not b in a party to a promi ory
n t . wh at its dat and h f r 1 liver)', an l f r th puri
f
having a loan mad upon th
tr ngi.h of hi o-uaranty, guarant
talc
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paid at maturity, without notice of non-payment having been

given to lum liy the holder at the maturity of the note, or witliin

a. reasonable time thereafter: or in case notice is not given, and

no proceedings taken to collect the note from the maker, and the

maker of the note, at the maturity thereof, was solvent, and sub-

sequently, and before suit is brought on the guaranty, becomes

insolvent, can such guarantor, when such action is brought against

him. set up such insolvengy as a defense? The defense being

based on plaintiiT's laches in not giving notice to the defendant

of the non-payment of this note at maturity, and the consequent

damage to defendant thereby, the correctness of the court's ruling

depends on whether or not there rested on the plaintiff the duty

to give such notice under any circumstances.

The defendant claims that his liability existed only on the

happening of a contingency and the performance of a condition ;

that whether or not that contingenc}- happened, or condition was

performed, was matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the

plaintiff, and not within his own ; and that if plaintiff' intended to
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assert the performance of the condition, or the happening of the

contingency, whereby alone defendant was to become liable, it was

her duty to do so within a reasonable time, and, in any event,

before the maker of the note became insolvent and a fugitive ; that

her neglect to do so, and the damage to him thereby, has released

him from the obligation of his conditional contract.

The position, however, of a guarantor of payment, as between

him and the maker of the note, is that of a surety. It is a com-

mon-law contract, and not a contract known to the law-merchant.

It is an absolute promise to pay if the maker does not pay. and

the right of action accrues against the guarantor at the moment

the maker fails to pa}-. The guarantor would not be discharged

by any neglect or even refusal on the part of the holder of the

note to prosecute the principal, even if the maker was solvent^

at the maturity of the note, and subsequently became insolvent;

and the fact that no notice of non-payment was given the guar-

antor at tlie maturity of the note, or at any time before bringing

suit, would not aff'ect the rights of the holder of the note against

the guarantor. The guarantor's remedy was to have paid the

note, and taken it up, and himself proceeded against the maker.

A guaranty is hekl to be a contract by which one person is

bound to another for the due fulfillment of a promise or engage-

ment of a third party. 2 Pars. Cont. 3.

the payment of uch note, lial le thereon in ca e the note i not
pai I at maturity, without notice of non-payment having been
given to him by the holder at the maturity of th note, or within
.a r asonable tim e thereafter: or in case n tice is not g iven, and
no proceeding taken to coll ct the note from th maker, and the
mak r of the note, at th e maturity thereof, was olvent, and ub1uently, and befo re suit is broug ht on the o-uaranty, becomes
in olvent. can such g uara ntor, when such action i brought again t
him, set up such in o lv e n~y a a defense? The clefen e being
ba eel on plaintiff's lache in not g ivin g notice to the defendant
of the non-paym ent of thi s note at maturity, and the con equent
damao-e to defendant th ereby, the co rr~ct n ess of the court' s rulin g
depend on wh ether or not th ere rested on the plaintiff the duty
to g ive such notice under any circurn tances.
The defendant claims that hi liability ex isted only on the
hap1 ening of a contingency and th e performance of a condition;
that wJ1ether or not that contingency happened, or condition was
performed, was matter peculiarly within th e knowledge of the
plaintiff. and not \11, ithin his mY n; and that if plaintiff intended to
.assert th e performance of the condition, or th e happening of the
contingency, whereby alone defendant was to become liable, it wa
her duty to do so within a r ea onabl e time, and, in any event,
before th e maker of the note became insolvent and a fug itive ; that
her neglect to do so, and the damage to him thereby, has released
him from the obligation of his conditional contract.
The position, however, of a g uarantor of payment, a between
him and the maker of the note, is that of a surety. It is a common-law contract, and not a contract known to the law-merchant.
It is an ab olute promi e to pay if the maker does not pay, and
the right of action accrues again t th ~ g uarantor at th e m oment
th maker fails to pay. The g uarantor would not be discharged
by any neglect or even refu sal on the part of the holder of the
n ote to prosecute the principal, even if the maker was solvent]
at the maturity of the note, tind ub equently became in olvent;
and the fact that no notice of non-payment was g iven the g uarantor at the maturity of the note, or at any time before bringinosuit, would not affect the right of the holder of th e note again t
the guarantor. T he g uarantor 's remedy was to have paid the
n ote, and taken it up, and him. elf proceeded again t the maker.
g uaranty i hel-l to be a contract by which one per on is
bound to another fo r the clue fulfillm ent of a promise or engagem ent of a third party. 2 Par . Cont. 3.
1
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one person to be answerable for the payment of some debt, or

the perfomiance of some act or chity, in case of the failure of

another person who is himself ]iriniarily responsible for the pay-

ment of such debt or the performance of the act or duty. 3 Add.

Cont. Sec. ittt : 3 Kent, Onnm. 121 ; IFrii^^ht v. Simpson, 6 Ves.

734-

In the case of Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (decided in

1816), it was held that if the surety call upcn the creditor to col-

lect the debt of the principal, and he disregard that request, and

thereby the surety is injured, as by the subseciuent insolvency of

the principal, the surety was thereby discharged. A directly con-

trary decision was given by Chancellor Kent, upon argument and

full consideration, the following year. King v. Baldzvin, 2 Johns.

Ch. 554. Two years later the last decision was reversed by the

court of errors by castmg vote of the presiding of^cer, a lay-

man, and against the opinion nf the majority of the judges. King

V. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384.

In the case of Brozvn v. Ciirfiss, 2 X. Y. 226 (decided in
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1849), tbc action was brought against the guarantor of a promis-

sory note. On the trial it was admitted that there had been no

demand of the maker, nor any notice of non-payment, and the

note was dated April 2, 1838, and payable six months after the

date. The suit was lirought against the guarantor in September,

1845. The defendant offered to prove that, from the time the

note fell due until the latter part of 1843, the maker was able to

pay the note; that he then failed, and was insolvent at the time

of the commencement of the suit, and still remained so. This

evidence was objected to, and excluded, and verdict directed for

plaintiff. The court (at p. 227) says:

"The undertaking of the defendant was not conditional, like that of

an indorser; nor was it upon any condition whatever. It was an absolute

agreement that the note should be paid by the maker at maturity. When

the maker failed to pay, the defendant's contract was broken, and the

plaintiff had a complete right of action against him. It was no part of

the agreement that the pLaintiff should give notice of the non-payment, nor

thiL he should sue the maker, or use any diligence to get the money from

him. '-■ -"■■ * Proof that wiien tlie note l^ecamc due, and for several

years afterwards, the maker was abundantly able to pay, and that he had

since become insolvent, would be no answer to this action. Tlie defend-

ant was under an absolute agreement to see that the maker paid the note

at maturitv. * * *

The rnntract or un lcrtaking of a ur ty i a c ntra l I y
one person to b ~IL werable for the paym ~ nt of -ome debt, or
the perfom1ancc o f $ rn act r clutv, in ca e of lh failure of
another p L on wh o i_ him. elf primarily rc _ponsihl for th payment uf such debt r the performance f the acl or duty. 3 Adel.
ont. · cc. r Ir 1 ; :) K ,nt, 0 111111. T21 ; J f 'rig!zt Y. 'i111 pso11, 6 V .
73-t·
ln the ca e of Pa ill v. Paclwrd, 13 John . r 74 (decided in
r r6 ) , it " ·a held that if th
urety call upon the er di tor to
1lect the debt of the principal, and h li regard that r que t, aQd
thereby the mety i injured, a by th
ubsequcnt in olvency of
the principal, the ur ty wa thereby di charg d.
dir ctly contrary deci ion wa giYen by Chancellor Yent, up n argument and
full con ideration, the f 11 wing year. J\.ing v. Bald<.1.n·n, 2 Johns.
' h. SS-t· 'i\Yo y ar later the la t cleci i n wa rever ed by the
court f error by castmg vote of the pre icling offic r, a layman, and again t the opini n of th maj rity of the juclg . King
v. Bald7-vin 17 John . c ._t.
In the ca e of Bro<.\ 12 v . C11rt1ss, _ :\. Y . 226 (decided in
1849), the action was I rOlwht again t the o·uarant r of a promi ory note. On the trial it \\·a admitted that there had b en no
demand of the maker, nor any notice f non-payment and the
note wa dat cl • pril 2, Ic38, and payable six m nth after the
date. T'hc uit wa brought again t the cruarantor in eptember,
1845. The clefrnclant off erecl to prove that, from the tim the
note fell clue until the lati r part f r8 . f3, the maker wa able to
pay the not ' ; that he then failed, and wa in h·ent at the time
of the commencement £ the suit. ancl still remam l o. This
evidence \Ya objected t , and xcludecl, and v relict directed for
plaintiff. The court (at I. _27) say
1

1

" T he undertakin g of the defendant wa not conditional, like that of
an inclor e r; no r \Yas it up n any co nditi on whateYer. It was an absolute
agree m ent that th e n ot
hould be paid by the maker at maturity. When
th e ma k er fail ed to pay, th defendant' s contract wa br ken, and the
pl a intiff had a compl ete ri g ht of act ion again st him. It was no part of
th e ag reem nt that th e plaintiff should o-iye n tice of the n n-payrnent, nor
th l l he sho uld sue th e mak r, or u e any diligence to get the money fr m
him . ., ;· * P roo f th a t \\'iien th e n,1te became rlue, and for several
y ea r s aft erw a rd s, th e mak r wa abun lantly able to pay, and that he had
ince becom e in solnnt, w uld be n o an swer to this action . The defendant was und er an ab so lute agreement to ee that the maker paid the note
a t mat11rity.
'' * *
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"If the defendant wished to have him sued, he should have taken up

the note, and brought the suit himself. The plaintiff was under no obliga-

tion to institute legal proceedings."'

The weight of authority, both in this country and in England,

"If t he I f n dan t w i. h cl t ha\'e h im u cl, h houlcl ha\' taken up
t h e n ote, and bro ug h t th . ui t himself. T h e plai n tiff wa ' un<l r no bl igati n to in ti t u te lega l l rocee <lin gs.'

sustains this doctrine, and we think with much good reason. Bel-

lozus V. LoTcll, 5 Pick. 310; Davis v. Huggins, 3 N. H. 231;

Page V. Webster, 15 Me. 249; Dennis v. Rider, 2 McLean, 451.

In Traill v. Jones, 11 Vt. 446, it is said:

"An absohite guaranty that the debt of a third person shall

be paid, or that he shall pay it, imposes the same obligation upon

T he weig ht of auth rity, b th in thi country and in E ng land,
sustains thi doctrine, and ·we think with much goo l r a on . Belloic.•s v . Lo<.·c//, 5 Pick. 31 0; Dm•is v . Huggins, 3 :Y. H. ~ 31;
Page v . l/ 'eb fer, 15 l\Ie. 2.+9; De1uzis \'. Rider, 2 ::\lcL ean, 45r.

the guarantor. In either case, it is an absolute guaranty of the

sum stipulated, and the creditor is not bound to use diligence, or

In Traill v. Jones, r l V t. 4._+6, it i

aid:

to give reasonable notice of non-payment." A^oyes v. Nichols,

28 Vt. 174.

In Bloom v. Warder, 13 Neb. 478 (14 N. W. Rep. 396),

which was an action against the guarantors of payment of a prom-

issory note, the court says :

"This is an absolute contract, for a lawful consideration, that
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the money expressed in the note shall be paid at maturity thereof

at al! events, and depends in no degree upon a demand of pay-

ment of the maker of the note, or any diligence on the part of the

holder."

Mere passiveness on the part of the holder will not release

the guarantor, even if the maker of the note was solvent at its

maturity, and thereafter became insolvent. Breed v. Hillhouse, 7

Conn. 528: Bank v. Hopson, 53 Conn. 454 (5 Atl. Rep. 601);

Foster v. Tolleson, 13 Rich. Law, 33 ; Machine Co. v. Jones, 61 Mo.

409 ; Barker v. Scndder, 56 Id. 276 ; Norton v. Eastman, 4 Greenl.

521 ; Brozvn v. Curtiss, 2 N. Y. 225 ; Allen v. Rightmcre, 20 Johns.

365; Bank v. Sinclair, 60 N. H. 100; Gage v. Bank, 79 111. 62;

JJungerford v. O'Brien, 37 Minn. 306 (34 N. W. Rep. 161).

It follows that, this being an absolute undertaking on the part

of the defendant as guarantor to pay the amount of this note at

maturity in the event of the default of payment by the principal,

the guarantor could not demand any diligence on the part of the

holder of the note to collect the same froin the principal. It was

his dutv to perform his contract — that is, to pay the note upon

default of the principal ; and it is no answer for him to say that

the principal was solvent at the maturity of the note, and that the

same could then have been collected of him bv the holder, and that

" A n a b olute g uaranty that th e debt of a th ir d pe rson hall
be paid , or that li e shall pay it, impo c the sam e ol li gati on upon
the guarantor. In either case, it is an ab olu te g uara nty of the
um tipul ated, and th reditor i not bo und to u e dili gence, or
to give reasonable noti e of non-paym ent." Nayes v . Nic hols,
28 \ Tt. I7-t·
In Bloom v. T17ardcr, 13 Neb. 47c' ( q 1\. \V. R ep. 396 ),
which \Ya an action ag ain t the g uarantor of paym ent of a prom i sory note, the court ay :
"Thi i an absolute contract, fo r a lawful consideration, that
the money expressed in th e note shall be paid at m a turity th ereo ~
at all event , and depend in no degre upon a demand of paym ent of th e maker of th note, o r any diligence on the part of the
hold er.' '
::\Iere passivene s on the part of th holder will not relea e
the guarantor, even if the maker of th e note wa solvent at its
maturity, and th ereaft r became insolvent. Breed v . H illhouse, 7
Conn. 528: B an!? v. H opso1l, 53 Conn . 45-t ( 5 A t!. R ep. 60 1) ;
F oster v. To lleso11 , l :) Rich. Law, 33 ; 1Uarlz ine Co . v. f oll es, 6 1 1:0.
409; Barker v. S rndde r, 5 I d. 276 · l\ orto n v. East/llall, 4 G reen!.
521 · Brown v. Curtiss, 2 l . Y . 225; L-1. llcn v. R ightlll ere, 20 J ohns.
365 ; B an/i v. Sinclair, 60 N . H . mo ; Gage v . Emile, 79 Ill. 62 ;
H 1lll gerfo rd v. O'Brien, 37 Minn . 306 ( 34 N . \V. R ep . 161).
It fo llow that, this being an ab solute undertakin g on the part
of the defendant as g uarantor to pay th e amount of thi note at
maturity in th event of the default of paym ent by the principal,
the guarantor could not demand an)' clili o-ence on the part of the
holder of the not to c llect the ame fr om the principal. It was
hi duty to perfo rm hi contract- th at i , to pay the note upon
default of the principal ; and it is no an w er fo r him to say that
the principal wa olvent at the maturi ty of the note, and that the
same could then have been collected of him by the holder, and that
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1k' has since become insolvent. It he wished to protect himself

against loss, he should have kept his engagement with the holder

of the note, paid it upon default of the principal, taken up the note,

and himself prosecuted the party for whose faithful performance

of the contract he became lial)le.

The court properly directed the verdict for the plaintiff ; and

the judgment of the court below must be affirmed, with costs.

The other Justices concurred.

Smith tx Mollesox (1896),

148 N. Y. 241 ; 42 X. E. 669.

Appeal from .Supreme Court, general term. First department.

h' ha s in ·c becom in . h ·cnt. If he wi heel lo protect him 'Clf
against los.' , he hould ha\' ' kepl hi encrag'mcnt \\'ith the h lei r
of th e note , paid it upon cl faull o f the principal, tak n ur th n t ,
and him self pr . ecut cd th e party for \\'ho e faithful performance
of th ' ·ontract he b cam' liable.
The co urt properly direc ted lh Ye rdict f r the plaintiff; and
th e j uclgment of the co url bclo\\' mu t be affirm cl, \\'ith co L.

IVilliain C. Bccchcr, for appellant.

Jacob F. Miller, for respondent.

The oth er Ju tices

ncurrcd .

O'Briex, J. The defendant has been held liable as surety

upon a bond given to secure the performance, by the con-

tract(jrs, of a building contract, dated November 1, 1888, in which

they agreed to furnish, cut. set and clean all the new granite work

for the enlargement of a public building in the City of New York.

~I I TH 'Z'S . ~IOLLL' OX ( J

The plaintiff agreed to pay the contractors for this work the sum

96),
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of $30,000, in monthly payments of not to exceed 80% of "the

q

estimated value of the work performed on the building," the bal-

X. Y. 2_p; 42 X. E. 669.

ance, or final payment, to be made when the work was completed.

The work was to be done according to drawings and specifications

_\ppca l [rom Suprcm ' Court. gen ral term.

hr t clepartm nt.

referred to in the contract, and the payments made upon the cer-

tificate of the i)]ainliA"s superintendent. The rights and obliga-

tions of the parties are specified in the contract with minute detail,

and, among other things, it was stipulated that, in case the con-

tractors failed to i)erform, the plaintitT might take possession of

ff 'i/lia111 C.

B~'cchcr.

for appe lla n t.

ftlt'O/J F. J i ii/er, for respond e nt.

the work and complete it at the contractors' expense. It is con-

ceded that they failed to perform and that the j)laintift' was obliged

to complete the work himself at an expense of several thousand

dollars more than the contract ])rice. It was agreed between the

plaintiff and the contractors that the latter should give to him a

bond to insure the faithful performance of the contract, and, in

J. T!H:' defendant ha. been h lei liable a
urety
u1 on a bond g-iYcn to secure the perfo rmance . by th e contracto r , o f a building contract, elate 1 :\ov mber 1, 1 8, in which
tlte)· agreed to furni h. cut . ct and clean all ~ h e new oTanit work
fo r th e Pnlarg m enl of a publi · building in the ity of ... r w York.
The plaintiff agre.ed to pay tlw contra"tc)r. for tbi " ·ork th
um
of 30,000, in monlhly paym ent. of not lo ex
1 809{ of 'the
estimated valu of the work p rformecl on th buil lin o-," th balance, or final paym nt, to be made when th w ork wa compl ted.
Th w rk \Ya · to he done according to d ra\ ·ing ancl pecifi ations
r fer reel l0 in th contract, and the pa)'lll nt mad upon th certificat of th plaintiff'
upe rint ncl ent. 1 h ri~ht and bligations of th p::irti . are pecifi d in the Cl ntra '" with minut detail,
and, among 0th r thin gs . it was tipulatccl that, in ca
th contractor failed to p rf o rrn, th plaintiff might tak po
i n of
th \\Ork ancl c0111pletc it at th contra tor · xpc n.e. It i onceclcd that th y failed to I d orm and that th plaintiff " ·a ol li g 1
to compl t thr work him If at an xpcn c of ev ral th u and
dollars more than th , contract pric . It wa agr d 1 tw n th
plaintiff ancl the cont ractor. that th e latter h uld o-ive to him a
bond to in . ure th e faithfu l performan ce of th ' ontract , and, in
() ' DR1Ex.
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pursuance of this agreement, the defendant, in behalf of the con-

t: actors, executed, under seal, and delivered, the instrument ui)i)n

which this action was brought. It bears date Dec. 27, 1888, and

was executed subsequent to the contract, and one of the conditions

is that the contractors should well and truly perform the contract

referred to, accordhig to its terms, in v.hich case the instrument

sliould be void and of no effect, but that, in case they failed to so

perform, the defendant would pay to the plaintifif his damages sus-

tained by reason of such non-performance, not exceeding a sum

named. ' It is conceded that the plaintiff sustained damages by

reason of the failure of the contractors to perform their contract,

and the recovery is within the limits of the bond. The defense is

that the bond was given without consideration, and that the defend-

ant became released from its obligations by reason of changes in

and departures from the contract guaranteed, without the defend-

ant's consent, by the parties thereto. At the trial a verdict was

directed for the plaintiff.

The plaintiff entered into the contract and bound himself,

according to its terms, upon the faith of the promise of the con-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

tractors to give the bond, and it is admitted that if this was con-

current with the execution and delivery of the instrument, it would

constitute a sufficient consideration. But, since the bond was given

afterwards, and, as the defendant claims, subsequent to the time

that the contractors had entered upon the actual performance of

the contract, it is insisted that it required some new consideration.

If it be true that the evidence in the case would warrant a finding

by the jury that the contractors were engaged in the performance

of the contract when the bond was given, it would also be true that

this was by the grace and pleasure of the plaintiff', and not by

virtue of any right under the contract. Their right to insist iipon

performance, as against the plaintiff, and to receive the benefit of

the contract, was not perfected until the bond was given. What-

ever the contractors may have assumed to do before, it was only

upon the delivery of the bond that the contract became complete

and binding upon the plaintiff', and hence the mutual obligations

imposed upon the contractors at one time, and upon the plaintiff

at another, furnished a consideration for the bond. Bank v. Coit,

104 N. Y. 532, II N. E. 54.

The other defense rests mainly upon a construction of the

contract which the defendant claims to be the correct one. It

should be observed at the outset that the contract guaranteed is.

pur uan ·e of thi s a oTeem cnt , the defe ndant, in behalf of th e cnnt1ac~or , exe uted, under ea!, and cl li ve r ed, the in trumcnt upon
v\ l: ich thi acti n '·as brought.
lt bear:; dat Dec. 27, 1888, and
wa ex ruted ub equent to th contract, and one i th e co n ci i rion~
is that th cuntra ct r_ ho ulcl w ell a nd truly perform the ontract
r -fr rred to, according to its term . in '. Vhich ca c the in trum ent
li, uld b vo id rill(\ of no effed. but that, in ca e they failed to o
perform, th e d efendant \\'Ould pay to the plaintiff hi damage ustainecl by rca on of s uch non-perfo rman ce, not xcecdin g a urn
named. It i conced ed th at t he pl a intiff su tain ed damage by
reason of the failure of the co ntractor - to per fo rm their contract,
and the r ecovery i \\·ith in the limit o f th bond. T he clefe n e i
that the b ncl wa. g iven without con idcra tion, and that the defend am becam e rclea cl from its obligations hy n~ a on of changes in
and departure. fron-; the contract g uaranleed, with out th e d efend ant's consent, by the partie thereto. At the trial a verdict wa
ciirected for the plaintiff .
The plaintiff enter ed into th e contract a nd 1ound him self,
according to it term s, upo11 th e faith of th e promise of the contractor to g ive th e bond, ancl it i_ acl mitte l that if thi was concurrent with th e exec ution and d eliver y of th e instrument, it w ould
con titute a nfficient co nsideration. Dut, ince the bond was g iven
afterward _, and, as th defendant cla im . . ubsequent to the time
that the contractor s had entPred upon th actual performance of
the contract, it i in i tecl that it required som e n ew consideration .
If it 1 e true that the ev id ence in the ca e would warrant a findin g
by th e jury that the co n tractors " ·er en o-aged in the performance
of the cont ract wh en t he bond wa g iven , it would also be true that
thi was by th e g rac a nd plea ure of the plaintiff, and not l;>y
virtue of any rig ht under the contract. Their rig ht to in ist upon
perf rman cc, as again st the plaintiff. and to r eceive the benefit of
the contract w as not p rfected until th bond wa g iven . \Vhatever the contractor may have as urn ed to do before, it wa only
upon the delivery of th e bo nd that the contract became compl ete
the mutual obligation
a nd binding upon the plaintiff. and hen
imposed upon the contractors at one time , and upon th e plaintiff
at anoth r, furni hed a con ideration for the bond . Bank v. Coit,
TO..j.
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Th other defense r e t mainly upon a co n truction of the
contract which the clef ndant claim to be the co rrect one. It
honld be b en recl at th e ouLet that the contract g uaranteed i ,
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by reference, made a part of the bond, and tlierefore, in order to

determine the scope of the defendant's undertaking, the two instru-

ments must be read together. It is true, as the learned counsel for

the defendant contends, that the liability of a surety is strictissimi

juris. But that does not mean that a difit'erent rule must l)e applied

in the construction of contracts of suretyship than that which is to

1)e applied in the construction of contracts in general. Like all

other contracts, the undertaking of a surety must be construed

fairly and reasonably, anrl according to the intention of the parties.

If the surety has used ambiguous language, and the party sectired

has advanced his money on the faith of the interpretation most

favorable to his rights, that will, ordinarily, prevail, if the instru-

ment is open, reasonably, to such interpretation. It means that a

surety shall not be held beyond the precise stipulations of his con-

tract. He is not liable on any implied engagement, where a party

contracting for his own interest might be, and he has the right to

insist on the strict performance of any condition for which he has

stipulated, w'hethers others would consider it material or not. But

w^here the question is a? to the meaning of the written language
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in which he has contracted, there is no difference, and there ought

not to be any, between the contract of a surety and that of any

other party. In this respect they are ordinary commercial obliga-

tions standing upon the same footing as other contracts. Gates v.

McKee, 13 N. Y. 232; Bennett v. Draper, 139 N. Y. 266, 34 N. E.

791. When the terms of the contract guaranteed have been

changed, or the contract, as finally made, is not the one ui)on which

the surety agreed to become bound, he will be released. Page v.

Krekey, 137 N. Y. 307, 33 N. E. 311. But in this case there is no

claim that the terms of the building contract to which the defend-

ant's bond related, have in any res]^ect been changed by the par-

ties to it. The most that is claimed is that, in its performance, the

parties have so far departed from its terms as to change the de-

fendant's condition, to her prejudice, and to deprive her of rights

and benefits under the contract, which, otherwise, she would be

entitled to by subrogation. Where the party -secured does some

act v.'hich changes the position of the surety to his injury or preju-

dice, the latter is no longer bound. Phelps v. Borland. 103 N. Y.

406, 9 N. E. 307; Bank v. Strecter, 106 N. Y. t86, 12 N. E. 706;

Lynch v. Reynolds, 16 Johns. 41 : Brozvn v. Jl'illiains, 4 Wend.

360; Navigation Co. v. Roll, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 550; Calvert v. Dock

Co., 2 Keen 638; IVarre v. Calvert, 7 Adol. & E. 143.

by r f rcncc, mad a part of th b nd , an 1 th r f r ,
cl tcrminc th cnp f the 1 f nclant' uncl rtakin , th
m nt mu t be read t t> th r. It i tru a the learn cl
tb d frndant cont ml , that th liability of a urety i

in rd r to
two in trucoun cl for

strictissinii

]i!ri ·. But that doc n t m 'a n that a differ ent rule mu t 1 applied
in th
n tru ction f contra t f urety -hip than that whi h i to
be appli cl in the con tructi n of
ntract in g neral. Lik all
oth r con tract , th e und rtakin g of a urety mu t b con tru ed
fairly an 1 r ea onabl y, and accordin g to th e in t nti n of the partie .
If th urcty ha u eel ambiguon lan o-uage, ac. l the party cured
ha a h 'ance 1 hi s m n y on th faith of th e interpretation m o t
fay rabl e to hi ri o-ht , that ,,·jJJ, rdinarily, pr vail, if tb in trument i pen, r ea onably, to uch int rpr tati n. Jt m ean that a
. urety hall not be hel 1 beyond th e 1 r ci .. e . tipulation of hi c ntract. Fl i not liahl o n any impli d cn o-agement, wh re a party
contracting fo r hi own interes t might be, and h has th right to
in i t on the trict per fo rmance of any condition for which h has
tipulate I. whether other · \ L ulcl con icl r it mat rial or not.
ut
,,·here th e ques tion i a . to the m eanin o- of the \Hitten lano-uao-e
in ,,·hich he has contracted, there i. 11 0 differ n e, and th re ught
not to be any, hetwe n th e contract f a ur ty and that f any
other party. ln thi r esp ect they ar or tinary ommercial obli ati n La ndin g upon th ame footing a oth r contracts. Gates v.
JI cf\.ec, 13 !\. Y. 23~; Bennett v. Draper 139 ?\. Y. 2 6, 34 T. E.
79r. \Vhen the t rm of th e contract o·uarantee 1 hav 1 en
chan o- cl, or th contract, a finally mad , is not tb
ne ur on which
th
urcty agree l to bee me 1 ouncl . he will be r clea d. Page v.
Krdey, r 37 _ . Y . 107, 33 ?\. T~. 3 II. But in thi. ca e th re i 110
claim tl-~at the term
f th ' building ontract to whi h th d fendanl's bond r elated, hav in any re sp ct be n chang cl by th parti _ to it. Th e m o. t t hat i claimed i that, in it pcrf rmanc , the
parti
haYc s0 far depart d from it term a t cha1we th defe nd ant' cond ition. t h er prejn lice, and to l I riv her f rights
a n d h n fit_ un 1 r th
ntra t, whi h, otherwi , sh w uld 1 e
·ntitlccl to by • nbrogat i n. \\Th ' r e th party
ure l cl s
me
8 t wh ich change the po iti 11 f th e ur ty to hi ll1Jllr.Y r 1 rr- judic , the latter i no 1 no- r 1 nncl . P helps v. Borland, IO ~r. Y.
406, X. E. 307; Ballh v . trceter, 106 ?\. . T 6, L
. E. 706;
Lynch v. Reynalds, 16 J bn . 41 : Bro'wn v. TVilliallls, 4 \ V nd.

360; Nm 1igation Co. v. Roll,
. B. (
.) SS ; ah•ert v. Dock
Co., 2 I c n 63, ; TT'arrc v. ah·crt, 7 .. \cl 1. & E. 143.
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The learned counsel for the defendant insists upon his con-

struction of the contract, that the plaintiff paid or advanced to the

contractors a larger portion of the contract price than he was re-

quired to by the contract, and that it was paid without any certifi-

cate. The contention rests upon the defendant's construction of the

building contract, which, in substance, is tliat the provision for

"monthly payments, not to exceed eighty per cent of the estimated

value of the work performed on the building," required the estimate

to be based only upon the work when actually set in the building,

whereas it was in fact based upon the work actually done under or

in pursuance of the contract, whether the granite was actually placed

in the building or not. This is the alleged departure from the

terms of the contract, which constitutes the principal ground of

the defense. Before the conclusion of the learned counsel for the

defendant can be adopted, we nmst assent to the premise from which

it is sought to be deduced, and that requires us to ascertain and

determine the true meaning and intention of the clause of the con-

tract above quoted. It must be given a fair and reasonable con-

struction, and the general situation will throw some light upon the
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meaning of the written words. It appears that the granite required

was to be quarried in Nova Scotia, transported from the quarry to

a place in Connecticut, where it was to be dressed, and then trans-

ported to New York, and set in the building. The work involved

in the preparation and carriage of the material was by far the most

expensive part of the contract, and it appears that the contractors

had no means to meet this outlay, except the monthly payments,

so that if they could realize nothing until the stone was placed in

the building, they would be practically unable to perform the con-

tract at all. This would be an unreasonable construction, and

would, if acted upon, operate so oppressively as to place the con-

tractors at the mercy of the owner, a view that is always to be

avoided when possible. Russell v. Allerton, io8 N. Y. 292, 15

N. E. 391. It would deprive them of all right to monthly payments

except when and to the extent the granite had actually been placed

in the walls, however large tlieir outlay for procuring and pre-

paring the material may have been during the month. The parties

had the right to give to the expression "work performed on the

building" a broader meaning, which could very properly include

the value of any work done or materials procured under the con-

tract toward its erection, although the granite procured and pre-

pared had not yet been placed. Since no payments were made in

The learn cl oun 1 for th~ l fenda nt in i ts upon hi contruction of th contract, that the plaintiff paid or advanced to the
contractor a laro-er portion of th e contract price than he ·wa required to by the co ntract. and that it wa paid without any certificate. The ontention rests upon the defendant's con truction of the
building contract, which , in ub tan ce , i that the pr vision for
" monthly payment , not to "ceecl eighty p r cent of the estimated
value of the work p rfo rm ed on the building,'' requ ired thee timate
to be ba eel only upon the work ' vhen actually et in the building,
whereas it wa in fact based upon the work actually done under or
in pursuance of th contract, wheth r the granite was actually placed
in the building or not. This i the alleged departure from the
terms of the contract, which constitutes the principal ground of
the defense. Before th conclusion of the learn ed counsel fo r the
defendant can be adopted, we nm t assent to th e premise from which
it i sought to be deduced, and that require. us to ascertain and
determine the tru e meaning and intention of the clause of the contract above quoted. It mu t be given a fair and rea onable construction, and the general ituation will throw some lio-ht upon the
meaning of the written word . It appears tha~ the g ranite r quired
was to be quarried in Nova Scotia, transported from the quarry to
a place in Connecti cut, \vhere it was to be dressed, and then transported to New York, and set in the building. The work involved
in the preparation and carriage of the material was by far the most
expen ive part of th e contract, and it appears that the contractors
ha l no means to meet thi outlay, except the monthly payment ,
o that if they co uld realize nothin g until th e stone ·was placed in
the buildin g, they would be practically unable to perform the contract at all. T his would be an 11nrea onable con truction, and
would, if acted upon, operate o oppre sively as to place th e contractors at the mercy of the owner, a view that is alway to be
avoided when pos ibl e. Russell v. Allerton, ro8 N. Y. 292, 15
.r . E. 39r. It would deprive them of all right to monthly payments
except when ::i.nd to the extent the granite had actually been placed
in the wa ll s, however large th eir outlay fo r procuring and preparing the matrrial may have been during the month . The parties
had the right to give to the expressio11 "work performed on the
building" a broader m eaning, which could very properly include
the value of any work done or material procured under the contract toward it er ction, although the g ranite procured and prepared had not y t been placed.
ince no payments were made in
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excess of 80% of the value of the work pcrfoniicd in ^citing the

stone, and in procurin.i,'- and preparino- them, and as all the material

so procured and prepared actually went into the Imilding, no ad-

vances were made by the plaintiff to the contractors beyond the

fair requirements of the contract. It is said that it cannot l)e sup-

posed that the plaintift' contracted to pay any part c^f the contract

price for material at the cpuirry. and at the place where it was to

be prepared, or for the work performed in preparing^ the same for

use, before it could be known that it would ever actually reach the

building. I'ut since the monthly payments were stipulated for the

purpose of enablino; tiie contractors to prosecute the work, and as

the operation of placing the granite in jjlace Vidien prepared was

the least part of it, we do not think that this view would be un-

reasonable or improbable, it gave to the plaintiff reasonable

assurance and protection against loss, and at the same time enabled

the contractors to prosecute the work. While the plaintiff' is

described in the contract as owner, he in fact had no interest what-

ever in the building, but was the general and immediate con-

tractor from the citv for the erection of the v;hole building, and
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the defendant's ])r;iK-i])Ies were his sub-contractors for a particular

anrl specific part of the work, namely, the granite work. The

i:)laintift' was not entitled to his contract price from the city until

the building w^as com])leted. though the ofticers representing it had

discretion to make aflvances. ^Moreover, by a clause in the con-

tract, tlie ijlaintiff, in case the suljconlractors al)andone(l the work-

er failed to perform, could terminate the contract and go on with

the work himself, and in that event the material in process of

preparation should belong to him for the jiurpose of completing

the work, whether such material was at tliC building, at the quarry,

or at some other place. So that the plaintiff', in stipulating for

monthly i)aynients, estiinated upim the work actually performed,

whether in the building or not, assumed nothing more than the

ordinary and usual risks incident to all contracts of that character.

We do not think, therefore, that the meaning of the contract should

be made to depend upon the use of the words, "on the building,"

when we can see, from the situation of the parties, the nature of

the work and other provisions of the instrument, that the intention

was to make the advances as the work progressed. To give to it

the other construction would, in practice, disable the contractors at

the very outset from jjcrformance, and impose upon the defendant

a liability, inevitable from the beginning, and possibly in a much

L' Cl's:-- of , 'oCf,, '1f th e ,·a l UL' of the \\ ork p ·rformcd in :cltino- the
. to111.:. and in prncuring- and preparing· 1h<:m, and as all th mat rial
so prncun:d ~~nd prepared actually \\Tilt into the building, no ad,·anCl'" \\ere made hy th· plaintiff to th· contractors bcyornl the
iair requin·ment" of the contract. l t i~ sa id that iL cannot be · upp()st:d that the pbintiff rnntractecl tu pay any part uf the contract
price for material at th· qu<l.rry, and :lt the place where it wa , to
he prepared. or fo r th' \\ ork performed in preparing th
ame for
u. e. before it could h · knmYn th<lt it \\'ould e\Tr actually r ach th·
building. nut . inc the monthly paymcnt: \\"C IT .' tipu}al cl for the
pmpo:e of enal ling ti1' c ntra tor. to pros cul<' th w rk, and a
the ope ration f pacing· the granite in pla ·e \\hen prepared \\'a
the lea:t part of it, ,,. ' do not think that thi · ,·iew \\·o uld be unrea onable or improhahlc. It gaye to th plaintiff r a nal le
a urance and protecti n again t Joss. ancl al the same tim enabl rl
the contract r. to prosecute th work. \\' hi! th plaintiff i
ck cribed in th . contract a owner . he in fact hacl no intere t ,,·hate,·er in the lrntlcling. but ,,·a. the general and immecliat contractor from th city for the rection · f the \\· ho! building, and
the dcfenclant' principles \\'ere his ' ub-contracto r for a particular
and pecirc pan of ~he ,,. rk, namely, the o-ranite ,,·o rk. Th
plaintiff \Ya net ·ntill 'd to hi rontract price from the city until
the building ,,·a::; com pl ·!eel, though th' fficcrs rep re cntino- it had
cl iscretion to make- advanc ·s. ~ roreover. l)y a cl au
in the c ntract. the plaintiff. in case the subconlrc1ctor, a ban lon 'd the work
or failed to perform, could terminate thi: contra t and go on with
the \\'nrk himself. anrl in that evC'nt tlw mat rial 111 proce
of
pr ·paration should belong to him for the purpo,
f completin
th· \\'ork. '.\"11etlwr uch material was at the ])llil lin g at th quarry
or at :0111('. oth ·r place. , o that th pJ;tinti ff, in . tipulating f r
monthly paym ·11ts. est imated upon the work actually perform l
\\'hcthcr in th building or n0t, a sumecl nothing m r than th
or-linarv ancl u ual risk · incident to all 011trad
f that haract r.
\\ 'c do ;iot think. th rdor '.that the rn ·mi n~· of th contra t . houl l
h made to clcpcncl upon th us of th word", '' n th buildinb··"
wh ·11 \\'e can s · , fr m the , itualion of the parti , the natur
f
the work and other JJr<Wi'>ion , of th in trum nt, that th int nti n
"'a" tn mak tht ach·anccs as the work 1 ro;r .. cl. To giv t it
th other construction \\'nulcl, in 1 racti ·e, clisabl the ontractor at
th very ouL cl from pcriormanc», and imp e ur on th 1 fendant
a liability, inc,·i tahl from tli c lr;-;inning. and I o ibly in a much
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larger amount than has followed the construction adopted by the

parties themselves.

The objection that the payments were made without the cer-

tificate may be answered in the same way. The owner could dis-

pense v.dth it if he so elected, under the terms of the contract, if

not upon general principles, and since the payments made without

it were not greater in amount than, upon the true construction of

the contract, they sliould have been if it had been exacted, the omis-

sion of the owner to insist upon it did not prejudice the surety.

We are not dealing, now, with any actual change in the terms of

the contract, l)ut with acts or omissions of the plaintiff in the pei-

formance. whicli, in order to operate to release the surety, must be

of such a character that it can be said that her position was changed

to her prejudice. It should also be observed that there is a clause

in the contract the material part of which reads as follows : "Should

the owner, at any time during the progress of said work, request

any alterations, deviations, additions :jr omissions from the said

contract, he shall be at liberty to do so, and the same shall in no

wav affect or make void the contract." The defendant, having, by
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reference, in eft'ect made the contract a part of the bond, must be

deemed to have assented to this provision, and to any changes or

deviations in j^ierformance from the building contract made under

it. She has, in eft'ect, guaranteed the perfomiance of a written

contract between other parties, which, by its terms, permitted the

parties to change it or deviate from it. While it is not important

to consider the real scope of this clause, since we prefer to dispose

of the questions in the case upon the ground that there was no

material departure from the contract, when properly construed, it

should be noted that she consented iw advance to changes of some

character which are permitted by the contract in language quite

broad and comprehensive. It would not be difficult to show that

the plaintiff might, under this provision at least, dispense with the

formality of a c^ertificate when called upon by the contractors, from

time to time, for some portion of the contract price, without dis-

charging the surety, even though it v/as more important to the

defendant's interest and protection than it appears to be. It is

manifest that the provision was intended for the benefit of the

owner alone, and he could waive it without affecting the defend-

ant's liabilitv.

The contractors having failed to complete the work, the plain-

tiff gave the notice required by the contract in order to terminate

laro-er amount than ha followed the con truction adopted by the
partie them -elw .
The obj ecti on that th e payment \Y Crc made with out th e certificate m ay be an \\'ered in th e ame way. The ow ner could di pen e with it if he o elected, under the term of th c ntract, if
not upon general principle . and ince rh e paym nts made without
it were not o-reater in amount than, upon the true construction of
the contract, they sho uld hav1..: been if it had 1 een exacted, the omi sion of tbe own er to in i t upon it diJ not prejudice the surety.
\Ve are not cleaiin~.,;. now, with any actual change in the term · of
the contract, but with acts or omi ion o:f the plaintiff in the pe1 formance. \\·hich, in orde r to ope rate to relea e the nrety, mu t be
of nch a character that it can be aid that her po ition wa chan ged
to h er prejudice. It should al o be observed that there i a clause
in the contract. th e rnalerial part of " ·hich reads a follows: .. hould
the own er , at any time durina the p rogre of said work. req ue t
any alter;::i.tion , d viation , aLidition :)r omi ion from the said
contract, he hall be at libe r ty to do so, and th ~ ame hall in no
way affect o r make void t.he co ntract." The defendant, having, by
reference, in effect made th e contract a part of the bond, mu st be
d emed to hav . a ented to thi provision, and to any changes or
deviations in pPrformanr from the building contract mad e under
it.
he has, in effect, g uaranteed the pe rforn1ance of a written
contract between other partie - . which. by it term , permitted th e
partie to change it or deviate fr om it. \Vhil e it i not important
to r.on ider the r eal scope of thi clause, ince we prefer to di spose
of t.he question in the case upon th e grounJ that th ere wa no
material departure fr om the contract, when properly con trued, it
!1otild be note l that h e con enterl i1'1 advance to chan ge of om e
character \Yhicb are permitt~ d bv th e contract in lang uage quite
broad and cornprehen~sive. It \Y~ uld not be difficult to show that
ti1e plaintiff might, under this provi i o~1 at lea t , di pen e with the
formality of a certificate when called upon by th e contractor . from
time to time, for orne portion of the contract price, with out di chargin a the urety, ev n th ough it \'\a more important to the
cl fendant ' interest and protecti on than it ~ppears to be. It is
manife t that the provision y,-as intended for the benefit of the
owner alone, and he could waive it with out affecting th e clefendanL liabilitv.
The c:o;1trartor. having failed to complete the work, the plaintiff gave the notice r equired by the contract in order to terminate
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il. The contract provides wlien and upon what contingencies the

plaintiff could terminate, and the manner of proceeding for that

purpose. The tinal act which was to ].ui an end to the contract

was taking possession of the premises by the plaintiff. The notice

niav have been a necessary step or formality in that direction, but,

of itself, it did not operate to bring the contract to an end. It was

clearly within the power of the plaintiff to recall it, after given, if

not upon general principles, then under the permission contained

in the contract. It appears that he was induced, subsequently, to

allow the contractors to go on, anrl they again attempted to com-

plete the work, and again failed. It is said that the loss which the

plaintiff sustained, and for which the recovery was had, occurred

under this permission, and the defendant's counsel treats this last

effort at performance as a new contract in regard to which the

suretv was not bound. Tt was manifestly nothing more than a

mere waiver or recall of the notice for the termination of the con-

tract, and the work was performed and payment made, not upon

a new contract, but upon the old one, up to the time that the final

notice was given, w^hen the plaintiff was obliged to take possession
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.of the w^ork. The case w^as very fully considered in the court be-

low, and, as we have sufficiently indicated the ground of our con-

currence in the decision upon pohits that are controlling, it is

unnecessary to notice other and minor questions in the case. The

judgment should therefore be affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Ballard vs. Burton (1892).

64 Vt. 387; 16 L. R. A. 664, 24 Atl. 769.

Exceptions by defendant to rulings of the Franklin County

•Court made during the trial of an action brought to enforce the

.alleged liability of defendant for the amount of a certificate of

deposit which he had indorsed,' which resulted in a judgment in

favor of plaintiff. Judgment reversed.

;l. 'l h contract prO\·ide · \\'h · n and upon " ·hat c ntin n-c nci the
pla11ni ff o ulr! lerminJ.tL: an cl the manner of pr c dino- fo r that
purpo e. Th final act \\ hi ch wa to p ut an n I to the contract
" ·a , taking po ~' "i n f th ' pr mi
l y th 1 laintiff. Th notic
may haYe 1 cen ::i. n c a ry tep r f rrnalily in that dirccti n, 1 ut,
of it ·e lf, it did n t oper at to bring the c n tra t lo an ml. [t wa
ckarly withi n th pow r f th plaintiff to r call it aft r o-iv n, if
not upon ge neral prin iples, then under th e p rm i i n contained
in th c mra t. It ap1 ar · that he wa inclu c I, ul
iucntl y, t
allow th
ontra t r t go on, and they a::,ain att 1111 t d t
om1 lete the work, an 1 a~ain fail cl. It i aicl that th 1
whi h th
plaintiff u tain e !, and f r wh ich the r covery \Ya had,
curred
under thi permi ion, and th defendant' coun 1 tr at thi la t
ffort at p r fo rmanc a a new contr;ict in r egard t which the
ur ty was not 1 un I. It ' a manife tl y n thinb m re than a
m ere \\·aiver or r ca ll of th 11 tice for th t rminati n of th e contract, and the \\' rk \ a per fo rmed and payment mad , not upon
a new contract, but upon the old on , up to th tim that the final
noti ·w a giv n , wh n the plaintiff wa 1 Ji g -cl to take po e i n
of the work. Th ca e wa v ry fully c n idered in the court below, and, a we hav . ufnc i ntly in li at d th gr und f ur c ncurr nee in t he de i ion up•; n poi nt tbat ar c ntr !lino-, it i
111111ece ary to notice oth r and min r que tion in th ca . The
judgment ho ulcl therefore be affirmed, with co t . •\11 c ncur.

Judg m

nt affirmed.

BALLARD VS.

64

t. ~

7;

I

t;RT N

(I

- ).

. R. A. 6 -J., ---!- . \tl. 7

Exe pti n 1 y l f n !ant
ourt mad during th trial
alleged liJ.bility f d f nclant
cl p it which h had in cl r
fav r f i laintiff. Ju Jo-111 nt

to ruli1w
f th F ranklin ounty
f an acti n br u~· ht t
nf re the
for th ':l.111 unt f a ertifi at
f
l : whi hr ult 1 in a juclMment in
r \'er cl.

111

BALLARD VS. DURTO:N.

BALLARD VS. BURTON, 111

The certificate of deposit which constituted the foundation for

the cause of action was as follows :

"No. 34S3.

T he cer tificate of depo it wh ich con tituted th e foundati on fo r
the ca u e of action was as fo llow :

First National Bank of St. Albans, St. Ale\ns, Vt., Jan. 14, 18S4.

I hereby certify that Joseph Ballard has this day deposited in this

'' N o. 3-1-83.

bank nine hundred sixty-two dollars, payable to the order of himself on

return of this certificate properly indorsed, with interest at 4 per cent per

annum.

(Signed) A. Sowles."

and on the back thereof,

E. A. Sowles, A. Sowles, O. A. Burton, Surety.

Messrs. Farriiigton & Post, and Wilson & Hall, for defendant.

1 -"I. B lu
K OF ST. ALBA NS, ST. ALD .\N , V1 ., J a n. I-J., 1884.
l hereby cert ify t hat J osep h Balla r d ha s thi · day depo ited in thi s
bank nin e h undred ixty-two dollars, payable to th e o r d r of him se lf on
r eturn of t hi cer tifica te proper ly in dor sed, with interest a t 4- per cent per
ann um .
A. S O \\' LES ...
( Si gned )

FIR ST N ATIO

H. C. Adams and Ballard & Burlcton, for plaintifif.

Start, J., delivered the opinion of the court :

and on the back thereof)

The defendant's motion for a verdict was properly overruled.

E . A.

It appears from testimony, not controverted, that the defendant was

SovVLE S,

A.

SowLE S,

0.

.

B U RTO N ,

Surety.

a stockholder and a director of the First National Bank of St.

Albans. The plaintifif and his sister had money deposited there,

evidenced by certificates of deposit. There was a run on the bank,
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and the plaintifl: presented these certificates, and demanded the

Mess rs. Farri 11 g to11 & Post, and ~Vi!so n & Hall, fo r defenda nt.
H . C. A dams and Ballard & B urleton, for plaintiff.

money evidenced by them. There was a sufficient amount of monev

at hand to pay the sums demanded ; but the officers of the bank

T . \RT,

J.,

delive red the opinion of the court :

desired to retain it, and asked the plaintiff to leave it. Thereupon

he told them he would accept of a new certificate signed by the

defendant : otherwise he wanted the money. They gave him such

a certificate, and he surrendered up to the bank the old certificates.

The plaintifif subsequently paid his sister the amount of her certifi-

cate, which was included in the new certificate. The cashier of

the bank understood the plaintiff" was to^ forbear for a reasonable

time the exercise of his right to draw his money, and the plaintiff*

did forbear until the bank closed its doors, and its funds went into

the hands of a receiver. At this time the bank was insolvent. The

evidence fails to show that a definite period of forbearance was

agreed upon, but no question is made but that the plaintiff did

forbear for a reasonable time. The uncontroverted evidence

clearly entitled the plaintifif to a holding by the court that there

was a sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise. The

request by the officers of the bank that the plaintiff' leave the

money, his reply, the giving of a new certificate, the surrender of

T he defendant' motion fo r a ve r d i c~ wa prope rl y ove rrul ed.
It appears from tes timony, not controvertet.l , tha t the defendant wa
a stockh old r and a director of the F irst National Bank of t.
A lbans. T he plaintiff and hi s si ter had money deposited there,
evidenced by certifica te of depo it. T here was a run on the ba nk ,
and th e plaintiff pre ented the e certifica tes, and deman ded the
money evidenced by them . T her e wa a uffici nt amount of m oney
at hand to pay th e urns demanded; but th e offi cers of the ba nk
desired to r etain it, and a keel the plaintiff to leave it. Thereupon
he told them he wo uld accept of a new certificate ig ned by th
de fendant : otherwi e he wanted the money. T hey gave him such
a certificate, and he surrend ered up to i.. he bank the old certificate .
T he plaintiff sub equ entl y paid his si ter th e amount of her certifica te. whi ch \ra . included in the new certificate. T he ca bier of
the bank understood the plaintiff was to fo rbear fo r a rea onable
t ime th e exercise of his ri g ht to d raw hi money, and the plaintiff
did fo rbear until th e bank closed its door , and it fund s ·went into
the hands of a receiver.
t thi time th e bank was in olvent. The
vidence fail to how that a definite period of fo rbearance vva
agreed upon , but no question is made but that the plaintiff did
fo rbear fo r a rea onable time. The uncontrovertecl evidence
clearl y entitled the plaintiff to a holding by the court that there
\Yas a ufficient con ideration for the defendant's promise . The
reque t by the offi ce r of the bank that th e plaintiff leave th e
rn.oney, hi s reply, the g iving of a new ce rtificate, the urrender of
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the old t)iu-s, and tlie forbearance nt the plaintiff adniii of hut one

interi)retation. The i)laintift', in consideration of a new certiticate

signed l)y the defendant, surrendered the old certificates, and

agreed to and did forhear the exercise of a legal right to then draw

his own and his sister's money. In view of the uncontroverted

facts and circumstances in the case, any other construction of the

contract would !)(.■ meaningless. It is a rule, in construing con-

tracts, that they are to he so understood as to have a legal and

actual operation ; and a construction which would he senseless, in

view of the circumstances of the case, or wholly inapplicable, should

never be adopted. Story, Cont. § 640; Atzvood v. Cobb, 16 Pick.

22/: 26 Am. Dec. 657; Evans v. Sanders, 8 Port. (Ala.) 497, t,^

Am. 1 )ec. 2()7.

Words are not to be construed in a frivolous or ineffectual

sense, when a contrary exposition can be given them. They should

have a fjeasonaljle construction, according to the intent of the

l)arties. Chitty, Cont. 79. In Gunnison v. Bancroft, 1 1 Vt. 490,

it is held that language used Ijy one ])arry to a contract is to receive

such a construction as he at the time su])posed the other party
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would give to it, or such a construction as the other party was

fairly justified in giving to it. In Judcz'ine v. Goodrich, 35 Vt.

19, where one, in reply to the request of another for a license to

do something in respect to the former's pro])erty. did not intend

to accede to the rec|uest, but purposely used language susceptible

of a double interpretation in this respect, with the intention that

the other ]jarlv should derive the impression that he did accede

to the request, and the other did derive such impression and relied

on it, it w^as held that he was bound to the .same extent as if he

had, in express words, granted the license. When the plaintiff

said to the officers of the liank. in re])]} to their requests that he

leave the money, that he would accept a new certificate signed by

the defendant, otherwise he wanted his money, they had the right

to understand him as offering to leave the money for a reasonable

time if such a certificate w-ere furnished. They accepted of his

offer, furnished the certificate, he accepted of it. and t'or])ore for a

reasonable time the exercise of his right to draw the money. All

parties seemed to have underst(X)d that such was his undertaking,

aiKl what was said and done admits of no other interpretation, and

such will be deemed to have been the contract.

It is insisted that the defendant's promise was without con-

sideration, because no time of forbearance was agreed upon. A

the uld onvs. and th· furbcara n - · of the plaintiff aclmit o f but o n
interpretation. The plaintiff. in co n. id cra ti o n o f a n w - rtificate
signed by the ddu1dant, · u rr ' nder 'd th · lei c rlificat , and
agr ' cd to and cl id fo rbea r th e 'xercis -' •)f a I 'gal ri ht to th e n draw
hi .' O\\ 11 and hi -,istcr': money. In vi ' \\' f th e unco ntrov rt d
fa t and circum s tan ce in th' 'c\o;; ' , an: o l11 ·r o n, tru ' li o n of th
contract \\·ould be m 'an in gless. ] t is a ruk. in con truin g c ntracts. that the:· arc tl• lie . o ull(l ' rstnod as to have a 1 gal and
actual operati')ll; and a con _truction ,,·hi ch ,,·o ulcl be , en . le , in
,·ie,,· of the circrnnstanc '. of th ' 'asc, o r \\'holly inapplicabl . ho uld
nc,·er he adopted. Sto ry . Olll. ~ )..j.O: , lf 'i.l'Ood v. Cobb, 1 Pi k.
227; - . \111. l cc. t157: F1.·a11s v. , ·anders, R P o rt. (Ala. ) 4<J7, 33
. \m . D 'C. -<):;-.
\\ 'or cls are n ot to be cow trn d in a frivolou o r in ff ctual
:en. c, \Yh n a co ntrary ex po itio n can be gi,· ' 11 th m. Th y h o ulcl
h::rn: a ~ ca onab l co n. tructi n. acconling to the intent o f th
partic .
' bitty, 'o nt. 79. In C1n111ison v. Bancroft, i l Yt. 490,
it i. h kl that la1wuao-e u sed by one party to a ontract i t r
i e
. uc h a -on structi o n as he at th e time uppo eel th e th r party
would g in: t o it, o r uch a con . trnctio n a the oth er party wa
fairly ju tifiecl in g iving to it. In Jud e'uinc v. Goodrich, 35 Vt.
19. where on . in reply to th-, r e 1ue t of an th r fo r a Ii e n e to
do .omething- in r 'S P ' t to the farmer's 1 r p e rty, clicl n ot int end
to ac eel to th r cq u c t. but purpo ly t. ed la1wuage u c ptibl
of a double inte rpr tation in thi . r e pect, with the intenti n that
th oth ; party . ho11lcl d erive th impre io n that h clicl ace cl
to th e r cq ue t, and th e o th e r did d e rive s u ch irnpr
io n ancl r li d
o n it, it wa h 'lei th:it he wa s bound to th e am extent a if h
w ord . granted the lie n . e. \Vh n th plaintiff
hacl, in ex pre
·aid to th e offi ce r s of th hank. in r eply to th ir requ s t that h
1 ave the m on ey, that h \\"Q uid acrcpt a ne\\· certificat . i;ned by
the defendant, othern·i. · h e wantecl hi m n --y . they bad th right
to under. tancl him a. offe ring t o leave the m o ney for a r a onable
tim e if . u ch a ertificat w er forni h ee l. rl h y ac 1 t 1 f hi
off r , furni sh cl th ' c rtificatc , h accept cl o f it, and f r l r f r a
rea . onabl c time the x rc i c f hi ri<-;ht lo clra w the 111 n y.
11
parti . erm ed to hav un l rst
I that u h wa hi und rtakino-,
and what wa. aicl and cl n a lmit
f no o th r interpr tati n, and
. u ch will b cle 111 cl t have 1 n th c ntra t.
ft i in . i t d that th cl f n lant' r r 1111
wa with ut conid rati on, 1 cau
n tim of f rl aran
\Ya agr cl up n.

J! ,\LLArrn vs. DURTO

]:ALr.AKD vs. BURTON, 113

T .

113

promise to forbear and give further time for the payment of a

debt, although no certain or definite time be named, if followed Iw

an actual forbearance for a reasonable time, is a valid and sufficient

consideration for a promise to pay the debt by a person other than

the debtor. King v. Upton, 4 Me. 387, 16 Am. Dec. 266; Elton v.

Johnson, 16 Conn. 253; Hozi'c v. Taggart, 133 Mass. 284; Prouty

v. Wilson, 123 Mass. 297; Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 55; Moore

v. McKenney, 83 Me. 80. In Howe v. Taggart, supra, Field, J.,

in delivering- the opinion of the court, says: "It seems to have been

assumed in this commonwealth that an agreement to forbear bring-

ing suit for a debt due, even although for an indefinite time, and

even although it cannot be construed to be an agreement for per-

petual forbearance, if followed by actual forbearance for a reason-

able time, is a good consideration for a promise." In Moore v.

McKenney, supra, decided by the Supreme Court of Maine in

1890, the 'defendant wrote his name upon the back of the note

declared upon, intending thereby to guarantee its payment. He

did this in consideration of the plaintiff's promise to forbear and

give further time for the payment of the note ; no time of for-
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bearance was agreed upon, and it was held that the court properly

ordered a verdict for the plaintiff'. Walton, J., in delivering the

opinion of the court, says: "If the promise is in general t'.-rms, no»

particular time being named, the law implies that the forbearance

shall be for a reasonable time. Such is the legal construction of

such a promise. The debtor, therefore, by such promise, does

obtain a right, not only to some delay, but to a reasonable delay ;

such as, under all the circumstances, he is reasonably entitled to."

In King v. Upton, supra, the promise counted on was to pay the

debt of another, in consideration that the creditor would "forbear

and give further time for the payment of the debt," naming no

time. The plaintiff averred that he did thereupon forbear, and

the consideration was held sufficient. In Calkins v. Chandler, 36

Mich. 320. 24 Am. Rep. 593, it is held that an agreement to pay

the debt of another in consideration that the creditor would forbear -

and give further time for payment is founded upon a good con-

sideration, although no definite time of forbearance is named. In

Hakes V. Hotchkiss, 23 Vt. 235, it is said: "If no agreement be

made as to the length of time during which the promisee will for-

bear, the law will presume that he undertakes to forbear for a

reasonable time, and this is sufficiently certain, and is a good con-

sideration." Parsons in his work on Contracts (vol. i, p. 442).'

9

promise to forbear and _give furth er time fo r the payment of a
debt, although no certain or definite time be nam ed, if fo llovved by
an actual forbearance for a reasonable time, is a valid and sufficient
consideration for a promise to pay the debt by a per on oth er than
the debtor. King v. Upton, 4 M e. 387, i6 Am. Dec. 266; E lton v.
Joh11Son, 16 Conn. 253; Hoive v. Taggart , 133 Mass. 28--t; Prouty
v. T-V ilson, 123 l\las . 297; Robinson v. Could, l l Cush. 55; JH oore
v. McKenney, 83 M e. 80. In Ho7. 1e v. Taggart, supra, 1-<' rnLD, J.,
in delivering th opinion of the court, says : "'It eems to have been
assumed in this commonwealth that an agreement to forbear brin ging nit fo r a debt du e, even althoug h fo r an indefinite tim e, and
even although it cannot be constr ued to be an agreement fo r perpetual forbearance, if fo llowed by actual fo rbearance for a rea onabl e time, is a good consideration fo r a promise." In Jl! oore v.
ill cf{ ewzey, supra, decided by th S upreme Court of Maine in
1890, th e "defendant ·w rote his name Llpon the back of the note
declared upon: intending thereby to guarantee its payment. He
did this in consideration of the plaintiff' promi e to fo rbea r and
give further time for th e payment of the note; no time of fo rbearance was agreed upon, and it was held that th e co urt properly
ordered a verdict for the plaintiff. vVaiton, J., in delivering the
opinion of the court, says: "If the promi e is in general V:rm , no
particular time being named, the law implies that the forL arance
shall be fo r a rea onable tim e. Such is th e legal construction of
such a promise. The d btor , therefore, by such promi se, doe
obtain a right, not onl y to some delay, but to a rea onable delay;
uch as, under all the circumstances, h ~ is reason ably entitled to."
In King v. Upton, supra, the promise counted on was to pay th e
debt of another, in consideration that th e credit ·r would "forbear
and give furth er time for the paym nt of th e debt,' ' naming no
time. The plaintiff averred that he did ther upon fo rbear, and
the consideration was held sufficient. In Ca ll~ i11 s v. Chandler, 36
Mich. 320, 24 m. R ep. 593, it is held that au ao-reement to pay
the debt of another in consideration that the creditor would fo rbear and give furth er time for payment is founded t:pon a good consideration, although no definite tim of fo rbeara'.1ce i nam ed. In
Hal-us v. H otch!?iss, 23 Vt. 235, it is said: " If no agreem ent be
mad e as to the length of time during which the promisee will forbear, the law will presume that he undertakes to fo rbear fo r a
rea onable time, and this is sufficiently certain , arid is a good conid ration... Parsons in his work on Contract ( vol. l. p. 442 ~·
9
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says: "Nor need the agreement to delay lie for a time certain, for it

may be for a reasonable time only, and yet be sufficient considera-

tion for a promise."

The Revised Statutes of the United States (sec. 5242, relating

to banks) provide, among other things, that all payments of

money made after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in

contemplation thereof, with a view to prevent the application of its

assets in the manner i^rovided in that chapter, (-i wiih a view to

the preference of one creditor to another, except in payment of its

circulating notes, shall be utterly null and void. It is insisted by

the defendant that a payment by the bank at the time the plaintiff

called for his money would have been void under this provision

of the statute ; that the plaintiff lost nothing by his agreement

and forbearance; and that neither the bank I'.or the defendant

were benefitted thereby, .\otwithstanding this statute and the

insolvency of the bank, the plaintiff' waived a legal right in con-

sideration of the defendant's promise, llefore he agreed to for-

bear, the certificates were not subject 10 any defense, and he could

have negotiated them, and they would have been payable on pre-
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sentation at the bank, jjy surrendering them, and taking a new

certificate impaired by this agreement to forbear, he made his

claim subject to a defense that would be likely to aff'ect its nego-

tiability and value. Had the j^laintiff drawn his money, it is not

certain that the receiver would have called for it, or that he would

have recovered it by an action. A determination of the receiver's

right to the money might necessitate a trial of doubtful issues of

law and fact. The plaintitT had a right to draw, and to try and

hold the monc}'. 1 le waived this right in consideration of the

defendant's promise. J kit for tins promise he would have drawn

Ills money January 14, 1884. The receiver was not appointed

until some three months thereafter, during which time no one

could have rightfully called on him for the money ; and during

ays: .. :\ o r lll'ed the agreement to de la_} he for a time certain, for it
lie fur a reaso nable time unly, and ycl b' '>ufficient con · iderat i()n fur a prumi . e.
The Rl'\ i ed ' tatute ' uf the Cnited ' talc ' l ' l'C. 52 ..p, relating
tu IJanl ~ ) pruviue, amo ng other things, that all payment of
monl'y made after the commis ion of an act uf in ·oh ·ency, or in
cuntcmplatio n thereof, with a view tu prevent the application of its
a s. cts in the manner provided in that ·haptl'.r, { ·I \\·ith a vi w to
the prckrence of one creditor to another, exccp 1• in payment of it
circu l2ti ng note . . shall be utterly null and \ oid. It i · in i · t cl by
the defendant that a payment by the bank al the time the i laintiff
called fur his m oney w o uld have been void under thi · provi ion
o f the ' tatute; that the I laintiff lo t uothing by hi - agreement
and forbearance : ancl that neither the bank 1~ o r the defendant
\\·ere benefittecl therebv. :\otwith tancling tbi ~. tatute and th
in ·olvency o f the bank, the plaintiff \va1vecl a legal right in consideratio n u f thl'. defendant· promi e. Defore he ao-reed to forbear, the certificate were not subject w any defon e, and he could
ha,·c nego tiated them, ancl they would have b en payable on presentation at the bank. Dy urrenderino- them, and taking a n w
certificate impaired by thi . ao-reement to forbear, he made hi
1
.::laim uhj ct to a clefcn. e that \\·ould he likely to affect it negoIlla\

t iability ancl value.

Had the plaintiff drawn his money, it is not

this time, at least, he waived his right to have and enjoy his

money. He may, or may not, have been damaged by waiving these

rights. He waived them in consideration of the defendant's prom-

ise, and that is sufficient.

Consideration does not necessarily depend upon whether the

thing promised results in a benefit to the promisee, or a detriment

to the promisor. It is enough that something is promised, or the

exercise of a present right is forborne. In Anson, on Contracts,

p. 62, it is said: "Courts will not inquire whether the thing which

certain that the receiver would have called for it, or that he would
haYe recovered it by an action. _\ determination of the r ceiv r'
ricrht
to the m o ne•·
mio-ht
n ~ c ' itat a trial of doubtful i ue of
b
)
b
law and fact. The plaintiff had a right to draw, and to try and
h ole! the money. He waived this right in con id ration of the
d ,fendant's promise. But for thi prorni eh would have lrawn
Li s money January q, t88 ..1.. The receiv r \\"a n t appoint d
until ome three month thereafter, JL:rino· wbich time no one
-n uld have rightfully called on him for th money; and durinb
this time. at lea t, he waived hi right to ha\·e and enjoy hi
money. ] Jc may, or may not, hav been lamaged by waiving th e
right. . I Ic waived them in con ideration of the def nclant' promise. and that is ufficient.
Cunc.;ideration doc. not ncce arily depend upon wheth r th
thing promised re ults in a b nefit to the promi ee, or a detriment
to th prom i or. It i enough that omethin o- is promi ed or the
cxer i. e of a pr ent rio-ht i forborne. In . \n, on on on tract ,
p. 62. it i . aid: "Court " ·ill n t in luire wh tber the thino- which
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forms the consideration does, in fact, benefit the promisee or a

third party or is of any benefit to any one. It is enough that some-

thing is promised, done, forborne, or suft"ered by the party to whom

the promise is made, as a consideration for the promise made tq

him." The law will not enter into an niquiry as to the adequacy

of the consideration for a promise, but will leave the parties to be

the sole judges of the benefits to be derived therefrom, unless the

inadequacy of the consideration is so gross as of itself to prove

fraud or imposition. Judy v. Loudernian, 48 Ohio St. 562. In

general a waiver of any legal right, at the request of another

party, is a sufficient consideration for a promise, i Parsons, Cont.,

p. 444. Any damage or suspension or forbearance of a right will

be sufficient to sustain a promise. 2 Kent, Com. 12th ed., p. 465.

In Burr v. Wilcox, 13 Allen, 273, Wells, J., in defining "consid-

erations," says: "Any act done at the defendant's request, and for

his convenience, or to the inconvenience of the plaintiff', would be

sufficient." The exchequer chamber, in 1875, defined "considera-

tion" as follows : "A valuable consideration in the sense of the

law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit
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accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or

responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." Any

act done by the promisee at the request of the promisor, however

trifling the loss to himself or the benefit to the promisor, is a suffi-

cient consideration for a promise made without fraud, and with

full knowledge of all the circumstances. Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass.

213, 93 Am. Dec. 80. Pollock, in his work on Contracts, p. 166,

says : "Consideration means, not so much that one party is profit-

ing, as that the other abandons some legal right in the present."

In Boyd v. Friese, 5 Gray 554, Shaw, Ch. J., says : "An agree-

ment, therefore, to forego one's legal right, or forbear collecting

a debt, or enforcing any other beneficial right, is a good consid-

eration for an express promise made upon it. Such agreement

may be expressed or implied by law."

There was evidence tending to show that the defendant was

a maker of the certificate, and, if such maker, his undertaking was

to pay the plaintiff the amount called for by the certificate when it,

properly indorsed, should be returned to the bank. The bank

having been closed, and a receiver appointed, a return of the cer-

tificate, properly indorsed, to the receiver, was all that was re-

quired. No other demand or notice was necessary before bringing

suit. There were no officers of the bank to whom the certificate

form the con ideration doe , in fact, benefit the prom1 ee or a.
third party or is of any benefit to any one. It i nough that something is promised, done, forborne, or suffered by the party to whom
the promise is mad , as a consid ration for the promise made tq
him." The la,,· will not enter into an mquiry as to the adequacy
of the consideration for a promise, but will leave the parties to be
the sole j uclges of the benefits to be derived therefrom, unless the
1nadequacy of the consideration i so gross as of itself to prove
fraud or impo ition. Judy v. Loudernian, 48 Ohio St. 562. In
general a waiver of any legal right, at the request of another
party, is a sufficient consideration for a promise. r Par ons, Cont.,
p. 444. Any damage or suspension or fo rbearance of a right will
be sufficient to u tain a promise. 2 K~nt, Com. 12th ed., p. 465.
In Burr v. ~Vilco:r 1 r3 Allen, 273, \tVELLS J., in defining "consideration ," says: ''Any act done at the clefendan~'s request, and for
his convenience, or to the inconvenien~i.; of the plaintiff, would be
ufficient." The exchequer chamber, in 1875, defined "consideration" as fo llows : "A valuable con ideration in the sense of the
law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit
accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or
responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." Any
act done by the promisee at the request of the promisor, however
trifling the loss to himself or the benefit to the promisor, is a sufficient consideration for a promise made without fraud, and with
full knowledge of all the circumstance . Doyle v. Dixon 97 Mass.
213, 93 Am. Dec. 80. Pollock, in hi work on Contracts, p. r66,
says: "Consideration means, not so much that one party is profiting, as that the other abandons ome legal right in the present."
In Bo'y d v. Frie~e. 5 Gray 554, Shaw, Ch. J., says: 'An agreement, therefore, to forego one's legal right, e r forbear collecting
a debt, o'r enforcing any other beneficial right, is a good consideration for an xpres promise made upon it. Such agreement
may be expressed or implied by law."
There was evidence tending to show that the defendant was
a maker of the certificate, and, if such maker, his undertaking was
to pay the plaintiff the amount called for by the certificate when it,
properly indorsed, should be returned to the bank. The bank
having been closed, and a receiver appointed, a return of the certificate, properly indorsed, to the receiver, was all that was reqnired. No other demand or notice was necessary before bringing
uit. There were no officers of the bank to whom the certificate
1

1
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could be rL'turiK'd. The funds of the hinik were in the hands of

llie receiver, and, for tlie purpose of returning the certificate as

therein provided, the receiver was the bank. The plaintiff was

allowed to testify that he would not have left his money in the

bank if he had not understood that the defentlant was obligated

to pay it. I'he plaintiff was allowed to testify, without objection,

t'.al he went to the bank for the purpose of drawing his money;

and there was no errdr in all<i\\ing him to state that he would

have done what he proposed to do, but for the defendant's promise.

The defendant requested tlie court to instruct the jury "that if

Albert Sowles and Edward S. Sowlcs signed the certificate as in-

dorsers, with tlie right of demand and notice, then, under the

testimony, the defendant is not lialilc. We tliink from the testi-

mony, that, if Albert and Edward A. Sowles were indorsers, then

the defendant was an indorser: ])ut the nccessitv for such instruc-

tion w-as obviated by the instruction that, if the jury found that the

defendant was an indorser. then the plaintifY could not recover,

and it was not error to decline to give the instruction re(|nestc(].

Whatever may have been the relation of the signers of the certi-
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ficate to each other, they were for the purpose of determining their

liability to the plaintiff, either makers or indorsers of the certificate.

The evidence showing the understanding between the signers of

the certificate as to their respective liability to the plaintiff, and

as between each other, was not withdrawn from the consideration

of the jury, and it was for them to say, from all the evidence,,

whether the undertaking of the defendant was that of a maker

or that of an indorser. The court told the jury that, if nothing

was said to the plaintiff to explain to him that their obligation on

the certificate was that of indorsers, and not makers, he had

the right to understand that they were makers and absolutely liable

upon it. It is insisted by counsel for the defendant that the affix-

ing of the word "surety" to the defendant's name was notice to the

plaintiff that the defendant intended to limit and restrict his lial)il-

itv. and that this fact should overcome the presum])tion of law laid

down by the court. The word "surety," affixed to the defendant's

name, only indicated to the plaintiff the fact that the defendant

was surety for the bank, and this was already known to him. He

knew that the bank had the money ; that the defendants E. A.

Sowdes and A. Sowles did not have it ; and that, in fact, they were

sureties for the bank: liut this fact did not change the under-

taking of the defendant from that of a maker to that of an in-

u ulcl he returned. Th ' iuncl - of the lr 1 11k \\ere 111 the hand - of
the n ·ce iver. a11cl, for the purpo. e of 1-el urnin o· the ertifi ·at a
th1:n:in prm·iclcrl, the rcceiYer '' J.s thL' ]1ank. The plaintiff \\'a
a:J. J\\ cd to tcti h. tlrnt he ,,·mild no t ha Ye 1 ·ft his m o ney- in the
hat1k if he had n ot t111CI ' rstoo cl that the clefrndanl \\'a obligated
to pay il. The plaintiff \\'as allrJwe cl to t ·stify. \\'ithout objection
tl.at lw went to the l>::rnk for the: purp1J,e o f clra\\ ina his 111011 ·y;
and there \Yas no error in allO\ring- him to state that he woulcl
kt-. L clone ,,·hat he pr<Jp• ·~e el to d o . hut for the ddenclant' promi .
The defendant r equested th court lo instruct the jury "that if
. \ll>ert ,'o\\'le ' and Etl,,·a nl , '. Srrn·l s signed the certifi 'Cll' a - indorsers, \\"ith the riaht o f clcmancl an 1 no tice, then, under th
tes timo ny, the cl ·fcnclanl i n ot liable. \V think from th ' t tirnuny. that. if . \lbe rt and E chYard . \ .. -0\,·l ·s \\"<.Tc inclo rs ' r s. then
the cldcnclant \ras an indu rser: but the nee 's.' it ,. fo r such in. tructio n \\"a . o h\'iatccl by the instructi o n that. if the _i ury found that the
clcfenclant \\"a . an inclor e r. then the p~aintifi rnuld not recm·e r,
ancl it \\·a , n o t error to lccline to o-iv the instructi o n r eq u .' te cl.
\ \ ' hatevcr may ha Ye be n the relation o f the . ign rs o f the 'ert1ficatC' to each other, th y w ' re for the purpo c of letcrmining th eir
liJ.hilily to th plaintiff, either maker or ii:clorscr of the cert ificate .
The e,·idcnce . hmYing the uncl r tancling between the ~ ig-ners of
the certificate a ~ to their re pectiv liability lo the i laintiff, and
:i. . bet \\·ee n each other, \\'as n o t \\·ithclra wn from th
con iclcrati n
o f the jury, and it wa f r them t say, from all th evidence,
\\'hether the undertaking f the clefenclant wa that of a make:
or that of an inrlorse r. The court t le! the jury that, if no thingwa
aid to the plaintiff to expla in to h im that th ir obliga tio n on
the certificat wa that of inclor r , and not maker , h had
th rio-ht to uncl r tand that th y wer maker and ab o lutely liable
upon it. It i in. i tecl by coun el for tlw clef ndant that th affixing of th ''" r l " tlr t~r " to th def n lant' nam \\·a n oti
to the
plaintiff that the clef nclant intended to limit ancl restrict hi , liahilit v. and that thi . fact s h ulc: ov re 111 - th pre. umpli o n of law laid
down by th
ourt. 'fhc w rel " mety,'' affix cl to the d f nclant' ,
name, only indicat l to the plaintiff th, fact that the clef n !ant
"a sur ty for the bank, and thi was alrC'acly kn wn to him. He
kn w that the bank had th mon y; ~hat th def ndanL E.
wle and A. owl , li I not hav it; 'dlcl that, in fa t, th y \\·er
. ur tie f r the bank: but thi fact lid not hang th und rt;:iking of th cl fenclant fr rn that f J. maker lo that of an in -
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dorser entitled to demand and notice. A surety is an original

maker, and becomes primarily and absolutely liable, as much so

as the principal, to any person lawfully holding the paper. Bank

of Nezvbury v. Richards, 35 Vt. 284. The defendant was liable,

prima facie, as a maker of the certificate. A'ational Bank of

Belloii's Falls v. Dorset Marble Co., 61 Vt. 106, 2 L. R. A. 428;

.Strong V. Rikers, 16 Vt. 554. But this presumption was suscep-

tible of being controlled by evidence of the real obligation in-

tended to be assumed by the defendant, and known to the plaintiff.

The court made a proper application of this rule in admitting evi-

dence as to what transpired before and at the time of the execution

of the certificate of deposit, as affecting the liability of the defend-

ant, and told the jury that, if they found that the defendant was

an indorser, then the plaintiff could not recover. To justify the

verdict returned by the jury, they must have found that the defend-

ant's undertaking was that of a maker of the certificate. The court

told the jur}' that, if the defendant put his name upon the certi-

ficate for the purpose of stopping a run on the bank and tiding it

over its then exigency, this would be a sufficient consideration. If
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this was not the true test of consideration, the defendant has no

reason to complain. Tt was not necessary that he receive a con-

sideration. As the evidence stood, the question as to whether he

received a consideration was an immaterial issue, and the defend-

ant was not prejudiced by the court's submitting such issue to the

jury. It appeared from the undisputed facts that his principal

received a sufficient consideration to support his promise. This

was all that was recjuired. Moore v. McKenney, King v. Upton

and Hozve v. Taggart, snpra. The court might have properly

held that a sufficient consideration was established by the uncon-

tradicted facts, and withheld this question from, the consideration

of the jury. The plaintifif concedes that there was error in the

pro forma ruling of the court upon the question of interest, and

offers to remit the excess of interest included in the judgment

rendered in the county court.

Judgment reversed.

Judgment for the plaintiff to recover $962, with interest to

be computed at the rate of 4 per cent per annum from the date of

the certificate to the date of the writ, and 6 per cent thereafter,

and his costs in the count}' court, less the dividends paid on the

certificate by the receiver, and the defendant's costs in this court.

dorser entitled to demand and notice. A surety is an original
maker, and become primarily and absolutely liable, as much o
<.. th e principal, to any per on lawfully holding the paper. Banh
of N e1.r.1bury v. Richards, 35 Vt. 284. The defendant was liable,
pril!la facie . a a maker of th e certificate. Xational Bani< of
Bello7.us Falls v. Dorset Jfarble Co., 61 \ -t. 106, 2 L. R . ~ . 42 ;
Stro11g v. Rit?ers, 16 \ ~ t. 5- -t· But thi pr sumption \Ya s usce1 tible of being controlled by evidence of the real obligation intended to be assumed by the defendant, an l knmYn to the plaintiff.
The court made a proper application of this rul e in admitting ev idence a to what tran pired before and at the time of the execution
of the ce rtificate of deposit, as afteding the liability of the defenclant, and told the jnry that, if they found that the defendant
an indor er, then the plaintiff could not r ecoyer. To ju tify the
verdict returned by the jury, they mu. t have fo und that the defendant". und ertakin o- \Ya s that of a maker of the certificate. The court
told the jury that, if the defendant put hi nam e upon the ce rtificate fo r the purpose of stopping a run on the bank and tiding it
o rer iL then exigency, thi would be a sufficient consideration. If
thi wa not the true te t of consideration, the defendant ha no
rea on to complain. It wa not neces ary that he receive a coniderati on.
the evidence tood, the que tion as to whether he
received a consideration was an immaterial i ue, and the defendant wa not prejudiced by the co urt'. ubmitti ng uch is ·ue to the
j m y. It appeared from the undi . puted facts that his principal
r ceived a ufficient conside ration to upport hi promi e. Thi
wa all th at wa r eq uired. J[ oore v. )f c!\.c1rne3 King v. Upton
and H O'Z •e v-. Taggart, supra. Th e conrt might have properl y
held that a sufficient con irlera tion wa e tablished by the uncontradicted facts, and withheld this que tion from the con ideration
of th e jury. The plaintiff concede that there was error in th e
pro f or111a ruling of the court upon the que tion of intere t, and
offers to remit the exce s of interest included in the judgment
rendered in the county court.

,,.a

1,

Judgment reversed.
J udg111ent for the plaintiff to r ecover $962, with interest to
be computed at the rate of -+ per cent per annum from the date of
the certificate to the date of th e writ, and 6 per cent thereafte r,
and his costs in the county court, le the divid end paid on the
certificate by the receiver, and the defendant's costs in this court.
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Taft. J. On the 14th of January, 1884, the bank was hope-

lessly insolvent and the plaint i tit' had no right to withdraw his

money. J, therefore, while not dissenting, doubt on the subject

of consideration.

Davis Sewing Machine Comi-axv t'.s-. RiciiARns et. al. (1885)-

115 L". S. 524; L. Ed'n Book 29, 480.

In error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

J. On the qth f January, r ....j. the bank wa hope1 ~ ly in olvent and th plaintiff had no ri ; ht t withdraw hi
money. J, th refor , while not di nting, dol'bt on the ubj t
uf co1L id ration.
T . \FT,

Mr. James G. Payne, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. IV. A. Cook and Mr. C. C. Cole, for defendants in error.

Gray, J. This was an action, brought in the Supreme Court

of the District of Columbia, upon a guaranty of the performance

by one John W. Poler of a contract under seal, dated December

17, 1872, between him and the plaintiff corporation, by which it

was agreed that all sales of sewing machines which the corporation

D.\n

E\\·rxc .:'-.h cnlXE

should make to him should lie upon certain terms and conditions,^

the principal of which were that Poler should use all reasonable

I

~ O:'-J

P.\.:\Y -z•s. RlcII.\Rn et. al. ( r8 5).

rs u. . 524; L.

Ed 'n D ok 29 .

....j. 0.

efforts to introduce, supply and sell the machines of the corpora-

tion, at not less than its regular retail prices, throughout the Dis-

In error to the

upreme

ourl of the Di trict of

oluml ia.

trict of Columbia and the Counties of Prince George and Mont-
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gomery, in the State of Maryland, and should pay all indebtedness

by account, note, indorsement or otherwise, which should arise

from him to the corporation under the contract, and shotild not

engage in the sale of sewing machines of any other manufacture;

::\Ir . .Tall!cs G. Payne, fo r plaintiff in rror.
::.\fr. TV. A . Cook and Mr. C. C. Cole, for defendants in

rror ~

and that the corporation, during the continuance of the agency,

should sell its machines to him at a certain discount, and receive

payment therefor in a certain manner ; and that either party might

terminate the agency at pleasure.

The guarantv was upon the same paper with the above con-

tract, and was as follows :

"For value received, we hereby guarantee to the Davis Sewing Ma-

chine Company, of Watertown, New York, the full performance of the

foregoing contract on the part of John W. Poler. and the payment by

said John W. Poler of all indebtedness, by account, note, indorsement of

notes (including renewals and extensions) or otherwise, to the said Davis

GRAY, J. This was an action, broug ht in the Supreme onrt
of the Di trict of Columbia, upon a guaranty of the p erformance
by one J ohn \ V. Poler of a contract under "eal. dated D c rnb r
17, 1872, between him and the piaintiff corporation, by which it
\Ya agreed that all ale of sewing machine \Yhich the corporati n
houlcl make to him should be upon certain term an 1 ndition ,
the principal of whi h " ·ere that P ler hould u e all rea onable
effort t introduce. uppl y and sell the machines of the corporation, at not le than it regular retail price , throughout the Di trict of olumbia and th e ou nlies of Prince Georg and Montgomery , in the tate of ::\Iarylancl. and should pay all indcbt dn s
by account, note, indor ement or oth crw i e \\·hich hould ari e
from him to the corporation uncl r th contTact, an l h uld not
engage in the ale f ewing machine of any other manufacture;
and that th corporati n, during th r:ontinuance of t.he agency,
hould sell it machine t o h im at a ce:tain li count, and receive
payment th r efor in a certain manner; and that eith r party might
terminate the agency at plea ur .
The guar::mty wa upon th e am paper with the above contract, and wa a follow :
"For Yaluc received, we he reby guar:i.ntee t the Davi
ew in g Machine Company, of \\'atcrt wn, _ cw Y rk the foll performance of the
foregoing c mtrcict on the part of J ohn \V. P lc r, and t h pay m ' 11t by
aid John \ V. Poler of al l inclebt dncss, 1 y account , note, indor m ent of
notes (including renewal and extensions) or otherwise, to the said Davis
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Sewing Machine Company, for property sold to said John W. Poler,

under this contract, to the amount of Three Thousand C$3,000) Dollars.

"Dated Washington, D. C, this 17th day of December, 1872.

"A. ROTHWELL.

"A. C. Richards."

Under the guaranty were these words: "I consider the above

sureties entirely responsible. Washington, Dec. 19. 1872. J. T.

Sewin g Machine Company, for property sold to said J ohn \ V. Poler,
unJ tr t hi contract, to the amount of T hree Thou c..nd ($3,000) Dollars.
"Dated \ Vas hin gto n, D. C., this 17th day of December, 1872.
"A. R OTH \\' ELL.
"A.
R ICHARDS."

c.

Stevens."

U nder the guaranty were the e word : "I con ide r the above
uretie entirely re pon ible. \Yashirwtcm, Dec. i9. 1872. J. T.

At the trial the above papers, signed by the parties, were given

in evidence by the plaintiff, and there v.as proof of the following

facts: On December 17, 1872, at Washington, the contract was

'

TE\ EKS . "

executed by Poler, and the guaranty was signed l^y the defendants,

and the contract and guaranty, after being so signed, were deliv-

ered by the defendants to Poler, and by Poler to Stevens, the

plaintiff's attorney, and by Stevens afterwards forwarded, with

his recommendation of tlie sureties, to the plaintiff at W^atertown

in the State of New York, and the contract there executed by the

plaintiff'. The plaintiff afterwards delivered goods to Poler under

the contract, and he did not pay for tliem. The defendants had
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no notice of the plaintiff's execution of the contract, or acceptance

of the guaranty, and no notice or knowledge that the plaintiff had

furnished any goods to Poler under the contract or upon the faith

of the guaranty, until January, 1875. when payment therefor was

demanded bv the plaintiff' of the defendants and refused. At the

time of the signing of the guaranty, the plaintiff had furnished no

goods to Poler, and the negotiations then pending between the

plaintiff' and Poler related to prospective transactions between

them.

The court instructed the jury as follows: "It appearing, at

the time the defendants signed the guarant}' on the back of the

contract between plaintiff and Poler, the plaintiff had not executed

the contract or assented thereto, and that the contract and guar-

anty related to prospective dealings between the plaintiff and Poler,

and that subsequently to the signing thereof by the defendants the

attorney for the plaintiffs approved the responsibility of the guar-

antors and sent the contract to Watertown, New York, to the

plaintiff, which subsequently signed it, and no notice having been

given by the plaintiff to the defendants of the acceptance of such

contract and guaranty, and that it intended to furnish goods there-

on and hold the defendants responsible, the plaintiff cannot recover,

and the jury should find for the defendants."

At th e trial the above papers, sig ned by the parties , \\'ere g iven
in evidence by th e plaintiff, and th ere v:as proof of the fo llowinofact : On December 17, 1872, at vVash ington, the contract was
executed by Poler, and the g uaranty wa _ igned by the defendant ,
and the contract and guaranty, after being o signed, were delivered by the defendants to Poler, and by Poler to Stevens, th e
plaintiffs attorney, and by . . teven afterwards fonya rcled, with
his recommendation of foe ureties, to tbe plaintiff at \\' atertown
in th e tate of ::\ ew York, and the contract there executed by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff afterward delivtred goods to Poler under
the contract, and he did not pay for them. The defendants hc.td
no notice of th e plaintiff execution of tl-,e contract, or acceptance
of the guaranty, and no notice or knowledge that the plaintiff had
furni heel any goods to Poler under the contract or upon the faith
of the guaranty, until January. 1875. ffhen payment therefor wa
demanded by th e plaintiff of th e defendanL and refu eel . At th e
time of the ig ning of the g uaranty, the plaintiff had furnished no
goods to Poler, and th e nego tiations then pending between the
plaintiff and Poler related to pro pective tran action between
them.
The court in tructecl the jury a follows: "It appearing. at
th e time the defendants iane<l the g uaranty on the back of the
contract between plaintiff an<l Poler, the plaintiff had not executed
the contract or a sented th ereto, and that th e contract and g uaranty related to prospective dealing between the plaintiff and Poler,
and that ubsequently to the igning thereof by the defendants the
attorney fo r the plaintiff approved the re ponsibility of the guarantors and ent the contract to Watertown, ~ew York, to the
plaintiff, which sub eq uently signed it, <cncl no notice having been
given by the plaintiff to the defendants of the acceptance of such
contract and g uarant) , and that it intended to furni sh goods thereon and hold the defendants re ponsible, the pbintiff ca nnot recover,
and the jury hould find for the defendants."
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A verdict was returned for the defendants, and judgment ren-

dered thereon, which on exceptions Uy the plaintiff was alTfirnied

at the Cieneral Term, and the plaintitit sued out this writ of error,

penchng which one of the defendants died and liis executor was

summoned in.

The decision of this case depends upon the apphcation of the

rules of law stated in die opinion in the recent case of Dazis v.

Udells, 104 U. S. 159. in \\liich the earlier decisions of Uiis court

upon the subject are reviewed.

Those rules may be stmimed up as follows: .\ contract of

guarant}', like every other contract, can only l)e made by the

mutual assent of the parties. If the guaranty is signed by the

guarantor at the request of the other party, or if the hitter's agree-

men to accept is contemporaneous with the guaranty, or if the

receipt from him (if a valuable consideratitni, however small, is

acknowledged in the guaranty, the mutual assent is proved, and

the delivery of the gttaranty to him or for his use completes the

contract. Btit if the guaranty is signed b\- the guarantor with-

out an\- previous request of the other party, and in his absence,
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for no consideration moving between them except future advances

to be made to the principal debtor, the guaranty is in legal efifect

an offer or proposal on the part of the guarantor, needing an

acceptance by the other party to complete the contract.

The case at bar belongs to the latter class. There is no evi-

dence of any request from the plaintiff" corporation to the guaran-

tors or of any consideration moving from it and received or ac-

knowledged by them at the time of their signing the guaranty.

The general words at the beginning of a guarant}-, "value re-

ceived," without stating from wdiom, are quite as consistent with

a consideration received by the guarantor from the principal debtor

only. The certificate of the sufficiency of the guarantors, written

by the plaintiff's attorney under the guaranty, bears date two days

later than the guarantv itself. The plaintiff's original contract

with the principal debtor was not executed by the ]:)laintiff" until

after that. The guarantors had no notice that their sufficiency

had been approved, or that their guaranty had l)een accepted, or

even that the original contract had been executed or assented to

by the plaintiff, until long afterward, when payment was de-

manded of them for goods supplied by the plaintiff to the principal

debtor.

Judgment affirmed.

A. n:nlict \\as returned fo r th' defendant , and judo-rnent rendered thereon . \\ hich on exc-:ptiuns by the plaintiff wa - affirmed
at the c;encral Term. and th e plaintiff ·uecl oul thi s \\'rit of rror
pending \\·hi ·h one uf the cld ' ncl a nt s died an l his xec utor wa
Sllllll11011Ccl in.
The decision of thi ca. e clepcncls upon th' application of the
rule, of law , tatecl in the opinion in the recent ca - ~ of Daz.•is v.
I I .ells. 10.~ C. S. 159, in '"hich th' ea rli er cleci ion of thi court
upon the , ubject are r vi \\'eel.
Those ru lcs may he summ ed up as follm,· : ~ \ contract of
o-uaranty. like every other contract, ca n only be mad e by the
mutual a. sent of the partie . If the guaranty i
i; necl by the
guarantor at the reque t of the other party, or if the latter' agr emen to accept i · contempo ranco u with the g uaranty, or if the
receipt frum him of a valuab le con siderati on, how ver small, is
acknowledged in th g ua ranty, th e mutual as ent i p roved , ancl
the delivery of the g uaranty to him or fo r hi u e complete the
contract. Dut if the guara nt y i signed by the guarantor without any previous request of the othe r party, and in his absence,
for no con sideration m ov in g between them except futur e advance
to be made to the principal debtor, the g uaranty i in 1 gal effect
an offer or propo a l on the part of the g uarantor, needing an
acceptance by the other party to compl ete th e contract.
The case al bar belongs to the latter cla . There i no evidence of any request from the plaintiff co rporation to th guarantor or of a ny consideration m oving fr om it and received or acknowledged by them at th e tim e of their -igning the guaranty.
The general word at the beginning of a guaranty. "valu received," without tating from whom, are quite a c n i tent with
a consideration re eived by th e g uarantor from th principal debtor
only. T he ce rtificate of the sufficiency of the ;uarantor , written
by the plaintiff's atto rney uncl r the guaranty. bea rs clat two day
later than the guara nty itself. The plaintiff's original contract
with the principal debtor wa. not exec uted by the plaintiff until
after that. The gua rantor had n o notice that their uffi iency
had been approved, r that their guaranty had been accepted, or
even that the original ontract had b e~ n exec ut cl r a ented to
by the plaintiff. until long afterward, when paym nt was demanded of them for goo l uppli ecl by th I laintiff t th principal
cl ·btor.
Judgment affirmed.
0

GANO VS. FARMERS P.t\ N K.

GANG VS. FARMERS RANK. 1-1

1~1

«Gano z's. FAR^n-:Rs' Bank of Kfntuckv at Georgetown (1898)

103 Ky. 508; 45 S. W. 519.

·-G.-\

0 'i,!S. F .\R :\IERS' D.\XK OF KEXTlJC KY .\ T GEORGETO\\'X (

1898)

Appeal from Circiii*: Court, Scott county.

103 Ky. 508: 45 S. \V. Sr9.

Jas. 7 . Kcliy and Geo. E. Prc-d'itf, for appellant.

Ozvens & Fiiincll, for appellee.

Hazelrigg, J. The appellant, Gano, and nine others executed

a writing to the end that one P. T. Pullen might obtain the sum of

Appea l from Circuit

ourt, S cott county.

$io.coo with which to run a milling business in Georgetown, Ken-

tucky. The appellee bank, on the strength of this writing, fur-

nished $5,000, which was used to pay off a debt then owing the

bank by Pullen, and also $5,000 which was used in the business.

]as. T. Ecliy and Geo. E . Prc·1uitt, fo r appellant.
07- 1c11s & Fill ncll, fo r appellee.

After a time, Pullen being insolvent, the bank called on the obligors

in the writing for a discharge of their undertaking. All seemed

to have paid their respective shares demanded by the writing, ex-

cept the appellant, who tendered certain issues of law and fact in

defense of the action which followed liis refusal to pay his share.

The writing which forms the basis of action is as follows :

"P. T. Pullen, of Georgetown, Kentucky, contemplating the leasing

of the Thompson mills, and carrying on the milling business, and being in
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need of capital with which to buy stock and run the same as it should be

run successfully : Now, in order to aid him, we. W. E. Pullen, George

Carley, George V. Payne, T. T. Hedger, J. M. Penn, James W. Craig,

Buford Hall, Daniel Gano, S. ?>. Triplett, and Warren C. Graves, whose

names are hereto signed, agree to become his surety to an amount not

exceeding ten thousand dollars in the aggregate. After this instrument

of writing had been signed by all of us (ten in number), it may be used by

the said P. T. Pullen in the nature of a collateral for a sum or sums not

exceeding ten thousand dollars in the aggregate, and we, the said signers,

J.

The appellant, Gano, and nine others exec u ted
a '~' r i ling to the end that one P. T. Pullen might obtain the sum of
$10.coo with which to run a milling bu sine in Georgetow n. Kentucky. Tbe appellee bank, on the strength of this writing, for ni ~. h ed $5,000, which was used to pay off a debt then owing the
bank by Pullen, and also $s,ooo which was used in the business.
After a tim e, Pullen bein g insolvent, th e hank called on the obli go rs
in the wri( ing fo r a di charge of their und ertaking . A ll seemed
to have paid their r es pect ive sha res demanded by the writing. except the appellant, who tendered ce rtain is ues of law and fact in
defense of the action which fo llowed his refo al to pay his share.
The '~r riting which fo rms th e basis of action is a fo llows:
H AZELR1 cc;,

shall be bound jointly and severally as sureties upon any note or notes not

exceeding in the aggregate said sum to which said Pullen shall sign his

name and deposit this as collateral. In case the money is borrowed of more

than one party, the lenders can agree upon who shall hold this writing for

the benefit of all. Said Pullen agrees to mortgage all property he now has

to us in order to secure us by virtue of obligations assumed in this instru-

ment, and renew said mortgage from time to time when required, upon

any and all property he may have. This instrument of writing to con-

tinue in force for three years from the first day of July, 1891, and no

longer, and if at any time any one or more of the signers hereto should

die or become insolvent, said Pullen is to either pay off his or their por-

tion of the money that may be borrowed, or furnish other good and

: solvent surety or sureties in his or their stead. Said Pullen agrees to

"P. T. Pullen, of Georgetown, Ke ntu cky, contemplating the leas ing
of th e Thomp on mill s. ;-incl c1rrying on the milling bu iness , and being in
need of capital with which to buy tock and run the same a it should be
run succes fully: Now, in order to aid him, we. 'vV. E. Pullen, George
Carley, George V. Prtyne, T. T. Hedger. J . -:\I. Penn, J a m es W. Craig,
Buford Hall, Daniel Gano, S. n. T ri plett, a nd \ i\Ta rren C. Graves. who:-c~
n am es are h ereto ig n ed, agree to become his u rety to an a m o un t not
exceed ing te n th o usa nd dol la rs in th e aggregate. After this in s trument
of w ritin g ha d Leen sig ned by a ll of t1 ( ten in numb er), it may be u ed hy
th e said P. T. Pu ll en in the nature of a col l a1er ~d for a su m or sum s n0 l
exceed in g ten thousand clolbrs in the aggro::gate, a n d we, the said s igner.;;.
s in!! be bo und jo in t ly an d seYe ral ly as sureties upon any note or notes n ot
exceed in g in the agg regate sa id s um to which said Pullen shall s ign hi s
nam a n d deposit this as collateral. In ca ~ th e mo ney is borrowed of m o r~
th an o ne party, the lend er s ca n 1grce upon w h n hall hold thi · writing for
th e benefit of ali. Said Pullen ao; rees to mortgage a ll prop rty h e now ha s
to ns in o rd er to secure us by v irtu e of ob ligations ass um ed in this in strument, and renew a id m o rtgage fr om tim e to time when requir ed, upon
a ny and a ll prope r ty he may have. This instrument of writing to continu e in fo rce for three yea rs from the first clay of July, 1891, a nd no
lon<rer, a nd if at a ny t ime any one o r m ore of the sig n ers hereto should
d ie: o r become insolYent. sa id Pullen is to either pay o ff hi s or their porti on of the m oney that may be borrowed, o r furnish oth er good a nd
o lvent surety o r suretie in hi s o r th eir stead. S a id Pullen ag rees to
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keep all grain and llour he may have on hand insured in some good in-

surance company for the benefit of the signers hereto, and his books are

at all times to be open to the inspection of any one or all of the said sign-

ers, either in person or by an expert of their selection. Given under our

hands this 15th day of July, 1891.

(Signed) George V. Payne,"

And others named in the writing.

The paper, as we have already indicated, was taken by Pullen

to tlie appellee, to whom Ptillen was then indebted in the sum of

k ·ep ;i.ll grain an<l 11our he may have on hand in . ured in some good inurnnce company for the benefit of the signers heret , and his book are
at all times to be open to the in pection of any on
r all of the said signer.;;, either in person or by an expert f their el clion. Given und r our
hanJs thi I 5th clay of July 1891.
GEORGE V. PAYNE,"
( ' igned)
And ot hers named in the writing.

$5,000, evidenced by Pullen's note with his brother as surety. A

new note was then executed to the bank for $5,000, and this note

was then discounted l)y the bank, and the proceeds taken to pay

off this pre-existinc^ debt. It is therefore insisted for the appel-

lant that the principle announced in Russell v. Ballard, 16 B. Mon.

205, is applicable here and, when applied, the surety stands dis-

charged. It was there said: "If a note be purchased by a party,

with notice that one of the obligors is surety merely, and that the

sale and purchase will defeat the purpose for which it was exe-

cuted by him, or will violate any understanding or agreement
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between him and his principal, then the purchaser will be affected

by such notice, and cannot hold the stirety liable on the note to

compel him to pay it."' Here the bank had notice that Gano was

surety merely on the writing taken as collateral by the bank to

secure the new note, and it had notice that the sale and purchase

of this new note and application of its proceeds to pay off the

old debt would defeat the sole purpose for which the writing was

executed by the surety, namely, "to raise the sum of ten thousand

dollars, buy stock and run the same." This would seem sufficient

to bring the case within the principle announced in the cited case,

for it is manifest that, if one-half the capital needed to carry on

the milling business and "run the same successfully" was to be

taken to pay off an old dcl)t, the business must suffer, and likely

not be run successfully. But this is not all. The bank had notice

that the sureties looked to the property which this money — all of

it — would buy as an indcninity by way of mortgage; and b\ what-

ever amount the actual cash furnished Pullen for his business was

lessened, by that amount the value of their indemnity would be

lessened. This is also in line with the general doctrine so often

announced by the textwriter and by this court for the protection

of sureties. We might assume without proof-^l)Ul the evidence

is conclusive on the point — that appellant would not have entered

The paper, a w hav already indicat cl, wa tak n by Pull n
to the appelle , to whom Pullen wa. then inclcl ted in the sum f
5,000, evicl need by
ull n' note with hi 1 roth r a urety. A
new note wa then ex cutecl to the bank for $s,ooo, and thi note
was then di count cl by th bank, and the pr ce cl taken to pay
off this pre-existing debt. It i therefore in i t d for the app 1lant that the principle announced in Russell v. Ballard, 16 B. Mon.
205, is applicable h re and, when appli ·d, the urety tand di charged. It -vva ther aicl: "If a note be purcha cl by a party,
with notice that one of the obligor is _urety m rely an 1 that the
ale and purcha e will defeat the purpo e for which it wa executed by him, or will violate any und r tancling or agre m nt
between him and hi principal, then the pur baser will be affect d
by uch notice, and cannot hold the surety liable on the not to
compel him to pay it." Herc the bank had notice that Gano was
urety merely on the writing taken a c llat ral by the bank to
ecure the new note, and it had notic that the sale and purcha e
of this new note and application of its proceed t pay off the
old debt would defeat the ole purpo e for whi h the writing wa
executed by the urety, namely, "to rai c the um of ten thou and
dollar , buy tock and run the same. · Thi would
m uffi ient
to bring the a within the principle arlll unce l in th cited a ,
f r it is manif t tbat, if one-half the capital nc clecl to carry n
the milling busine and ''run the amc 'Uccc folly" ·wa to be
taken to pay off an old cl bt, the bu ine must , uffcr, and lik ly
not be run succe fully. But thi i not all. Th 1 ank had notice
that the surctie I k d to the property which thi mon y-all of
it-would buy a an indemnity by way of mort ·acre; and l y whatever amount the actual ca h furni h cl Pullen f r hi bu ines wa
le cned, by that amount the alt1
f th ir indem11ity would be
I
ned. Thi i al o in line with th e g n ral doctrine
often
announced by th t xtwrit r and by thi c urt for the pr tection
of surctie . \V might a ume without proof- 1 ut the evidence
is on lu iv on the point-that app llant would not have entered·
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into this contract had it been disclosed to him that this "letter of

credit", as the writing may be termed, was to be used to pay off

the large debt due the bank, and therefore it was incumbent on

the bank to disclose to the surety all the facts material to the risk

before it could divert the fund intended to be raised by the col-

lateral to purposes of its own. The rule is thus stated by Mr.

Story in his Equity Jurisprudence: "The contract of suretyship

imports entire good faith and confidence between the parties in

regard to the whole transaction. Anv concealment of material

facts, or any expressed or implied misrepresentation of facts, or

any undue advantage taken of a surety by his creditor, either by

surprise or by withholding proper information, will undoubtedly

permit sufficient grounds to invalidate the contract." Section 324.

And further: "Thus if a party taking a guaranty from a surety

conceals from him facts which increase his risk, and suffers him

to enter into the contract under false impressions as to the real

state of facts, such concealment will amount to a fraud, because

the party is bound to make the disclosure, and the omission to

make it under such circumstances is equivalent to an affirmation
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that the facts do not exist." Sections 214, 215. See Com. v.

Berry, 95 Ky. 443, 26 S. W. 7, and cases cited. Other obligors,

who lived in or about Georgetown, the scene of this transaction,

seem either to have had knowledge of these material facts at the

time, or obtained it shortly afterwards, and, having that knowledge,

still paid off their shares ; but the appellant was an old man, some

85 years of age, living quite a distance from the town, and visiting

there only a few times within a year. There is no doubt of his

entire ignorance of the material facts indicated. He was not even

apprised of the fact that the writing had been used by Pullen with

the bank or anyone else, and money obtained thereby. It seems

to be clear that he was entitled to this notice. He had merely

offered his name with that of others as surety to whomsoever

might accept the offer and loan of money. He was therefore

entitled to notice of acceptance. In Steadman v. Guthrie, 4 Mete.

(Ky.) 148. it was held that: "When the off'er is to guaranty a

debt for which another is primarily liable in consideration of some

act to be performed by the creditor, mere performance of the act

is not sufficient to fix the liability of the guarantor ; but the credi-

tor must notify the guarantor of his acceptance of the offer or of

his intention to act upon if." That the guarantor might, by inquiry

from the person in whose favor the guaranty was given, have

into this contract had it been disclo ed to him that thi "letter of
credit', a the writing may be termed, was to be used to pay off
the large debt due the bank, and therefore it was incumbent on
the bank to disclo e to the surety all the facts material to the risk
before it could divert the fund intended to be raised by the collateral to purpose of it own. The rule i thus stated by Mr.
tory in his Equity Jurisprudence: "The contract of suretyship
imports entire good faith and confidence between the parties in
regard to the whole transaction. Any concealment of material
fact , or any expressed or implied misrepn:: entation of facts, or
any undue advantage taken of a surety by hi creditor, either by
surprise or by withholding proper information, will undoubtedly
permit sufficient ground to invalidate the contract."
ection 324.
And further: "Thu if a party taking a guaranty from a urety
conceals from him facts which increase his risk, and suffer him
to enter into the contract under fal e impre sions a to the real
state of fact , uch concealment will amount to a fraud , because
the party i bound to make the discbsure, and the omi ion to
make it under uch circum tances is equivalent to an affirmation
that the facts do not exist." Sections 2q, 215. See Com. v.
Berry, 95 Ky. 443, 26 S. vV. 7, and ca es cited. Other obligors,
who lived in or about Georgetown, the scene of thi tran action,
seem either to have had knowledge of these material facts at the
time, or obtained it shortly afterward , and, having that knowledge,
still paid off their shares; bul the appellant vvas an old man, some
85 years of age, living quite a distance from the town, and vi iting
there only a few times within a year. There is no doubt of his
entire ignorance of the material facts indicated. He wa not even
apprised of the fact that the writing had been used by Pullen with
the bank or anyone else, and money obtained thereby. It eems
to be clear that he \Vas entitled to this notice. He had merely
offered his name with that of others as surety to whomsoever
might accept the offer and loan of money. He wa therefore
entitled to notice of acceptance. In Steadman v. Guthrie, 4 Mete.
(Ky.) 148, it was held that: "\Vhen the offer is to guaranty a
debt for which another is primarily liable in con ideration of some
act to be performed by the creditor, mere performance of the act
is not suffici nt to fix the liability of the guarantor; but the creditor must notify the guarantor of his a(:ceptance of the offer or of
hi intention to act upon it." That the guarantor might, by inquiry ·
from the per on in who e favor the guaranty was given, have
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learned what had passed iDeluccn the grnarantees ami himself, does

not dispense with notice. A person tiius proposing to become

surety for another is not bound tn inquire as to the acceptance of

his proposal. The creditor who intends to hold him responsible

for the debt of another must show reasonable notice of such inten-

tion. See, also, Khicheloc v. Holmes. 7 B. ]\Ion. 5 ; Lozcc v. Beck-

zvitli, 14 B. Mon. 189; Thompson v. Glover. 78 Ky. 195 It is

true in this case that the record does not show that the bank's old

debt on l\illen was in danger of being lost. Jt was secured by the

brother of the debtor, who was solvent, although his property was

in the main covered by mortgages, and he was already indebted

to the l)ank in a considerable sum. Still it may be said he

was solvent. We think this, however, makes no difference. It

niav show more conclusively — what is already apparent enough —

that there was no actual fraud intended by the bank, or any of its

officers, in the transaction ; but this does not change the legal

status of the parties on the point involved. It further appears that

the brother of the principal debtor, who was surety on an old debt,

had a mortgage on certain stock and property belonging to the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

debtor to indemnify him in his suretyship; and this was released,

and a mortgage taken in favor of the obligors in the writing in

question. But it further appears that the value of this property

was quite insignificant, and that appellant had no knowledge even

that this had been done. The writing, the contents of which the

bank had notice of, because they accepted and acted on it. entitled

the ol)ligors to have a mortgage on all the property the debtor had

or might acquire ; and we do not see that, because one was in fact

•executed of which no notice whatever was given to the ai)pellant,

this can take the place of the notice to which we have said appel-

lant was entitled when his offer was accepted and acted on by

the bank. Actual notice is what the law requires, and notice or

knowledge of this new mortgage might have been sufficient, but

this the appellant did not have. We think the plaintiff's petition

should have been dismissed, and the judgment is reversed for pro-

ceedings cojisistent with this opinion.

lcarn~d

\\·hat had pas. 'd bct\\·cen the guarante .' an.cl himself, clo
not dispense \\ ith notic '. A person ti1u proposing l h -ome
urety for another is not bound tt) inqu:re as to the acceptance of
his proposal. The -reditor who i11tcn1l: to ho! I him re ·pon ible
for the d 'i>t of another mu ' t show rea unable notice of such intention.
'cc, aLo, Xincl!clvc v. J10!111c.s. 7 ll. ).Ion. 5; Lo'l~·c v. Bccl?<.l1ith. q D. ~Ion. I 9; Tho111pso11 v. 010·1..•cr, 7' Ky. 195
It i ,
true in this case that the record docs not , ho,,· that the bank' old
debt on Pullen wa in dan._;er of being Jri t. It \Ya · cur 'd by th
brother of the debt r, who wa solvent, although hi property \Ya
in the main cov reel by mortgage. , ancl he wa already ind bt l
to the hank in a co1L 1clerable . um.
Still it may b
aicl he
wa. . oh·ent. \\' e think thi , hmYcver. make no differ n -e. It
111ay .· how more conclusiv ly-wliat i. already apparent n ughthat there wa no a tual fraud intended by the bank. or any of it
officeL, in the tran . action; but thi dc.e: not change the le al
status of the parties on the point involved. It further app ar that
the brother of the principal debtor, \\"ho '"a urety on an old debt,
had a mortgage on certain tock and property bel nging to the
debtor to indemnify him in his suretyship; and this was rclea eel,
and ~ mortgage taken in favor of the obligoL in the writing in
que<;tion. lh1t it further appears that the value of thi prop rty
\\·as quite in. ignificant, and that appellant had no knowledge v n
that this had been clone. The writing, the content of which th
bank had notice of, becau e they acccpkd an cl acted on it, ntitled
the obligor · to hav a mortgage on all t:1 pr perty tbe clel t r had
or might acquir ; and we clo not sec that. bccau e one wa in fact
executed of which no notice whatever \\·as given t the app llant,
thi can tak the place of the notice to ,,·hich we have aicl appellant wa
ntitlc<l ,,·hen bi off r wa ac - ptecl and a tecl n by
th bank. , \ctual notic., i ,,·hat the
requir, , ancl n ti e r
knmYl dg of thi new mortgag · might bav b n uffi i nt, l ut
this the app llant clicl n t hav . \\re think the plaintiff' I etiti n
· houlcl have been di mi eel, and the j uclgment i rever ed f r pro- eding con i t nt with thi opini n.
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The facts and the exceptions to the ruhngs and the charge of
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the court are stated in the opinion.

292.

M. J. Smiley, for plaintiff in error.

H. F. Sez'ci'ciis, for defendant in error.

Christinacy^ J. The main question in this case is whether"

the promise of Gibbs (one of the defendants below) comes within

the second clause of the second section of our statute of frauds,

The fact and th xc ption to the ruling, and the charge of
the court are tated in the opinion.

as a "special promise to answer for the debt, default, or misdoings"

of Daily, the other defendant.

The declaration contains a special count upon the contract,

l \!f. J. Smilc3 fo r plaintiff in error.
1

,

and the common counts for goods sold and delivered. The special

count sets forth that, "in consideration that said plaintiff agreed

H. F. S e·z_•erens, for defendant in error.

to sell to the said Daily a certain horse which the plaintiff' then and

there had, of the value of sixty dollars, undertook and promised the

said plaintiff to make, sign and deliver their promissory note to

said plaintiff or bearer, in the sum of sixty dollars, for the pur-

chase price of said horse, which said promissory note was to be
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payable thereafter, in six months from date." It further alleges

that the plaintiff, relying upon said promise of said defendants,

and in consideration thereof, did sell and deliver the horse to said

John Daily, for the price of sixty dollars. The breach alleges the

failure and refusal to make and deliver the note, as well as the

refusal to pay the money.

It was clear, from the evidence, that the horse was bought for

the benefit of, and delivered to Daily, and that the plaintiff' would

not have sold the horse on the credit of Daily alone. But upon

the question, whether Daily and Gibbs were to give a joint note,

or whether the latter was only to indorse the note of the former,.

or to become his guarantor, the evidence was conflicting.

There was evidence from which the jury might have found a

joint promise, or, in other words, a promise by both to execute and

deliver to the plaintiff a joint note for the price ; and from the cir-

cumstances and subsequent acts of the parties, the jury might have

been authorized to find that the note was to be made payable in six

T he main question in this case is whethe r
the promi e of Gibbs (one of the defendants b low) comes within
the second clau se of th e seco nd section of our statute of fraud s,
a a "special promise to an wer fo r the debt, default, or misd oings''
of Daily, the other defendant.
The declaration contains J. special count upon the contract,
and the common count for good sold ar:d d J ivered. T he special
count sets for th that, " in consideration that said plaintiff aoTeed
to sell to th e said Daily a certain horse vv hich the plaintiff th en and
there had, of the value of sixty dollars, und ertook and promi eel the
said plaintiff to make, sign and deliver their promissory note to
aid plaintiff or bearer, in the sum of sixty dollars, for the purchase price of aid horse, which said promissory note was to be
payable thereaft r, in six months from ·date." It further alleges
that the plaintiff, r elying upon said promise of said defendants,
and in consideration thereof, did ell anJ deliver the horse to aid
J ohn Daily, for the price of sixty dollars. The brtach alleges the
failure and refu sal to make and deliver th e note, as well as the
refu sal to pay the money.
It was clear, from the evidence, that th e horse v,ras boug ht for
the benefit of, and delivered to Daily, and that the plaintiff would
not have sold the hor e on the credit of Daily alone. But upon
the question , whether Daily and Gibbs \Yere to g ive a joint note,
or whether the ·iatter \Vas only to indorse the note of the fo rm er,
or to become hi guarantor, the vidence was conflicting.
There was evidence from which the jury mig ht have found a
joint promise, or, in other words, a promise by both to execute and
deliver to th e plaintiff a joint note for th e price; and from the circumstances and sub equent acts of th e parti es, th e jury mi a ht have
be n authorized to find that the note wa to be mad e payable in six
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months, though they might also have found that no particular

time was mentioned or expressly agreed upon for whicli the note

was to run.

The evidence tending to shOw that the promise was joint, or

that a joint note was tt) be given, was substantially this: Gibbs

and Daily called upon the plaintiff together, and Gibbs asked

plaintiff' if he wanted to sell his mare. Plaintiff" said he did. Gibbs

inquired the price, and being told sixty dollars, wanted to know if

plaintiff' would take Daily's note if he, Gibbs, would sign it and see

it paid; to this plaintiff' assented. The mare not being present,

and Gibbs, being anxious to get home, said Daily might go with

plaintiff and see the mare, and if the mare suited him he might

fetch her back with him and draw up a note and Daily might sign

it, and the first time he, Gibbs, went to town he would sign it.

The mare was delivered to Daily, who signed a note for it at six

months, which was afterwards endorsed by Gibbs on Sunday.

This note was produced on the trial and tendered back to defend-

ants.

The court charged the jury that "if it was the understanding
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of the parties that Daily was the purchaser, and that he should

give his note to the plaintiff for the price, and that Gibbs should

so sign as only to be liable as indorser, the plaintiff must fail. If

however, the understanding of the parties was, at the time, that

Gibbs and Daily were the buyers of the mare, and that both were

to be liable as purchasers for the purchase price, and, accordingly,

should Ijecome joint makers of a promissory note for its payment,

though Daily was less relied upon by die plaintiff than Gibbs, and

though, in ])oint of tact, it was understood that the mare, when

bought, should belong to Daily, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.

That the principle in this class of cases is. that if the agreement

be such that two persons, in the purchase of goods, do at the same

time become co-debtors to the seller for the price, then both are

purchasers, and the case is not w itliin the statute of frauds, and no

memorandum in writing is necessary. But if \^ be such that one,

at the time, becomes debtor to the seller, and the other security

onlv for the debt, it is within the statute of frauds, and the under-

taking of the security is void unless a memorandum of it in writing

is made."

Though the f|uestion is one requiring some accuracy of dis-

crimination, I have come to the conclusion, after a careful exam-

ination of the authorities, that the charge of the court was not only

month . though the,· 111io-ht abo have found that nu particular
time ,,·a - mentioned or exr r · ·ly agreed upon for '' h ich the not'
\\·a to nm.
'1 he l'vidcnce tending to -ho,,· thal lh' promi · wa · joint, r
that a joint note wa · tu be given, wa · ub::-.tantially thi · : Gibb
and Dail_> called upon the plaintiff togeth ' r, an<l l~iblr a -ked
plaintiff if h wanted tu 11 hi mare. I lain tiff said h' did.
· ibb
inquired the price, and b ing told ixty dollar , wanted to kno\\ if
plaintiff would take Daily' not if he. Gil I , w ulcl ign it ancl ee
it paid; to thi plaintiff a entecl. The mar r:ot b ino- pre ent,
and Gil b being anxious to get home, ·aid Daily might o-o with
1 laintiff and ee the mare, and if the mare uited him he might
fetch her back \vith him and draw up a note and Daily might i n
it. and the fir t time he, Gibb , went t town be would ign it.
The mare wa leliv r cl to Daily, who ignecl ::i. not for it at ix
munths, which wa afterwards endor e 1 by Gibb on
unday.
Thi note wa produc d on the trial and tendered back to defendant .
The court charged the jury that "'if it \\·as the uncler tancling
of the partie that Daily was the purcha er, and that h
hould
o-ive hi note to the plaintiff for the price, and that ibb
h uld
. o . ign a only to he liable a indorser, 1be plaintiff mu t fail. If
however, th under tanding of the part1e wa , at the time, that
c;ibb and Daily were th buyers of the mare, and that both w .re
to be liable a. purcha. er. for the purcha e price, and, accordino-ly
houlcl bee m' joint makers of a promi sory not<:> f r it payment,
though Daily was le relied upon by the plaintiff than ·:ribb , and
though, in poinl of fact, it was under tood that th mare, when
bought, sboulcl b long to Daily, the plaintiff i cntitl cl to r cover.
That the prin iple in thi cla . of ca e i . tha if th agre ment
be uch that ~\\' O 1 er-on .. in the pur ha," of g od , clo at th am
time b come co-debtors to the eller for the price, th n both are
purcha ers , and th ca . i not within the tatute of fraud . and no
m m oranclum in \\Titing· i n ce . ary. Dut if it be uch that one,
at the tim<>. become debtor to tl1e s lier. and the other ecurity
on!)· for the cl bt, it is within th tatut of fraud , an l the un 1 rtaking of the . curity i. void uni " am rn ran km of it in writin~
is made."
Though the que::;tion i one requiring , ome a uracy f di crimination, I haY com t th conclu ion, after a careful xamination of th authoritic .. that th charg f th ourt wa. not only
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correct, but that it expresses the true rule of law applicable to the

question with remarkable clearness.

No question can arise as to the sufficiency of the consideration

for the undertaking of Gibbs, whether original or collateral, with-

in or without the statute. Without his promise, the plaintiff would

not have parted with his property. The consideration, therefore,

is equally as good in law as a sale of the horse to him alone would

have been for his sole promise to pay the price.

The plain ordinary meaning of the language used in this

clause of the statute would seem sufficiently to indicate that the

class of special promises required to be in writing includes only

such as are secondary or collateral to, or in aid of the undertaking

or liability of some other party whose obligation, as between the

promisor and promisee, is original or primary. If there be no

such original or primary undertaking or liability of another party,

there is nothing to which the promise in question can be secondary

or collateral, and tne promise is, therefore, original in its nature,

and not within the statute. In other words, the statute applies

only to promises which are in the nature of guaranties for some

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

original or primary obligations to be performed by another. This

has been settled by a remarkably uniform course of decision since

the passage of the statute (29 Car. II., ch. 3, Sec. 4), which does

not essentially differ from our own and those of most of the states

of the Union. So numerous and so uniform have been the deci-

sions upon this point, that it would savor of affectation to cite

them. They will be found cited in most of the elementary treatises :

See Browne on Stat. Frauds, cli. 10 ; Chitty on Cont., p. 442, et seq. ;

2 Pars, on Cont., 4th ed., 301. And though the terms original ana

collateral have i)een criticised, yet when used, the one to mark

the obligation of the principal debtor, the other that of the person

who undertakes to answer for such debt, they are strictly correct,

and give the true view of this clause of the statute : Mallory v.

Gillctt, 2T N. Y. 412, 414; Elrowne on Stat. Frauds, ch. to. Sec.

192.

' As a result of this principle, that one must be held originally

or primarily, and the other only collaterally, or in default of the

former it follows that the statute only applies to such promises

made in behalf or for the benefit of another, as would, if valid,

create a distinct and several liability of the party thus promising,

and not a joint liability with the party in whose behalf it is made.

For if one be bound in the first instance and at all events, and the

correct, but tha t it x pre sc the true rul of law applicable to the
que tion vv ith r ma rkable clearne s.
::..Jo qu estion can a rise as to the sufficiency of the consideration
fo r the undertakin g of Gibbs, whether o r~ gi n a l or collateral, within or without the statute. \tVithout his promise, the plaintiff wou ld
not have parted with hi propert)'. T he cons ideration, therefo re,
is equally as good in law as a sale of tbc horse to h im alone would
have been fo r his sole promise to pay tlie pri ce .
The plain or dina ry mea nin g of the language used in this
clause of the statute would seem sufficiently to indicate that the
class of special prom ises n:quired to be in wr it.ing includes only
such as a re seconda ry or colla t ral to, or in aid of the undertaking
or liability of ome oth r party whose obligat ion, a between the
promisor a nd prorni see, is original or pr imary. If there be no
such orig inal or primary undertaking or liabili ty of another party,
there is nothing to wh ich th e promise in questiou can be seconda ry
or collateral, a nd foe promise is, therefo re, orig inal in its nature,
and not within the statu t . In other wo rd , the statute app li s
only to prom ises which are in the nature of g uar anties fo r some
or iginal or p rimary obligations to be perfo rmed by anoth er. · T hi
has been settl ed by a remarkably uni for m co urse of decision since
the passage of the statute ( 29 Car. I I., ch. 3, Sec. 4 ), which does
not e sentially cliff r fro m our own and those of most of the states
of the U nion. So numerou and so uni fo rm have been the decisions upon this poin t. that it woul d savor of affectation to cite
them. They will b fo und ci te l in most of the el n1entary treatises :
See Browne on C::,tat. Frauds, ch. 1 o ; Chitty on Cont. , p. 442, et seq. ;
2 P ars. on Cont. , 4th eel ., 301. A nd thoug h th e term s original anct
collateral have been criticised. yet wh en used, the one to mark
th e obligation of the principal debto r, the other that of th e person
'"·ho undertake to answ r fo r such debt, th ey are tri ctly correct,
and g ive the trn view of this clau se of the statute : JUallor'y v.
Gillett) 2i: N . \ -. -t 1 2 . -t q: Browne on S tat. Frauds, ch. ro, ec.
192 .

As a re ult of this prin cipl e. that one m u t be held orig inally
or primaril y, and the oth er only colla terally, or in default of the
fo rmer it fo llows that the statute only applie to uch promises
mad e in behalf or fo r the benefit of anoth er, as would , if vali d .
create a di tinct an l several liabilit y of th party thus promising,
and not a joint liability with th e party irl who e behalf it is made.
F or if one be bound in the fir t instance and a t all events, and the
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Other only contingently, or on default of the first, the liahility

could not he j<iinl. ( )n the other hand, if ihr ])i-(iniise ny tlie «>l)h-

gation of the two he joint, as hetvveen th.ein, on the one side and

the promisee on the other, then neither is collateral to the other,

and such jcjint ])roniise is original as to hoth. Hence it has heen

held in England that an agreement^ to convert a separate into a

jtiint deht is not w illiin the sta'uti, : ihe effect heing to create a new

deht, in consideration of the- fornv.r heing extinguished: Ex parte

Lane, i De Gex. 300; llrowne on Stat, of hYauds. 193.

Where the question arises (as it lias in almost all the cases)

as one of the several liahility of the party promising in hehalf of

another (as for the price of goods sold to another), the true rule

undoul)tedl\' is. tliat if tlie lait^r (to wlioiii the goods are sold)

he liable at all. then the promise of the former is collateral, and

must he in writing; because, from the very nature of such a case,

the part}- to whom the goods are sold, and in whose behalf the

promise is made, is the principal debtor, and l^ccause it would be

manifest] \- tnn-easonable to hold that both were in such cases

severally liable as principals, as upon several original undertakings
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at the same moment. See Ilctficld ct al. v. Doiv, 3 Dutcher, 440;

Dixon V. F razee, 1 1*^. 1). Smith, 32. y\nd this rule applies e(|ually

when the promise is made in reference to a pre-existing lialjility of

another, if the plaintifif in accepting the promise does not release the

I)rincipal. In reference to all such cases tlie aiuhorities may be said

to be entirel\- uniform. But the rule thus estal)lished as to cases

where the question is one of the several Uabilitv of the i)aiiv making

the special ]>romi.se, can, I think, have no application to the f|uestion

of a joint liability upon a joint promise of the two. Tlie only intima-

tion to the contrary which 1 have seen is to be found in a dictmn of

Judge Catron in Mctlheh.'s v. Mlllnii, .\ N'crg. 576, a case in which

no sucli question was involved, there l)eing no evidence tending to

show a joint j^romise. To say that when the party originally owing

the debt, or for whom goods are ptu'chased and to whom they are

delivered, is liable at all, no other ])erson can be lield severally

liable' unless the promise be in writing, is merelv sa\ing tliat such

promise is collateral, and. therefore, within the statute. lUit to

say that they cannot both become jointly liable tipon their joint

promise, not in writing, to pay such debt or the i)rice of such

gO(Kls. if the i)ariy originally cnving the deljl or receiving the

goods be at all liable, is btit another form of declaring that it is

not compeicul for botli to become original promisors, as between

other unh untiIWL'llth-, ur un default of th· first. th· liability
cuuld nut lie joint. Un th ' oth T han I, if th · prurni::.' or th' bltgatiun of the t\\·u l>c joint, as bet\\·een tl~em, on tht: one sid, anc1
thl' promise· on th· other, th ·n 11 'ith T is collateral tu the oth r,
and su 'h jCJint prCJ111i!'-e i-, original as to both. 11 ·n 'l' it has Ii' ' 11
held in England that an agr · ·rn ·nt. to cun\'ert <L 'eparat · int a
j<>int tll'l>t is not '' ithi11 the stat utc: the L ll'cct being to er 'a t, a 11 w
debt. in 'Dnsickration of th <..: forn1°r h mg 'x tingui heel: l ~x part
Lane. 1 J) · (;ex. 3 o; l~rmrne on Stal. of l•'ra ucl s. 193.
\\' here the question arise:-. (as it 11as i11 altilosl all th ' a, )
as nnc of th ' sC \' ·ral liabilit~· r)f th party promising in h ·half f
another (as for the price of goods sold to an-:>th r), th tru rul
uncloubtedly is, that if th httcr (lo \\'horn th 0 d ar • le.I)
he liable at all. then the promise of the former is collateral, and
mu . t be in \\'riling; b c:rn. , from th v ry nature f uch a a ,
th party Lo \\'horn 1 !Jc goclcL ar ,old, ancl in who e h half the
promi . is mad , is th e principal dcl tor, ancl h cau
it would b
manif , tly unrea. onahk to h !cl that both \\'ere in u h ca e
severally liabl a princi1 al , a upon v ral ori ginal uncl rtaking
at the am mom nt. ,'e J!et field et al. v. DO'il', 3 Dutch r , 4-10;
Dixon , .. FrO'::cc . 1 E. l . mith, 32. \ncl thi. rul e appli . qually
" ·hen th, I rom is is mad e in ref renc · to a pre-exi. ting liability f
another. if the plaintiff in ace pting th pro1111. clo ·s not relea. e the
principal. In r f r nee to all. u 'h ca. th e authoriti s ma\· b aicl
to be entir ly uniform. But tl1 c rul r LhLL ' tahli h ·cl as to ca, ,
" ·here the qu •c;tion is one o f th' scz cral liability of th ' pariy makint-t
the . pecial promise, can. f think. ha\' C n applicali n to th qu c, Lion
of a joint lia bility upon a jo int J romi c of th · two. 'Th only intimation to the 'ontrar\' whi h T hav e ~ec n i. t h f uncl in a Ii tum f
Jucl g· 'atron in J!otthc'i• 'S ,._ Jlilt o11, -I Y rg. 57 , a ca, in whi h
no . u h qu >. tion was i1wolnc1. th er · being no
icl nc tencling to
. how a joint pr mi.'. Tc , ay that wh n th e party riginally owing
th' cl ·ht, o r for ,,·!111111 g-oocl . ar r ur hasc cl ancl t ) \\'horn th ~· ar
deli,· r cl. is liable al all, !10 oth r p 1 ,0 11 can h h lei , v rally
liable unlc. s th promi . h in \\·riting, i. 111 r ly . aying that uch
promise is ollat ral. ancl. ther fore. within th<' . tatul . I>Llt to
say that th y ca nn l 1 th I ' me j intly liabl ' up 11 th ir j int
prnmi . , not in writing. t0 pay • u h d ht o r th pn
f uch
good .. if th · party rir.ina!ly c wing th ' deb t r r
ivin::-i· th
good. b al all liable. is but an th r form of cl laring that it
not co111pctc11t f r both to 1 ome riginal pr 1111 r , a 1 t' n
1
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them and the promisee, unless both are under an equal obligation,

as betzveen tbeiitselves, for the ultimate ];iayment of the debt. Such

them and the promisee . unl e both are und er a n equal obligation,
a bef'l(.ICelL the111seh c ; fo r the ultimate r1ayment of the lebt. Such
a proposition, it eems to me, can n t be mainta ined either upon
principle or authority. S ucb an obj ecti on to a joint promise seems
rather to hav reference to om': supposed defect of consideration
(a que tion entirely distinct from th e t~tute) tban to th promi . e.
And, if the party prorni ing jointly with another to whom good
are furni heel, ca n not be hound jointly with the latter, becau e
a between th e two promi or , be, not having received the good ,
is under no obligation to pa)' ; then the ame reason oug ht to operate with still g reater fo rce against hi se·1. cral promise to pay the
z 1/10/ c price of goods received by the oth er. Dut the law in the
latter case is well settled the other way.
It was v ry correctl y remarked I y \ VnELPLY, J.. in H ctficld
et al. v. Doi , above cited, that, "to ~e ttle the r ight of promi or '
inter sese, to a ~ certain a bctwee1L t11 c111 who i_ to pay the debt
ultimately, is no part of the object of the act. It 1 y no mean
follmvs that he who by the arrangement bet ween the promi or
ultimately may be bound to pay the debt i , as to the promiscc, tbe
principal debtor. That cl es not conce rn him. " Thi view, it
eems to me, res ts upon so und rea ans-reasons which mu st !lat...
urally enter into the consideration of bu iness men, in th ordin:i ry
tran action of business. \ i\There a party has been willing to pu t
him elf in the po ition of an original promisor ( eith r jointly or
severally) to a vendor fo r goods purcha eel fo r the benefit of, or
delivered to, another, the vendor ha a ri g ht conclu sively to presume that such relations or arrangement exist between the two
as to make it th e duty of the party or parties promising, as betw een
themselves, to pay according to th e promise.
nd to allow the
contrary to be shown to defeat the promise would ope rate as a
fraud upon the vendor.
The qu e ti on of a joint promise a ppea rs to have b en seldom
raised for adjudication in connection with the statute of fraud s;
but the following case fully sustain th prop o~ iti o n that a joint
promise of two, whether to pay the pre-existing debt of one of
them, or a debt contracted at the time fo r bis ben efit (a for goods
bought for and delivered to the one), does not com within the
statute, but it i an original promi e, as betw een th m and the
promisee, and valid without writin o- : Ex parte Lane, r De Gex.
300 ; Tf/ aim_ r i_uht v. Strm. ·, IS Vt. 2 r .5; Stolle v. f!T/ a!l?cr, J 3 Gray,
6 J 3; and H etfi eld v. D oi', 3 Dutcher ~40. See al o by analogy
1

a proposition, it seems to me, can not be maintained either upon

principle or authority. Such an objection to a joint promise seems

rather to have reference to som*" supposed defect of consideration

(a question entirely distinct from the statute) than to the promise.

And, if the party promising jointly with another to whom goods

are furnished, can not be bound jointly with the latter, because,

as between the two promisors, he, not having received the goods,

is under no obligation to pay ; then the same reason ought to op-

erate with still greater force against his scz'cral promise to pay the

zi'Jwlc price of goods received by the other. But the law in the

latter case is well settled the other way.

It was very correctly remarked by Whelply, J., in Hcfficld

1

et al. V. Dozv, above cited, that, "'tO' settle the rights of promisor^'

inter sesc, to ascertain as betzveen tiieni who is to pay the debt

ultimatel}-. is no part of the object of the act. It by no means

follows that he who by the arrangement between the promisors

ultimately may be bound to pay the debt is. as to the promisee, the
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principal debtor. That does not concern him." This view, it

seems to me, rests upon sound reasons — reasons which must nat^

urally enter into the consideration of business men, in the ordinary

transactions of business. Where a partv has been willing to put

himself in the position of an original promisor (either jointly or

severally) to a vendor for goods purchased for the benefit of. or

delivered to, another, the vendor has a right conclusively to pre-

sume that such relations or arrangements exist between the two

as to make it the duty of the party or parties promising, as between

themselves, to pay according to the promise. And to allow the

contrary to be shown to defeat the promise would operate as a

fraud upon the vendor.

The question of a joint promise appears to have been seldom

raised for adjudication in connection with the statute of frauds;

but the following cases fully sustain the proposition that a joint

promise of two, whether to pay the pre-existing debt of one of

them, or a debt contracted at the time for his benefit (as for goods

bought for and delivered to the one), does not come within the

statute, but it is an original promise, as between them and the

promisee, and valid without writing: Ex parte Lane, i De Gex,

300; Wainzvright v. Straw, 15 Vt. 2r5; Stone v. Walker. 13 Gray,

613; and Hetfield v. Dozv, 3 Dutcher 440. See also b}' analogy

1
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Batson v. King, 4 H. & N., 739. The same doctrine is laid down

by Mr. Browne in his p.hle treatise on the statute of frauds : Ch. 10,

Sec. 197.

It is true that in IVaimur'ght v. Straiv, which most resembles

the present case, the decision is placed in part upcm ihc ground

that the sale was made to both. The facts were that Straw and

Cunnin^^ham both went to plaintiff's store and said they wished

to .buy a stove for Straw, but that both would be responsible. Now,

I can see no diti'crence in legal effect between the case where A

and B say to a merchant, "We want to buy a stove for B, and both

of us will be responsible." and the case where A says, "B wishes

to purchase a stove, but we will both be responsible." Siibstan-

tiolly, the transaction is the same; in both cases alike it is a sale

for the benefit of the one on the joint credit of the two, and the

real question in both cases is, whether the credit was given to both

jointly. I do not think tlie court, in JJ'aiimright v. Strain', based

their decision upon tlie narrow and merely verbal ground of the use

of the first person plural, showing merely who wanted the stove, but

upon the broad ground above stated, that it was sold upon their
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joint credit. And in all such cases where the sale is upon the

joint credit and promise of the defendants, though the property

is purchased for and delivered to but one of *hem, I think the

legal efifect of the transaction constitutes, as between them and the

vendor, a sale to the two jointly. The sale as between the vendor

and the vendee is to the party or parties to whom the credit is

given for the price, without reference to the question for whose

use it is purchased, or who, as between the promisors, is to be its

owner when bought.

This brings us to another point in the case. The sale (if upon

the joint credit and promise of the defendants) was a joint sale

to lioth, as between them and the plaintiff. But in the special

count of the declaration it is alleged as a sale to Daily only. The

plaintiff cannot, therefore, recover upon the special count.

But upon the count for goods sold and delivered, the sale

having been made to both, the plaintiff would be entitled to re-

cover, if the facts be such as would warrant a recovery upon a sale

made for the joint benefit of, and the property delivered to both.

I think there was no error in the charge or proceedings of

the court below, and that the judgment should be affirmed, with

costs.

Note— The concurring opinion of Camphell, !., and that part of the opinion of

Christiancy, J., relating to questions other than the statute of frauds, are omitted.

BatsoJ1 \'. I\.ing, -1 II. ' . -., 739. The _am doct rine i , laid <l wn
by ).fr. Dro\Yne in hi :!blc trcati ·' on the _tatut
f fraud : ' h. IO,
cc. 197.
lt i · tru that in TT7aiw1.•rig fit v. tra'll' which 111 tr mbl
the pre ent ca e, the deci io n i , placed in part upon th e gr und
that the sal wa made to both. Th fact wcr that 'traw and
\rnning·ham both \Yent to plaintiff
tore and aid they wi hed
to .buy a tove for 'traw, but that both would b re pon ibl . ~ . . ow,
I ·an see no cliff r nee in lega l effect between th ca \Yh re ..
and B . ay to a merchant,"\\' want to buy a t v fo r B, and hoth
of u - " ·ill be re pon ible," and th e ca e " ·h r A ay , ''B wi hes
to pure ha e a rove, but we will both be r e pon ible. "
ubstantially, the transaction i the _ame; in both ca e. alike it i a al
for the benefit of the one on the joint ere lit f the two, and the
real que tion in both ca e i. , wh ther the cr ed it wa given to both
jointly. I clo not thin k the comt, in T!7 oi1m.•right v . • trmv. ba ed
th ir cleci ion upon the narro\\' a nd m erely verbal ground of the u e
of the fir_ t prr on plural , ·ho,,·ing m erely \Yho \\'anted the tove. but
upon the broad around abov
tated, that it
old upon their
juint credit. And in all u h case where the sal i upon the
juint credit and promi e of the defend:mt , thcrngh th proper ty
f +.hem , I think the
i_ p urchased fo r and deliv red to but n
legal effect of the tran acti n con titute , a between th em and the
vendor, a , ale to the two jointly. The sale a 1 r:twe n the vendor
and the venclee is to the party o r partie to whom th credit i
giYen fo r the pric , without r efe r nee to the q~ 1est i o n fo r who e
tLe it is purcha cl, or wh , a b tween the pr mi or , 1 to be it
0\\· ner w hen bought.
Thi bring u to anoth r point in th a _e . The al ( if upon
the joint credit ancl promi
o f the defendant ) wa a joint ale
to both_, a. between them and th plaintiff. But in the pecial
{,rn111t of the cleclaration it is all gecl a a alp to Daily nly. The
rlaintiff can not, therefore, recover upon th
pecial count.
Dut npon th e count for good
old and <leliv r d, the a le
l1a,·ing been made to both , the plaintiff would be entitl d to r ez:• 1vcr. if the fact be such a woukl warrant a recovery upon a ale
made for the joint ben fit f, an 1 the property deliver d to 1 oth.
I think there wa no error in the cha rg or proc edincrs of
he co urt below, and that the judgment hou ld 1 e affir med, with
co L.

'"°"

1

OTE- The co n curring opinio n of CA ;11PBE LL . J .. and t h:1t pa rt of th e opi nio n o f
J., relating to ques t ions other t ha n th e t atute o f frauds. ar e o mitt d .
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MANLEY VS. GEAGAN.
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Manley, i\dm'strix, z's. Geagan (1870).

MANLEY, Adm'strix, vs. GEAGAN ( 1870).

105 Mass. 445-

Contract by the administratrix of Edwin Manley upon an

105 Mass. 445.

oral promise to pay the following order:

"Fall River, October 9, 1868.

■"Nicholas T. Geagan.

"Sir: Please to pay Edwin Manley thirteen hundred and fifty- four

"dollars for work on your house, corner of Bedford and Twelfth streets, and

charge the same to account of H. B. Borden & Co."

The answer denied all the plaintiff's allegations, and pleaded

want of consideration, and the statute of frauds.

The trial was in the superior court, without jury, before Pit-

man^ J., who made the following report of the case for the deter-

mination of this court :

"The plaintiff proved that her intestate, in whose favor the

CONTRACT by the admini tratrix of Edwin Manley upon an
-oral promise to pay the following order:
"FALL RIVER, October 9, 1868.
icholas T. Geagan.
" Sir : Pl ease to pay Edwin Manley thirteen hundred an d fifty-four
•dollars for work on your house, corner of Eedford a nd Twelfth streets, and
diarge the same to acco unt of
H . B. BORDEN & Co."

"

order was drawn, did work as a stone mason on a block of build-

ings belonging to the defendant, and which he was then erecting,

prior to the time of drawing this order. It appeared that the

whole contract was taken by H. B. Borden & Co., who employed
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the plaintiff's intestate to do the mason work, and that there was

no contract between the plaintiff's intestate and the defendant,

and no employment by the defendant ; that after the work was

done the defendant sent word to the plaintiff's intestate to get an

order from Borden & Co. on him, adding, T am going to pay all

off on the loth, and am not going to trust Borden & Co. to pay it;

I am going to see the help all paid ;' and that this was communi-

cated to the intestate ; that the next day he procured the order in

suit and presented it to the defendant ; that the defendant took

it, read it, said it was all right, and that he would accept it, and

pay it on Monday ; that on Monday he could not be found, was

gone out of town for a week, and has since refused to pay it. The

defendant who was called as a witness by the plaintiff, testified

that he owed H. B. Borden & Co. nothing at the time when this

order was presented ; and I find as a fact that 'it is not proved

that he actually did owe them anything. The defendant offered

no evidence.

"Upon the above, the court ruled that the promise of the

defendant, being an oral promise to pay the debt of another, and-

beine: also without anv consideration, no action could be main-

The an \>Ver denied all th e plaintiff's allegation , and pleaded
want of con ideration, and the statute of frauds .
The trial wa in the superior court, without jury, before Pitnwn, J., who made the following report of the case for the determination of this court:
''The plaintiff proved that her intestate, in whose favor the
o rder was drawn, did work as a stone mason on a block of buildings belono-ing to the defendant, anJ which he wa then erecting,
prior to the time of drawing this order. It appeared that the
whole contract ,,va taken by H. B. Borden & Co., who employed
the plaintiff's intestate to do th e mason work, and that there was
no contract between the plaintiff's intestate and the defendant,
and no employment by the defendant; that after the work was
done the defendant sent word to the plaintiff's intestate to get an
order from Borden & Co. on him, adding, 'I am going to pay all
o ff on th e roth, and am not going to trust Borden & Co. to pay it ;
I am going to see the help all paid;' and that this was communic ated to the inte tate; that the next day he procured the order in
suit and presented it to the defendant; that the defendant took
it, read it, said it was all right, and that he would accept it, and
pay it on Monday ; that on Monday he could not be found, was
gone out of town for a week, and has since refused to pay it. The
defendant who was called as a witness by the plaintiff, testified
that he owed H . B. Borden & Co. nothing at the time when this
order ·was presented; and I find as a fact that 'it is not proved
that he actually did owe them anything. The defendant offered
n o evidence.
"Upon the above, the court ruled that the promise of the
defendant, being an oral promise to pay the debt of another, and·
being· also without any consideration, no action could be main-
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taiiicd on it. and thereupon found for the defendant. Tf this

ruhng is wrong, a new trial is to he had; otherwise, jnd.^nent on

the venhct."

/. C. BlaisdcU. for llu' plaintilT.

/. .1/. Morton, Jr., for the dffcndant.

tainccl on it. and th ' r ' Upon fo und fo r th cl 'f nclant. If thi
ruling i · \\Tong, a n ,,. tri a l is l 1 e had; oth rwi · ' , j uclg-m nt n
th \'Crclict."

(Jrav, J. The promise of the defendant was to i)ay for work

already done hv the intestate for Uorden & Company, without any

previous eontract with or i.iii])loynient l)y the defendant. I he

defendant owed I'.orden & Company nnihin--, and received no

J. C. Blaisdell . for th , 1 laintiff.
J. JI. .l!ortv11, Jr., f r the cl ef n !ant.

consideration, either from Borden & Company or from the intes-

tate for his promise. The intestate neither did any work nor paid

any money u])on the faith of this ])romise. nor gave uj) any right

or security against Borden & Company. 'I'heir original liahility

to him was not altered or a.ffected 1)\ the defendant's ])romise.

This promise was therefore clearly a promise to answer for the

deht of another, and, not heing in writing, was within the statute

of frauds. Gen. Sts. c. 105, § i, cl. 2. Stone v. Symiiics, 18

Pick. 467; Curtis v. Brown. 5 Cush. 4S8 ; Furbish v. Goodnow^

98 Mass. 296; Browne on St. of Frauds, §§ 172-174-
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Judgment on the verdict for the defendant.

KiKKliAM T'.S-. M ARTKK, ( 1819),

2 Barn. X: .\ld.. 613.

This was an action on an oral promise. The plaintiff declared

that one T. E. Marter, hefore the making of the promise of

defendant, had without the leave or license of the plaintiff, wrong-

fuUv rid<len a horse of the plaintifl"s, in consequence whereof the

horse died ; that the plaintiff had threatened to commence an action

against said T. E. Marter for the recovery of such damages as

I)laintiff had sustained hy reason of the premises; and thereupon,

in consideration of the premises, and that the plaintiff, at die re-

( ;1u Y, ]. Th' p ro rni c o f th ' def ' nciant ,,·a · to pay fu r work
air acly done b · the intc. tat ' fo r Uorc! cn ', ~ mpany, with out any
I rc\'i o u. contract with or ·rnpl oyrnent by th ' cl ·fcndanl. The
d ef nclant \\' d n on! 11 c ~ 'ompany n othing, and r
iv cl no
c 11 , icleration, eith r fr 111 nl~ rcl e n & 'ompany or fr 111 th int tatc fo r hi promise. Th e inle tat e neith r did any wo rk n r paid
any money upon th faith of thi s pr mi c, no r gave u1 any right
r ccurity a 0 ain t L o r lcn c
ompany. Th eir original liability
t him wa not a lt reel or affc tccl by th e clcfenclanl ·. J romi. e.
Thi. promi. c wa. therefo r e cl early a pr mis to an \\' r for the
cl ebt of another. and, not being in writing, wa. within th
tatute
f fraud .
~en.
L. c. 105,
l, d. 2.
~ follc v.
y1111ncs, 18
I- ick. 467; 11rtis v. Br07. l'll, 5 u h. 48 : F1trbish v . Goodnow,.
1\1a . 29 ; l)ro\\' ne n t. f F raud , §, T72-174.
Juclgm nt on th e verdict for th e defenda nt.

quest of the drfcndani. would ni>i hring any action against the

said T. h^. Marter for the cause aforesaid, and that thf ])laintiff^

would he crtntent to take, for and on accouiU of said horse, what

Krn. 10T.\:\[ 'i'S. ::.\L\RTER, (I

2

19),

Darn . & A ld., 613.

Thi v\'a an a ti o n n an r al p romis . T he p la inti ff le Jar d
that on T . _,. Mart r, 1 ef r th e making f t he pr mi e of
def nc.lant, had with ut th l av o r 1ic n c f th i la in tiff, wr n o-fully ridden :i hor
f th plaintiff' , in con quenc wh r f th e
h r e di ed; that th plaintiff had tb r a ten "cl to omme n - a n action
again t aic.1 rl . E. }\far t 'r f r the :r Overy f SU h dam ahe a
plaintiff ha 1 , u ~ tainccl by r a n f th pr m i. ; a n l t h r u p n,
in · n icl rati n f th J r mi , and th at th pla inti ff, at th r qu t of the cl f nclant, w ul I not bring any a Li n agai n ~ t th
said T. E. ).fart r for the au
afore aid, a n I tha t t h J laintiffi
w ulcl b cd nlent to lak . for a n 1 on a co un t f a icl h Le, w hat

KIRKHAM VS. MARTER. 133

should be agreed upon between the defendant and one A. B.,

KIRKHAM VS. MARTER .

133

defendant promised to pay plaintiif what should be agreed upon

between defendant and said A. B. for and on account of said

horse. Plaintiff further declared that he had brought no action

for the cause aforesaid, and that he was willing to take, for and

on account of the horse,, what had been agreed upon between the

defendant and A. B.. and that defendant and A. B. did agree that

defendant should pay plaintiff fifty guineas for the said horse,

and the bill due for the maintenance and keep of the said horse.

Breach : The non-payment of the said several sums.

Plea : General Issue.

On the trial of the cause the plaintiff proved an oral contract

as laid in the declaration. Abbott, C. J., thought this an under-"

taking for the default or miscarriage of another within the statute

of frauds, and consequently that the promise ought to have i^een

in writing, and the plaintiff' was non-suited.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial.

Abbott, C. J. This case is clearly within the mischief in-

tended to be riemedied by the statute of frauds, that mischief
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being the frequent fraudulent practices which were too commonly

endeavored to be upheld by perjury ; and if it be within the mis-

chief I think the words of the statute are sufficiently large to com-

prehend the case. The words are these: "No action shall be

brought to charge a defendant upon any special promise to answer

for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person.'"' Now the

word "miscarriage'' has not the same meaning as the word "debt"

or "default" ; it seems to me to comprehend that species of wrong-

ful act for the consequences of which the law would make the

party civilly responsible. The wrongful riding the horse of an-

other, without his leave and license, and thereby causing its death,

is clearly an act for which the party is responsible in damages and

therefore, in my judgment, falls within the meaning of the word

"miscarriage." The case of Reed and Nash (i Wilson, 305), is

very distinguishable from this : The promise there was to pay a sum

of money as an inducement to withdraw a record in an action of

assault, brought against a third person. It did not appear that

the defendant in that action had ever committed the assault, or

that he had ever been liable in damages ; and the case was ex-

pressly decided on the ground that it was an original, and not a

collateral promise. Here the son had rendered himself liable by

hould be agreed upon between th _ defendant and one A . B.,
defendant promised to pay plaintiff what should be agreed upon
betwe n defendant and aid A . B. fo r and on account of aid
hor e. Plaintiff furth er declared that h had broug ht no action
for th e cau e afor aid, and that he was willing to take, fo r and
on account of the horse, , what had been ag reed upon betw een the
defendant and . B. , and that defendant and A. B. did ag ree that
defendant hould pay plaintiff fifty guineas for th e saicl horse,
and th e bill du e for the maintenance and keep of the said hors .
Breach: The non-payment of the said several sums.
Plea : General I sue.
O n the trial of the cau e the plaintiff p roved an oral contract
as laid in the declaration.
BBOTT , C. J., thought this an und er- ·
taking for the default or mi carriage of another within the statute
of fraud s, and cons qu ently that the promi e oug ht to have been
111 writing, and the plaintiff was non-suited.
Plaintiff moved for a new trial.
A BBOT T , C. J.
'I hi s ca e is cl early within the mischief int ended to 1 e rlemedied by th e tatute of fraud s, that mischief
being the frequent fraudul ent practices which were too commonl y
endeavored to be upheld by perjury; and if it be within the mischief I think the words of the tatnte are sufficiently large to comprehend the case. The v.rord s are these : " o action shall be
brought to charge a defendant upon 2ny special promise to answer
for th e debt, default or m iscarriage of another per on." _l\Jow th "
word "miscarriage" has not th e same meaning as the word " debt"
or "default"; it seems to me to comprehend that species of wrongful act for the con equence of which the law would make the
party civilly r spon ible. The wrongful riding the horse of another, without his leave and licen e, ancl th rehy cau ing its death.
is clearly an act for which th party is responsible in damages and
therefore, in my judg ment, falls within the meaning of the word
" mi carriage." The ca e of R eed and N"ash ( I vVilson, 305 )' is
very distinguishable from this : The promise there was to pay a sum
of money as an inducement to withdraw a record in an action of
a ssault, brou o-ht against a third per on. It did not appear that
the defendant in that action had ever committed the as ault, or
that he had ever been liable in damages ; and the ca e was expre sl y decided on th e ground tbat it was an original , and not a
collateral promise. Here the son bad rendered himself liable by
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his wrongful act, and the promise was expressly made in consid-

134
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eration of the plaintiff's forbearing to sue the son. I therefore

think that the nonsuit was right.

i\ulc refused.^

Note— The concurring opinions of judges are omitted.

The People of the State of New York. Respondent, vs.

hi \Vr ngful act, and th promLe wa xpre ly made in con ideration of the plaintiff forbearing to . u the on. I th r fore
think that th n n -uit wa right.

Backus et al., Appellants (1889).

Ru!

117 X. Y. 196; 22 N. E. 759.

r fu

cl.1

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

r OTE-The concurring oprnions of judge are omitted.

Court in the Third Judicial Department, entered upon an order

made February 5, 1889, which affimied a judgment in favor of

plaintiff, entered upon the report of a referee.

This action was brought by the people against tlui defend-

ants as guarantors upon the following bond or contract of the

National Bank of Auburn, to-wit :

"Whereas certain moneys of the State of New York have been and

Trrn

PEOPLE OF THE

L\TE

_ EW

F

YoRK,

Re pondent, vs.

are proposed to be deposited in the First National Bank of Auburn, under

the direction of the comptroller of the state, by the agent and warden of

B,\CK U et al.) Appellant

(I

::-J. Y. 196;

E. 759.

9).

Auburn prison, to the credit of the treasurer of the state, for safekeeping

II7
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and for interest.

22

l

.

"Now, therefore, the said First National Bank of Auburn, in consider-

ation of such deposits and for vahie received, does hereby agree to pay on

demand, to the order of the state treasurer, or other officer of the state

having lawful authority to demand the same, such deposits, and any and

all parts thereof, together with interest on daily balance, at the rate of

three per cent.

"Witness the seal of said Bank and the signature of its president and

_ PPE.\L from judgment of th General Term of the Supreme
Court in the Third Judicial Department, entered upon an order
made February 5, I< 89, \\· hi ch affirmed a judgment in favor of
plaintiff, entered upon the r port of a referee.

cashier, this 14th day of Tune, 1880."

The guaranty was as follows:

"In consideration of the making the deposits by the people of the

State of New York in the First National Bank of Auburn, in the agree-

ment mentioned, and for value received, we, the undersigned, Clinton T.

Thi action wa brought by the people again t the defendant a guarantor upon the following bond or contract f th·e
~ ational Bank of A uburn, to-\Yit:

Backus, Manson F. Backus, James Kerr and William E. Ilughitt, do

'To the same effect are: Turner v. Hubbell, 2 Day, 457; Baker v. Mor-

ris, 33 Kan. 580, s. c. 7, P. 267.

" \i\Therea certain money.3 of the State f Tew York have be n and
are propo ed to be depo. ited in the Fir. t .. ational Bank of Auburn, under
th dir ction of the comptroller of the state, by the agent and warden of
Auburn pri son, to the credit of th e trea urer of the state, for afekeeping
and for interest.
" Tow, therefore, the sa id Fir t Ta ti onal Bank of Auburn, in con ideration of such depo,its and for vallle receiYecl, does hereby agr e to pay on
d mancl, to the order of the state treasurer, or other officer of th state
having lawful authority to dc;J1ancl the same, such depo it , and any and
all parts thereof, together willi interest on daily balance, at the rate of
three per cent.
"\Vitne s the s al f said Bank and the ignatnre of its pr sid nt and
cashitr, thi s 14th day of June, I8 'o."

The O'llaranty wa a follow :
"In con sicler:i.tion of th e making ti1 deposits by the people of t:he
tate of ew York in the Fir t National Bank of uburn, in the agreement mentioned, and for value rec ived, w , the under igned, Clinton T.
Backu , ~'Ian on F. Backus, Jam s K rr and \!Villiam E. Hughitt, do
1

To the . ame effect are: Tnmr1· v. H11bbelL,
ris, 33 K an. 580, s. c. 7, P. 267.

'.2

Day, 457 ; Baker v. lvl or-
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hereby jointly and severally guarantee the full and punctual performance
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of the condition of said agreement on the part of said bank, and that all

such deposits and interest shall be fully paid on legal demand. The said

guarantors may serve upon the comptroller a written notice, terminating

or limiting their liability under this guaranty, after a date to be specified

in said notice, which shall not be less than ten days after the service of

said notice."

The agent and warden was by law the official manager of

the state prison at Auburn, and was requested to deposit all moneys

credited by him each week to the credit of the treasurer of the state,

h ereby jointly a nd seve rally gLta rantee the full and punctual performance
of the co nditi on of sa id agreem nt on the pa rt of said bank, and that all
s uch depo its and interest s hall b<' fully paid on lega l demand. The said
guarantor may erve upon th e co mptroll er a written notice. terminating
or limiting their li ab ifay und er thi g uaranty, after a cbte lo be pecified
in a id notice, which shall n ot be less t ha n ten days aft r the serv ice of
said n oti ce.,.

in a bank located at Auburn, and send to the comptroller weekly a

statement showing the amoimt so received, and from whom or

where received and deposited, and the days on which such de-

posits were made, such statement to Ije certified by the proper

officer of the bank receiving such deposits. The agent and war-

den was required to verify by his affidavit that the sum so de-

posited was all the money received by him from whatever source

of prison income during the week and up to the time of the

deposit, and all moneys so deposited by him were subject to the
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quarterly drafts of the treasurer of the state. The law required

that any bank in which deposits should be made should, before

receiving any such deposit, file a bond with the coirqDtroller of

the state, subject to his approval, for such sum as he should deem

necessary. § 50, Chap. 460, Laws of 1847, as amended

by Chap. 58, Laws of 1854, and Chap. 599, Laws of i860. By

section 6 of Chapter 177 of the Laws of 1877, it was provided

that "The system of labor in rhe state prisons shall be by contract

or by the state or partly by one system and partly by the other,

as shall in the discretion of the superintendent be deemed

best." From the time of the execution of the bond until Decem-

ber, 1884, the business of the Auburn state prison was carried

on under what was known as the contract system. By chapter

21 of the Laws of that year, the renewal of the then existing con-

tracts, or the making of new contracts for convict labor, was

prohibited and after that the prisoners were employed in manu-

facturing on state account. The bank was incorporated under the

National Bank Act of 1863. on the 31st day of December of that

year, and by its articles of association it was provided that it

should conjtinue until the 25th day of February, 1883 unless

sooner dissolved by the act of a majority of the stockholders

thereof. By the Act of Congress, passed July 12, 1882, (U. S.

The agent and \l\'arden wa by law the official manager of
the state prison at Auburn, and was r equested to deposit all moneys
credited by him each week to the credit of the treasurer of the state,
in a bank located at A.uburn, and send to the comptro ller weekly a
statement showing the amount so r eceived, and from whom or
where received and depo itecl, and the clays on which uch deposits wer e made, such tatement to be certified by th proper
officer o f the bank receiving uch de1 os its. The agent and vvarden wa required to verify by his affidavit that the sum so deposited was all the money r eceived. by him from whatever source
of prison income during th e week and up to the time of the
depo it, and all mon eys so depo ited by him were subj ect to the
quarterly drafts of th e treasm <:> r 0£ the stat . The law requir d
that any bank in which depo it should be made houlcl, before
receiving any such depo it, file a bond with the comptroller of
the state, ubject to hi approval. for such sum a he should deem
necessary.
§ 50, Chap. 460, Law of I8-+7, a amended
by Chap. 58, Laws of 1854, and Chap. 599, Laws of 1860. By
section 6 of Chapter 177 of the Law s of 1877, it was provided
that " The sy tern of labor in th e ~tate prison hall be by contract
or by th e tate or partly by one sy tern and partly by the other,
as hall in the di cretion of the superintend ent be deemed
be t. '' From th time of the execution of the bond until D ecem ber, 188..+, the husine s of tli e Auburn state pri on was carried
on und er what was known a~ the contract y tern. By chapter
21 of the Laws of that year, the renewal of the then existing contract , or the making of new contracts for convict labor , was
prohibited and after that th prisoners were employed in manufacturing on stat account. The bank was incorporated under the
National Bank ct of 1863, on the 31st day of D ecember of that
year, and by it article of association it was provided that it
should contim1e until the 25th day of February, 1883 unl ess
sooner di solved by the act of a majority of the stockholders
thereof. By th Act of Congre , passed July 12, 1882, (U. S.
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Stats, at Large, Vol. 22. p. 162,) National Banks were authorized

\ ;\

. L. RETYS II 11'.

to extend their corporate existence; and in January, 1883, such

proceedings were taken under that act as to extend the charter of

the hank and its corporate existence until the 24th day of Feb-

ruarv, 1903 By section 4 of that act it is provided thai "any

association so extending the period of its existence shall continue

to enjoy all the rights and privileges and immunities graiUed. and

shall continue to he subject to all the duties, liabilities and restric-

tions imposetl by the Revised Statutes of the United States, and

other acts having reference to national l)anking associations, and

it shall continue to be in all respects the identical association it was

before the extension of its ]x'riod of existence."

After the giving of the bond by the bank and the guaranty

by the defendants, the agent and warden of the prison made

deposits in the l)an1<. from time to lime, down to i'^ebruar}-, 1888,

on which dav there was upward of $65,000 on deposit in the bank,

which il refused and neglected to pay up(^n the draft of the State

'i'reasurer. it ha\ing become insolvent, and this action was brought

against the defendants, as sureties, to recover the amount remain-
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ing on deposit.

William F. Cogs7i'cll, for a])pellant.

Clhvics P. Tabor, attorney-general, for respondent.

Earli:, J. Xo citation of authorities is needed to show that

the contracts of sureties are to be construed like other contracts

' so as to give effect to the intention of the parties. In ascertain-

ing that intention we are to read the language used by the parties

in. the light of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the

instrument, and when we have thus ascertained their meaning

we are to give it effect. lUit when the meaning of the language

used has been thus ascertained, the responsiljility of the surety is

~t ab.

at Large, \ ol. 22 . p. 162 . ) \' a ti o nal l~ a n ks \\·e r · autho riz l
tu exte nd the ir co rpo ral' ex ist ' 11 ·c: a nd in J a nuar y , 1 c 1 3, u ·h
p r()cccding~ \\e re tak ·n un de r th a t act a ~ tu ·xt ' ncl th c ha rt r o f
t h· hank and it. co rpora l ' cx i!-. tc ncc until th e --tth clay [ F brn ar~. 1lJ03
I iy !:> C tio n . ~ oi th at ac t it is p rov ided tha t "any
assoc iat io n so ex tendin g th e pe ri od o f it s ·.· isl ·nee shall ·o ntinu c
lo e n joy al l th e rights a nd privil ge~ a nd immunili e. g ra ntee! , a nd
s hall co n ti nu e to he s uh je·t to a ll th e rluti ·s. lia hiliti . a ncl r tri ·tio n:-- im pos 'cl by th e I~ ' \'i se d .' tatut . o f th e L' nit cl ' ta t , and
o th er ac ts havin g rcfe ren ·, to natio nal ban k in g a oc iati o n . , and
it . ha ll co n t inu e to he in a ll r espc · ts th id ' 111 ica l a .. oc iati on it wa
befo re th e ex t n. io n o f it s period f ex i. t nee ."
. \itc r th e g-i \·in g o f th e bo nd by th ' ha nk ancl th e ~.;uaranty
by th ' cl cfe ncl a n ts. the age nt ancl \\'ard n of th e priso n mack
d epo s it -; in th · ha n k. fr om tirn c tn tim e, clo wn to F ehruar.\·, I
o n \\·li ic h cla~ th e re \\·a. u1rn·arcl o f
5,000 11 cl epo. it in th e bank,
\\hi -h it ref used a nd neg \ ct cl to pay up n th · draft o f th e tat
Trea:-- ure r, it ha \·ing becom e in so l\' ' Ill, ancl thi s a ctio n \\"a . b ro u o-ht
aga in . t th e cl cfe ncl a nt . . as s urcti c . . to re -o,·c r th ~ amo unt r main ing o n clepo. it.

not to be extended or enlarged by implication or construction,

and is strictissiini juris.

/f 'i/lia lll F . Cogs1.Lcll, fo r app ' llant.
1

After the contract system in t'u' stati' prisons was abolished,

and manufacturing therein could be done only on state account,

CIIarlC's F. Ta bor, a tto rn ey-ge nera l, fo r r ' sp o ncl ent.

the amount of money deposited in this bank by the agent and

warden largely increased, and it is now claimed on behalf of the

defendants that their responsibilitv as sureties was largely ex-

tended bevond what was coiit(.-mplatc<l at the time of the execu-

tion of their guaranty, and that they are therefore discharged.

l ~. \ l{Ll : , J.
:\o c itati o n o f auth o riti es i. neeclecl to . how that
th · contrac ts o f s ure ti es arc to h ' co ns tru ed lik o th r c ntra t
so a" to g i,·e e ffec t to th e int nti o n o f th e parti e . In a sc rtainin g th a t intentio n w e a rc to reacl th ' lang uag' u eel by th e parti
in t he li g ht of th · cir · um s ta nces s ur ro undin g th e ~ e uti o n o f th
in . trum ·n t , a nd wh en w e ha,·e tlrn . a ce rtain d th e ir m ea nin g" . ' a r · to g iv it ffcc t. lh1t \\'hen th m a11111 g f th lano·uat;
u ~ecl ha . h ·e n thu s :isc ' rtainecl , Lh r e pons il>ility o f th e ·urety i
no t to he ex t ' ncl ecl o r ·nla rgecl by impli ·ati o n r ·on ·tru tio n ,
an d i..., strictissillli j uris .
. \ ft cr th · contra · t sys t 111 in th e s t<l le pri so ns was aho li h cl,
an d m a n ufac turin g· th e re in c ulcl he d o n o nly o n tat ' acco unt,
th e a m ount nf m o ney dq os it •cl in thi s bank by th e a;::, nt an 1
\\a rd ' n larg Iv in r ased, a nd it is 11 \Y !aim cl o n I half o f th
d ef ' 1Hl a 11 b th at th ir r ·s pon sibilit.\· a · s ur ti
wa Jar ly x te ndcd he) o nd " hat \\' f1S - nt mpl a tecl a t th e tim
f th e · cut io n of the ir g uaranty . a n cl that th y a r th r 'fo r ck harg cl .
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By the statutes in force at the time of the execution of the

bond and guaranty, the agent and warden of the prison was re-

quired to deposit all the moneys received by him from any source

in the bank. It is not reasonable to suppose that the sureties,

when they signed their guaranty, had in mind the particular source

from which the agent and warden received the money. They

must have known that they became responsible for all the moneys,

from whatever source, coming into his hands to be deposited. It

cannot l)e supposed that they had in mind that the system of lalior

then in force at tlie prison would remain unchanged for an indefi-

nite time, or that they cared anything about it. Much stress is laid

upon the words in the bond, "certain moneys," which had been

and ^^•ere proposed to be deposited. We think those words have

reference to the moneys to be deposited by the agent and warden

of the prison, as distinguished from other moneys of the state.

They were intended to point out the source from which the moneys

of the state to be deposited should come; and the words "such

deposits," used later in the bond, have reference to the deposits

to be made by the agent and warden of the prison. So, the bond,
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in the most general terms, covers and applies to all the money

to be deposited in the bank, under the direction of the comptroller

of the state, by the agent and warden of the prison. The words

"certain moneys" and "such deposits" do not indicate that the

parties then had in mind the source from which the agent and

warden should receive his money, or the particular moneys which

he had theretofore deposited. But they manifestly have reference

to all the moneys wdiich, under the direction of the Comptroller,

he might deposit in the bank. The bank desired to get all the

deposits it could, and the defendants, who were directors and

ofificers of the bank, desired to secure all the deposits. It cannot

be supposed that they contemplated, at the time they signed their

guaranty, that their lial)ility was to be limited or restricted to

the amounts which had been previously deposited, or that those

amounts had any influence whatever upon their action. They

must therefore be held to the plain language of their guaranty,

and in holding that it covers moneys deposited subsequently to

1884. we do not extend their responsibility by implication or

construction, but simply hold them to the responsibility plainly

expressed in the language of the bond and the guaranty.

It is still further claimed, on the part of the defendants, that

they are discharged from any liability on their guaranty on

Dy th e statut e in force at the time of the execution of the
bond and guaranty. the agent and warden f th e prison was required to depo it all th e moneys received by him from any sourc
uppose that the ureti e ,
in the bank. It i not reasonable t
when th ey ignecl th eir guara nty, had in mind the particular so urce
from which the agent and warden received th e money. They
mu t have known that th ey becam e responsible for all the moneys,
from whatever ource, coming into hi ban l to be depo ited. It
cannot be uppo eel that th ey had in mind that the system of labor
then in force at th e pri on would remain unchanged fo r an indefinite tim e, or that th ey cared anythino- about it. Much stress is laid
upon th e word in the bond, " certain moneys," which ha cl been
and were propo eel to be rl e p o~ it e 1. vVe think those words have
reference to the rnon ys to be deposited by the agent and .ward en
of the pri on, as distingui heel from other moneys of the state.
Th y were intended to point out the source from which the money
of th e tate to be depos ited hould com e : an l th e words " uch
deposits," used later in the bond , have r efe rence to th e deposits
to 1 e made by the agent an d \Yarden of the pri on. So, th e bond ,
in th e m o t g eneral term . covers and applie to all th e money
to be clepo ited in th e bank, uucler th e din=-ction of th e comptrn ller
of th · state, by the agent and warrl ell of the pri on. ThE; word
"certain moneys" and " such d ep o~ it " do not indicate that the
parties thtn had in mind th e source from which the agent a nd
warden should receive hi m oney, or th e particular moneys wl1ich
he had th eretofor deposited . But they manifestly have referen ce
to all the moneys which, under the direction { the omptroller ,
he might depo it in the bank. The bank desired to get all the
deposi ts it could, and the defendants. who w ere directors a nd
officer of the bank. desired to secure all the depos it . It cannot
be upposed that they contemplated, at the time they signed their
guaranty, that th eir liability wa to be limited or restricted to
th e amount which had be n previously deposited, or that th o e
amount had any influence what ver upon their action. They
must th refo re be held to the plain language of theii: o·uaranty,
an 1 in holding that it covers money deposited subsequently to
1884. w e do not extend their r espon ibility by implication or
construction, but imply bold them to the respon ibility plainly
expre sed in th e language of the bond and the guaranty.
It i still further claimed, on the part of the defendants, that
they are di charged from any liability on th eir guaranty on
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account of the extension of the existence of the corporation in

1883, hefore any default on the part of the bank, and for this

contention the learned counsel for the defendants cites Thompson

V. Young, 2 Ohio, 334; Union Bank v. Ridgcley, i H. & G. 324;

Bank of IVasliington v. Barringlon, 2 Pa. 27; Brown v. Latimore,

17 Cal. 93. None of those cases are precisely like this in their

ac ·otml f th ' xt n ion £ th
xi t ' ncc of the c rp ration in
I
3, be£ r any d fau lt n th part f th 1 a nk, and f r this
contcnti n th 1 arn cl coun 1 f r th cl fencla nt cit Tlzolllpson
v. 1·ow icr, hio, 334 · Union Banll v. Rid O'Cle-y, r II.
324;
Banll of H aslzington v . BarriH afon, 2 I a. 27; Brown v. Latimore,
17 'al. 3. .1\ on
f tho
a e art.: preci ly lik thi in th ir
circum tan e , but o far a th ey uph lcl th cont ntion of the
clef ndant we ar quit unwilling to foll w th m. Th contrary
do trin wa h Id in Exeter Ba11ll v . Rogers, 7
. H. 21; and
we think our cl ci i n in National Ba1tll of Pou O'hfleepsie v. Phelps,
97 X . Y. 44, i ample authority for the maintenance of this rec ver y n twith tancling exten ion of the corporate ex i tence of
th bank. In th latt r ca e, und r th provi ion
f the ational
Bankin<Y Act anJ f hapter 7 f the Law
f I 65, the tate
bank wa tran f rm I into a nati onal bank , and it wa h Id t be
but a continuanc f the ame body und r a changed juri dicti n;
thci.t h tw en it an l tho who had contract d with it, it retain d
it identity and mi <Yht, a a national bank, en fo rce contract made
with it a a tat bank ; that whe r a state bank, at th time of its
chang to a national bank, h Id a continuing 0 ·uara11ty f 1 ans
made by it upon the tr ngth of which it ha 1 made 1 an , and
after th change had mad e furth er aclvanc , an acti n wa maintainabl by th nati nal bank upon the g uaranty, and that the auarant r wa liable f r the loan mad , b th b fore and after the
change. 1 Icre a n w corpora ti n was not formed; but there ' a
a m r prol ngation f the ex i tence of the am corporati n
wb e
rporat i l ntity was not hang cl or lo t. The 1 ank
\Yhich d faulte l wa th e sam bank f r w hich the cl fendant becam bound. Ther were not two ba1-1k in ucce ion, but all
th time on bank. J t chart r wa amended so as t extend its
xi · t n ; a nd in th
rigi nal nati nal banking act ( 67 ),
it wa pr vicl ecl that ong re coul 1, at a ny tim , "am n I, a lt r
r r epeal thi act." It would c rtainly I a v ry inconvenient
rul to h ld that a ll the
ntra t of ureti to th 1 ank, and of
ur ' lie by th 1 ank t
th cr p r n
h ulcl be de tr y l by
v ry mat rial ·ban
or alt rat ion in it charter. Th
ontract
wa
nt reel into by th
ur ti
with knov 1 d<Y
f thi law , and
it b cam a part f th ir
ntract a if th y had stir ul at d that
th chan<Yc o r alt ration mi ht be mad . Tb act f r 2 was a
m -re am 11 lm nt r alt rati 11 f th previ u 1 anking act.
T

circumstances, but so far as they uphold the contention of the

defendants we are quite unwilling; to follow them. The contrary

doctrine was held in Exeter Bank v. Rogers, 7 N. H. 21 ; and

we think our decision in Ahitional Bank of Fonghkeepsie v. Phelps,

97 \. V. 44, is ample authority for the maintenance of this re-

covery, notwithstanding extension of the corporate existence of

the bank. ]n the latter case, under the provisions of the National

Banking Act and of chapter 97 of the Laws of 1865, the state

bank was transformed into a national bank, and it was held to be

but a continuance of the same body under a changed jurisdiction;

tha.t between it and those who had contracted with it, it retained

its identity and might, as a national bank, enforce contracts made

with it as a state bank ; that wdiere a state bank, at the time of its
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change to a national bank, held a continuing guaranty of loans

made by it upon the strength of wdiich it had made loans, and

after the change had made further advances, an action was main-

tainable by the national bank upon the guaranty, and that the guar-

antor was liable for the loans made, both before and after the

change. Here a new corporation was not formed ; but there was

a -mere prolongation of the existence of the same corporation

whose corporate identity was not changed or lost. The bank

which defaulted was the same bank for w'hich the defendants be-

came bound. There were not two banks in succession, but all

the time one bank. Its charter was amended so as to extend its

existence; and in the original national banking act (§ 67),

it was provided that Congress could, at any time, "amend, alter

or repeal this act." Tt would certainly be a very inconvenient

rule to hold that all the contracts of sureties to the bank, and of

sureties by the bank, to other persons should be destroyed by

every material change or alteration in its charter. The contract

was entered into by the sureties with knowledge of this law, and

it became a ])art of their contract as if they had stipulated that

the changes or alterations might be made. The act of 1882 was a

mere amendment or alteration of the previous banking act.

•
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We do not deem it important to consider the effect that should

be given to the fact that these various defendants, as officers of

the bank, procured the extension of its existence, of which they

now seek to take advantage.

For the reasons we have already given, and those so well

expressed in the opinion of the learned referee before whom the

case w^as tried, we think the' judgment should be affirmed, with

costs.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Starr et al. vs. Milltkin (1899),

180 111.458; 54 N. E. 328.

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;—

heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon

Vv e do not deem it important to consider the effect that shou ld
be given to the fact that the e various defendants, as officers of
the bank, procured the extension of its existence, of which they
now seek to tak advantage.
For the reasons we have already given, and those so well
expressed in th e opinion of th e learned referee before whom the
case was tried, we think the judgment should be affirmed, with
costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.

county; the Hon. Edward P. Vail, J., presiding.

LeForgcc & Lcc, and Mills Bros., for appellants.

/. A. Buckingham and Hugh Crca, for appellee.
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Mr. Justice Phillips delivered the opinion of the court :

Suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Macon county by

William H. Starr and Isaac R. Mills, for the use of William H.

STARR ET A L .

vs.

MILLIKIN (

1899) '

Starr, against James Millikin, upon the following contract:

"Whereas, Murray G. Millikin has purchased of Starr & Mills lot

180 Ill. 458; 54 N. E. 328.

sixteen (16) and fifteen feet ofif of the east side of lot fifteen (15), in

block three (3), in Starr' & Mills' addition to the city of Decatur, for

the sum of $800; and whereas, the said Murray G. Millikin has given to

the said Starr & Mills his certain promissory notes to secure the payment

of said consideration, together with a mortgage upon said premises; and

whereas, the said Murray G. Millikin is a minor under the age of twenty-

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District ; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon
county; th e Hon . Em,V ARD P. VAIL, J., presiding.

one years but is desirous of having the deed to said lots so purchased

made to him :

L eForgee & L ee, and J,1i!ls Bros. , for appellants.

"Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises and in considera-

tion of the making of the deed direct to the said Murray G. Millikin, I,

James Millikin, do hereby guarantee that the said Murray G. Millikin

will ratify said purchase and the giving of said notes upon his arrival at

I. A. Buclcillgham and Hitgh Crea, for appellee.
Mr. J USTICE PHILLIP del ivered the opinion of the court:
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Macon county by
William H. Starr and T. aac R. M ill ) for the use of William H .
Starr, again t James M illikin, upon the f Ilowing contract:
"Whe reas, Murray G. M illikin has purchased of Starr & M ill s lot
sixteen ( 16) and fifteen f,eet off of the east side of lot fift een ( 15 ), in
block three (3), in Starr & Mi ll s' addition to the city of Decatur, for
the sum of $800; a nd whereas, the said M urray G. Mi llikin has given to
the said Starr & M ills hi s certain promi sory notes to secu re the pay ment
of sa id cons id erat ion, together with a mortgage upon said premises; and
whereas, the said Murray G. Millikin is a minor und er th e age of twentyonc yea rs but is de irou s of hav ing the deed to said lots so purchased
made to him :
"Now, t herefo re, in considerati on of the premises and in consideration of the making of the deed direct to the said M urray G. M illikin, I ,
Jam e Millikin, do her eby g uarantee that th e said Murray G. Millikin
will rat ify sa id purchase and the g ivi ng of sa id note upon hi arrival at
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the age of lULiuy-onc years, in such maiiiKT as will iiiak.,- him personally

liable on said notes so given for said purchase money, and in the event

that said Murray G. Millikin sliali repudiate or refuse to pay said notes

I hereby agree to pay the same to the said Starr & Mills, or their assigns.

"Dated at Decatur, Illinois, this jOih day of June, A. 1). 1893.

James Mii.i.ikin."

A verdict was re'tiinird in tlic trial c<>un ai,'-aiiisl appellee for

thl agt: 11f l \\T11ty-011t: } t:ar..;, in ..,uch manner a" will makt: him p r . a nally
lial•k o n ..;;ucl nntL'" ..;o gl\ Lil ior "aid purch :i...t: mont:y. and in th' vent
tha t ..;aid :-lurray ;_ :-tillikin ... hall repudiate o r r · fu ~ · to pay aid n l e
l hereby agre · to pay the :-.ame to tht: -,aid • tarr - '.lill..,, or their a..,-;ig-ns.
"Datl'd at Decatur, Illinois, thi.., 26th clay of Jun e, .\ . D. I 93.

$1076.88. Jtulgnient was rendered on this verdict, l)ut on appeal

].\M ES ;_flLLlKl ' ."

to the Ai)pellate Cotirt for the Third District tlie jiidi^-ment was

reversed witliout remanding, the A]i])ellate Court at the same time

making a finding of facts to be recited in its final order.

The Appellate Court found from 'Aw evidence in the case that

James Millikin undertook, in the contract above mentioned, to pay

the sum of money therein mentioued upon condition, only, that

}ilurray (i. Millikin, a minor, upon his arrival at the age of twcntv-

one years, would fail to ratify the notes in controversy in such

manner as would make him personally liable, or if the minor should

repudiate or refuse to pay the notes on account of their having been

executed during his minority. This finding of facts was the re-
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sult of the legal construction given the contract by the Appellate

Court. That court also found as a fact arising out of the evidence,

that u])on his arrival at the age of majority Murray G. Millikin did

ratif\ the notes made by him, thus making himself personally

liable, and that he did not repudiate or refuse to ])ay theiu on ac-

count of their having been executed during his minority. As this

record is presented to us, therefore, only one question is involved.

This is conceded by cotmsel for appellants, as they say that the

construction to be ])laced ui)on this contract is the only real ques-

tion involved in the litigation in this court, and that this question,

when determined, ends the controversy.

The finding ])y the Appellate Cottrt as to the legal construction

to be given tlus contract is not such a finding of fact is is binding

upon this court. The construction to be given a contract is one

of law, rather than of fact. However, that is not material in this

case, as we in nowise dift'er from the A])pellate Court as to the

legal construction to be given the contract. Starr & Mills were

conveying some property to Muri-ay (i. Millikin, a minor. h>om

the fact that upon his arrival at his majority he would have the

right, in law, to repudiate the notes or refuse paymeiU on account

of their having been executed during his minority, this separate

coiUract was exectited to guarantee tliere should be no such re-

. \ n~ n li ct \\a-, r turned in th e trial court against app ' li e for
Juclg m ent wa~ r ncl ·red n tlii vcrcli · t, but n ar p al
to th' . \pp !lat ' 'o urt f r the Third l i tri ·t th ' j udgm nt wa
r ' \'Crseci withou t remanding, th .i: \pp !lat ' · urt at th
am ~ tim
makino- a finding CJf fa ·ts to be r, ited in it. fin a l o re\ ' r.
Th . \pp !late u urt £1 urn I from the ' \·icl n · in th ca
that
James ~I iliikm undertook, in th contract ab v' m e nti on d t pay
th · sum o f m o ney th c r ·in m nti0ned upo n
nditi n, on ly, that
~l urray ( ;_ ~fillikin , a min o r , upo n hi s arriYal at th e acre of tw ntyOllC.' years, \\' •u lcl iail to rnti fy the n ot · in
ntr v r y in uch
manner a . \\·o uld m a ke 11im pe rso nally !iahle , or if th ' min o r ho uld
r ep11diate o r rcfos ' to pay th ' no te. n acco unt of their having 1 n
cxern t ·cl c!urin; hi s mino rity . Thi s findino- o f fa ·t wa th r ult of the lega l 011 tru ·ti o n g iv ·n th e contract by th . . \1 p llat
'o urt. Tha t co urt al ·o fo und 'l S a fa ·t ari in o- ul of th
Yid nc ,
that upon hi arriY2l at the· age o f maj rity ~Iurray G. Millikin did
ratify th' no tes mad e by him, tlrn . maJ..:: i1w him lf per nally
liahl<' . a nd that he di ' l n m r puclicitr o r rdu c to pay th 111 n a -o unt f th ir having be n 'Xe utcd !ming hi s min r ity.
thi
r ec rd is pr
ntecl to tL. th e refo r e, o nly o n quc Lio n i itw lv d.
T hi is c need <I hy coun. el for appellant., as th ey say that th
con stru cti un t h pla ce<..~ up n thi . - ntract i th
nly r al JU tion involv cl in the liti ga ti o n in thi . · urt, and that thi qu ti n,
wh n cl t rmin cl. ncL th c ntrov r y.
'Th ' fi.ncling by the . \ppellatc
urt <:~ t th legal
n tru ti n
t he g i\' n tbi on tra t i not n h a fi.n ling f fa t i i bindinrr
upon this court. The co n. tru cti ( n t he giv n a o ntract i
ne
of law, ra th er than f fa t. ll ow ve r, that i n t mat rial in thi
ca , as w in nO\\·i. cliffrr from th e . \pp lbt
urt a t th
1 gal con stru cti in t
giv n th e co ntra t. Starr
Iill
o nv y in g- . 111 proJ.• rty t :\ f urray C. >.Iillikin, a min o r. I• r m
the fact that upr) n hi. arrival at hi maj rity h \\' ul 1 hav the
r ig-ht. in law. to rqmcliat th n t . or rcfu ~ paym nt n a
unt
of t1 ·ir haYin g- he n ' X 'etit cl during hi min rity, thi
parate
cont ract was C'\. .'c1 1t 'cl to gnarant . fJ1 r ·h ul l 1 no uch r 107 .t\).

T
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fusal or repudiation. The entire controversy occurs over the last

clause of tlie Contract, wh.ich reads: "In the event that said Murray

G. Millikin shall repudiate or refuse to pay said notes I hereby

agree to pay the same to said Starr & Mills, or their assigns." This

clause, however, when taken in connection with all the circum-

stances of the case and the recitals in the contract preceding this

clause, to the elTect that Murray G. Millikin was a minor under

the age 'of twenty-one years and that he was desirous of having

the deeds to the lots made to him, and that appellee guaranteed

Murray G. Millikin would ratify such purchase and the giving of

said notes uix)n his arrival at the age of rwenty-one years, tends to

establish, without question, that the only purpose of the execution

of this contract was that the notes should not be repudiated or pay-

ment refused on account of the age of the maker. It is evident

that there was no intention on the part of James Millikin to per-

sonally guarantee the payment of this indebtedness. The parties

connected with the transaction were all business men. — one a

banker, another a lawyer, — and if the intention had been to per-

sonally guarantee this indebtedness such guaranty would have
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been on the back of the note, or as a joint maker, or in some other

manner much less cumbersome than as shown by this record.

The construction given this contract by the Appellate Court

was the correct one, and the judgment of that court will be

affirmed.

Judgment affinned.

Davis z'.?. Patrick (1891).

141 U. S. 479; L. Ed'n, Bk. 35 826.

The case w^as stated by the court as follows :

This case was commenced on the 24th day of November,.

1880. by the filing of a petition in the District Court of Knox

county, Nebraska. Subsequently it w'as removed to the Circuit

Court of the United States, and at the May term, 1883. of that

court a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. That

judgment was reversed by this court, at its October term, 1886.

Davis V. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138. A second trial in January, 1890,

fu . al or re1 udiation. The mire cont-rover y occur over th e la t
clau e of the ontract, which reads: "ln the event that aid 1urray
G. Millikin shall repudiate or refu e to pay aid notes I hereby
agr e to pay the ame to aid Starr & Mi ll , or their assign ." Thi
clause , however, when taken in conn cti n with all th e circumtance of the ca e and the recitals in the contract preceding this.
clause, to the effect that Iurray G. :'.\l( illikin wa a minor un der
the ao-e ·of twenty-one years and that he wa desirou s of having
the deeds to the lots made to him, and th at appellee g ua rante cl
Murray T. Millikin would ratify such p .Jrchase and the g iving of
said notes upon hi s arrival at the age '.)f twenty-one years, tends to
establish, w ithout question, that the only purpo e of the execution
of thi contract was that the note hould not be repudiated or payment refu sed on account of the age of the maker. It is evident
that thc:- re wa no intenti on 0 11 th e part of JJ.mes M illikin to peronally g uarantee the payment of this indebtedne s. The parties
connected with the tran action were all business men.-on e a
banker, anoth r a lawyer,-and if the intention had be n to personally guarantee this indebtedness such guaranty wo uld have
been on the back of the note, or as a joint ma ker, or in orne other
manner much less cumbersome than as show n by this r cord.
The \:Onstructi on given this contract by the Appellate Court
was the correct one, and th e judgment of that court will be
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
1

resulted in another verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and

D AVIS

vs.

PATRICK

( 1891).

141 U . S. 479; L. Ed'n, Bk. 35 826.
The ca wa tated by the court a fo llow :
This cas wa comm need on the 24th clay of Iovember,.
1880, by the filing of a petition in the Di trict Co urt of Knox
county, Nebraska. Sub equently it was removed to the Circuit
ourt of the nited States, and at the May term , 1883. of that
court a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. That
judgment wa reversed by this ccurt, at it October term, 1886.
Davis v. Patric!?, 122 U . . T38. A second tria l in January, 1890,
re ulted in anoth er verdict and judgment for th e plaintiff, and_
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again the defendant alleges error. The petition counts on two

causes of action. No question is made by counsel for plaintiff in

error with respect to the first count or the rulings thereon — the

only error alleged being in reference to the second count. That

count is for the transportation of silver ore from the Flagstaff

mine, in Utah Territory, to furnaces at Sand} , in the same Terri-

tor}-. In the first trial it was claimed that Davis, the defendant,

was the real owner of the Flagstaff mine, and therefore primarily

responsible for all debts contracted in its w^orking. The relations

between Davis and the Flagstaff Mining Company were disclosed

by a written agreement, of date December i6, 1873. By that

agreement it appeared that Davis, on June 12, 1873, had advanced

to the Company £5,000. at the rate of 6% interest, a sum then

due; that it had sold to Davis and agreed to deliver at the ore-

house of the Company, free of cost, 5,195 tons of ore, of which it

had only then delivered 200 tons, although Davis had paid in

full for the entire amount. The agreement also recited that Davis

was to advance an additional amount, if needed, not exceeding

i 10,000. It then provided that the mine should be put under
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the sole management of J. N. H. Patrick, to be worked and con-

trolled by him until such time as the ore sold had been delivered

and the sums borrowed had been repaid, with interest. This

control was irrevocable, save at the instance of Davis. Coupled

wath this agreement was a full power of attorney to Patrick.

This court held that such contract established between Davis and

the Mining Company simply the relation of creditor and debtor,

and did not make him in an) trite sense the owner. For the

erroneous rulings of the trial court in this res])ect, the judgment

was reversed, in the second trial, this construction of the rela-

tions of Davis to the Flagstaff Mining Company was followed by

the court, and die jury instructed that the contract put in evidence

between Davis and the Mining Company created simply the rela-

tions of creditor and (lel)tor, and did not make the former liable

for expenses created in working and operating the mine; and the

trial proceeded upon the theory that during the time the services

sued for were being rendered. Davis was the party mainly and

pecuniarily interested in the workings of the mine, and that he

assumed to Patrick a personal resixinsibility for such services;

and the real question tried was whether Davis' ])romises were col-

lateral undertakings to pay the debts of another, and void because

not in writing.

a am th d f ndant all o-e
rr r. ] h pelili n count
n two
cau e of action. No qu tion i ma 1 1 y c un l for plaintiff in
error with re p ct to th fir t ount r th rulini:. th r n-the
on ly error all o- d b ing in r fcrenc t lh
nd c unt. That
count i for the tran p rtation of ilv r re from the Fla taff
min , in L' lah T rrit ry, t furnac at ·andy, in th ame T rrit ry. ln th fir t trial it wa claimed that Davi , th def ndant,
wa the r al own r f th Flao· taff min . and th r f r primarily
re pon ibl fo r all lebt
ntracted in it workino-. The r lation
betw en Davi an 1 the Fla · taff 1 :Iining ' mpany were di lo ed
y that
by a written agreement, of late D ecember 16, r 73.
agr m nt it app ar 1 that Davis, on Jun 12 r 73, had advanced
t th
ompany £5,0 o, rt.t th e rate of G% inter t, a um then
due; that it had
ld to Davi and agreed to d liv r at the rehou
f the
mpany, fr e of co t, 5, 195 ton of ore, of which it
had nly then deliv r d 200 t n , alth LWh Davi had paid in
full f r th entire amount. The agr ment al o recited that Davis
wa to advanc an additional amount, if ne cl I, not xceeding
£10, oo.
It th n provicl I that th mine sh ul l be put und r
the ole management of J. . H. Patrick, to be worked and controll cl by him until uch time as th or old had been delivered
and the urns borr wed had been repaid, ' ith inter t. Thi
control was irrevocable, ave at the in tance f Davi .
oupl d
with tbi agre ment was a full pow r of attorn y to atrick.
Thi court held that uch contract tabli hed b tw n Davi and
the ::\Iinino- 'ompany imply th e r elati n of credit r and l I t r,
and clid not rnak him in any tru sen e th own r. For the
erron ou ruling f lhe trial court in thi r p ct, th e judo111ent
wa r ever ed. ln th
c ncl trial, thi con lructio11 of th relati011 of Davi t the Flag ·taff -:.\:Iining- 'ompany wa followed by
the c urt, and th jury in tru tccl that th e ontract put in vid nee
bet\\' en Davi ancl the J' 1ininh· om [ any creat 1 imply th r lation of er clit r an l debt r, ancl clicl n t mak th f rm r liable
f r ex1 en e creat l in w rkin ....; ancl p rating th min ; an l the
trial pr
1 cl upon th th ry that durin o- th tim th
rvic
u ·cl fo r w r b ing r n l r 1, Davi wa th party mainly and
pe nniaril y int r t cl in th \\' rking
f th min , an l that he
rv1
a . um ·cl l l atri k a p r nal r p n il ility f r u h
ancl the real 1u ti n tri l wa wh th r avi ' pr mi
w r collateral und rtakin · t pay th cl lit f an lh er. an 1 v icl 1 cau e
not in writin ·.

D,\ \ 'IS \' . P .\TRI K .
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(In the opinion of the court, post, 485-487, some of the

material evidence at the last trial is set forth.)

Mr. J. M. Wookvorth, for plaintiff in error.

(In the op1111on of the court, post, 4 5- 4 7,
material evidence at the la t trial i et forth.)

ome of the

Mr. John L. IVebster, for defendant in error. Mr. Nathaniel

Wilson was with him on the brief.

l\Ir. J. 11!. TV ool7.1)orth, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice Brewer, after stating the case, delivered the

opinion of the court :

That Davis was interested in having the ore transported

to the furnaces is clear. He was interested in two respects : First,

Jir. John L. TVebster, for defendant in error.
1/V ilson wa with him on the brief.

Jir. N athanitl

as to the 4,995 tons to be delivered to him at the ore-house, it

being his property when thus 'delivered, any subsequent handling

was solely for his benefit ; and in respect to the balance, as the

1\lr. Ju tice BREWER, after
opinion of the court:

ta ting the ca e, deliYered the

transportation was one step in the process of converting the

product of the mine into money, it would help to pay the debt of

the Company to him. Davis, therefore, was so pecuniarily inter-

ested in, and so much to be benefited by, the prompt and success-

ful transportation of the ore, that any contract which he might

enter into in reference to it, was supported by abundant considera-

tion. We proceed, therefore, to inquire what he said and did.
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After the execution of the papers, the newdy appointed manager

took possession of the mine ; and in the fore part of 1874 the

plaintiff commenced the transportation of the ore under contract

with the agent of the manager. The business was carried on in

the name of the Mining Company. The plaintiff understood that

Davis was interested in the matter, though not informed as to

the extent of the interest, or the terms of the agreement beween

him and the Mining Company. In the fall of 1874 Davis came

to Utah to examine the property. He was introduced by the

manager to the foreman of plaintiff, in the latter's presence,

as the boss of the mine, to which Davis assented. After this,

plaintiff, who had not received his pay in full for the services

already rendered, had an account made up showing the balance

due him, and presented it to Davis. His testimony as to the

conversation which followed is in these words: 'T showed it to

Mr. Davis and told him I was not getting my money, and Mr.

Davis said mv account was all right and he would be personally

responsible to me for the money, and for me to go on as I had been

doing and draw as little money as I could get along with to pay the

men and the running expenses, and he would see that I got every

That Davis wa intere ted in having the ore tran ported
to the furnace is clea r. He was interested in two r espect : First,
as to the 4,995 ton to be delivered to him at the ore- house, it
being hi property when thu C:lelivered, any ubsequ ent handling
wa olely for hi benefit; and in respect to the balance, a the
tran portation \Ya one tep in the proce s of converting the
product of the mine into m oney, it would help to pay the debt of
th
ompany to him. Davi , therefor , \Yas so pecuniarily intere ted in, and o much to be benefited by, th e prompt and succes fol transportation of the ore, that any contract which he might
enter into in reference to it, \Va npported by abundant con ideration. VI/ e proceed, therefo re, to ·inquire what he aid and did.
After the execution of the paper. , the newly appointed manager
took po e ion of the mine; and in the fore part of 1874 the:
plaintiff commenced the tran portation of the ore under contract
with the agent of the manager. The busine s wa carried on in
the name of the Mining ompany. The plaintiff understood that
Davi wa intere ted in the matter, though not informed as to
the extent of the interest, or the terms of the agreement beween
him and the Mining Company. In the fall of 1874 Davis came
t.o Utah to examine the property. He wa introduced by the
manager to the foreman of plaintiff, in the latter' pre ence,
as the bos of the mine, to which Davis as ented. ~ fter thi ,
plaintiff, who had not received his pay in full for the service
already rendered, had an account made up showing the balance
due him, and pre ented it to Davis. Hi testimony as to the
conversation which followed i in the e word : "I hO\Yed it to
~fr . Davis and told h im I was not gettincr my mon y, and Mr.
Davis aid my account wa all right and he would b p rsonally
1:e pon ible to me for the m oney, and for me to rro on a I had been
doing and dra\Y a little money as I could get along with to pay the
m n 3.nd the runnincr expen es, and he would e that I g·ot every
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dollar of my money." The plaintiff's cashier, who was present at

this conversation, j^ives this as his recollection of the ctMiversa-

tion :

"O. In that conversation state what ]\lr. Davis said about

being responsible to A. S. Patrick for that account.

cl li ar of 1m· mon y.
The plain ti ff' c:L hi r, who wa pr ent at
thi · ·om·c r ·ati n , ;:-,1\'e · thi a h1 r - li e ti n f th con r ati 11:

"A. He stated to Mr. Patrick in my presence that he would

personall}- be responsil)le for that account. He says, 'You know,.

AL, I practically (i\' n ihi> nnni', Init money is scarce and we must

get what you can out of the mine." He says we are making large

expenditures for improvements, and he says you shall have all

the money you want to pay your men and expenses, but you

must wait for the balance, and I will see that you are paid.

"O. What did he say in that connection to A. S. Patrick

about continuing on in the hauling of the ores?

"A. He requested him to continue in llu' hauling of the

ores. He requested him to do it.

"O. In res]:)onse to Mr. Davis t(T that request what did Mr.

I'atrick say?

"A. He said to Mr. Davis, if he would guarantee him to be

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

paid he would continue to work, and Davis said he would see him

paid."

After this, the ])laintiff continued the work of transportation

until the fall of 1875, receiving such payments from time to time

as to extinguish the amount due him at the date of this conversa-

tion, and leaving a balance more than covered by the work done

in 1875, and it is only for work done after these promises that

this recovery was had and in respect to which the questions pre-

sented and discussed arise. The jilaintiff testified to another con-

versation, in September, 1876, in the city of New York. His

account of that conversation is given in these words: "Plaintiff

"Q.

that com·cr ation ·tate what 1lr. Davi s aid ab ut
h ing r '' l n ·ibl ' t \. S. Patrick f r that a
unt.
.. . \. ll e tat d to ::\lr. Patrick in my Ir
n - that b woul l
personally b ., r cs pon. ibl c fo r that account. H
ay , ·y u kn \ ,
Al., I pra ti cal ly O\" ll thi s mine', but m on ')' i care ancl \\' mu t
er t what you ca n out o f th
min e. ' Il e ay w e arc making lar e
exp n litur
for improvem ent , an 1 h e say you hall have all
the m o n y you want to pay your 111 n and expen e , but y u
mu t wait f r th 1 alancc, ancl l \\) ll
e that y u are paid.
"Q. \\'h at did h ay in that connecti n t ~ \. ' . Patrick
ab ut continuing o n in tbe hauling of the ore ?
"A. H reque ted him t continu ' in th haulincr f the
ore . lle rcqu ted him to do it.
"Q. In r ·po n c t 1\lr. Davi t that reque t what lid Mr.
Patrick ay?
H e a id t :\ [r. Davi , if he w o uld uarant
him to be
paid he w ulcl cont inu e to work, a nd Davi aid h w o uld
him
paid."
1n

told Davis that his brother and himself were hard up for money,

and wanted to know if Davis would not give them some money on

the 'b^lagstaff' account, for hauling the ores. Plaintiff had his

account with him and showed it to Davis. Davis said the whole

of the account was all right, and he ])roi)osed to pay the account,

and said he would pay the plaintiff. Plaintiff" said to Davis that

if he would give him some money on the account it would help

him out. Davis said he had some securities in London which he

was going to sell, and would have some money in a few days

and wouUl give plaintiff $5,000 on the account. Plaintiff said

. fter thi , th e plaintiff continu <l the work f tran p rtati on
until th fa ll f r 75, r c iving such payment fr om time to time
a to extingu i h tb' am unt due him at th clat
f thi conv r atio n, an I I aving a balanc m re than c verecl by the \\ ork done
in 1875, ancl it i only fo r wo rk don aft r the e pr mi e that
thi r ecove ry wa had and in re 1 ct to which the qu ti n pr cl ari s . The plaintiff t tifi d t anoth r conent cl and di cu
v r ation, in ' pt mber, J 7 , in the city of
\\' Y rk. His
a count f that onver ati n i given in th
wor I : "Plaintiff
t lcl l av i ~ that hi . br ther and him If w r hard up f r m 11 y,
and want ' cl t kn \\' if Davi · w 11lc1 not g·iv e th m
m m ney n
th 'Flag taff' a c unt, £ r haulin o- th
r . Plaintiff ha 1 hi
ac o unt " ·ith him and how cl it t
av is. Davi
aid th wh I
of th a
unt wa all rig ht, a n 1 h pr p c 1 t pay th account,
an l . aid h e w ulcl I ay th plaintiff. Plaintiff ai I to Davi that
if h \\' ulcl giv him
m m n y n th rt c unt it w ul l h lp
him ut. 1 aYi . aid h had , m
in Lone! n which h e
II , ancl would hav
rn m n y in a f w day
\\·a g in:--: to
a nd woulcl g iv<"' pl a intiff .' 5, oo n th acco unt. Plaintiff aid
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if the money was going to be there in a few days he would wait

for it, but Davis said, 'Xo; you go home and 1 wiU pledge you

my word that I will telegraph the money to you to the First

National Bank by the first of October.' "'

And, again, he testified to an interview in 1877 with Davis, in

the city of Omaha, in the presence of other parties, in which he

said : "Davis, you promised all along to pay me that money," and

Davis replied, "I believe I did."

This testimony of plamtiff as to conversations with defend-

ant is corroborated by other witnesses and contradicted by none.

It must therefore be accepted as presented the facts upon which

this case must be determined. Were these promises binding upon

Davis, or of no avail to the plaintiff because not in writing?

Were it not for the Statute of Frauds there would be no question,

for obviously there was both promise and consideration. Defend-

ant relies upon that provision of the Statute of Frauds which for-

bids the maintenance of an action "to charge the defendant upon

any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage

of another person, unless the agreement upon which such action
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shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall l^e

in writing," etc. The purpose of this provision was not to effect-

uate, but to prevent, wrong. It does not apply to promises m

respect to debts created at the instance and for the benefit of

the promisor, but only to those by which the debt of one party is

sought to be charged upon and collected from another. The rea-

son of the statute is obvious, for in the one case if there be any

conflict between the parties as to the exact terms of the promise,

the courts can see that justice is done by charging against the

promisor the reasonable value of that in respect to which the

promise was made, while in the other case, and when a third

party is the real debtor, and the party alone receiving benefit, it

is impossible to solve the conflict of memory or testimony in any

manner certain to accomplish justice. There is also a temptation

for a promisee, in a case where the real debtor has proved insolv-

ent or unable to pay. to enlarge the scope of the promise, or to

torture mere words of encouragement and confidence into an

absolute promise: and it is so obviously just that a promisor re-

ceiving no benefits should be bound only by the exact temis of

the promise, that this statute requiring a memorandum in writing

was enacted. Therefore, whenever the alleged promisor is an

ab.solute stranger to the transaction, and without interest in it.

if the money wa going to be there in a fe,,· days he would wait
for it, but Davis aid, ·xo; you go home and I will pledge you
my word that I will telegraph the money to you to the F irst
Nationa l Bank by the fir t of October.'"
And, again, he te tifi d to an interview in 1877 with Davis, in
the city of Omaha, in th presence of other parties, in which he
aid: "Davis, yo u promi ed all along to pay me that money," and
Davi replied, "l believe I did."
This testimony of plaintiff as to conversation s \\·ith defendant i corroborated by oth er witnesse and contradicted by none.
It mu t therefore be accepted as pre ented the fact upon which
this ca e mu t be determined. \\rere the e promi e binding upon
Davi , or of no avail to the plaintiff because not in writing?
\\ ere it not fo r the Statute of Frauds there would be no que tion,
for obvio usly th ere was both promi e and con ideration. Defendant r elie upon that provision of the tatute of Fraud ,,·hich forbid the maintenance of an action ''to cha rge the defendant upon
any pecial promi e to an wer fo r th e debt, default or mi carriage
of another person, unle s the agreement upon which such action
hall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, hall be
in writing," etc. The purpo e of this provision \\·as not to effectuate, but to prevent, wrong. It doe not apply to promi es in
r e pect to debt created at the in tance and for the benefit of
the promisor, but only to tho e by which the debt of one party i
ought to be charged upon and collected from another. The reason of the tatute is obviou , for in the one case if there be any
conflict between the partie a to th e exact term s of the promi e,
the courts can see that ju tice is done by charg ing again t the
promi or the reasonable value of that in respect to which the
promi e wa mad e, whil e in the other case, and wh n a third
party is the real debtor, and the party alone receiving benefit, it
is impo sible to solve the conflict of m e.rnory or testimony in any
manner certain to accomplish ju tice. There is also a temptation
for a promisee, in a case where the real debtor has proved in olvent or unabl e to pay, to enlarge th scope of the promi e, or to
torture mere words of encouragement and confidence into an
absolute promise : and it is so obviou ly just that a promisor receiving no 1 enefits hould be bound only by the exact term s of
the promi e, that this tatute requiring a memorandum in \Hiting
was enacted . Therefore, \\ henever the alleged promi or i an
absolute tranger to the tran. action , and without intere t in it,
II

146 GUARANTY AND SURETYSHIP.

courls strictly uphold the obligations of this statute. But cases
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sometimes arise in which, though a third party is the original

obligor, the primary debtor, the promisor has a personal, imme-

diate and pecuniary- interest in the transaction, and is therefore

himself a party to be benejited by the performance of the prom-

isee. In such cases the reason which underlies and which

prompted this statutory provision fails, and the courts will give

effect to the promise. As said by this court in liuierson v. Slater,

22 How. 28, 43: "Whenever the main ])urpose and object of the

promisor is not to answer for another, ])ut to subserve some

pecuniary or business purpose of his own, involving either a bene-

fit to liimself or damage to the other contracthig party, his

promise is not within the statute, although it may be in form a

promise to pay the debt of another, and although the performance

of it may incidentally have the effect of extinguishing that lia-

bility." To this may be added the observation of Browne, in his

work on iItc Statute of I'Vauds, Sec. 165: "The statute contem-

plates tla: mere promise of one man to be responsible for another,

and cannot be interposed as a cover and shield against the actual
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obligations of the defendant himself." The thought is, that there

is a marked difference between a promise which, without any inter-

est in the subject matter of the promise in the promisor, is purely

collateral to the obligation of a third party, and that which, though

operating upon the debt of a third party, is also and mainly for

the benefit of the promisor. The case before us is in the latter

category. While the original ])n)misnr was the mining company,

and tlie undertaking v.as for its beneht, yet the performance of

the contract inured equally to the benefit of Davis and the mining

company. Performance helped the mining company in the pay-

ment of its debt to Davis, and at the same time helped Davis to

.secure the payment of the mining company's debt to him ; and as

the mining company- was apparent I y destitute of any other proji-

erty, and the payment of its de1)t to Davis therefore dependent

upon the continual and successful working of this mine ; and as the

control and working of the mine had been put in the hands of

Davis so that he might justly say, as he did: "1 am practically

the owner," it follows that he was a real, substantial party in inter-

est in the ])erformance of this contract. Tlis promise was not one

purely collateral to sustain the obligations of the mining company,

but substantially a direct and personal one to advance his own

in'erests. While the mining company was ultimately to be bene-

courl
lrictly nph ld Lh
bligalion
f Lhi
talute. But ca s
mctimc ari c in which, though a third party i - the ri ·inal
obligor, th primary <l ' btor , th e 1 rorni · r ha · a p T ' na l, imm "iiate and p c uniary int ' re t in th tran sa ·Lion, and i · Lher fore
him self a parly to be brncfit cl by th , p crforman - , of the pr 1111 cc.
ln
uch a!"c ~ th r:: r 'a o n which uncl rli
and which
prompted this tal 1to r y provi ion fail , and Lb e court \\·ill g ive
effect lo th promi · . . \ sa id by this c urt in E Iller.son v . Slater,
22 ll ow. 2 , 43: "\Vh n vcr th ' main purp e an 1 obj ct of the
promi o r i n o t to a n ,,·er fo r a no Lh ' r , but to · ub "' f\'
om
l cc uniary or bu in c. purpose of his O\\ · n , invo lvi n g- eith r a b 11 fiL to him se lf or da1mwe to the th cr contractin I arty, hi
promi c i. n t within the s ta tute, although it may be in fo rm a
promi
to pay the debt of a no th ' r , and alth ou g h th p r fo rrnance
of it may incicl ntally have th e eff ct of 'x ting ui hin 0 that liability.·· To thi m ay be a cld ed th ob ' n ·at ion o f Dr wne in hi
w or k o n the ' tatute o f Fraud , S ec. 165: "Th' ta tute cont m platc:, the m re promise o f o ne m a n to 1 e re ·po n ihl for an th r,
and cann t be !ntcrpos cl a · a cov r and ·hi el l aaain t th actual
oblig-Ltion
f th clef nclant him elf. " Th , tho ug ht i , that th r
i a marked liffrren c between a l romi
which, without a ny int
t in the ubj ct matter f th e prurni . e in th promi or , i_ pur ly
collateral to tbe bligation of a thircl party, and that which, though
op erat in g- u1 n th cl bt of a third p a rt y , i al o an 1 mainly f r
the 1>enefit f the promi or. The ca e befor e u i in the latt r
~at g o ry. \Yhil th
riginal pr mi or wa th minin · c mpany,
ci.n 1 t!1 uncl er tah ng wa f r it , benefit, ycl lh p erf rmance o f
the ontract inured qually to th ben fit of avi an l tb e mining
compan y. I 'r fo rman c h elped th minin; c mpany in the payment f it cl bt to DaYi ) and at th ' sam tim h 11 l avi to
. cure tbe paym 'nt of tbe minin g co mpan y' d 1 t t him ; an 1 a
Lh mining - mpan y wa . a1 par ' ntly cl titul
f any o th r p ro perty, a nd tb pay!ll nt f it debt to n av is th r fo r
d p n I nt
u1 n th continual and u cc . fol w rhn
f thi min ; and a the
co ntrol a ncl Wt)rkin g o f th min ha l 1 n put in th hand
f
l avi
o that Ii might ju tly say, a b did: " [ am practically
th e ow n er ," it fo ll ow that h wa a r a l, ub tantial I arty in int rf thi c ntra -t. Ili. pr mi
wa n t on e
t in th perf rmanc
pm ly collat ra1 to u tain th
1 li ga tion of the mini1io- c mpany ,
but nb tantially a dir ct anrl p r nal n t advance hi ow n
in ~ ·re t . \Yhil the min in · ompany wa. u ltim at ly to be b en -
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fitcd, Davis was primarily to be benefited by the transportation of

ihe ore, for thereby that debt, which otherwise could not, would

be paid to him. He, therefore, in any true sense of the term, occu-

P'Vd not the position of a collateral undertaker, but that of an orig-

inj.I promisor, and it would be a shadow on justice if the admin-

istration of the law relieved him from the burden of his promise

on the ground that it also resulted to the benefit of the mining

company, his debtor.

Counsel for Davis placed .stress on the form of expression

attributed by Patrick to Davis, to-wit: "I will be personally respon-

sible ; I will see you paid ;" and contends that the import of such

language is that of a collateral promise. There is force in this

contention, as it implies that someone else was also bound, but the

real character of a promise does not depend altogether upon the

form of expression, but largely on the situation of the parties ;

and the question always is, what the parties mutually understood by

the language, whether they understood it to be a collateral or a

direct promise. Patrick declares he understood it to be a direct

promise, and acted on the faith of it. That Davis understood it
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in the same way, is evidenced not only from the circumstances sur-

rounding the parties at the time, but from the fact that in a sub-

sequent interview, when charged to have always promised to pay

this debt, he admits that he believes that he did. The plaintiff, be-

lieving that Davis was, as he said, practically the owner, the party

primarily to be benefited by the conversion of the products of the

mine into money, understood that Davis was making an original

promise to pay for the w^ork which he might do, and upon such

promise- he might surely rely as an original promise, at least for

any work done thereafter.

The merits of the case, therefore, as disclosed by the testi-

mony, were with Patrick, and the judgment in his favor was right.

It is objected that the court in its instructions spoke of Davis as

an original promisor, as one promising to pay the debt, and not

as one promising to be responsible for the debt, or to see it paid.

But as Davis, in the second conversation, promised to pay, and in

the third admitted that he had always promised to pay the debt,

we cannot think that the court misinterpreted the scope and effect

of his words. It is not probable that the parties to this transaction

understood the difference between an original and a collateral

promise. We must interpret Davis's promise in the light of the

surroundings and of his subsequent admissions, and in that light

£tcd, Davi was primarily to be b nefi ted by the- transpor tation of
.i h ore, for ther by that debt, which otherwise could not, would
be paid to him. H e, therefore, in any true sense of the term, occu.P;f- .J not the po ition of a collateral undertaker, but that of an origin;.] promi or, and it woul d be a shadow on j ustic if the aclmin1 tration of the law reliev d him from the burden of his promise
on the g ro und that it also resulted to the benefit of the mining
company, his debtor.
Counsel fo r Davis placed .stress on th e fo rm of expre sion
.attributed by P atrick to Davi , to-wit: " I will be perso nally responible; I will 'ce yo u paid ;" and contends that the import of such
language i that of a collateral promi e. There i fo rce in this
contention, as it implies that someone else was al o bound, but the
r eal charact r of a promi e does not depend altogether upon the
form of expre sion, but largely on the situation of the parties;
.and the que_tion always is, what the parties mutually under toed by
the lang uage, whether they understood it to be a collateral or a
direct promi se. P atrick cl dare he under tood it to be a direct
promise, and acted on the faith of it. That Davis understood it
in the same way, is evidenced not only from the circum stances sm rouncling the partie at the time, but from the fact that in a ubequ ent interview: when charged to have alway promised to pay
.this debt, he admits that he believe that he did. The plaintiff, believing that Davi wa , as he said, practically the owner, the party
p rimarily to be benefited by the conversion of the products of the
mine into money, understood that Davis was making an original
promise to pay for the work which he might do, and upon such
promise· he might surely rely as an original promise, at least for
.any work done thereafter.
The merits of the case, therefore, as di closed by the testim ony, were with Patrick, and the judgment in his favor wa right.
It i obj ected that the court in it instructions spoke of Davis as
an original promisor, as one promising to pay the debt, and not
as one promising to be responsible for the debt, or to see it paid.
But as Davi , in the second conversation, promised to pay, and in
th e third admitted that he had always promised to pay the debt,
we cannot think that the court misinterpreted the scope and effect
of hi \vord . It i not probable that the parties to this transaction
understood the difference between an ori o-inal and a collateral
promise. \ Ve mu t interpret Davis's promise in the light of the
:.. urrounding and of his . ubsequent admis ions, and in that light
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we cannot think that the court crrcd in its construction thereof;
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and if tlie jury beHeved that he luid made such promises, we can-

not doubt that the verdict should have been as it was.

It is also objected that the court erred in u< <[ directing a ver-

dict for defendant upon the ground of a departure from the allega-

tions of the petition. That counts on an original emi^loynient by

Davis, in 1873, while the testimony shows that the original employ-

ment was by the mining company, and that the promise of Davis

was made in the fall of 1874. and after I'alrick had been at work

for months for the mining company. As no ol)jection was made

to the admission of testimony on this groinid, and as an amend-

ment of the petition to correspond with the proof would involve

but a trilling change, we cannot see that there was an\- error in

the ruling of the court. If objection had been made in ilie hrst

instance, doubtless the court would, as it ought to have done, have

permitted an amendment of the petition. There was no surprise,

for the facts were fully develo])ed in the former trial.

Tpon the record as presented, we think that the verdict and

judgment were right, and as no substantial error appears in the
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proceedings the judgment is

Affirmed.

The Chikf JrsTiCK, .Mr. Justice r>u. \l)l.l■:^■ and Air. Justice

(JI^\^■ did not hear the argument nor take part in the decision of

this case.

Hooker ct a!.. Respondents, vs. Russell, Appellant (1886).

67 Wis. 257 ; 30 X. W. 358.

Appeal from the I'ounly Court of Fond du Lac County.

Suthcvland & Sitihcrhuid. for a])i)ellant.

lili Hooker and C. li. Hooker, for respondents.
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The facts will sufBciently appear from the opinion.

Ortox, J. In 1883 the village board of the village of Bran-
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the ensuing year, and passed an ordinance prohibiting such sale

and providing for the punishment of those who should violate the

same. Certain persons continued to sell intoxicating liquors in

said village notwithstanding, and in violation of said ordinance,

and in July, 1883, said village board, by resolution, employed the

.said plaintiffs and respondents to act as tlie attorneys of the village

in the prosecution of such offenders, llie respondents, as such

attorneys of the village, commenced several prosecutions under

such employment, and rendered therein legal services, amounting

in value to $173.66, up to and including September 7, 1883. when

on that day an injunction was served upon said village, at the suit

of one David Whitton, a taxpayer of said village, restraining the

village board from appropriating or paying out of the treasury

any money for the payment of attorneys' fees in the prosecution

of criminal actions theretofore or thereafter had for the violation

of the excise laws of the state, and from appropriating or paying

any money for expenses incurred in such prosecutions. Notwith-

standing said injunction, the respondents continued to render legal

services for said village in such prosecutions up to and including
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the 26th day of Januar}', 1884, the value of which then was the

sum of $657.34, including the above amount of $173.66. The bill

for these services was presented to and filed with the village board

as a claim against the village, and the respondents brought suit

against the village therefor, which suit is still pending.

The seventh finding of fact, which must be received as a verity

in the case as neither party has excepted thereto, is as foUow^s :

"That on or about the 8th day of September, 1883, and subsequent

to the service of such in junctional order upon said village, the

defendant, George A. Russell, requested the plaintiff to continue

said prosecutions notwithstanding said injunction, and promised

and agreed to pay them for their past and future services therein

in case of their inability to collect their claim therefor from said

village." It was on this promise that this suit was brought against

the appellant, and on which the respondents recovered in the county

court. There can be no question but that this special promise of the

appellant, not in writing, to answer for the debt of the village of

Brandon, is void by the statute of frauds (R. S. sec. 2307, subd. 2).

The services of the respondents were rendered for the village, and

under a contract with the village. They have presented their

claim to, as being against, the village, and have sued the village

as being liable therefor. "So long as the oiiginal debt remains

t he en uin o· y ar, and pa d an ordinance prohibiting such sale
and providing for the puni hm nt of those who hould violate the
same. Certain persons continu ed t ·ei l intoxicating liquor in
aid village notwith tancling, and in iolation of said ordinance,
and in July, l 83, aid village b ard, by re oluti n, mploy d th
aid plaintiff and respond ent to act a the attorney of the vi lla<Ye
in th pro ecution of uch offenders. The re ponclent , a
uch
attorneys of the villa<Ye, c mmencecl several prosecutions under
uch employm ent, and rendered th r in legal ervices, amounting
in value to $173.66, up lo and inclu lin · eptember 7, 1883, when
on that day an injunction wa served upon aid village, at the uit
of one David \ Vhitton a taxpayer of ·a id village, restraining the
village board from appropriatin<Y or paying out of the trea ury
a ny mone:' fo r th e payment of attorn eys' fee in the pro ecution
of crimina1 actions th eretofore or thereafter had fo r the violation
of the exci e law of the tate, and from appropriating or paying
a ny money fo r expen e incurred in uch pro ecution . N otw ithtancl ing said injunction, th respondents continu ed to r nder legal
ervices fo r said village in such pro ecut1ons up to and including
the 26th day of January, 1884, the value of which then was the
um of $657.34, including the above amount of $173.66. The bill
for th e e ervices was pre ented to and filed "ith the village board
a a claim again t the village, and the respondent brought uit
against the village therefor, \\·hich suit i till pending.
The seventh finding of fact, which n:ust be received as a verity
in the case a neither party ha exc ptrcl thereto is as follows:
"That on or about the 8th clay of September, i883, and subsequent
to the ervic of such injunctional ordu upon aid villa<Ye, the
defendant, George A. Ru ell, requested the plaintiff to continue
aid prosecutions notwithstanding aid injunction, and promi ed
and agreed to pay them fo r their past and future ervices therein
in case of their inability to collect their claim the ref or from said'
village." It was on this promi. e that thi suit was brought again t
the appellant, and on which th e r e pondent recovered in the county
court. Th re can be no que tion but that thi special promi e of the
appellant, not in writing to answer for the debt of th e village of
Brandon, is void by the tatute of fraud s (R. S. sec. 2307, ubd . 2).
The service of the re pondent were rendered for the village, and
under a contract with the village. They have presented their
claim to, " beinCY aga in t, th e village, and have sued the village
as being liable therefor. '· o long a the 0 1 iginal d bt remains
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payable b_\- the debtor to his creditor, any arrang-einent whatever

by which another party promises to pay that debt is within the

very letter of tlie statute, no matter from what souce the considera-

tion of the latter promise is derived." liuicrick v. Sanders, i Wis,

jy ; Cotter ill v. Stevens, lo Wis. 422 ; Cook v. Barrett, 15 Wis. 596,

Ag-ainst the operation of the statvite upon this promise it is

claimed (i) that it has been judicially determined, in the injunc-

tion suit against the village, that the village is not liable for such

payable bY th debtor to hi
r dit r, any arra ngement whatev r
by which an th r party pr m i
pay that d bt i within th
v ry 1 tt r of th tatut , no matter fr m whal souce the con ideration of the latter pr mi i derive I." Elllcric l~ Y. anders, r \ i .

77; Cottcrill v.

services. It is sufficiently answered that nriihcr of these parties

was a party to that suit, and therefore not bduiid liy the judgment

therein. But, again, it was a suit in equity, and there might have

been other reasons for the injunction than that the village was

not legally liable on the contract to pay their attorneys for their

services in the prosecutions. (2) It is claimed that for future

services of the respondents the credit was given to the appellant.

All the services were performed under one contract with the vil-

lage. It is so alleged in the complaint, and the respondents not

only so testify, Init they have preferred their claim against the

village, and brought suit against the village for it. The village
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has never been released from any part of it. (3) It is claimed

that the appellant originally promised to pay for such future serv-

ices on a new considerati'on of benefit or advantage to himself as a

citizen and officer of the village, having an interest in enforcing

the laws against the sale of intoxicating liquors. His zeal in the

cause of temperance, and his interest in enforcing the laws in

common with all other citizens, would scarcely be a good or valu-

able consideration for a promise to pay. But the above finding is

sufficient to show that the same promise embraced the payment

for the past and future services alike.

We shall not decide in this case whether the village of Bran-

don is lialjlc to the respondents on its contract, although the county

court found, as a conclusion of law, that the village was not liable

and had no authority to make the contract. The village is not a

party to this suit, and has not denied its liability in this suit. The

village is presumptively liable, for it has the capacity to contract.

It will be in time to decide the question of the liability of the

village on this particular contract when the action of the respond-

ents against the village to enforce it is on trial.

Are the respondents bound by the finding in this case that

the village is not liable? It can only be determined whether the

respondents are able to collect their claim against the village, when

~ \gain

fC7,'f11S, I

\Yi . ..j.22: Cooh v . Barrett,

rs

\Vi . 596.

t th
1 ration of the tatute upon thi promi
it is
claim d (r) that it ha been judiciall y d .t rrnin cl, in th injunction uit at;ain t the villag , that th e viEa; i not liabl for uch
ervice . It i ufficientl y an wered that n ither of th
parti
wa a party to that uit, and th ref re not b uncl by th judgment
ther in. But, acain, it wa a uit in equity, and ther mi o-ht have
b n oth r r a n fo r the injun ction tban that the village was
not 1 a-ally liabl · on the contract to pay th ei r attorney for their
rvi e in the pro ecution . ( 2) It is claim d that f r future
services of th e respondent the credit wa given to the appellant.
11 the ervi c s wer performed under one contract with the v'illage. It is o alleo-ed in the complaint, and the r p n ent not
onl y so testify, but they have preferred th eir claim again t the
village, and broug ht uit against th village for it. Th village
ha never bee n r elea ed from an y part of it. ( 3 ) It i claimed
that the app llant originally promi ed to pay f r such future ervice n a new c nsideratlon of benefit or advantag to him lf a a
citizen and officer of th e village, having an int rest in cnf rcing
th law again t th e ale of into:x i ating liquors. Hi z al in the
cau e of temp ranee, and his inter t in enforcing th law in
common with all other citizen , would scarcely b a g cl or valuabl consideration for a promise to pay. But the above finding is
uffi cient to how that the sam promi e eml raced th payment
fo r th pa t and future ervices alike.
\Ve shall not cl cicle in this a e wheth r th villao- of Brandon i liable to th re pondent on its contract, although the county
c urt fo und, a a c nclu ion of law, that the village wa n t liable
an I had no a uthority to mak th contract. The villa o-e i not a
party to thi uit, and has n t 1 ni d it liability in thi uit. The
villag i pr sumptiv ly lial 1 , for it has the capacity t contract.
It w ill be in tim to d cid th qu tion of the liability of the
villag- n thi particular c ntract when th action of the r pondent aa-ain t th vi1lag to nforc it i on trial.
that
r the r . pond nt bound by the findin in thi ca
th village i n t liable? It can only be det rmined v.rheth r the
r p ncl nt ar al 1 t coll ct their claim against the village, when
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their suit for that purpose, now pending, shall be tried. In any

view that can be properly taken of this promise, it is a collateral

one and void.

By the Court. — The judgment of the county court is reversed,

and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Sutton & Co. vs. CtRev (1893).

I O. B. Div. (T894). 285.

their uit for that purpo e, no\\· pending, hall be tri cl. In any
view that can be properly taken of thi promi e, it i a collateral
one and void.
By th e 01irt.-The judgment of th e county court i rever ed,
and the cau e remand d for a new trial.

Appeal by the defendant against the judgment of Bowen,

L. J., at the trial of the action without a jury.

The plaintiffs were stockbrokers and members of the London

Stock Exchange. The defendant was not a member of the Stock

Exchange. The plaintiiTs had, as they alleged in their statement

ScTTON

&

o . <.'s. GREY

( 1

93).

of claim, in January, 1891, entered into an oral agreement with the

defendant that he should introduce clients to them, and that they

I Q. B. Div. ( T89-t ), 285.

should transact business on the Stock Exchange for the clients

thus introduced, upon the terms, as between the plaintiffs and the

defendants, that he should receive one-half the commission earned

by the plaintiff's in respect of any transactions by them for and on

Appeal by the defendant again t th e j ud a ment of Bowen,
L. J., at the trial of the action without a jury.
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behalf of such clients as were introduced h\ the defendant, and

that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff one-half of any loss

which might be incurred by the plaintiffs in respect of those tran-

sactions.

The plaintiffs claimed from the defendant half the loss which

they had incurred in Stock Exchange transactions which they had

entered into on behalf of a client named Robertson, who had been

introduced to them by the defendant in pursuance of the oral

agreement.

By his statement of defence, the defendant pleaded that Sec.

4 of the Statute of Frauds had not been complied with ; that the

contract alleged by the plaintiff's was, within the meaning of Sec.

4 of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), "a special promise to

answer for the debt of another person" ; and that, consequently,

as it was not in writing, an action upon it could not be maintained.

Stevenson, for defendant.

Rufits Isaacs, for the plaintiffs, was not called upon.

The plaintiffs were tockbrokers and member of th e L ondon
Stock Exchange. The defendant wa not a member of the tock
Exchange. The plaintiff had, a they alleged in their tatement
of claim, in January, i891 , entered into an oral agreement with the
defendant that he should introduce client to them, and that they
hould tran act busin e on the tock Exchange for the client
thu intro<luced, upon th term , a between the plaintiff and the
defendant , that he should receive one-half the commi ion earned
by the plaintiff in respect of any tran action by th m for and on
behalf of uch client a were introduc cl by th e defendant, and
that th e defendant houlcl pay to the plaintiff one-half of any loss
,,,;hich mia ht be incurred by th e plaintiffs in respect of tho e tran;i,.ctions.
The plaintiff claimed from the defendant half the lo which
they had incurred in Stoel- Exchange tran actions which they had
entered into on behalf of a client named Robert on, who had been
introduced to them by the defendant in pursuance of the oral
agreement.
By hi tatement of defence, the defendant pleaded that Sec.
4 of the Statute of Fraud had not been complied with; that the
contract alleaed by the plaintiff wa 'Vithin the meaning of Sec.
4 of the • tatute of Frauds ( 29 Car. 2, c. 3) ' a pecial promise to
answer for the debt of another person"; and that, con equently,
as it was not in writing, an action upon it could not be maintained.

Ste<.•enson, for defendant.
Rufus Isaacs, for the plaintiff , was not called upon .
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LuKi) Msiii:k, M. I\. In inv upiniun lhi> api)cal slioukl l>e

dismissed, I think thai the judgment of Bowen, L. J., was in

every respect rig-lit . I do not think iliat the relation between the

plaintiffs and the defendant was that of ])artnership. They had

no intention to become partners, and. as the law now stands, a part-

nership can not be constituted without such an intention. In my

opinion the true relation between the plaintiffs and the defendant

was this: The plaintiffs being- brokers upon the Stock Exchange,

of which the (U'fendant was not a meiuhcr, they agreed together

diat the ])laintift's should carry out transactions upon the Stock

Exchange t\jr the mutual benefit of themselves and the defendant.

The defendant could not himself transact business upon the Stock

Exchange, and the plaintiffs made this agreement with him: "If

yi)U will find persons who \vish to operate u])on the .Stock Exchange

and will introduce llutii to us as clients, we will, on l)eiialf of the

persons whom you thus introduce to us, transact the ordinary

business of a broker on the Stock Exchange, and make ourselves

personally responsible according to its tules on these terms — that

our brokers' commission on the Stock Exchange .shall l)e divided
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between us and you, just as if y(;u were our ])artner and a member

of the Stock Exchange, and tliat, if ihere should be a loss in

respect of the transactions, you shall indemnify us against half the

loss." The defendant verballv agreed to Uiis, but diere was not

any contract or memorandum in writing. The contract, in my

opinion, is one which regulated the jjart which the defendant was

to take in the transactions which were contemplated, and, if he

was to be an agent for the plaintiffs, the contract regulated the

terms of his agenc}. Again, before the transactions were entered

into, the terms were regulated by the agreement, and they were

such as to give the defendant an interest in the transactions. The

transactions were to be entered into by the plaintiffs parUy for

their own benefit and ])artly for the benefit of the defendant. Is

such a contract a simple contract of guarantee — "a special promise

to answer for the debt or default of another person" — so as to

bring the case widiin Sec. 4 of the Statute of Erauds. or is it a

contract of indemnity? Whether any contract is the one or the

other is often a ver\- nice (jui'stion. liut certain tests have been

laid down to guide the Court in determining under which head

any particular contract comes. The principal case in English law

which aff'ords such a guide is Courtier v. Hastic, 8 Ex. 40. In

that case a test was given l)v Parke, B., who delivered the judg-

r. ]\. Tn 111\' opinio n thi - appal h uld h
I think that the judgment of DowEx , L. J.. wa in
' \' Ty r •, pee~ rig-ht . l cl<) no t think thaL th r lati n l tw e n th
plaintiffs and t h d { ndarn wa that of partn T hi1 . Th y ha l
nn intention to b j l11 partners . and. a Lh law n w tan I , a partner~hip c8.n not 1
·on titutecl \Yitho ut s uch an intention. In my
opi ni o n th' true r lat ion bet \Y een the plaintiff a nd th lefen lam
\\'a - thi . : The plaintiff h ing broker · tiJ X H1 th e • tock E .·chang ,
of \\ hich the clef nclant wa n ot a m embe r, th "Y agr cl tog th r
that th e plaintiffs s ho uld carry o ut tran action upon th
tock
Exchan ge fo r the mutual ben efit o f them clv a n l th cl f n lant.
The clefencla it could not him. e lf tran a t bu it 1 s up n th
tock
~:xchangc , and the plaintiff made thi s agre m cnt with him: · If
yo u will fin cl per. o ns \Yho wi sh t o p ra te upon thL' ~ to k Exchano·
ancl \Yill introdu ce them to u as clients , \\'e will, on b nalf f th
per on s whom you thu s introduce to u s, tram-a t the ordinary
busine __ of a brok r o n the Stock Ex hange, and mak our e lve
per o nally r cs po n ible according to it t ul e o n th
t rm - that
o ur brokers' c mmi s ion on th e Stock E:xchang · shall be divided
bet\Y en u s an cl y u, ju t as if yc u \\·e r e ·ur partne r an l a mem b r
of the Sto k Exchange, and that, if Ll1 r
h o ulcl be a Jo
in
r e pect of the tra1ractions, you hall indemnify n again t half the
lo . " Th clef nclant v rbally agreed to thi , but th r e wa n ot
any con tract o r m cmo rancltim in writmg. The ontract, in my
opini o n. i on e which r gulatecl the part which th cl fendant wa
to take in th t ran acti n s which w er e ontemplat cl, and, if h
wa to be an agent for th e plaintiffs , th -ontract r gulated the
term of his a~enc:. . \gain , lwfo r e th e transaction ~ w er e entered
into . the term . wer r eo-ulated hy the a r m nt, and they w re
. uch a. to give the cl fcnclant an inte re t in th tran a tio n . The
tran acti n were t be ~nt r e.J into hy th plaintiff partly for
thei r ow n b n fit ancl partly for the ben fit o f th e cl fen lant. I
u ch a o ntract a imp! 'O ntract of guJ.rant e -"a I cial promi e
to an . wer for th debt o r default of an th r p r on''- o a to
bring th ca
within ... cc . 4- f the Statut
f Frau l , or i it a
contract of incl mnity? \ h th r any o ntract i th
ne or the
oth r i o ft n a v f\' ni
que Lio n .
hav b n
laid d wn to gu id e th C'ourt in clet rmining un 1 r whi h h ead
any particular on tract com . Th prin -ipal a
in Engli h law
w hi ch aff ,rcL u -h a g u id i. r 0 11 rticr v. 1las tic,
.. :x. 40. In
that ca at . t wa g iv ·n by P .\RKE, B., wb
l liv r l th juclgLo1w l •,'-' IJl·:R, •

di .· mi~s e d
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:ment of himself and Ai.derson, 1>. (from whom Pollock, C. L'>..

dififered as to the construction of the contract). The learned

Judge said (at p. 53): The other and only remaining point is,

whether the defendants are responsible by reason of their charging

a del credere commission, though they have not guaranteed by

writing signed bv themselves. We think thev are. Doubtless if

they had for a percentage guaranteed the debt owing, or per-

formance of the contract by the vendee, being totally unconnected

with the sale" (I would read that "totally unconnected with the

transaction"), "they would not be liable without a note in writing

signed by them; but, being the agents to negotiate the sale" (that

is, as I read it, "being connected with the transaction" ). "the com-

mission is paid in respect of that employment : a higher reward is

paid in consideration of their taking greater care in sales to their

customers, and precludmg all questions whether the loss arose

from negligence or not and also for assuming a greater share of

responsibility than ordinary agents, namely, responsibility for the

solvency and performance of their contracts by their vendees. This

is the main object of the reward being given to them : and, though
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it may terminate in a liability to pay the debt of another, that is

not the immediate object for which the consideration is given."

There the test given is, whether the defendant is interested in the

transaction, either by being the person vho is to negotiate it or in

some other w-ay, or whether he is totally unconnected with it. If

he is totally unconnected with it, except by means of his promise

to pav the loss, the contract is a guarantee ; if he is not totally un-

connected with the transaction, but is to derive some benefit from

it, the contract is one of indemnity, not a guarantee, and Sec. 4

does not apply. The rule thus laid down has been adopted as a

test in subsequent cases. In Fitzgerald v. Dressier, 7 C. B.

(N. S.) 374, CocKP.URX, C. J., said (at p. 392) : "The law upon

this subject is, I think, correctly stated in the notes to Forth v.

Stanton, i Wms. Saund. 21 le, where the learned editor thus sums

up the result of the authorities : 'There is considerable difficulty in

the subject, occasioned perhaps by unguarded expressions in the

reports of the dififerent cases ; btit the fair result seems to be that

the question whether each particular case comes within this clause

of the statute (Sec. 4) or not depends, not on the consideration for

the promise, but on the fact of the original party remaining liable,

coupled with th-e absence of any liability on the part of the defend-

ant or his property, except such as arises from his express prom-

:ment f him lf and ALDERsox, B. (from \\·h m PoLLO · i-,:, ". LL,
diff r d a t th con tru ti n of th
on tract ) . The learned
Judge . aid ( at 1 . S.S) : rI he thcr and only remainin g point is,
wh etb r th e cl fen !ant are re p n ible b;· rea on of th ir charging
a de/ crcdcrc c mmi ion. though the~· haYe not guara nteed by
writing ign° cl by th ernselve . \Ve thi1-,k they are. Doubtl e - if
th y had fo r a percentag guaranteed th e debt o win o·, or performance of th e co ntract by the v ndee. bein g totally un con nec ted
\ ith the ale" (I \\·ould read that ·•totally uncon nected with the
tran acti n" ) . "th ey would not be liabl e without a note in \\Ti tin g
igned by them; but, being th e ag nts to n egotiate the ale" ( that
i , a I r ead it, " I ing connected with th·~ tran action"), "the com mi ion i · paid in re pect of that em pl ) ment ; d hwh er reward i
paid in con ideration of their takin o- gt ater car e in ale to their
cu tom r , and precludmg all qne tion wheth er the lo s aro e
from negligence or not and a\ -o for :i. urning a great r hare of
re pon ibility than o rdinary agents. namely, r espon ibility fo r the
olvency and performance of thei r contract by th eir vendee . This
i th e main obj ec t of the reward being g iven to th em; and, thOLwh
it may terminate in a liability to pay th e debt of anoth er , that is
not the immed iate obj ect f r which the consideration i given."
There the te t given is, whether the def nclant is intere ted in the
tran action, either by bein g th e peLon ·who is to negotiate it or in
ome other way, or wh ether he i. ~ total!~· unconnected with it. If
he i totally unconnected with it, except by m ean of hi promi e
to pay the lo , the contract i a g uarantee; if h~ i not totally unconnected with the tran action, but i to derive ome benefit from
it, the contract i one of indemnity, not a guarantee, and ec. -t
does not apply. The rule thu. 1aid dmYn ha been adopted a a
te t in ubsequent cases. In Fit~gcrald v. Dressler. 7 . B.
(I'{ . . ) 37-t, CocKB-URl'.'", . ]., aid (at p. 392 ) : "The law upon
thi
ubj ect i , I think. correctly tatecl in the note to Forth v.
Sta11to11, r \Vm . auncl. _r 1e. wh ere th learned editor thu um
up th re ult o"f th authoriti _ : 'There i con ideral le difficulty in
the ubj ect. occa ioned perhaps by un o-uard ed cxpre ion in th e
r epo r~ of the diffe rent ca e ; but the fair r e ult seem to be that
the que tion whether each particular case come ~ within thi clau e
of th e tatute ( ec. -t ) or not depend , not on the con id ration fo r
the promi e, but on th e fact of the original party r emaining liable,
coupled with the ab ence of any liability on the part of the defendant or hi property. except uch a ar i-e from hi expre prom-
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ise.' I quite concur in ihat view of the doolriue. provided the

proposition is considered as embracing tne ciuaUtication at the

conclusion of the passage ; for, though I agree that the considera-

tion alone is not the test, but that the party taking upon himself

the obligation upon which the action is brought makes himself

responsible for the debt or default of another, still it must bd

taken with the qualification stated in the note above cited, viz.,

an absence of prior liability on the part of the defendant or his

property, it being, as I think, truly stated there as the result of the

authorities, that if there be something more than a mere under-

taking to pay the debt of another, as, where the property in con-

sideration of the giving up of which the party enters into the un-

dertaking is in point of fact his own, or is property in which he

has some interest, the case is not within the provision of the stat-

ute, which w^as intended to apply to the case of an undertaking

to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, where

the person making the promise has himself no interest in the

property which is the subject of the undertaking. I, therefore,

agree with my learned brothers that this case is not w'ithin the
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Statute of Frauds." The learned Judge there used die words,

"has himself no interest in the property which is the subject of

the undertaking," because he was dealing with a case of property ;

but if his words be read, as I think they should be. "has no inter-

est in the transaction," he is adopting that interpretation of

Couturier v. Hastie, 8 Ex. 40, which I think is the right one. Then

again, in Fleet v. Mitrton (Law Rep. 7 Q. B. at p. 133), Black-

BURX, J., quotes the passage which i have read from the judgment

of Parke, B., in Cunturicr v. Hastie (8 Ex. 40). and thus inter-

prets it: "He says that it is neither a guaranteeing nor a contract

for sale, and tliat consequently the Statute of Frauds is out of the

question. It seems to me, therefore, as Mr. Cohen said, that this

custom must be taken as merely regulating the tenns of the em-

ployment." If in the present case the agreement is taken as regu-

lating the terms of the defendant's employment, it is not within

Sec. 4 of the statute; on the other hand, if the transaction

is looked at as entered into partly for the benefit of the plaint-

iffs and partly for the benefit of the defendant, it comes within

the rule laid down by Parke, B., in Couturier v. Hastie, and

adopted by Cockburn, C. J., in Fitagcrald v. Dressier. The

contract is not a guarantee with regard to a matter in which the

defendant has no interest except by virtue of the guarantee ; it is

i c.'
I iuit '
n ·ur in ti1at Yiew uf th ' <I ·trin '. 1 r vid ' <l th
propo itiun i con ider ·cl a c:mh ra ·ing tn " qualifi ·ati 11 at th
·011 -Iu i n
f th pa ·:ag ' ; for, th Lwh l a r ee that the con ·id ration alon' i not th ' t t, but that the I arty taJ-in r upon him If
the bligati n llJ on which th' a ti n i br u g ht mak
him If
re ·p n -ibl f r th d bt or default f anoth 'r , till it mu t bel
taken with th qualificati n tate l in tI-.e n ote ab v cit <l, viz.,
an ab enc ' of prior liabilit.: on th I art of th defendant or his
property, it I eing, a I think, truly tated th r a th e re ult f the
~uth riti , that if th er e be . m thin g m o r than a rn r
un<l rtakin g t pay th cl 'bt of an 1hcr , a , where th e pro1 rty in coni<leration f the g ivi n g up of \Yhich the party cnt r into th und rtakina i in p int f fact hi: ow n , r i pr I rty in whi h he
ha om int r e t th ca
i n t within th e p rov i io n f th
tatut , whi h wa intend ed to apply t th ca e of an undertaking
to an w r f r th cl bt, default, r mi -carriage of anoth r , wh re
th p r ;i.1 makin g th e pr()mi e ha him elf n intere t in the
property which i th e ul j ct f th undertal..:itw. I, th r f r ,
agree with m y learned br th e r · that th i ca
i no t within the
tatut
f Fr:iucl . " Th lea rn e I Jucl a th r ~ u d th \\' rd ,
"ha him elf n o interest in th , l rop n.:y which i the ubj t f
th und rtaking ," beca u se h e wa d ealin o- with a ca e f pr p rty;
but if hi ''" rel be r ead, as I think th )' h o ul 1 b , ' 'ha n o int rt in the tran action," h is adop~ing that int rpretati n of
Couturier v. II astie) ; x . -1-0, which I think is the r ig ht on . Th n
again, in Fleet v. Jfu rton ( Law H. p. 7 Q. 13. at p. I33), BL\ KB ' RN") J., qu te th e pa ag wb i Ii I h ave r ad fr m th ju lg m nt
f I .\ RKE, B., in Cout urier v . JI astie ( Ex. 4 ,) , and thu int rpret it: "l J ay th a t it i , n eit lw r a <ruarant · iu g no r a c ntract
£ r ale, ancl tbat co n cq u ntly tb , talllte of Fraud i out of the
qu' ti n. [t
'111 to m e, th r eforc, a
::\Ir. oh n ai I, that thi
u tom mu . t b tak n as m er ly r a ulatin a th t rm
f th
mp! yment." If in th pre ent ca th e aoTeern nt i tak n a r gulating th, t rm
f th cl fendant' ·mpl oym nt. it i n o t within
ec. 4 of th
tatut ; n th
th r hand , if the tran acti n
i 1 ok 1 a t a
nt r 1 into partly f r the b n efit of th e p1aintiff and partly £ r the b n :fit f the def n lant, it co m e ~ within
th rul laid cl wn I y P ..\R KE, B., in Cout 1trier . Has tie, and
acl pt cl by
o KB RN)
. J., in h"t.-::uerald v. Dressler.
The
ontra t i n t a huarante with r ga rd t a matt r in whi h the
clefen !ant ha no int r . t xc It by v irtu
[ th ' a uarantee; it i
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an indemnity with regard to a transaction in which the defendant

has an interest equally with the plaintiffs. In my opinion, Bowen,.

L. J., was right in holding that the agreement is not within the

statute, and his decision ought to be affirmed.

Lopes, L. J. I am of the same opinion. Bowen, L. J., has

adopted the view of the plaintiffs, that the contract was one of

indemnity, and I think he was right in so holding. The defend-

ant says that the contract amounts to "a special promise to answer

for the debt or default of another person," and is therefore within

the statute. The true test, as derived from the cases, is, as the

master of the Rolls has already said, to see whether the person

who makes the promise is. but for the liability which attaches to

him by reason of the promise, totally unconnected with the tran-

saction, or whether he has an interest in it independently of the

promise. In the former case, the agreement is Vv'ithin the statute ;.

in the latter, it is not. In the present case, it appears to me be-

yond all question that the defendant had an independent interest

in the transaction, because it was entered into for the mutual

benefit of the plaintiff's and himself. In another view, the contract
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was to regulate the terms of the defendant's employment by the

plaintiffs. In my opinion, the decision of Bovv^en, L. J., was right,

and the appeal must be dismissed.

Kay, L. J. According to the report which I have of the judg-

ment of Bowen, L. J., he said, 'M have come to the conclusion that

the plaintiffs are correct in saying that it was arranged between

them and the defendant that he should contribute to any loss that

might occur to them upon Robertson's transactions." I agree that

this arrangement hardly comes up to a partnership, though it is

verv near it. The commission received in respect of any transaction

might not be all clear profit ; the expenses of th.e office establish-

ment would have to be provided for; and therefore the contract

with the defendant was not that he should share the profit what-

ever it might be. On the whole I think it would be going too far

to say that the contract was that the defendant sliould share in the

profits and losses of the transactions. But then comes in the prin-

ciple of the decision, that a contract to employ a del credere agent is

not within the statute and need not be in writing, because its main

object is to regulate the terms of the agent's employment, and,

though in the result the agent may have to indemnify the prin-

cipal against losses, that is not the main object of the contract.

The present case, however, is not strictly that of a del credere

an indemnity with r aa rcl to a tran act i n in which th cl fondant
ha an int r t eq uall y with th plainti ff . In my opini n, BowE ,
L. J., was ri aht in hol lin g that the agreement i not within the
tatut , and hi decision ought to b affirmed.
LOPES, L. J. I am of the am e opinion. BowEN, L. J., has
adopted th e view of th plaintiff , that the contract was one of
indemnity, and I think he wa right in o holdin 0 . T he d fe ndant ay that the contract amount to "a special promi e to answer
for the debt or default of another per on,'' and is therefore within
the statute. The tru e te t, as derived from the cases, is, as the
ma ter of the R oll has already aid, to see whether the person
who mak the promise is, but for th e liability which attache to
him by rea on of the promise, totally unconnected with the transaction, or whether he has an interest in it independently of the
promi e. In the fo rmer case, the agreement i within the tatute;.
in the latt r, it is not. In the present case, it appears to me beyond all qu e tion that the defendant had an in dependent interest
in the tran action, because it was entered into fo r th e mutual
benefit of the plaintiffs and him elf. In another view, the co ntract
wa to regulate the terms of th e defendant's employment by the
plaintiffs. In my opinion, the J ccision of BOWEN_, L. J., was right,
and the appeal must be di mi sed.
KAY, L. J.
ccordin g to the report which I have of the judgment of BowEN, L. J., he aid: " I have come to the conclu ion that
the plaintiffs are correct in saying that it was arranged between
them and the defendant that he houl d contribute to any los that
might occur to them upon R obertson' transaction ." I ag ree that
thi arrangement hardly come up to a partnership, though it i&
very near it. The commission received in re pect of any tran action
mig ht not 1 e all clear profit ; the expen e of th e office e tablishment would have to be provided fo r ; and therefore the contract
with the defendant was not that he should hare the profit whatever it might be. O n the whole I think it would be going too far
to a) that the contract was that the defendant should share in the
profits and los es of the transaction . Rut then comes in the principle of the decisioE, that a contract to employ a de f credere agent is
not within the statute and need not be in writing, 1 ecause its main
obj ect i to regulate the terms of the agent's employm ent, and,.
thoug h in the result the agent may have to indemnify the principal again t los e , that is not the main object of the contract.
The pre ent case, however. is not st rictl y that of a del credere
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agx'iit, am! the (|ucslitiii is, wIu'iIut iIk' cxcc'plion frnin the statute

which has been establislu-il in the case of a del crcdcrc agent ap-

plies to the present case. 1 can not see any (hfficuhy in holding

that it does, when 1 look at the reasons given by I'arki:, T. , for

the decision in Couturier v. Ilastie (8 K.\. 40), when a man simply

agrees to assnnu' lial)ility for the deljt of another, he has no inter-

est whatever in the transaction, except 1)\ virtue i4 the guarantee.

In the present case the defendant lias an independent interest

in the transactions. Another distinction is this, that the contract

is one which regulated the terms upon which the defendant was

t© be employed by the i)laintiffs. 1 agree with HowiiN, L. J., that

"this is really a contract which regulates the terms of the agency,

and the defendant's liability to answer f(-r the del)t of another is

onlv an ulterior conse(iuence of the terms in which the contract is

framed." I agree that the appeal nuist he dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors: I/arold .1. Faniiaii,

lildred & Bignold.

The Fn<ST Natiu.nal JJank, Respondent, zx Chalmers et al.,
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Appellants (1895).

144 N. ^■. 432; 39 N. E. 33T.

Appeal from judgment of the Cieneral Term of the Supreme

ag ·nt, a nd th e qu 's ti cm is. w hcth ' r th e ·xc '1 Li o1 1 fr om th e talut
,,·hich has bee n es ta blis h ·d in th ' ra:e ri f a d ·I crcrlcrc age nt a pplies to t he pr ·:cn t l·a: '. l ·a n no t s 'c a ny cl iffi -ulty in hold in
t hat it cine-.., , \\he n J lo )k a t thl' r ea~r)Jl:-, g i\'cn b) P \ R KE. l ~ . f r
th e der i ·io n in Co 11/11ricr v. !last 1c ( E"-. -l ) , wh 'n a m a n s impl y
agrees to ass um e lia bility fo r th e cl ·bt l) f an th r. h ha no interest wha t \'er in th tra nsac ti o n . x ·c pl hy virtu ' of th e g ua rante .
[11 th , pre enl a
th ' d fc nclant bas an incl ' P nd nt int r e t
in the tran ·acti n . _\n th ' r d i ~ tin c ti o n i thi s , that th
ntract
is ne w h ich r eo-ul a ted th t rm s up n which th e cl f ndant wa
l~) be mpl y ' d by th plaintiffs. l a g-r ' with I~O\\' L , L. J., that
''th is i r a ll y a co ntrac t w hi ch r cgulat s th e t ' rill . of the ag- ' l1 y ,
a nd the dd n la n t's li a l>ilil\· to an sw e r fl;r th ' d ebt f ano th e r t •
<' nl y J l1 ulterio r ro n. cq u encc of th e tcr111 · in whi -h th contract i
fr am ed... l ag ree th a t th e app 'a l nrn :-> t h di mi eel .
. \ppcal cli mi ss' !.

Court in the Second Judicial Department, entered upon an order

made at the May Term, 1893, which affirmed a judgment in favor

Soli cito rs : I /a1\ 1/d . I.

of the plaintiff, entered upon a decision of the C'ourt on trial al

/ ;:7ri11 a11 .

Circuit without a jury.

Ji.ldrcd & Ri,anold.

A lucui. of the case on a former appeal appears in 120 N. Y.

658.

This action was l)rouglit upon an alleged agreement made by

defendants for a valuable consideration, to jiay to plaintiff the

amount of an indebtedness of the firm of Charles Spruce & Co.

to it.

On October 30. 1882, said firm, being financially embarrassed,

TIC E F IRST ::\ .\T I O:\ .\ L n .\ i\ K,

R e p o ne! nt ,

t:'S .

IL\ L \ IER . cl

al. ,

A ppellants ( I 95 ) .

confessed judgment to defendants for various sums due them and

for amounts owing to other parties. The statement on wdiich the

'4-t X. Y . 43 2 ; 39 · . E. 33r.
. \ppea l from juclg rn nt o f th e C ' 11 ral T' rm of th ' ,' upr ' m e
·o urt in th e 'eco ncl Judi cial D partm nt , ent r cl u1 nan o rcl r
mad a t the fa y T rm, 1 93, \\·hi ch affirm cl a jud o-rn ent in favor
f th e pla intiff, e nter ed upon a clcc i i n of th' ' urt o n trial al
' ircui t w ith ut a jury .
• \ 11ie 111.
f th e ca
n a fo rm r a ppeal appear in 1 2 0 • . Y.

65 .
Thi action w a. bro u ·ht upo n an all g d ag r m nt mad by
def n la nts [o r a valua bl
0 11 id rati o n. t
pay t o plaintiff th
a m un t of a n in 1 bt ln
of th e firm f harl
1 rue
l it.
d,
O n Oc toh r 3 le ~, aid firm, b in o- finan c ially mbarra
cl j uclr-. m ' nt t cl f n !ant f r vanou um lu th m and
c n fc
f r a mo un t. \\·in g to o ther parti . . Th tat m nt n whi h the
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judgiiient was entered, under the head of "Liahihties assumed,"

set forth, among other items, the following: "Money due by

Charles Spruce & Co. to First National Bank of Sing Sing on

overdraw account, $1556.47.''

The court found that defendant made an absolute, uncondi-

tional promise to pay plaintiff's debt.

Further facts are stated in the opinion.

Calrin Frost, for appellants.

Francis Larkin, for respondent.

Finch, J. What constitutes an original promise, upon which

the Statute of Frauds does not operate, and which therefore may

j uclgm nt wa ' nterecl, un I r th heacl of "Lia! iii ti
a urned,''
t f rth , among th r item , th f llowing: "Money du by
harl
'pru c & CJ . to Fir t .l\ational ank of 11w
111
on
ov rdra w account, $155 47.''
The ourt fo und th at defendant made an ab Jut , uncondi tional pr mi e to pay plaintiff d bt.
F urth er fa t are tatecl in th op11110n.

be valid and eft'ectual without a waiting, is fairly settled in one

direction at least. Wherever the facts show that the debtor has

C ah·ill Frost, fo r app llants.

transferred or delivered to the promisor, for his own use and ben-

efit, money or property in consideration of the latter's agreement

Fra ll cis Larlii11) for r e pondent.

to assume and pay the outstanding debt, and he, thereupon, has

promised the creditor to pay, that promise is original, upon the

ground that by the acceptance of the fund or property under an

agreement to assume and pay the debt the promisor has made that
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debt his own, has become primarily liable for its discharge, and has

assumed an independent duty of payment irrespective of the liabil-

ity of the principal debtor. Acklcy v. Parmcnter, 98 N. Y. 425 ;

VVhitc V. Rintoul, 108 id. 222>. In such a case the debt has become

that of the new^ party promising ; his promise is not to pay the debt

of another, but his own ; as between him and the primary debtor

the latter has become practically a surety entitled to require the

payment to be made by his transferee. The consideration of the

primary debt, by the transfer of the money or property into which

that consideration had been in effect merged, may be said to have

been shifted over to the new promisor, who thereby comes under a

dutv of payment as obvious as if original consideration had passed

directly to him.

The question before us therefore is whether the promise of

the defendants, made to the bank, to pay the delit due it from Leary

& Spruce, was founded uix)n such a transfer of property as I have

above described, and thus was original, or whether it was not so

founded, and must be for that reason deemed collateral.

We are bound to assume upon the findings that the promise

to pay was absolute, and clean of condition or contingency. The

Fr~ II) ]. \\hat con titute an original promis , upon which
the tatut of Fraud doe not op rat , and which therefore may
be valid and effectual with out a writin g, is fairly ettled in one
dir ction at least. \i\!hercver the facts show that the debtor bas
tran ferr cl or delivered to the promi or, fo r his mvn u e and benefit, m oney or property in consideration of the latter' agreement
to a um and pay the out ta ndin g debt, and he, ther upon, ha
promi eel the creditor to pay, that promi e is orig inal , upon the
ground that by th e acceptance of the fund or property und r an
agreem nt to a ume and pay the cl bt the promisor ha made that
debt hi own, ha become primarily liable fo r it di charge , and bas
a urned an independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of th principal debtor. .rlc/?fc·y v. Par1lle11ter) 98 ~. Y. 4-5;
T,Yhite v. Ri7lto11l) 108 id. 223. In such a ca e the debt has become
that of th ne\\ party promi ing; his promi e i not to pay th e debt
of another. but his own ; a between him and the primary debtor
the latter ha becom e practically a surety entitled to require the
paym ent to be mad e by hi tran feree. The consideration of the
primary debt, by the tran fer of the money or property into which
that con icl eration had been in effect merged, may be sa id to ha ve
been shifted over to the new promi or, who th ereby come und er a
duty of payment as obviou a if ori g inal considerati on had pas ed
directly to him.
Th question befo r u therefo r i ,,·hether the promi e of
the defendant , made to th e bank, to pay th debt du e it from L eary
& pruc , wa fo und ed upon such a tran sfer of property a I have
above de cribed, and thu was original , or wheth er it wa not o
founded. and mu t be f r that rea on deemed collat ral.
W e ar bound t a um e upon th e finding that th e promi e
to pay wa ab olute, an 1 lean of ~onditi on or contingency. The
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question whether it was made at ah was sevcrel\- Htigated, and

depended upon the conclusion to be drawn from testimony full of

violent contradictions, and we are not at liberty to review the deter-

mination of fact which affirms that the promise to pay was in truth

made, and was absolute in its terms as sworn to by the witnesses

on die part of the plaintiit. As to the substance of the agreement

between the defendants and the primary debtors, there is also con-

tradiction. The former assert that their assumption of the debt

went no further than a consent to pay it out of the proceeds of the

debtor's property after the discharge of their own debt, or in other

words, that their agreed liability was to pay plaintiff only out

of proceeds when realized, and even then out of any possible excess

remaining over and alnnc their own debt, if that is true, they

were under no present duty to pay the bank when the promise was

made ; the debt had not become theirs ; might never become theirs ;

and so their verbal promise to the bank was purely collateral and

to answer for the del:)t of another. That proposition was quite

distinctly held in Ackley v. Parmcnter, supra, and upon the author-

ity of Belknap v. Bender, 75 N. Y. 446, which disclo.sed an agree-
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ment simply to pay out of proceeds when realized, and so far as

sufficient. On this branch of the case the inquiry turns upon the

facts, and the findings fail to disclose any such agrement, but

establish the contrary. They determine diat for a valuable con-

sideration, and by an agreement with Leary and Spruce, the de-

fendants agreed to pay the plaintiff the debt due to it. This find-

ing is free of any conditions, and imports an absolute agreement to

pay at once and in full, and so negatives the defendants' version of

the facts. Tt is sustained by the testimony of the plaintift''s wit-

nesses, and is stronglv corroborated by the form of the confession

of judgment which the defendants' attorney drew, which they

.accepted, upon which they issued an execution, and which provides

for an assumption of the liank dd)t absolutely and without condi-

tion. All the re(iuisites of an original promise, unaffected by the

Statute of Frauds, were thus explicitly embraced in the findings,

^xcei)t one. It is not in ternis or expressly found that the consid-

eration, described simply as valuable, was, beyond that, such a

■consideration as would avoid the statute because it consisted of a

transfer to the defendants for their own use and benefit of the

■debtors' property. That fact is involved in the finrlings. since it

is essential to the legal conclusion, which cannot stand without it.

W't may look into the evidence, therefore, to see whether it would

qu . ti n wh ct h r it "a, made at all wa: ·cv ' rely !itigat 1, and
clcp ndecl upon th e ·onclu ion to b ' clra,,·n fr om l e tim ony full of
vi I nt contra liction , and w arc n t at liberty t r evic" th e cl t rm ination o f fa ct " ·hich affirm that th promi ·e to 1 ay "a · in truth
mad e, and wa · ab ·o lutc in it t rm a · w rn Lo by th ' witn
on th ' part o f the plaintiff.
to the ub tanrc of th ' ai:.,r ·em nt
b ' t" en th e d ' fendant an I th primary debtor ·, ther , i · al o contradi ·tion. The f nrm r a
rt that their a ss umption f th l 1 t:
" cnt no furth er than a con ent t pay it out of the 1 r c ' cl of th
cl ·btor· pr perty after the.: di charo- f th ir own debt, r in oth r
worcl , that th eir aoTeed liability was t pay plaintiff only out
o f procc d wh n r 'aliz cl, and ven th n o ut f any po ible exec
r emaining ov r and al ov ' their own d ' bl. lf that i true, th y
\\·ere under no pre ent duty to pay the bank when the promi e wa
mad ' ; the <lei t had not become th ir ; might n v ' r becom their ;
an d s th ir v rbal promi e to the bank was pur ly collateral and
to an ' \\' r for th
debt f another. That propo ition wa iuite
c li~tinctly h ld in Acli!ley v. Par111c1Lter, supra and up n th auth rity o f B cllrnap v. Bender, 75 .. T. Y. -1 -16, which di clo. eel an ao-r m ent simply to pay out f 1 roe 1 when realized, and o far a
ufficient.
n thi branch f the ca th inquiry turn upon th
fact . and th e fin ling fail to cli cl
any uch agr m nt, but
e ~tahli h th
ontrary. Th y d t rmin that for a valuable
nsiclcrati on, :rncl by an agreement with Leary and 1 ruce. th d fcndant ao-re cl to pay th ' plaintiff th debt due t it. 1 hi :finding i free of any conditio ns. ancl import an ab olut ' ao-r rn nt to
pay at one and in foll, an cl so n 'gativ s tlie d f ' ndant v r i n f
th c fact s. It is ustain cl by th ' te timony f the plaintiff' witnc . se: . and i · , trongly co rrobo rated by the form f th conk ion
u i juclgm nt which the cl ,fenclant ' attorn y clr \\' which th y
ace ·pte I, upon which they i, . u ' cl an :x cutio n. and whi h Ir vicl
for an a um1 tion o f th' hank cl ht ab olut ly and with ut
nditi on . . \11 th requi s ite of an original pr mis ', unaff t cl by the
, tatut o f Frauds, \\'Cr' tlrn ·:xplicitly cmbra cl in th findino- ,
ex cpl one . ft i not in t ' nn or x1 n \ ly f und that th c n idera tion, clc, cribcd simply a valuabl , wa , b ·y n 1 that, u h a
tatut 1 cau
it
n i t I f a
c()n . . icl •rati on a, \\' ul 1 av i 1 th
tran s f T to the cl ' fondant f r their wn u ~ an 1 b 11 fit of the
debtor: ' pro1 rty. That fa t i inv Iv cl in the fincli1w
in e it
i_ , , ential to th 1'gal con 1Ll i n, wh i h an not tand without it.
\\- · mav look into th
vic1 11 • t11 r f r . to ee " ·h th r it would
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have sustained such a finding if it had been expHcitly made, and

thereupon assume the fact in support of the judgment. {Ogden v.

Alexander, 140 N. Y. 356.)

I can find in the proof no express agreement in words trans-

ferring the real and personal estate of the firm to the defendants,

but that there was such a transfer in fact is abundantly established

and beyond any reasonable doubt. The situation appears to have

been this. Leary and Spruce were manufacturers of files. The

defendants in New York were the regular purchasers at established

rates, of their whole product. The manufacturers became seriously

indebted to their vendees in the progress of the business, and as

security therefor had given to them a mortgage on their real

estate for $2,500, dated in 1876, and payable in one year; a second-

mortgage on the same land for $5,000, dated in April, 1882, and

payable in one year ; and, as collateral to the last-named security,

a chattel mortgage for $5,000 covering all machinery and personal

property used in the manufacture of files. The stock on hand and

the equity of the mortgagors still remained to them. There was

due, or to become due, on these securities about the sum of $7,400
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at the date of the final arrangement of October, 1882, assuming

that all the debt created prior to their dates was protected by the

mortgages. But an added indebtedness, not covered by the securi-

ties, had later accrued in the form of two notes and one indorse-

ment, amounting to about $4,200, no part of which had matured

on October 30, 1882. On that day the debtors announced to the

defendants their inability to pay. Of course the statement created

alarm. Xone of the mortgages secured future advances, and the

defendants found themselves unsecured creditors to the amount

of over $4,000. The chattel mortgage was not due and contained

no danger clause permitting an immediate seizure. The whole

stock on hand, manufactured and unmanufactured, was encum-

bered by no lien, and that and the equity under the mortgages be-

longed to the debtors, was open to attack and could be disposed of

by the firm. They estimated the entire value of their property at

$16,000, which was the footing of their last preceding inventory,

and claimed it to be sufficient, not only to pay the defendants in

full but also the bank and certain other creditors whom they wished

to protect. They were talking of an assignment, but assured the

defendants that they were ready to give them a bill of sale of all

their propertv. or any other security, provided that the bank and

other named creditors were protected. The defendants agreed to

have u tain d uch a findin g if it had been explicitly made, an I
thereupon a um the fact in upport of the judgment. ( 0 gdcll v.
Alexander, 140 N. Y . 356.)
1 can find in the proof n expre aoTeement in word lransferrin<::>· th e r al and per nal e tate of the firm to the def ndant ,
bu t that there wa uch a tran fer in fact is abundantl y e tabli bed
and beyon I any reasonable doubt. The situation appear to have
1 een thi . Leary and pruce were manufacturers of fi le . The
defendant in Xe\\· York w re the regular purchasers at tablished
rates, of th eir whole product. T he manufacturers became eriou ly
indebted to their vendees in the progres of the bu ine , and a
ecurity th refor had g iven to them a mortgage on their r al
e tate fo r 2,500, dated in 1876, and payable in one yea r ; a econd·
mortgage on the same land fo r $5,000, elated in pril , 1882, a nd
payable in one year ; and, as collateral to the la t-named security,
a chattel mortgage fo r 5,000 covering all machinery and per onal
property u eel in the manufacture of files. The tock on hand and
the equity of the mortgago r till remaine l to th m . There \\·a
clue, or to become due, on the e securities about th e sum of $7,-fOO
at the date of the final arrangement of October, 1882, assuming
that all the debt created prior to their date was protected by the
mortgag s. B ut an added indebtedness, not covered by the securitie , ha l lat r accrued in the form of two notes and one indor ement, amounting to about . -J.,200, no part of which had matured
on October 30, 1882. On that day the debtor announced to t he
defendants their inability to pay. Of cour e the statement created
alarm. ~one of the mortgages secured futur e advances, and the
defendant found them selves unsecured creditors to th e amount
of over $4,000. The chattel mortgage was not due and contained
no danger clause permitting an immediate seizure. The whole
tock on hand, manufactured and unmanufactured, wa encumbered by no lien, and that and the quity und er the mortgage be longed to the debtors , v\ as open to attack and could be di posed of
by the firm. They estimated the entire value of their property at
16,ooo, which was the footing of their la t preceding inventory,
and claimed it to be sufficient, not only to pay the defendants in
full but al o the bank and certain other creditors whom they wished
to protect. They were talking of an a ignment, but a ured the
defendant that th e) were ready to give th em a bill of ale of all
their property, or any other security, provided that the bank and
other named creditor were protected. The defendant ao-reed to
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assume and pay those debts, and chose instead of a l)ill of sale to-

take a confession of judgment. In thai the debtors swore that

they were justly indeljted to the defendants in a sum made up of

the total debt to the latter, and of the debts to other named cred-

itors, which the defendants had assumed and agreed to jiay. Had

the transaction stopped at this ])oint it would be difficult to support

the promise to the bank, unless upon the ground of an intended

purchase by the defendants of the debtor's assets, the price of

which was secured by the confession of judgment. lUit it did not

stop there. The defendants could at once have levied upon the

whole pc^rsonal property, and advertised a sale of the real estate,

but all that was needless, "because the debtors at once turned over

•the whole property to the defendants, and put them in entire and

complete possession, for their own use and benefit. Leary aban-

doned it utterl\- and went away. Spruce remained as the hired

servant of the defendants, working for wages which they cut down

at their pleasure, obeying their orders, shipping the whole manu-

factured product to them in New York, drawing on them for the

pay roll, and treating the property in all respects as theirs. Not a

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

vestige of it ever came back to the debtors. The latter were willing

to transfer it, as their offer of a bill of sale proves ; they did trans-

fer it, and in the light of the confession of judgment and the prom-

ise to the bank, it is impossil)le not to see that it w-as in considera-

tion of an agreement b\- the defendants to pay the specified debts.

I have not failed to consider the attempted explanation of

Chalmers and the argument about it of his counsel. The former

sought to put himself in the attitude of a tenant under Spruce as

landlord, to claim that his wages of $20 a week were in part for

rent, and to show that the goods were sold to him by Spruce as

before the failure. I'.ul the latter, though unwillingly, contro-

verterl the theon-, and Chalmers' own version of the facts does not

harmonize with the explanation made. The claim that Spruce was

to remain owner and work out the debts does not account for

Leary's abandonment of the ])ossession, nor Spruce's service for

wages, still less for the instant assumption and payment of all

expenses and exercise of complete control by the defendants. They

took all the products, and if they continued to keep the accounts

in the old wav it was but a natural measure of convenience in order

to separate the factory business from their own, and be able to

ascertain its ultimate resitlts. They took the confession of judg-

ment as a gtiard and protection against other creditors, and as a

a ·, umc a nd pay th ose cl ' bt , an 1 ·ho ·e in ·t 'a 1 of a bill of ·al totak' a co nks · ion of ju lg-111 nt. Jn that th d btors w r that
th 'Y wcr' ju ·tl y incl 'btc 1 t th ' defendants in a um ma le up of
the total cl 'bl to the latter, and f th 1 bt to th r named -r cl itor ·. ,,·hi ch th d ' fenclant · ha l as tun 1 and ao-r d t pay. Ha
the tran action Lopp cl al thi · point it wo uld be difficult to upport
th ' promi e l th e bank, unlcs upon th ' gro und of an intended
l ur ha e by th ' def ncl a nt s o f the d el tor· s a set , th pri
of
which \Yas ecurecl by the ·onfc . . ion of j ucl rn nt. Hut it lid not
top the r '. T he cl fo nd a nts could at nc ' have levied ur n the
tat ,
" ·ho le l c rso nal propert y. a ncl acl \' eri.i cl a sa l of th r al
1 u t a ll that \\·a s n edl e · , 1 eca u th d bt rs at nee turn l ov r
t h ' \\·h 1 property t th cl f nda nt s, a nd put them in ntir a nd
comp! te po c ion , for their o wn u
ancl benefit. L eary abandoned it titterl y and \\·ent a\\'ay.
' prucc r emain d a th hir d
rvant of th cld nd a nt , \\·orkin g fo r wag , which th y cut clown
at their i Jea urc, ol ying th ir or 1 r , hipping th wh l manufact ured I rocl uct to them in Kew York, drawing on them fo r the
pay roll, a nd tr ating th e p roperty in all r e pect a th ir . N t a
Y
tige of it e\' r cam back to th d ebtor . The latter w er willinoto tran fer it, a th ir offer o f a bill of ale pro\'e ; they lid tran f r it, and in th e lig ht of th confe ion of j ud 0 m ent a n I the pr m i e to the bank, it is i!nJ o ible not to ee that it wa in c n i l rati n of a n agTeem ent by th clef nclant to pay th e pecifi d cl bt .
I have not failed to con ider the attempted explanation of
halmer and th argument about it of hi c un I. Th f rmer
oug ht to put him elf in th e attit ud e of a t nant uncl r pru
a
Jan ell rel, t claim that hi wao- s of $20 a w ek w r in part for
r ent, a nd to ho w that the good s wer
lei t him by pruc as
bdor th e fai lure. Dut the latter, th ug h unwillin o-ly, controv rterl th th ry, a n cl halm er_' \\'n YCL i n f th fa t 1 e n t
harm nize with th e cx1 lanati n made. Th claim that pruc wa
t r m ai n own r ancl work out th d bt do
n t account for
L a ry' aLan 1 nm ent f th ~ po
r pmc
ervic for
" -age. , till !es fo r th in Lant a umpti n ancl paym nt of all
xp 'n
ancl exer cise f mp! te c rntrol by th e cl fendant . They
took a ll th pr duct , and if th y c ntinu l t k p th a c unt
in th
lei way it wa but a natural m ea ure .f c nvcn i n e in rder
parat th fa · to ry bu in
fr m th eir \rn, a n cl be abl to
nf ion f jud a. rtain its u ltimat r ult . Th y to k th
m n t a a gi1a rd a n 1 I r t ti n aga in t th r er clit r. , and a a
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defense of the transfer made to tlieni. They issued no execution

at once because that was needless to attain possession, but (Hd issue

it later when their title was threatened. That all this was done

upon an under.standing and agreement in accord widi the facts

seems to me a natural and necessary inference.

Nor have I overlooked the fact that the confession of judg-

ment was set aside on the motion of a junior creditor. The defend-

ants' attorney, after a consultation with his clients, accepted short

notice of the motion, and then suffered it to be granted by default.

The probabilities are that the proceeding was collusive, but if not,

it was one of the risks which the defendants assumed and is imma-

terial to the result.

1 have reached my conclusion without reliance upon the pre-

vious decision of this court on the first appeal (120 N. Y. 650),

and without any reference to the doctrine of Laurence v. Fo.\%

which has played some part in the discussion. The opinions of the

second division on the former appeal in the case indicate that a

majority of the court did not agree upon any one proposition dis-

cussed. I should treat that judgment as decisive if it had decided,
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but the only authoritative determination was the order for a new

trial. I do not deem the doctrine of Lazvrcnce v. Fox involved in

this controversy. That doptrine applies where no express promise

has been made to the party suing, but he claims the right to rest

upon a promise between other parties having respect to the debt

due to him and as having been made for his benefit. It struggles

to obviate a lack of privity upon equitable principles, but is need-

less and has no proper application where the privity exists, and a

direct promise has been made upon which the action may rest.

Here we have the promise, and if it is valid the wdiole problem

is solved.

I think the promise proved and found rested not only upon a

valuable consideration, but one of such character as to make the

promise original and save it from the condemnation of the Statute

of Frauds.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur, except Haight, J., not sitting.

Judgment affirmed.

clefen e of th e tran sfer mad e to th 111 . They iss u d no 'xec uli on
at once becau that wa s nc di e, io attain pos c ·sion, hut did i · ·uc
it lat r wh n th eir titl e wa threatened . That all th i was clone
upon an 1111 l e r .s tandin ~- and agreement in accord with the fac t
eem to m a natural and nece ary inference.
X or have I overlooked the fact tbat th e con fess ion of judt::;m ent ·w a set aside on the m otion of a junior cr editor. T he defer,dant ' attorney, after a consultation with hi clients, accepted hort
noti e of th e m otion , and th en uffer cl it to be g ranted by default.
The probabilities are that th e proceedin g was collusive, but if not,
it wa s one of the risks which the defendant assum ed and is immaterial to the result.
I have reached my conclu i n without r eliance upon the pr>eviou cleci ion of thi court on th e fir t appeal ( 120 N . Y. 650 ) ,
and without ,1ny r.~ f e r e nc c to the loctrin e of Lac.err en cc v. F o.r)
v,rhich ha played som e part in the di cus sion. T'he opinion of the
econd divi ion on the form er appeal in the case indicate that a
maj ority of the court did not agree upon any one propo ition di scuss cl. I should treat that juclgrnent a decisive if it had deciclccl ,
but th e only authoritative determination was th e order fo r a new
trial. I do not deem the doctrine of La'wrcnce v. F ox involved in
this controver y. That do ~trine applies where no expre promi se
has been mad to the party uing, but he claims the right to re ·t
upon a promise between other parties having r espect to the debt
due to him and as having been mad for hi benefit. It strugg l
to obviate a lack of privity upon equitabl e principl es, but i needless and has no proper application where the privity exi t , and a
direct promise has be n made upon which th e action may rest.
Here we have the promise, and if it is valid the whole problem
i solved.
I think the promi e proved and found rested not only upon a
valuabl e consideration , but one of such character as to make the
promi e original and ave it from the cond emnati on of the Statute
of Frauds.
Th

judgment should be affirm d, with cost

11 concur, except HAIGHT,
Judgment affirmed.
12

J.,

not sitting.
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Morris ct al. vs. Osterhout axd Hughart (1884).

55 Mich. 262; 21 X. W. 339.

?\IoRRIS

ct al.

'L'S.

0 ' TERIIOUT .\:· 1 llUGHART

(18 -t ).

, Assumpsit. Defendants bring error. Affirmed.

55 ~Iich. 262;

T. J. O'Brien, for appellants.

21

'X. \\'. 339.

Cooper & Winsor, for appellees.

Sherwood, J. The plaintiffs, who are millers residing at

Reed City, brought their action of assumpsit against the defend-

u::.rP

IT.

ef ndant l ring error.

Affirmed.

ants, who are engaged in the lumber business and reside at Grand

Rapids, to recover for a quantity of flour and mill-feed, amount-

ing to the sum of $482.92. James H. Carey had a contract with

defendants whereby he was to do sawing and make shingles for

them at Careyville, in Lake county, where the defendants had a

T. J. O'Brien, for appellant .
Cooper & TT'insor, for appellee .

quantity of pine timber. 'Die tlour and feed was purchased by

Carey and used b}- him while doing the sawing for defendants,

and when he made the purchase he told the plaintiffs that the

goods were for the defendants ; that he was at work for them, and

that they had ordered him to get the goods for them. The plaint-

iffs seek to hold the defendants liable under the authority, which

was verbal, thus claimed to have l^een given Carey to make the
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purchase, and a subsequent promise claimed to have been made

by Hughart to pay for the goods, which, however, is denied by

the latter. The defendants claim that by the terms of their agree-

ment with Carey they were under no obligation to supply the goods

or to make advances to Carey, and that they never authorized him

to make the purchase on their account.

The questions at the circuit were mostly those of fact, and

were submitted to the jury, who, under the rulings and charge of

the court, rendered their verdict for the plaintiffs for the amount

claimed. The defendants bring error, and the rulings and charge

of the court are now before us for review.

At the close of the trial the defendants' counsel asked the

court to direct a verdict for the defendants. The request was

refused.

We do not think the record presents a case for the instruc-

tion asked. Carey swears, in substance, that the defendants gave

him authority to make the purchase on their credit, and the credi-

bilitv of his testimonv was for the iurv. If he stated trulv the

Th plaintiff , who are miller r iding at
Recd 'ity, brought their action of a umpsit again t th defendant , who are engaged in the lumber bu ine and re icle at Grand
Rapid , to recover for a quantity of flour and mill-feed, amountinO' to the um of 482.92. Jame H. arey had a contract with
cl f nclant whereby he wa lo do ·awing and make hingle for
them at Careyville, in Lake county, where the defendant had a
quantity of pine timber. Tht Aour and feed \Ya purcha ed by
'arey and u ed by him whil doing the awing for defendant
and when he made the purcha e he told the plaintiff that the
goods were for the defendant ; that he wa at work for them, and
that they had rclered him to get the goods for them. Th plaintiff eek to hold the defendant liable under the authority, which
wa verbal, thu claimed to have been given Carey to make the
purcha e, and a sub equent promi e claimed to have been made
by Hughart to pay for the good , which, however, is denied by
the latter. The defendant claim that 1 y the term of their agreement with Carey th y were under no obligation to upply th good
or to make advance to arey, and that they never auth riz d him
to make the purcha e on their account.
The que tion at the circuit were mo tly tho e of fact, and
were submitted to the jury, \\·ho, und er the ruling and charge of
the court, rendered their verdict for th plaintiffs for the amount
claimed. The d fenclants bring rror, and the rulings and charge
of the court are now befor u for revievY.
t the cl e of the trial the defcn lant ' coun el a ked the
court to direct a verdict for the defendant . The reque t was
r fu ed.
\Ve do not think th record pre enl a case for the in truction a keel.
ar y wear , in ub tanc , that the defendant gave
him authority t0 make the purcha on their credit, and th credibility of hi te timony \Ya for the Jury. If he tated truly the
'nER\\'OOD . ].
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direction sworn to by him as coming from defendant Hughart,

the jur)' would be warranted in finding that the defendants au-

thorized the purchase. The promise would be by defendants and

not by Carey, and therefore not within the Statute of Frauds.

It would be a debt contracted upon their own promise, and not a

liability for the debt of another.

It is alleged as error that the court refused to give defend-

ants' second, eighth and ninth requests to charge, which requests

were as follows :

"Second. If the jury finds from the evidence that the goods

were charged, shipped and billed to Carey; that no bill was ever

sent to the defendants ; that the plaintiffs took an order on the

defendants for the amount of the bill, and afterwards presented

this order and requested its acceptance and payment, and still

retain this order — such evidence is inconsistent with the claim

now made by the plaintiffs, and they cannot recover in this action."

''Eighth. Under the undisputed facts in this case, it appears

that Carey is still liable to the plaintiffs for the amount of the

^oods in question, and the plaintiffs cannot recover in this action."
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"Nuitli. It is not sufficient for the jury to find that Hughart

authorized Carey to buy in their name and upon their credit. They

must also find from the evidence that the credit was given to

Osterhout and Hughart and not to James H. Carey. And in

arriving at a conclusion on this point they should consider all the

acts and conduct of the plaintiffs : such as the entry in their books,

the shipping of the goods, the taking of the order, their repeated

efforts to collect it, and their present possession of it."

The second and eighth requests, we think, were properly

refused. The facts stated in the second request exclude the idea

that the inconsistency claimed for them is susceptible of explana-

tion, but such is not the law. The eighth request seeks to have

the court state what the undisputed facts show. What they show

was a question for the jury, and in this case cannot be considered

disconnected with the other testimony in the case bearing on the

same point.

The circuit judge in his charge stated to the jury that the

first proposition for the plaintiffs to establish was that Carey was

authorized by defendants to purchase the goods for them ; and

second, that plaintiffs, when Carey made the purchase, relied en-

tirely upon defendants, and not upon Carey, for the pay ; and if

they found in the affirmative of these propositions the plaintiffs

1directioil , worn to by him a coming fr m def ndant Hughart,
th jury \\' uld be warrant d in finclino- that the def ndant authorized th purcha . Th pr mi e would be by <l fendant and
not by arey, and th r fore not within the tatute of Fraud .
It w uld b a debt contracted upon their own promise, and not a
liability f r the debt of an ther.
It i all g d a error that the court refused to give defend.ant ' econd, eio-hth and ninth reque t to charo-e, which requests
were a follow :
"Second. If the jury finds from the evidence that the goods
were charo·ed, hipped and billed to Carey; that no bill was ever
ent to the defendants; that the plaintiff took an order on the
defendant for the amount of the bill, and afterwards pre ented
thi order and reque ted its acceptance and payment, and till
retain this ord r - uch evidence is inconsistent with the claim
now made by the plaintiff , and they cannot recover in this action."
"Ei uht/1. Under the undisputed fact in thi case, it appears
that arey i till liable to the plaintiffs for the amount of the
goods in que tion, and the plaintiff cannot recov r in this action."
" inth. It i not sufficient for the jury to find that Hughart
authorized arey to buy in their name and upon their credit. They
mu t al o find from the evidence that the credit was given to
Osterhout and Hughart and not to James H. Carey. And in
:arriving at a conclu ion on this point they should con ider all the
.act and conduct of the plaintiff : uch a the entry in their books,
the hipping of the goods, the taking of the order, their repeated
effort to collect it, and their pre ent po session of it."
The second and eighth reque ts, ·we think, were properly
refu ed. The facts tated in the second request exclude the idea
that the incon i tency claimed for them i · usceptible of explanation, but uch is not the law. The eighth request seek to have
the court state what the undisputed facts how. What they show
wa a que ·tion for the jury, and in this ca e cannot be considered
di connected \Yith the other te timony in the case bearing on the
· ame point.
The circuit judge in hi charge tated to the jury that the
first propo ition for the plaintiff to establi h wa that Carey was
authorized by defendants to purchase the goods for them; and
second. that plaintiff , when Carey made the purchase, relied entirely upon defendant , and not upon Carey, for the pay; and if
they found in the affirmative of the e propo ition the plaintiffs
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would be entitled to recover; if not, the defendants must prevail.

He further told them that, in solving these propositions, they must

take into consideration all the testimony in the case, including the

\\·m il d be c ntitl d to r -m· r ; if n t, th d f ' ncl a nt mu t 1 r ail.
11 , furth e r to ld th m th a t, in !Yin g th e. 1 r po iti n , th y mu t
ta ke into con · i I ' rati n all th e t tim o n y in th ca e, in -Ju lin O" th
3

actions of the parties. We think ihcsc charges sufficiently cover

the substance of the defendants' ninth request.

We have carefully examined tlir remainder of the charge

excepted to by the defendants' counsel and do not find any error

therein. The facts were for the jury, and whether the court

below or this court would or would not have come to the conclu-

sion reached upon the testimony is not for our consideration. We

find no error in the record committed by the court, and here our

duty ends.

The judgment must be affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.

B.\i.o\\i.\ xx Huiks (1884).

73 ^^a. 739.

L. S. Baldwin brought suit against Charles Hiers, and John

act i n s o f th ' J a rti ' S . \ \ ' think th ' S' -ha rg s . ufft -i ' nll y c
r
th ·uh ·ta nc oi th d ef nclant ' ninth r qu t.
\\ . h ave -ar ' fully ·x amin cl th ' r maincl ' r of th e -harge
e.· ·eptecl to b\· th clcfencl a n L · conn el an 1 cl o n t fincl a n y rro r
urt
t h er ' in. Th fa ct \\' re fo r th e jury, and wh th r th
belo\\" r thi co urt \\·o uld o r w o uld no t have com to th c n lu ion r a h cl upo n th te. ti111 0 11 y is n o t fo r o ur co n. id e ra ti n. \\ ',
find n err r in th r ecor l - mmilt l by the ·o urt , and h re o ur
duty cn cL.

A. Hiers, as guarantor, in a justice's court, on March 22, 1881.

The account attached to the summons was in the name of Charles
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Hiers. The justice entered judgment for the plaintiff, an appeal

was entered, the jury found for the plaintiff, and a certiorari was

Th

ju !g m nt mu . t be affirm cl.

T h e o th e r Ju ti

c ncurr d .

sued out by the defendant, John A. lliers. The evidence for the

plaintiff on the trial in the justice's court was. that Charles lliers

was the minor son of John A. lliers; tliat the latter told ])laintiff

to let Charles and another son have goods and charge them to the

one who purchased them ; to let them have goods and he (John A.)

D .\IJ)\\' J >: 'L'S.

ll1rns (I 8-t ) .

would see that the plaintiff got the money for them ; and the goods

were furnished accordingly.

73 Ca. 73 ·

Defendant, lolni A., denied any such agreement, or that he

owed tile account, and testified that the son worked for himself

during the year. The son denied the correctness of the account,

and asserted that he purchased most of the goods charged, but

that some of the account was really for whisky, though charged

under other names.

The court sustained the certiorari and ordered a new trial.

Plaintiff excepted.

L. ~ . Baldwin I ro ught uit again t ' harl c Hier , and
TJ ier . a . g uaranto r, in a ~ u ti - '. co urt, o n ::-rarch -~.

J
1

hn
c I.

Th a ccount atta ch ed t th ' s umm on s wa s in th name o f ' harl
1 Ji rs . Th e ju stic
n tc r 'cl judgment for th ' i laintiff. an appeal
\Ya
nte red, th ' jury f uncl f r th e plaintiff, ancl a certiorari wa
. u cl o ut by th cl ·f "ndant, J o hn . \ . lli er s . Th ' cvi lenc ' f r th
plaintiff on the trial in th e ju. ti- ·s -o urt wa . that ' harl 'S Hi r
wa. th min r so n o f J ohn . \. Hier. ; that th ~ latt r told i laintiff
to 1't ' harl . and an o th r · n hav ' g oo 1 an l harg th ' 111 t th
o n e wh pur ha ~ d th em; l let th m hav
o cl and h CJ hn .)
w ulcl . c that th e plaintiff g- )l th m n y f r th m: ancl th g cL
were forni . Ii cl ac rcl ingly.
D1..·f nclanl, J hn . \., clcni I any u h a O"r cm nt, r that he
o w ·cl th ' a cco unt, and le tifi l that th
on w rk cl f r him lf
clurin · the ye ar. Th e
n cl ni cl th
rre tn '
f th a c unt,
and a.. rt cl that h pur ha cl rn t f the g
char d, but
that . rn o f th a o unt wa r all y f r whi ky, th ugh har d
und er o th r nam .
Th
o urt s u tain 1 th certiorari and rel r I a n w trial.
Pl a in ti ff x -e pt d .
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T. H. Pickett, by brief, for plaintiff in error.

MEAD VS . \V TS

G. IV. Warzmck; L. C. Hoylc, by R. J. Jordan, for defendant.

Br,ANDFOR», Justice.

(t) The plaintiff sued the defendant in a justice's court as

g-uarantor, and obtained a verdict in his favor. The evidence

sliowed that the son of the defendant wished to purchase goods

from the plaintiff", and the defendant agreed if plaintiff would let

defendant's son have the goods he, defendant, would see it paid.

T. H. Piclutt, by brief, f r plaintiff in error.
G. TV. TV an 1ic l~; L. . If oyle, by R . J. Jordan, fo r defendant.
1 L~\ 1

DfORl, JU

ti c .

This was an original and not a collateral undertaking. If the

premise had been that he would pay the debt if his son did not,

then '?uch a promise would be void unless reduced to writing; it

would be a promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage

of another; but an undertaking that if plaintiff would let de-

fendant's son have goods, he would see it paid, or would pay it him-

self, is an original undertaking, founded on a sufficient considera-

tion, and is good and binding on defendant.

(2) And the defendant being sued in a justice's court as

guarantor would make no difference, as there are no pleadings in

that court.
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(3) We think the evidence was sufficient to sustain the ver-

dict and judgment in the justice's court, and would have been sat-

isfied if the court below had allowed the same to stand, but as the

court thought proper to reverse and set aside the judgment of the

justice's court, we will not interfere, as this is equivalent to the

first grant of a new trial. The court below is nearer the parties

and witnesses than we are. The testimony is conflicting, and we

( r ) T he plaintiff u d the defen !ant in a justice' co urt as
~:ua ra nto r and obtained a verdict in hi favor.
T he vidence
.._how d that the on of the d fe nclant wished to p urcha e goods
fro m the plaintiff, and the d f n lant ag reed if plaintiff would let
defendant's son have the goods be, defendant, would ee it paid.
Thi:: wa an orig inal and not a collateral undertaking. If the
p ro m s had been that he woul d pay the debt if his on did not,
t hen c;uch a promi e would be void uni ss reduced to writing · it
wo Gld be a promi e to answer fo r th debt, default or miscarriage
o f anoth er ; but an under taking that if plaintiff would let deicncld11t' on have good , he would ee it paid, or would pay it him. elf . i an ori a inal undertakin g, fo unded on a sufficient con ide rat ir_;1 , a nd is good and bin ling on defendant.

will let the judgment of the court below stand.

Judgment affirmed.

Mead, Mason & Co. v. Watson (1885).

57 Vt. 426.

Assumpsit. Heard on a referee's report, December Term,

(- )
nd the defendant being sued in a justice's court as
guarantor ·would make no diffe rence, a there a re no pleadings in
that court.

1884, Taft, J., presiding. Judgment for the plaintiffs. The referee

found, that the plaintiffs were dealers in doors, windows, and ma-

( 3 ) W e think the evidence ·was sufficient to ustain the verdict and judgment in the justice's co urt, and would have been satisfied if the court below had allowed the same to stand, but a the
co urt thought p roper to rever. e and set a ide the judgment of th e
ju tice's court, we will not interfere, as this is equivalent to the
first grant of a new trial. T he court below i n arer the parties
a nd witnes es than \Ve ar . T he te timony i conflicting, and we
will let the judgment of the court below tand.
Ju dgment affirm ed.

\ IE

n,

MASON

& Co. v . \N.\T
57

o~

( r885 ).

t. ..j.26.

A SUMPSIT. H eard on a refere ' report, D ecember Term,
1884, T .\FT, J.. pr i ling. Judgment fo r the plaintiffs. The referee
fo und, that the plainti ff were dealer in door , window , and ma-
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terials for house furnishing; that ilic defendant, who was known

1.

G .\R.\XTY .\XD .

RETY HIP.

to be responsible, introduced Cameron to the plaintiffs ; that the

house, for which the articles were purchased, was situatec,! on the

defendant's land ; that the understanding was, that when the house

was completed, it was to be deeded to Cameron's wife ; that Cam-

eron abandoned the house before it was completed, and it was

finished by the defendants, who retained the title ; that the de-

fendant's contract with the plaintiffs was by parol. The other

facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

S. A/. Pingree, for the plaintiff's.

T. 0. Scavcr, for the defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Powers, J. The referee says the plaintiffs understood "that

whatever Cameron ordered for said house for the plaintiffs the

defendant would guarantee the payment of," and the plaintiffs-

t rial for hou
furni hing; that th' l f nclant, wh wa kn ' n
to b r pon ibl , introdu l 'amcron t th plaintiff ; that the
h u c, for which the arti l e ~ w r purcha 1, wa ituate~ on the
<lefenclant' land; that the uncl r tan lin wa , that wh n th hou e
wa
mpl t I, it wa to be dccdc 1 to 'am ron' wif ; that amron aband nee! the hou
1 for it wa c mpl t 1, and it wa
fini h 1 by the defendant , who retain cl the title; that the 1 fendant' c ntra t with th plain ti ff wa by par 1. Th otherfact ar uffi ci ntl y tat 1 in the opinion.

"would not have sold said articles to Cameron except for this un-

derstanding, that the payment was guaranteed by the defendant."

Later on he says, "Those articles were all charged to Cameron on

plaintiffs' books ; and plaintiffs understood that they were to col-

'. Jl. Pi110-rce
.::.
' for the plaintiff · .
T. 0. ca'uer, f r the defendant.
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lect the same of said Cameron, if possible, and that the defendant

was only liable to pay the same in case the plaintiff's were unable

to make collections of Cameron.

The contract of the defendant therefore was collateral to the

contract of Cameron.

It is true that no debt existed against Cameron when the

defendant's promise was made. But the defendant only promised

to be responsible for a future, debt. His promise could only attach

to the principal obligation of Cameron, when that obligation came

into force. The defendant did not promise to pay primarily, but

only in case the plaintiff failed to collect of Cameron.

If the future primary liability of a principal is contemplated

as the basis of the promise of a guarantor, such promise is within

the Statute of Frauds, precisely as it would be if the liability ex-

isted when the promise was made. Brandt, Sur., § 6i ; Browne,

St. Fr., § 162; Matson v. Wharaui, 2 Term, 80.

Judgment reversed, and judgment on the report for defendant-

The opinion of th e court \Ya d liv red by
POWERS, J. The r feree ay the plaintiff und r to d 'that
whatever Cam r n orcl reel f r said h u e for the plaintiff the
def ndant would guarantee the paym nt of,'' and the plaintiffs"would n t have sold _ aid article to ameron xc pt for thi und r tanding, that the payment was g uaranteed by the def ndant.' ,.
Lat r on he ay , "Tho e articl were all charg d to ameron n
plaintiff ' b k ; and plaintiff under tood that they w re to c 1lect the amE: of aid ameron, if po sible, and that th defendant
wa only liabl to pay the ame in ca e the plaintiff w r unable
t make collection of ameron.
The contract of the defendant th refore wa collateral t the
contract f am ron.
It i ~rue that no del t exi t d again t am r n wh n the
defendant' pr mi wa mad . But the d fendant only promi d
t I e r spon ible for a future. d bt. His promis
uld nly attach
to th principal obli ation f ameron, wh n that obligation came
into fore . Th def ndant did not promi to pay primarily, but
only in ca the plaintiff fail l to ollect of ameron.
If th futur primary lial ility of a principal i c ntemplated
as th ba i of th promi of a ·uarant r, uch promis i w ithin
the tatute of Fraud , preci -ly a it would b if th liability exist d wh n th pr mi wa mad . Brandt,
6r; Browne,.
t. Fr.,
I 2 ; Ji atson v. TV /uzranz , 2 T rm,
Juclgment r v r e 1, an 1 ju 1 ment n th r p rt for cl f ndant.

JONF.S VS. BACON. 167

1U7

Jones, Appellant, 'i's. LIacon, as Surviving Executor, etc.,

Respondent (1895),

145 N. Y. 446; 40 N. E. 216.

Appeal from juclg-ment of the General Term of the Supreme

J o ..

E)

pp ·llant. 'i:'S .

n.\ · o~,

a

urviving Executor. etc.,

R e pondent (1895),

Court in the fifth judicial department, entered upon an order made

October 3, 1893, which denied a motion for a new trial and ordered

145 N. Y. -1--1-6;

judgment in favor of defendant entered upon an order non-suiting

plaintiff.

40

;-J.E. 216 .

This action was brought to recover damages for a breach of

an oral contract alleged to have been made by James McKechnie,

defendant's testator, to indemnify him in case of his indorsement

of certain notes made by one Kingsbury.

Upon the trial plaintiff called Kingsbury as a witness to prove

the alleged promise. His testimony on that subject was objected

to by defendant's counsel on the ground that the witness was in-

competent to testify in regard thereto under section 829 of the Code

of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff' thereupon produced and proved and

gave in evidence an instrument executed by plaintiff' under seal, by

the terms of which, in consideration of the sum of one dollar, he
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released Kingsbury from "all liability, responsibility or damages"

sustained or which might thereafter be sustained by him by reason

of his indorsement. This release was by an amended answer set

up as a defense.

The further material facts are stated in the opinion.

VVilliam H. Smith, for appellant.

Henry M FieJd and Frank Rice, for respondent.

Andrews, Ch. J. The oral promise of the defendant's tes-

tator to the plaintiff was, in substance, a promise of indemnity in

case the plaintiff would become indorser on the note of Kingsbury

to the banking firm of McKechnie & Co. for a debt of Kingsbury

to the bank. Tlie plaintiff thereupon indorsed the note of Kings-

bury to the bank, and has been compelled, to pay thereon the sum

of about $16,000, Kingsbury having made default and being in-

solvent. This is a statement of the facts in the simplest form, and

the question arises whether the oral promise by the defendant's

testator to indemnify the plaintiff' was void under the Statute of

Frauds, as being a promise to "answer for the debt, default or mis-

. . ppeal from jud gment of th e General Term of the upreme
Court in the fifth judicial department, en ter cl upon an order made
ctober 3. r893. which denied a motion fo r a new trial a nd ordered
judgment in favor of defendant entered upon an rcler non-su iting
plaintiff.
T hi action was broug ht to recover damages for a breach of
an oral contract alleged to have been made by J ames McKechnie,
defendant's testator. to indemnify him in ca e of hi indor ernent
of certain note made by one Kingsbury.
epon the trial plaintiff called Kingsbury a a witne s to prove
the alleged promise. His te timony on that subject was ob jected
to by defendant' coun el on the ground that th e witn s was incompetent to te tify in r ga rd thereto und er section 829 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff thereupon produced and proved and
gave in evidence an iiF trum nt executed by plaintiff under eal, by
th e term of which , in consid ration of the um of one dollar, he
r elea eel Kingsbury from ''all liability, responsibility or damages''
u tain e l or which might thereaft er be u tained by him by rea , n
of hi indor em ent. This release wa by an amend ed an wer et
up a a defense.
The further material facts are tated in the opinion.

TVilfia771 H . Smith , for appellant.
Henry JI.. Field and Fra llk Rire, for r e ponclent.
Ch. J. The oral promise of the defendant' ~es
tator to the plaintiff wa , in nbstance, a promise of indemnity in
ca e the plaintiff would becom e inclorser on the note of Ying bury
to the banking- firm of McKechnie & Co. fo r a lebt of King bury
to the bank. The plaintiff ther eupon indorsed the not of Kingsbury to the bank an d has been compellerl. to pay thereon the sum
of about $16,000 Kingsbury having mad default and being inolvent. T his i a tatement of the fact in th e simple t fo rm , and
the que ~ ti on arises ·whether the oral promi e by the defendant's
testator to indemnify the p laintiff ' a void un der the tatute of
Fraud , as being a promi .e to "answ r fo r the debt, default or mis_-\ N"DREWS,
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carriage of another person." (2 Rev. St. 135, Sec. 2, Sub. 2.)

This is no longer an open question in this state. It was decided in

Cliapiii V. Merrill, 4 Wend. 657, that a promise by one person tO'

indemnify another for becoming a guaranty for a third is not within

the statute and need not be in writing, and that the assumption of

the responsibihty was a sufficient consideration for the promise.

The doctrine of Cliapin v. Merrill was approved in Mallory v. Gil-

lett, 21 N. Y. 412, in Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 id. 250, and Tighe v.

Morrison, 116 id. 263, and in other cases in this court. The same

doctrine now prevails in the English courts. Thomas v. Cook,

8 Barn. & C. 728; Reader v. Kingham, 13 Com. Bench, X. S. 344;

Wildes v. Dudlow, L. R. 19 Eq. Cas. 198. We do not deem it

proper to reopen the discussion or to refer to cases where a different

view has prevailed. The court below considered the subject at

large, and the al)le opinion of Bradley, J., refers to many of the

cases on the subject.

The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to maintain an action

except for his act in releasing Kingsbury from his liability for the

money he was compelled to pay on account of the indorsement.
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The release was probably essential in order to enable the plaintiff

to make any proof of the agreement for indemnity, since he could

establish the promise only by Kingsbury, the plaintiff himself not

being a competent witness by reason of the death of the promisor

McKechnie, and there being no other person cognizant of the tran-

saction. By the release Kingsbury was discharged from all respon-

sibility to the plaintiff. The plaintiff having paid the debt in part

out of his property, could, prior to the release, have maintained an

action against Kingsbury to recover the sum so paid. Butler v.

Wright, 20 Johns, 367 ; Huni v. Aniidon, 4. Hill, 345. The indem-

nitor of the plaintiff", on restoring to him this sum in performance

of the contract of indemnity, would be entitled to be substituted to

the claim of the plaintiff' against Kingsbur}-. This stands upon the

most obvious principles of natural justice. The money paid by the

plaintiff was at the request of Kingsbury, implied from the legal

liability as indorser assumed by him, and Kingsbur_\- was bound to

reimburse the plaintiff. But, l)y an independent contract between

the plaintiff and his indemnitor, McKechnie, the latter was also

bound to save the plaintiff' harmless. On performance of this obli-

ofation bv the indemnitor, he would be entitled to stand in the shoes

of the plaintiff as to his right to call upon Kingsbury. By equit-

able substitution the indemnitor would take the right which the

ca rn acrc of a noth r I er o n ." ( - H. v. ' t. 135,
•. -. ' ul. - ·
This i no lo ng r an p n guc tio n in thi talc. It wa clcc icl d in
Chapi11 v . .1Icrrill. -t \ Vend. 657, that a pr rni ~ e by o ne p r o n to
ind 'mnify an th r f r b
mit\:.. a auarJ.nt y fo r a third i n t within
the ;-;tatutc and 11 d 11 t b in wrilino·, a n l Lhal th as urnption of
th ' re po n ibility wa a uffici nl co n id ·ration for th promi e.
The doctr in e f ha pin v . JI errill was ap proved in Jfallory v. Gillett, -1 X. Y . ..J.L, in ~allders v. Gillespie, 59 id. 250, and Tighe v.
J !vrrisoll, u6 id. 263, a nd in other ca c in thi . co urt. The ame
d ctrinc no w prevails in the E ng lish co urts. Tholllas v . Cook,
8 Harn. & . 72 ; Reader v. F:.ill crlzalll , 13 om. B nch , X. . 3-1-4;
// 'i!dcs v. Dud/me•, L. R. 19 Eq. a , . 1<)8. \Ve clo n ot deem it
pro1 er to r open the di cu io n or to refer to a e where a cliff r nt
view ha prevail ed . Th court below con sider ed the ubj ect at
larrre, and the abl opi ni n of B1UDLEY, J., r efer to man y of the
ca . cs on the s ubject.
The plain ti ff was, therefor" , entitl ed to maintain an action
except for hi act in r el asino- Kin g bury fr om hi liability fo r the
m oney he ·w as comp ll ed to pay on account of the indor em nt.
The r elea e wa pr 1 ably c ential in ord er t enab le th plaintiff
t o make any p roof of the agreem nt fo r indemnity inc h e could
e, tabli h the pr mi e onl y by King bury, the plaintiff himself not
being a comp tent witne by r eason f th e l ath f th promi o r
~fcKechnie, and ther b in a n o ther per o n cognizant of the tranaction. By the r el a e King 1 nry wa discharg d fr om all r e p on ·
sil ility to th plaintiff . Th e plaintiff having paid th d bt in part
o ut of hi property, c ulcl , 1 ri r t o th e r elca e, have maintained an
action aga in t Y ing bury lo r ecov r th ~ um o paid.
Butler v.
TT 'riglzt, 20 J hn , . ., 7; /fo11i v . .:I 111/doll, .+IIill, 3 -~S· The incl m nitor of th e plaintiff, on r e, taring lo him thi
um in pcrf rman cc
of the co ntract of ind em nity, w ulcl b e e ntitl ed t o b s ub tituted to
th claim f th plaintiff aaain ~ t 1-ing . bury. Tbi tancl , upon the
mo t bvio u prin ipl e of n atural ju ti cc. The m oney 1 aid by th
plaintiff wa al th r qu c l f l r ino- bury, impli r] from th e lcg·al
liability a inclor r a um cl by him, and Kin a- bury wa bound to
rciml ur
th plainti ff. 13ul, by a n indep nd nt c ntracl 1 etw en
th I lai n tiff a n cl hi ind mnit r, ::\Id- e hnie, the latter ,,-a al o
n p r fo rmanc of thi oblibo und to · av th plaintiff harmlc .
gati 11 by th indcmnitor, h e w o uld h ' cntill 1 to tan 1 in the ho
of th plaintiff a . to hi ri o-ht t
all up n King bury.
y equitabl
ub tituli n th in I mnit r w ul l tak th ri a ht \\·hich the
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plaintiff had against Kingsbury. There was no privity of con-

tract between the indemnitor and Kingsbury, but there was between

the plaintiff and Kingsbury. On paying the plaintiff what he had

been compelled to pay for Kingsbury, pursuant to the contract of

indemnity, the indemnitor would stand as the equitable assignee

of the plaintiff of the obligation of Kingsbury to him. Kingsbury

had no equity to be relieved from his obligation, because the plain-

tiff had recourse against AIcKenzie. The plaintiff, though not

strictly such, had the equities of a surety against Kingsbury, and

the equities by operation of law would pass to McKechnie on his

performing his contract of indemnity, except for the release. The

release of Kingsbury by the plaintiff materially changed the rights

and remedies of the defendant against Kingsbury. It barred any

claim against Kingsbury in behalf of the estate of the indemnitor,

to recover as the representative of the rights of the plaintiff against

him, in case the plaintiff' should prevail in the action. Such an

interference plainly operates to discharge the estate of the indem-

nitor

L'pon the ground that the release defeated the right of action,
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the judgment should be affirmed.

All concur, except Haight, J., not sitting.

Judgment afffrmed.

Hartley vs. Sandford (1901).

66 N. J. L. 627; 55 L. R. A. 206; 50 Atl. 454.

Eiror to the Supreme Court to review a judgment in favor of

plaintil'i" in an action brought to enforce a promise to indemnify

plaintiff for payments which he had been compelled to make as a

srirety for defendant's son. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Jolui B. Humphreys, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Zebulon M. Ward, for defendant in error.

Dixon, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

plaintiff had a;ain t Kina- bury. There wa no pnv1ty of contract betwe n th indemnitor and Kino-sbury, 1 ut there wa belwcen
the plaintiff and King bury. On paying the plaintiff what he had
been c mpelled to pay for Kina- bury, pursuant to the contract of
indemnity, the indempitor woul<l tand as the equitabl a ignee
of the plaintiff of the ol lio-ation of Kingsbury to him. King bnry
had no equity to be relieved from his obligation, becau e the plaintiff had recour e against :'.\IcKenzie. The plaintiff, thOLwh not
strictly uch, had the equitie of a urety again t King bury, and
the equities by operation of law would pas to McKechnie on his
performing hi contract of indemnity, except for the relea e. The
relea e of King bury by the plaintiff materially changed the right
and remedies of the defendant against King bury. It barred any
claim against Kingsbury in behalf of the e tate of the indemnitor,
to recover as the representative of the right of the plaintiff against
him. in case th plaintiff should prevail in the action. Such an
interference plainly operates to discharge the estate of the indemnitor
l pon the ground that the release defeated the right of action,
the judgment should be affirmed.
r\11 concur, except HAIGHT, J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed.

The material facts in this case, as disclosed by the record,

are that the defendant's son was indebted to M., who desired addi-

HARTLEY 'ZS.

66 N.

J.

ANDFORD

L. 627; 55 L. R. A.

( 1901).

206 · 50

Atl. 454.

Eiror to the~ upreme Court to review a judgment in favor of
plaintiff in an action brought to enforce a promise to indemnify
plain ti ff for payments which he had been compelled to make as a
sun.:t·y for defendant's son. Rever ed.
Th e fact are stated in the opinion .
.I fr. John B. Humphreys, for plaintiff in error.

,.V r. Zebulon M. T-V ard, for defendant in error.

J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.
The material fact in thi ca e, a disclosed by the record,
are tliat the defendant' son was indebted to M., who de ired addiDIXON,
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URETY.

nrp.

tional security ; that thereupon the defendant appHed to the plain-

tiff to become surety for the son, and promised him that, if he was

compelled to pay the debt, he (the defendant) would reimburse

him; that accordingly the plaintiff' became surety for the son, and

subsequently was obliged to pay the debt. This suit was brought

upon the promise, which was oral only. It appears that at the trial

in the Passaic circuit the jury were instructed to find for the plain-

tiff if they were satisfied the promise had been made ; but the ques-

tion as to the legal sufficiency of the promise w^as reserved and

certified to the supreme court, which afterwards advised the circuit

that the promise was valid, and thereupon judgment was entered

on the verdict.

In this court error has been assigned on the charge at the cir-

cuit, as well as on the advisory opinion of the supreme court ; but,

there being no bill of exceptions presenting the charge, the assign-

ment of error respecting it is futile, and must be disregarded. The

assignment upon the opinion of the supreme court is legal, and

presents the only question now before us, which is whether the

plaintiff's suit can be maintained, in view of our statute, "that no
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action shall be brought to charge the defendant upon any special

promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another

person, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be

brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing

and signed by the person to be charged therewith or some other

person thereunto by him or her lawfully authorized." The advice

of the supreme court was based upon its opinion that under the

adjudications in this state the promise of one person to indemnify

another for becoming surety of a third is not within the statute.

The cases cited in that opinion to support this view are Apgar v.

Hiler, 24 N. J. L. 812; Cortclyon v. Hoagland, 40 N. J. Eq. i;

and Warren v. Abbeft (N. J. L.) 46 Atl. 575. Of these, the only

one of controlling authority here is that of Apgar v. Hilcr, which

is a decision of this court. That decision does not sustain the broad

proposition for which it was cited. This court there held merely

that, between two persons who had signed the same promissory

note as sureties for another signer, the oral promise of one surety

to indemnify the other was valid. I'his promise was deemed out-

side of the statute, because by signing the note the promisor had

himself become a debtor, and so his promise to indemnify was to

answer for his own debt. In Cortelyon v. Hoagland several stock-

holders and directors of a corporation had promised to indemnify

tional ecurity; that th r up n th defendant appli d to th plaintiff to become ur ty f r th on, and promi 'd him that, if he was
c mpell d to pay the d bt, he ( the defendant) would r eimburse
him; that accordingly the plainti ff became ur ty fo r the on, and
sub equ ntly wa obli o- d to pay th debt. 'Thi uit wa br ught
upon the promi e, which wa oral only. It appear that at the trial
in th Pa aic circu~it the jury \\' r in truct d to find f r the plaintiff if they were ati fi cl the promi ~e had been made; but th que tion a to the legal ufficiency of the promi e wa re rved and
certified t o the uprem co urt, which aft rward advi ed the circuit
that the promi e wa Yalid, and th reupon j uclgmcnt was entered
on the verdict.
In thi co urt error ha been a ia necl on the charge at the circuit, a well a on the ad vi ory opinion of th u1 rem e court; but,
there b ing no bill of exception pre entin o· the charge, the a ignment of error r e pecting it i futil e, and mu t be di regarded . The
a ignment upon th opinion of the upreme co urt i legal and
pre nt the onl y qu e tion now b fo re u , which is wheth r the
plaintiff uit ca n be maintained, in view of our tatut , " that no
action hall be brought to charge th G defendant upon any pecial
promi e to an wer fo r the debt, default, or mi carriao-e of an ther
per on, unl e
th agreement upon which uch action hall be
brought, r ome m emorandum or note thereof, hall be in writing
and ignecl by the p r on to be charged ther ewith or om other
p r n thereunto by him or her lawfully authorized." The advice
of th e upr m c urt wa ba eel upon its pinion that uncl r the
adjudications in thi tate the promi e f one p r n to ind mnify
another fo r becoming urety of a third i not within the tatute.
The ca e cited in thcit opinion to ·upport tbi Yiew are Apcrar v.
Hiler, 24 :'\!. ]. L. T2; Cortdyou v. Hoa a-la11d, --1-0 I . ]. Eq. r ;
and TVarren v. Abbett ( ~ - ]. L.) 46 Atl. 575.
f the , the nly
on of controllin g authority h r e i. that of .4.pgar v. Ilil cr which
i a deci ion of tbi court. That d ci i n clo not u tain th 1 road
propo ition for which it wa itecl. T'hi court th re held m rely
that, betw en tw o p r on who had ig ned the ame I romi ory
note a uretie f r another ign r the oral I romi of ne urety
to ind mnify the oth r wa valid. Thi promi e wa cl m cl outicle f th tatut , becau 1 y io-nino- th n t th e pr mi r had
him lf become a cl 1 tor, and _o hi. promi e to in lemnify wa to
a n w r for hi ow n cl bt. In Cortclyon v. H oaglalld ev ral tockhol ler and clir ctor of a c rporati on had 1 romi d t incl mnify
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and IVarren v. Abbctt was of similar character. In the Cortelyou

Case the chancellor rested his decision on Apgar v. Hiler, which,,

as above stated, was essentially different, and on Thompson v,

Coleman, 4 N. J. L. 216, which was a promise to indemnify a con-

stable for selling under execution goods claimed by an outside

party, — a case where the promisee had no redress except on the

promise, and therefore clearly outside of the statute. If the deci-

cisions in Cortelyou v. Hoagland and IVarren v. Abbett are to be

supported on prior New Jersey adjudications, such support must

be found in the doctrine that where the consideration of a promise

to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another is a sub-

stantial benefit moving to the promisor, then the statute does not

apply. This rule was recognized in Kutsmeycr v. Ennis, 27 N. J.

L. 371, and Cowenhoven v. Hozvell, 36 N. J. L. 323. To support

those decisions on this rule, it must be held that the payment of a

corporate debt is substantially beneficial to the stockholders or

directors of the corporation, — a proposition which seems to be

denied in other tribunals. Browne, Stat. Fr. § 164. In the prom-
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ise now under consideration there was no such element, and no

case has been found in our Reports involving the present question.

We should therefore decide the matter on principle, or as nearly

so as related adjudication will permit. Looked at as res nova, it

seems indisputable that the defendant's promise was wathin the

statute. It was to respond to the plaintiff m case the defendant's

son should make default in the obligation which he would come

under to the plaintiff" as soon as the plaintiff' became surety for

him, — an obligation either to pay the debt for which the plaintiff

was to be surety, or to reimburse the plaintiff' if he paid it. In this

statement of the nature of the promise there is, I think, every

element which seems necessary to bring a case within the purview

of the statute. The parties, in giving and accepting the promise,

contemplated ( i ) an obligation by a third person to the promisee ;

(2) that this obligation should be the foundation of the promise,.

i. e., that the obligation of the son to the promisee should attach

simultaneously with the suret}'ship of the plaintiff, and thereupon

should arise the obligation of the promisor for the fulfillment of the

son's obligation; and (3) that the obligation of the promisor

should be collateral to that of the son, /. e., if the latter should per-

form his obligation, the promisor would be discharged, while, if

the promisor was required to perform his obligation, that of the

another tockholder and director for indor ing a corporate note,
and TTarrcn v. _-ibbctt wa of similar character. In the Cortelyon
Case the chanc llor r ted hi deci ion on .rl.pgar v. Hiler, which,
a above tated, wa e entially different, and on Thompson v.
Coleman, 4 ~ . ]. L. 216, which wa a promi e to indemnify a contable for elling under xecution goods claimed 1 y an outside
party,-a ca e where the promi ee had no redre s except on the
promi e, and therefore cl arly out ide of the tatute. If the decicision in Cortel3 ou v. Hoagland and TVarren v. Abbett are to be
supported on prior ::.Jew Jer ey adjudication , uch support mu t
be found in the doctrine that where the con ideration of a promi e
to an wer for the debt, default, or mi carriage of another is a substantial benefit moving to the promiser, then the statute doe not
apply. Thi ruie \\·a recognized in Kut::::meyer v. Ennis, 27 I . J.
L. 371, and Coi cnlzoi en v. Howell, 36 N. ]. L. 323. To support
those deci ion on thi rule, it mu t be held that the payment of a
corporate debt i substantially beneficial to the stockholder or
director of the corporation,-a propo ition which seem to be
denied in other tribunal . Browne, Stat. Fr. § 16-t. In the prorni e now under con ideration there \\'a no such lement, and no
case ha been found in our Report involving the present question.
\Ye houl<l therefore decide the matter on principle, or a nearly
o a related adjudication will permit. Looked at a res nova, it
eem indi putable that the defendant' promi
was within the
tatute. It was to re pond to the plaintiff in ca e the defendant'
on hould make default in the obligation which he would come
under to the plaintiff a oon as the plaintiff became urety for
him,-an obligation either to pay the debt for which the plaintiff
wa to be urety, or to reimbu~ e the plaintiff if he paid it. In th1
tatement of the nature of the promi e there i , I think, every
element which eem nece sary to bring a case within the purview
of the tatute. The parties, in giving and acceptino- th promi e,
contemplated ( r) an obligation by a third person to the promi ee;
( 2) that this obligation houlcl be the foundation of the promi e,.
i. e., that the obligation of the on to the promi ee hould attach
imultaneou ly with the urety hip of the plaintiff, and thereupon
1

1

shoull~

on'

arise the obligation of the promisor for the fulfillment of the

obliaation; and (3) that the obJio-ation of the promisor
~ honlrl be collateral to that of the on, i. e., if the latter houlcl perform hi oblio-ation, the promi or \\·ould be di charged, while, if
the promi or wa required to perform hi obligation, that of the
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to the promisor. An examination of the cases will show that not

many of them are in conHict with this view, when they are free

from (lirt'erentiatino- circumstances. In the leading case of 'riiomas

V. Cook, 8 Barn. & C. 728, such a circumstance appears in the fact

that the promisor was himself a signer of the bond against which

he promised to indemnify the promisee, and thus the promise was,

in a reasonable sense, to answer for that which, as to the promisee,

:-un \\ ould not he discharged. hut o nl y sh ifted from th pro1111
t th promi or. . \n examination of th' cas ·s will sh JW that n t
man) of them are in co nlli ct with th i · Yicw, \\·hen th ey are fr
from cliffrrentiating ir ·umstances. I 11 the lcadin(T case of Tlzo111a
\'. (. ' oo/(,
l ~arn. & '. 7-<. ·uch a ircum · tanc' appears in th e fa t
that th - promi ·or wa him elf a ·igner of the b nd again t which
he promised to indemnify th e prnmis 'C, and thus th e pr mi e \\·a ,
in a rca. onabl , n e, to an wcr for that which, a. to th e promi ce,
\\a th' promi or' own d ebt. On thi differ nc, may b c.·1 lain d
the deci . ion in Jones 7'. Letcher, J ~ B. ::\I 11. 36...,: !Tom \'. Bray,
51 lncl . 555, I ~ \m . H.cp. 7-+2; Barry \' . Hansom, L X.
Sanders \'. Gillespie, 59 X. ).~. -50: Ferrell Y. JJ a.X'Ll'C!l, 2
hio
~l. 383 . 2_ ... \.m. H. l . 393 ; and o th cr s.-rc ti1io- on th rule ap1 lied
in .l pgar Y. !Ji/er, --+ X. J. L. 812. The r emark of ayley, ].. in
Tl101J1us \'. Coo /,, that a promi. ct indemnify wa 11 t within ith r
the wurcl , or th' pol icy of the ~ ta tut , has a u sed much of the c nfu -ion cxi ting o n thi - ubj cct, but i m ore than ·o unte rbalanced
hy the ob en ·aLio n . o f Loni Denman in Green v. CresS'iL'ell, IO
.. \cl. ~ El. -1.53, and Pollock, ·. H. , in l rip ps \'. Hart 11oll, -+ De t &
S. -+ 1 -J.. to th effect that a promise to ind emnify may be al o an
undertaking to an \\'er fo r the lebt or cl fault of anoth ·r, an 1 that
\\'hen it is it com e · within the operation o f the ta tut '. • \n th r
circum tance takin g ca ~ out of the impl e cla
with which w
a re now ·o ne rne I i that mentio ned in Xut =nieycr Y. E n11i , 27
:-J. J. L. 371, 376, viz., th exi tence f a new on id rati n b n ficial to the promi -o r , or, a it i
m time cxpre cl, m oYitw to
the promi or. ' u h ca e ar
lllith v . ·ay<vard, 5 ::\I . SO-+; Lllcas
v. Cha1J1berlai11 , 8 D. ::\Ion. -76; Ji ills v. Bro7L'll, l I Iowa, 3 q;
R eed v. IIolco J11b , 31 o nn. 3
111itfl v. Delancy, -+ ' nn. 26..+,
29 At!. -+ 6; Potter v. Bro7. ·1ll, 35 ~\lich. 27..+; Co11 1 stoc l~ v. X orton,
3 Mich . - 77 ; ff arrison v. Sml'tc/I, 1 o J ohn . . -..+2,
m. D e·. 337 ;
Salldcrs v. Gille·pie, 59 !\ . Y. 25 ; TipJ1c \'. Jloffi·oll, 11 X. Y.
263, 5 L. R . .. \. 617, 22 l . E. rG..+.
a c of till another hara m time cited in . up1 rt f the tatcment that c ntract
t cr ar
t indemnify ar out id
f th tatut , ~ u c h a Cripps v. Hart1wll,
4 Be t · . ..+LJ.; Reader v. K.illglia111, r 3 '. D. 1\. . 3-J.4; ~ lnder
son v. 'pence, 7- In 1. 315, 37 . \m. lZ ' p. I 2; J\.ces/i11 g v. Fra=ier,
Ir In l. I 85 . 2 r . E .... 5-; B ca111an v. Ru ·sell, 20 Yt. _05 , -+ •\m.
D c. 775. Dut these juclITT11 nt re t on th ame i 1 a a T/10111pso11 v. Colclllall, -+ ::\. J. L. _ l ·,- that th r
x i t d no other liability to the pr mi. , tban that o f th prom1 r, and o manife tly
(>

was the promisor's own debt. On this difference may be explained

the decisions in Jones v. Letcher, 13 B. Alon. 363; IJoiii v. Bray,

51 Ind. 555, 19 Am. Rep. 742; Barry v. Ransom, 12 X. Y. 462;

Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 X. \. 250: Ferrell v. Maxivell, 28 Ohio

St. 383, 22 Am. Rep. 393 ; and others, — resting on the rule applied

in Apgar v. Hiler, 24 X. J. L. 812. The remark of Bayley, J., in

Thomas v. Cook, that a i)roniise to indemnify was not within either

the words or the policy of the statute, has caused much of the con-

fusion existing on this subject, but is more than counterbalanced

by the observations of Lord Denman in Green v. Cressii'ell, 10

Ad. & El. 453, and Pollock, C. B., in Cripps v. Hartnoll, 4 Best &
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S. 414, to the effect that a promise to indemnify may be also an

undertaking to answer for the debt or default of another, and that

when it is it comes within the operation of the statute. Another

circumstance taking cases out of the simple class with which we

are now concerned is that mentioned in Kutsvieyer v. Ennis, 27

N. J. L. 371, 376, viz., the existence of a new consideration bene-

ficial to the promisor, or, as it is soinetimes expressed, moving to

the promisor. Such cases are Sniilh v. Sayivard, 5 Me. 504; Lucas

V. Chamberlain, 8 B. Mon. 276; Mills v. Brozvn, 11 Iowa, 314;

Reed v. Holcomb, 31 Conn. 360; Smith v. Delaney, 64 Conn. 264,

29 Atl. 496; Potter v. Brozvn, 35 Mich. 274; Comstock v. Norton,

36 Mich. 277 ; Harrison v. Saivtcll, 10 Johns. 242, 6 Am. Dec. 337 ;

Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 X. Y. 250; Tiiihc v. Morrison, 116 X. Y.

263, 5 L. R. A. 617, 22 N. E. 164. Cases of still another charac-

ter are sometimes cited in support of the statement that contracts

to indemnify are outside of the statute, such as Cripps v. Hartnoll,

4 Best & S. 414; Reader v. Kingham, 13 C. B. X^. S. 344; Ander-

son v. S pence, y2 Ind. 315, 37 Am. Rep. 162; Keesling v. Frazier,

119 Ind. 185, 21 X'. E. 552; Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205, 49 Am.

Dec. 775. But these judginents rest on the same idea as Thomp-

son v. Coleman, 4 X'. J. L. 216, — that there existed no other liabil-

ity to the promisee than that of the promisor, and so manifestly

T.
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the statute was not applical)le. On the other hand, there is suiifi-

cient judicial authority for the proposition that an undertaking to

indemnify a person for hecoming surety for another is, in the

absence of any modifying fact, a promise within the statute.

Green v. Cresswell, lo Ad. & El. 453 ; Siinpson, v. Nance, i Speers,

L. 4; Brozcji V. Adams, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 51, 18 Am. Dec. 36; Kcl-

sey V. Hibbs, 13 Ohio St. 340; Clement's Appeal, 52 Conn. 464;

Bissig V. Britton, 59 ]\Io. 204, 21 Am. Rep. 379; Nugent v. Wolfe,

III Pa. 471, 56 Am. Rep. 291, 4 Atl. 15; Draughan v. Bunting,

31 N. C. (9 Ired. L.) 10; Hurt v. Ford, 142 Mo. 283, 41 L. R. A.

823, 44 S. W. 228; and May v. Williams, 61 ]Miss. 126. 48 Am.

Rep. 80, — were decided on this basis. In the case last mentioned,

Cooper, J., stated the true rules very clearly and concisely. Xo

doubt, there are opposing cases which cannot be explained on any

distinguishing circumstances. Such seem to be Chapin v. Merrill,

4 Wend. 657; Jones v. Bacon, 145 N. Y. 446, 40 N. E. 216;.

Dunn v. Jl'cst, 5 B. Mon. 376; Vogel v. Melms, 31 Wis. 306, 11

Am. Rep. 608 ; and Wildes v. Dudloiv, L. R. 19 Eq. 198. But

some of these cases merely follow Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn. & C.
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728, without noticing the distinction which later discussion has

justified, while others appear to have been induced by the injus-

tice of a refusal to enforce a promise on the strength of which

the promisee incurred his liability, rather than by a read}' purpose

to execute the will of the legislature.

Xo doubt, injustice may result fom the enforcement of the

statutory rule ; but that rule sprang from a conviction that its

adoption would prevent more wrong than it would permit, and

its enactment in England and perhaps every state in this Union

indicates the generality of this assurance. Said ^Ir. Justice Ster-

rett in Nugent v. JVolfe. 11 1 Pa. 471, 56 Am. Rep. 291. 4 Atl. 15:

"The object of the statute is protection against 'fraudulent prac-

tices commonly endeavored to be upheld by perjury,' and it should

be enforced according to its true intent and meaning, notwith-

standing cases of great hardship mav result therefrom." With

more detail did Chief Justice Shaw, in Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Mete.

396, 37 Am. Dec. 148, say: "The object of the statute, manifestly,

was to secure the highest and most satisfactory species of evidence

in a case where a party, without apparent benefit to himself, enters

into stipulations of suretyship, and where there would be great

temptation on the part of a creditor, in danger of losing his debt

by the insolvency of his debtor, to support a suit against the friends

th tatute wa not applicable. On th
th er hand, there i uffici nt judicial authority fo r th l ropo ition that an undertakin o- to
indemnify a p r on for becoming urety for a noth ' r i , in the
ab ence of any modifyin · fact, a I romi c within the tatute.
Green V. Cresswell, IO cl. & ' 1. 453; impson, v. 1Vallce, I peer r
L. 4; Bro7..v11 v . Adalll·, 1 tew. ( la. ) 51, 18 Am. Dec. 36; Kelsey v. Hibbs 13 O hio t. 3-1-0; Cle111.::llt's Appeal, 52 'onn . 46-t;
Bissig . Britton, 59 1\Io. 204, 21 m. Rep. 379; ,.Vugcnt v. TVolfe,
I I I Pa. 471 , 56 Am. R ep. 291, 4 A tl. rs; Draughan v . Bunting,,
31
. (9 Ir d. L. ) IO; Hurt v. Ford, 142 11o. 283, 41 L. R.
823 44 . \ . 228; and 11Jay v. JT7 illiams, 6r 1\Iis. I26. 48 Am.
Rep. o,-were decided on thi basis. In the ca e last mentioned,
OOPER, J ., tated the true rul es very clearly and conci ely.
Xo
doubt, there are opposin o- ca e which cannot be xplainecl on any
di tingui hing circum tance .
uch seem to be Chapin v. 1\1errill,
4 \Vend. 657 ; l oll.Cs v. Bacon, I45
. Y. 446, 40 . . E. 216;
Dunn v. w· est, 5 B. 1\Ion. 376; Vo gel V. ,_lf elms, 3 I \ \ is. 306, I I
m . R ep. 60 ; and TVildes v . Dudlo7.., L. R. I9 Eq. I98. But
ome of the e ca es merely fo llow Thomas v . Coo /?,
Barn. & C.
728 without noticing the distinction which later discus ion ha
ju tified, \Yhile others appear to have been induced by the inju tice of a refu al to enforce a promise on the strength of which
the promisee incurred hi liability, rath er than by a r eady purpo e
to execute the will of the legi lature.
No doubt, inju tice may result fo m th e enforcement of the
tatutory rule; but that rule prang from a conviction that it
adoption would prevent more wrong than it would permit, and
it enactment in England and perhaps every state in thi U nion
indicate the generality of thi a urance. Said i\1r. Ju tice terrett in ~Tuge1lt v. TVo lfe III Pa. 4/I, 56 A.J11. R ep . 291 . ..+ :-\tl. 15:
"The obj ect of the statute i protection again t 'fraudulent practices commonly endeavored to be upheld by perjury,' and it should
be enforced according to its true intent and m eaning, not\Yith tanding ca e of great hard hip may res ult th erefrom ." \tVith
m ore detail did Chief Ju tice haw, in Nelson v. Boy11to11, 3 M ete.
396, 37 Am. D ec. 148, ay : aThe obj ect of the tatute, manife tly,
was to ecure the highe t and mo t atisfactory species of evidence
in a ca e wher e a party, without apparent ben fit to himself, enter
into tipulation of urety hip, and where there would be great
temptation on the part of a creditor, in clanger of lo ing hi debt
by the .in olvency of hi debtor, to support a uit again t th e fri end
T.
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or relatives of a debtor, — a father, son, or brother, — l)y means of

false evidence, by exaggerating words of recommendation, en-

couragement to forbearance, and requests for indulgence into posi-

tive contracts."

Our conclusion is that the promise proved at the trial was

insufficient to^ sustain the action, that tlie jiidgiiiciii for the plaintiff

should be reversed, and that, in accordance with the reservation at

the trial, a verdict and judgment should be entered in favor of

the defendant.

Eastwood vs. Ken yon (1840).

II Adol & El. 438; 39 E. C. L. 245.

In this term, (January i6th,) the judgment of the court was

delivered by

o r r elatives o f a deb tor ,- a fat her, un . o r hroth er.- by m ean of
fal e v idc n c , bv
' •xao-ora tin g \\' Ord - of r ' comm endation ' en~
b b
co ura<Yem ' nl lo £o rb a r a n ce, a n l r ' c1uest fo r indul rrc nc' into po iliv contract ."
u r co n Ju ion i that th p rom i e pron :cl al th e t ria l wa
in uffici n t to u la in the acti n, th a t the j11d 0'111c11 t for the plaiJiti ff
s/i o11/d be rc·(. •crsed a n d that, in accu r la nce w ith the r e r valion at
the tri a l, a ver d ict a nd jud ITTn n t h ul d be en ter ed in favo r of
t h ' clef ndant.

Lord Den MAN, C. J. The first point in this case arose on

the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds, viz., whether the prom-

ise of the defendant was to "answer for the debt, default, or mis-

carriage of another person." Upon the hearing we decided, in

conformity with the case of Bntteinere v. Hayes, 5 Mee. & W.

456, that this defense might be set up under the plea of Non

E .\
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Assumpsit.

T\VOO D

vs.

K EXYOX

( l

40 .

The facts were that the plaintiil was liable to a Mr. Black-

rr

burn on a promissory note; and the defendant, for a consideration,

dol

cT E

l. 43 ); 3

E.

~.

L.

.2r.

which may for the purpose of the argument be taken to have been

sufficient, promised the plaintiff to pay and discharge the note to

Blackburn. // the promise had bcoi made to Blackbur)i, doubt-

less the statute would have applied : it would then have been strictly

In thi term, (January 16th,) th e j ucl o-111 nt f the co urt wa
deliver ed by

.a promise to answer for the debt of another ; and the argument

on the part of the defendant is, that it is not less the debt of

another, because the ijromise is made to that other, viz., the

debtor, and not to the creditor, the statute not having in terms

stated to whom the promise, contemplated by it. is to be made.

But upon consideration we are of oj^inion that the statute applies

only to promises made to the person to whom another is answer-

able. We are not aw^are of any case in which the point has arisen,

or in which any attempt has been made to put thai construction

L ord DE l\I AN, . ]. The fir t po int in thi ca e aro e on
the fo urth ecti on o f the tatute o f F r a u cl · , \·iz ., \\·hether th promi e f the d ef ndant wa to "an w r fo r the de bt, default, or mi ca rriage o f anoth r per on. n U pon th hea ri1w we d ci l d, in
con fo rmi ty with th case o f Bll tte111ere v. Ha3•es, 5 M . & \V.
4 5 , that thi cl ef en. c mi g ht be et up un der the pl a of X on
, \ sump it.
T he fac t \Ycr c that th e plaintiff \\'a lia bl e t a ~ 1r. Blackburn on a l romi s ory n ot ; nd th d efe nd a nt fo r a con ideration ,
w hi h may for th ' purpo c of th e a rg um ent be tak n l have b en
ufficienl, I ro mi 'cl th e plaintiff to pa y a nd d i cha r o· th note to
B lackb urn. I f the pro 111 ise lzad been 111adc to Blacl:zb um , d oubtlc s the ta tute '\\·ould hav a ppli ed : it " ·oul l then hav b n trictly
.a pr mi to a n \\' 'r fo r th e d ebt o f a noth er : a n l th ar um nt
on the part of th e cl efcnclant i , th at it i not 1
th cl bt of
th ' promi ._ i m a d e t that th r, viz., the
a noth r , be au
cl el tor , a n cl not to th er "clito r , th e sta tut n t havin · in terms
tat d to w hom th p romi , cont mplat I by it, i to I made.
L u t upon con. iclc ra t ion ,,. ar o f pini n that th
tatut appli
on ly to promi cs m a d to th . ,. p r on to \\'h 111 another i an w erahl . \\. a r c not a \\·a r f any ~L in \\·hi h th p int ha ari en,
or in w hich a ny a lt mpt ha :; b ' 11 m ad to I ut that co n. tructi'o n
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upon the statute which is now sought to be cstabhshed, and wliich

we think not to be the true one.^

Rule to enter verdict for defendant discharged.

Alger vs. Scoville (1854).

I Gray (Mass.) 391.

up n the tatute which i now 0tiaht to be e tabl i hed, a nd whicli
\\. think not to be the true on .1
Rul e to enter v rdi t fo r defenda nt di cha rged.

Assumpsit. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

C. N. Emerson {I. Siinincr was with him), for the defendant.

D. D. Field (of Xew York) and /. E. Field, for the plaintiff.

Sha\\', C. J. In order to have a clear view of the question

discussed in the present case, which is assumpsit on a special

- LGER VS .

promise, made by the defendant, it is necessary to understand

O\' I L LE (I

5-+ ).

precisely the facts on which it arises. It appears that when the

r

contract was made, of which the promise sued on was a part, the

ray ( :\Ia .) 39r.

plaintiff", being the owner of 145 shares in the capital stock of

an incorporated company, known as the Duchess County Iron Co.,

_\

being a major part of the whole stock, and the defendant being

UMP IT .

The fa ct are sufficiently tated in th e op1111on.

the owner of a farm in Monroe county, N. Y., with the stock

C. _Y. E m erso n (!. S1111rn cr wa with him ), fo r the defendant.

thereon, the parties agreed to make an exchange of property. At

the same time plaintiff' held a promissory note against the Duchess

D . D. Field (of
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County Iron Co. for $3,350, and had indorsed the notes of the

~ ew

York ) and !. E . Field . fo r the plaintiff.

Company, which had been discounted at various banks and the

money received thereon, to the amount of about $4,000, which

H .\\\' )

C. ].

In order to have a clear vi ew of the que tion

would all come to maturity and fall due within four months from

the time of the contract. The agreement was that the plaintiff

should assign and transfer his shares in the stock of the Company,

and also indorse over his note against them to the defendant, and

that the defendant should, by a good warranty deed, convey the

farm in Monroe county, with the stock thereon, to the plaintiff,

and indemnify the plaintiff and save him harmless against his

said endorsements. This was one entire contract for one entire

consideration, the transfer of the shares and the company's note

to the defendant, on the one side, being a consideration for the

conveyance of the farm and the promised indemnity bv the de-

^Everything except the opinion on the one point is omitted.

di cu eel in the prese nt ca e, ,,·hich i a ump it on a pecial
promi e, made by the defendant, it i neces ary to understand
preci ely the fa ct on whi ch it arise . It appear that when the
contract wa made, of whi ch th e promi e ued on was a part, the
plaintiff, being the owner of 145 shares in the capital stock of
an incorporated company, known a the Duche s Co unty I ron Co.,
beino- a ma jor part of the whole tock, and the defendant being
the mn1 er of a farm in ::\Ionroe county, )l . Y ., with the stock
thereon, th e partie agr cl to make an excha nge of property. A t
th e same tim e plaintiff held a promissory note again t the Duche s
Co unty Tron Co. fo r 3, 350, and had indor ed the note of the
Company, which had been di counted at variou banks and the
money received thereon, to the amount of about $4,000, which
would all come to maturity and fall du e within fo ur month from
the time of the contract. The agreement wa that the plaintiff
hould a io-n and tran fer hi ha re in the tock of th e Compan y,
and al o indorse over hi s note again t them to the defendant, and
that the defendant hould, by a good warranty deed . convey th e
farm in M onroe county, with th e stock thereon. to the plaintiff,
and indemnify the plaintiff and save him harmle s again t his
ai d endor ements. This was one entire contract fo r one entire
con ideration, th e tran fer of the share all({ the company ' note
to the defendant, on the one side, being a con ideration fo r the
conveyance of the farm and the promi ed indemnity by the <le1

Eve r ythi ng except th e o pin ion on t he o n e point i

o mitted.
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feiulant to the plaintitT, on ilic hiIkt. This contract was executed

as far as it could l)c at the time, hy the transfer of the shares and

the dcHvery of tlie note to the defenchiut, and a conveyance of the

farm and stock by the defendant to the plaintiff ; but the promise

to indemnify tlic ])laintiiTf against the notes then outstanding was

something to be dcme in future, and was necessarily executory.

Afterwards, when the notes outstanding at lianks became due,

the plaintiff was called on. as indorser. to pay them, and paid

them accordingly ; and this action is brought on the defendant's

promise to indemnify him and save him harmless from his liability

on these notes.

The ground of defense is. that this was a promise to pay the

debt of another, and so, by force of the Statute of Frauds, no

action can be tnaintained upon it unless proved by a promise in

writing, signed by the party promising. This is the question.

The precise provision in our statute is as follows: "No action

shall be brought to charge any person ui)on any special promise

to answer for the (\c])i, default or misdoings of another, unless the

promise, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writ-
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ing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some

person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." Rev. Sts. c. 74,

§ I. This enactment is in nearly if not precisely the same

terms with that of 29 Car. 2 c. 3; so that adjudications on the

construction of the one apply v.-ith equal force to the other.

It is not objected that the case is within the other branch of

the Statute of Frauds, on the ground that it was part of one

entire transaction, a part of which was for the conveyance of

real estate, and on that account the promise could not be given

in evidence to support an action, not being in writing. All that

part of the contract, looking to the conveyance of real estate, hav-

ing- been executed, it stood onlv as a consideration for the execu-

tory undertaking relied on in support of this action ; and no part

of the contract remains unperformed, except the defendant's prom-

ise to indemnify the plaintiff against the payment of the out-

standing note, which is the subject of this suit.

In regard to the clause of the statute relied on, the court

are of the opinion that the promise is in no sense, in which these

terms are used in the Statute of Frauds, a promise to pay the

debt of another: ])Ut it is a promise to the plaintiff, on a consid-

eration moving from the i)laintiff to the defendant, to indemnify

the plaintiff against a contingent liability, which he is under,

frndant to thl' plaintiff, on the other. Thi · ·ontract was ex 'cut d
as iar as it could he at th · tim" liy the tran ·i ·r of the , bar and
the deli \·e r~ of the not' to th' d 'ic nclant, an cl a · m · ') a nee of the
farm and stu ·k by th ' defendant to th plaintiff: but th' pr mi e
to incle11111ify the plaintiff acrainsl th note. then out. tanclincr \\'a
sum ·thing t<> l>l' clone in future, and \\·as n ··cs ·arily ·xc ·utor_ .
. \ftcn\·L:.nls. \\ hl11 the n u t s uutst<rnding al hanks l>l'l'::i.m du ' ,
th ' plaintiff wa: called 011 _, as indor:cr. t pay them. and 1 aid
them acco rdingly: and this action is brought on the d 'fen bnt'
promi ·c to indemnify him and saYe him harmless fr m his liability
on the. note . .
The ground oi dcicn '(.: i , that thi wa a promi. e to pay the
debt f another, and ·o, by force of the ~ tatute of Fraud no
action can b' 111aintainccl upon it uni
pro,·ed by a 1 romi e in
writincr, i nccl by th' party promi ing. Thi i the JU ti n.
The prcci . e provi ·ion in our sta tute i a follow : " o action
hall be brought to charcrc any per n upon any p ial promi e
the
t an , \\. r for the debt, default r mi doing · of another, uni
pr mi e, ,r s me memorandum r not thereof. hall be in writing and . ignccl by th e party to b charg cl ther with, or by
rn
per on thereunto by him lawfully authorized." }{ v. , t . . 74,
am
r.
Thi.;; enactment is in nearly if not preci cly th
t rm with tliat of -9 'ar. 2 . 3; o that acljuclicati n
n th
con. trnction of th one app.!y Yith qual force t th
th r.
It i not obj ' ted that the a: i within th e th r bran h f
the ,'tatut of Fraud , n the gr und that it wa r art f one
entire tran . action, a part of which wa for the c nv yan
f
r al
tat , and on thal account the promi e could not 1e 0 iven
in Yidencc to upport an action, n t 1 i1w in writi1w.
11 that
part f th co ntract, look ing to th' onY 'ya nc
f r al tat , ha ing b n ·x ' cutccl, it toocl nly a a con iclerati n f r th ex cut ry undertaking r li ed on in ur p rt f thi a ti n: ancl n part
of the contra t remain unper form cl, ex J t the lefen !ant' promi. ' to incl mnify th plaintiff a~ain t th payment of th
ut~tancling not . which i th
ubj ct of thi s . uit.
f n r garcl to the c1au c f the tatut, r Ii d on, th
mt
ar of th O J inion that th pr mi s i in 11
' 11 e, 111 which th . e
term . ar' u. eel in th , tatut of Fraud , a pr n11s t pay the
debt f another: but it i. a pr mis to th plaintiff, n a
n idrati n moving· from th plaintiff t th cl f ndant, t in 1 mnify
the 1 laintiff ag-::iin . t a ontin g •nt li a hilit:·, which h i, t111cler,
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as indorser, to certain lianks, to pay certain notes given by the

Duchess County Iron Co. as promisors, if they should fail to

pay them at maturity. The Iron Company were not then indebted

to the plaintiff, nor would they become indebted to him, until

the happening- of the contingency of their not paying the notes,

and his being called on to pay them.

There being no debt due to the plaintiff from the Iron Com-

pany or anybody else, on account of those notes, the promise of

the defendant was not a suretyship or guaranty, or responsibility

to the plaintiff for any debt or duty due to him, but a mere con-

tract of mdemnity against a possible liability. Suppose, instead

of a contingent liability, it had been an absolute one, a debt due

from himself to a third person, a promise to him, made by a third

person, on a valuable consideration moving from him, to pay

that debt and save the plaintiff" harmless, is hot a promise to pay

the debt of another, but a promise to pay the plaintiff"s own debt,

which is equivalent to a promise to pay the money to him, by

which he himself could discharge the debt. The promise of the
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defendant to the plaintiff was, that he should not be called on

as indorser to pay the notes, and to save him hamiless from such

call ; and the promise was broken, and the cause of action accrued,

when the defendant failed to take up the notes of the Company

as thev fell due. and permitted the plaintiff to be called on and

compelled to pay them.

In a case m the Queen's Bench, comparatively recent, the

Court sav: "We are of opinion that the statute applies only to

promises made to the person to whom another is answerable."

Eastii'ood v. Kcnyon, ii Ad. & El. 446, and 3 P. & Dav. 282.

The same principle has been adopted in several cases in this

commonwealth.

A promise to pay the public taxes which may be levied on an

estate sold by A to B. made by the seller, as one of the terms of

sale, need not be in writing, not being a promise by A to B to

pav a debt due to B from another person, but to pay a sum which

would otherwise be a charge upon the promisee. Preble v.

Baldzvin. 6 Cush. 552.

The distinction between the common case, where the promise

is designed to secure the debt of another person to the promisee

and so a guaranty, and where the promise is made for another and

different purpose, is stated, and the cases on the subject are cited,,

in Nelson v. Boyiitoii. 3 ]\Iet. 396.

13

a in I r r, to ertain bank to pay certain note g 1v n by the
Duche
· unty Ir n
. a promi _or , if th ey houlcl fail to
pay them at maturity. Th e Iron 0 1111 an y were not th n indebted
to th plaintiff. nor woulJ th y 1 ecom e incl btecl to him, until
the happ nin g of th contin o-ency of their not payin t.,; th note ,
and hi being called on to pay them.
Ther " being no debt clue to the 1 lai11tiff from the Iron ompany or anybody el e, on acco unt of tho e note , the prorni e of
the cl fenclant wa not a urety hip or g uaranty, or re pon ibility
to th e plaintiff fo r any debt r duty clue to him , bu t a mere contract of indemnity 2.o-ain _t a pos ihl liability .
uppo e, in stead
of a co ntingent liability, it bad been an ab olute one, a cl bt clue
from hir:1 elf to a third person. a promi e to him, made by a third
per on, on a valuable consideration moving from him, to pay
that debt and ave the plaintiff harml ess, is riot a pr mi e to pay
th e debt of another. but a promi e to pay th e plaintiff' s own debt,
which is equivalent to a promi e to pay the money to him, by
which he him elf could di charge the debt. The promi e of th e
cl fendant to the plaintiff wa , that he hould not be called on
a indor er to pay the note , and to save him harn1l e from such
call; and th e promise wa broken, and the cause of action accrued,
when the defendant failed to take up the note of the ompany
a they fell due, and permitt cl the plaintiff to be call ed on and
compelled to pay them.
In a ca
m the Quee n' B ench , comparatively recent, the
ourt ay: " \ Ne are of opinion that th e statute applies only to
prorni e made to the perso n to whom another is an swerabl e .. ,
Eastwoo d v. Ke1l)'011. 1 r cl. & El. -t-t6, and 3 P. & Dav. 282.
The ame principle ha been adopt cl in everal ca e in thi
commonwealth.
A prorni e to pay the public taxes whi h may b levied on an
e tate ol I 1 y • to B, made by the sell er, a one of the terms of
ale, need not b in writing, not being a prorni e by A to B to
pay a cl bt due to B from another per r;;on. but to pay a um which
\\·ould oth rwi . e be a charge upon th e promisee. Preble v.
Baldw in. 6 u h. 552.
The Ii tinction betv\ een the common ca e, where th e promi e
is de ignecl to secure the debt of anotb r per on to the promisee
and o a guaranty, and wh re th e promi e i made for another and
lifferent purpos . i tate l. and the ca e on the ubj ct are cited,.
m .X cl soil v. B o)'11to11. 3 :0.I t. 396.
13
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That llie promise to one to pay his due clelH. a debt due from

him to another, is not widiin ihe Statute of Frauds, and need not

be in writing, was decided in Fikc v. Broz^'ii, 7 Cush. 136.

(2) iUu there is another ground on which we are of

opinion tliat this promise was not within the Statute of Frauds,

That th ' promi c to n to pay his due cl bt, a debt due from
him to an oth er, i n ut \\'ithin the ' tatut' of Fraud , and need not
be in writing, wa d cicl -cl in Pi/,'e v. BrVC.l'll 7 \i-11. 13 .

supposing it could be construed to be a promise, the effect of

which if performed would amount to a guaranty that the Iron

Company, as promisors on the outstanding notes, should pay

those notes, and so save the plaintifT from his liability thereon

as indorser, and so, although not a promise to pay the debt of

another, yet it might Ije construed to be a special promise to

answer for the default of another, to-wit : the Iron Company.

From the earliest period after the statute was passed in Eng-

land, the judicial construction there, has been, not merely that

there must be a good consideration (diat is required by the com-

mon law to give legal effect to all contracts) ; but to require the

higher species of evidence, that of writing, where guaranty or

suretyship has been the leading or apparent object. But it has

( ~) But th re

an ther g r uml o n whi -h we ar o f
'ta tute of Fraud;:;,
o pinio n that thi promise wa n ot within th
·u1 po -in cr il co ul 1 b - n · tru d to be a pr mi , the ffcct of
which if p -rformccl woul 1 amount to a o·uara nty that th Iron
'ompany, as promi . o r
n th
uut · tan ling n ot
h uld pay
th ose n o t ·, and . o av th plaintiff from hi liability ther on
a . inclor r amt o, althouo·h n o t a p ro mi se to pay the debt of
another, yet it might I c o n tru cl to be a pecial prom1
to
an m : r f r the d efa ult f another, to-w it: the Iro n ompany .
i

been held at the same time that when the leading and obvious
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object of the promisor was to induce the promisee to forego som.e

lien interest, benefit or advantage, held by him, and to transfer

that interest, or confer that or some equivalent benefit on the

promisor, although the effect may be to discharge another person

from an obligation, still it is a new, independent and original con-

tract between the parties, and is not within the Statute of Frauds

required to be in writing. The leading case is JVilliains v.

Leper. 3 liurr. 1886, where the landlord, having a lien on his

tenant's goods for arrears of rent, which -goods had been assigned,

and were alx)ut to be sold by the assignees, entered to distrain,

when the broker and agent promised the landlord to pay him his

rent if he would forbear distraining. Though the effect would

be to discharge the debt of the tenant, it was held not to be within

the Statute of Frauds requiring a note in writing. To the same

effect is Castling v. .hibcrt, 2 East. 325.

This doctrine is fully sustained 1)y the New York cases. It

is the third class of cases mentioned by Kent. C. J., in Leonard v.

Vredenhurgh, 8 Johns. 39. This third class of cases is, "when

the promise to pay the debt of another arises out of some new

and original consideration of benefit or harm moving between the

newly contracting parties." This class is not within the Statute.

G'r m th e earli e t I c ri ocl after tb ·tatute \\·a pa ed in Eno-lancl, th judicia l con truction th r , ha. been , n t m r ly that
th r e mu t be a o-oocl c 1i. ideration that i r quir cl I y th c mm n la w lo crivi: legal e ff ct to all c ntract ) ; but t r quire th
hio-her p cie. of cv i Jen e, that f writing, where o-uaranty o r
urct)· hip ha been th e I acling o r apparent o bj t. Dut it ha
been h Id at th e sam e t im e that when th leading and ob iou
object of th promi o r wa. to induce the I romi ee t for go on:e
lien intere t, benefi t o r acl van tag , h lei by him, and to tran f r
that int r t, o r confer that o r
m e e iuival nt b n cfit on the
pr mi or, although th e cff ct may be to di charg an ther per on
from an ol ligatio n, till it i a new, ind pend nt and riginal c nt ract behv n th parties, and is 11 l within th
tatute of Fraud
requir cl t be in writinh. The 1 ading ca
i TVilliams v.
Leper. 3 Burr. i886, wh ' r e th e landl o rd, havin · a Ii n n hi
tenant' g cl fo r arrears of r ·nt , which .o-oo d ~ had b n a ign d,
Jnrl \\. r e about t 1 e
lei by th e a it:;n cs, nter 1 to di train,
wh 11 th br k r and ag nt prorni eel th Ian ll or l t I ay him hi
rent if h "\\' u Jd fo r] ca r cl i training. Th ugh th
ff ct w uld
1) to li charg th clebt of th tenant , it \Ya h clcl n l t be within
the ' tatnt
f F ra ucl . req uirin o- a n t in writing. To th
am
eff ct i Castling v. ,J ubert, 2 at. 3-5·
Th i. cl o trin i. foll y . u stain cl by th
w
rk ca
It
i. the third c la . of ca c. mcnti n I by K nt, . J., in L eonard v.
l 'rcdc11b11n!:/1.
J hn . 3 ). T hi thir l la of
i , "when
the pr mi!' t pa ' th cl bi of an th r ari
f om n w
ancl original con id rati o n of 1 en fit r harm m ovin o- betwe n th
nc·.yJy con tracl in o- J arlics... Thi
la , i n ot within th
tatut .
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This point is confinncd and the cases are fully reviewed by

179

Savacje, C. J., in Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432.

The same doctrine is recognized in this commonwealth. The

case of Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Met. 402, after stating the distinc-

tion is summed up thus: "That cases are not considered as coming

within the vStatute, when the party promising has for his object

a benelit which he did not before enjoy, accruing immediately to

himself ; but where the object of the promise is to obtain a release

of the person or property of the debtor, or other forbearance or

benetit to him, it is within the Statute." One of the last cases

on the subject substantially afifirms the same principles. Curtis v.

Broum, 5 Cush. 488.

Supposing this rule to be well established, we are then to

look at the facts of the present case to see whether it applies.

We have already stated, that we consider the whole as one

entire transaction, the conveyance of the farm and the promise

of indemnity by the defendant, on the one side, were the con-

sideration of the transfer of shares in the Iron Company and

the assignment of the note due the plaintiff from the Iron Com-
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pany, on the other. Then, what were the relations of the parties

before and after the making of this contract? The plaintiff pre-

viously was the beneficial owner of more than one-half of the entire

property and capital of the company, and the only two other

shareholders held together an amount of the stock less than that

held by the plaintiff'. I believe it was stated in the argument that

the plaintiff' was president, treasurer or principal manager of

the affairs of the company. But this is not material. His large

interests would give him a large influence, if not a controlling

power, over the funds and affairs of the company, and whilst

holding such interest, he would have a powerful voice, if not a

decisive direction, in seeing that the funds of the company should

be applied to the payment of its notes, of which he was indorser.

Is it to be supposed that, acting on ordinary motives, he would

put his power entirely out of his control, and yet leave himself

liable to the payment of these notes, as their indorser?

Again ; the evidence shows, to use the significant figure of the

witnesses, that in regard to the Iron Company the defendant was

to step into the plaintiff's shoes. Was he to take the plaintiff's

large interest in the stock and property of the Iron Company, con-

stituting a natural fund out of which these indorsed notes were

to be paid, without taking it subject to the incumbrances? Pay-

Thi

point

onfirrn d ancl the ca
a re full y reviewed by
in Far/e3 v. Cle<. ela1Zd) 4 ow . 432.
T h am doct1-ine i recogni zed in thi, commonwealth. The
ca e of ~T elson v. Boy nton, 3 I et. 402, after tat ing the di tinction is umm cl up thu, : '·'I hat cas s are not consicl red a coming
w i ~hin the Statute, wh n the party promising ha for hi object
:i. benefit whi h h did not before enjoy, accruing immediately to
him If; but where the obj ect of the promise is to obtain a release
of th e person or prope-rty of the debtor, or other fo rb earance or
benefit to him, it is within the Statute." O ne of th la t cases
on rhe subject sub tantially affirm the ame principles. Curtis v.
Erm rn, S Ctd1. 488.
upposin o· this rule to be well established, we are then to
look at the facts of the present case to see whether it applies.
Vv have already tated, that we consider the whol as one
entire transaction, the conveyance of the farm and the promise
of indemnity by the defendant, on the one side, were the conideration of the tran fer of hare in the Iron Company and
the a sig nm nt of the note due the plaintiff from the Iron Company, on the other. Then, what were the relations of the parties
before and after the making of this contract? The plaintiff previou ly wa the benefi cial owner of more than one-half of the entire
property and capital of the company, and the only t'' o other
hareholders held together an amount of the stock less than that
held by the plaintiff. I believe it was tated in the argument that
the plaintiff \Vas president, treasurer or principal manager of
the affairs of the compan y. But this is not material. His larg"'
interests would give him a large influence, if not a controlling
power, over the fund s and affair · of th e company, and vvhil t
holding uch interest, he would have a powerful voice, if not a
decisive direction, in seeing that the fund s of the company should
be applied to the payment of its notes, of which he wa indorser.
I it to be supposed that, acting on ordinary motives, he would
p ut hi · power entirely out of his control, and yet leave himself
liable to th e payment of these notes, as their indor er?
Again ; the evidence show , to u e the significant fig ure of the
·witn e s, that in regard to the Iron Company the defendant was
to step into the plaintiff' shoes. vVa h to take the plaintiff's
large intere t in the stock and property of the Iron Company, con' tituting a natural fund out of which these indorsed notes were
to be paid, without taking it subject to the incumbrance ? PayAV.AGE)
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iiii; the debts of tlic company, after the defendant liad become a

shareholder of more than half, would in effect, and ii> the extent

of his interest in those shares, inure to his own direct l)enetit.

We are therefore of opinion, that this was a new and original

contract between these parties, originating in a new consideration

moving from the plaintiff to the defendant, in effect placing the

funds in the hands of the defendant, out of which these notes, in

due course of business, would be expected to l)e ])aid. The prom-

ise was part of a larger transaction constituting an entire con-

tract, and we have no reason to believe, and have no authority

to declare, that the i^laintiff would have parted with his interest

in the company without a simultaneous obligation U) Ix- indem-

nified against his liabilities for the company. For these reasons,

we are of opini<in that this ])roniise was not within the statute, and

that an action will lie u])on it, though not made in writing.

(3) It was urged, on the part of the defendant, that this

promise of indemnity against the outstanding notes was without

consideration, because the exchange of property was effected

independent of this promise, and that the promise was subse-
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quent and gratuitous.

We have again recurred to the facts stated in the report,

and can perceive in them no color for such an argument. Both

witnesses speak of it as one bargain, made at one time, and exe-

cuted as far as it could th.en be executed. (Jne of them says,

the bargain then made was, that Scoville was to take the interest

Alger had in the Company, saving bini hanuless from 3JI liability,

■ or, in other words, to steji into his shoes, as far as Alger was

in any way interested in the Company; the indorsed outstanding

notes were referred to, and it was then agreed between the parties

that Scoville was to pay and take up all said notes as they sev-

erallv fell due. Another witness, present at the same time, testi-

fied to the same facts. The use of the present participle, "saving

liini harniless," iiumediately after the words "taking his interest

in the compau}," couples the two things inseparably together as

one bargain. The one was a consideration for the other. It was

a material and essential part of the entire contract, for which the

transfer of the .shares and the assignment of the company's note

were the consideration. The court :ivv therefore of opinion, that

the instruction given to the jury was right, and that judgment be

entered upon the verdict for the plaintiff.

judgment on the verdict.
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c 111tract lJet\\'c ·n th ·se partic. , o ri cri na ting: in a n \\' ·o n · icl crati n
mo\·ing fr om th ' plaintiff to th · cl · f mhnt, in ffect 1 la ·ing t l1
fond s in th h::i.nd
f the d fr n chnt, o ut of \\' hich th ' SC n >t , in
due couL ' of busines~ . \Y o ulcl he ·xpecte<l to b' l aid . Th e promise ,,·as part of a large r transa ·tion o n titutin g an ntire c ntract, and ,,. ' hav n r ea. o n to beli eve, a n d have n au th rity
to cleclare, that the plaintiff \\'Oulcl have 1 artcd with hi int r t
in th , , mpa! !Y ,,·ith ut a s i111ultan cou ob li gat io n to be in cl m nifi 'd aga in l hi s liabi lities fo r the ·om pa n y . For th . r ea n ,
\\'C are f opinio n that th i 1 ro mi c \\'a not withi n th
tatute, a ncl
that a n act i n will li e upo n it , th o u g h n t m a d e in writ ing.
( ) It wa. urged , o n the part of the lcf n<lant, tf1at thi
promi . e of ind mnity aga in , t th· o ut tancling n ot
wa with ut
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o r, in o th er ,,·o rcl., to st ' P in to hi s h oc . a · far as . \l ge r wa
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An action upon the case wherein the plaintifif declared that

the defendant, in coiisideration the plaintiff, at his request locarct

et dclibcrarct ciiidaiii Josepho English a gelding of the plaintiff's

2

L r I Raym rnl

IO j :

5 M cl. -.+ : alk. 27; 3 a lk. i 5; J l It 606.

ad cquitanduin ct itiiicnmditiii nsqiic ad Reading in comitatii

Berks, assumpsit ct promisit the plaintiff, quod the said Joseph

and Charles the said gelding to the plaintiff rcdcliberarent, etc.

Upon }io)i assumpsit pleaded, this cause came to trial before Holt,

Chief Justice, at Westminster Hall ; and the counsel for the defend-

ant insisting that the plaintiff ought to produce a note in writing of

this promise, within the statute of frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3. s. 4; and

the Chief Justice doubting of it, a case was made of it and ordered

to be moved in court, to have the opinion of the other judges. And

now it was argued this term by Sci-gcaut Daniall for the defend-

ant and Mr. Raymond for the plaintiff. And it was insisted for

the defendant that this case was within the statute of frauds.

29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4, for it was a promise to answer for the default

and miscarriage of the person the horse was lent to. The very
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letting out and delivery of the horse to English implies a con-

tract by English to re-deliver him, and he is bound by law so to

do, and consequently the defendant is to answer for the default

of another. In a case, 2 Will. & Mar., your Lordship settled this

rule, that where an action will lie against the party himself, there

an undertaking by J. S. is within the statute; and where no action

will lie against the party himself, there it is otherwise. And there-

fore I agree this case, that a man should say to another, "Do you

build a house for J. S. and I will pay you," that case is not withint

the statute, because there J. S. is not liable. But this case is not

more than this, if a man should say, "Do you let J. S. have goods,

and if he does not pay you T will," and this is within the statute,

because an action wall lie against J. S. for the money for the

goods. Or. if a man should say, "Take J. S. into your service, and

if he does not serve you faithfully, or if he wrongs you, I will be

responsible," that is also withni the statute.

To this it was answered for the plaintiff, that here the credit

was wholly given to the pefendant; that, that rule of the sergeant's

must be understood, where an action does or does not lie against

the party himself on the contract, and not where an action does

~ .\ ' TIO.N upon th ca
wh rei n th plaintiff d cla rccl that
the I f n lanl. in c n. idera ti on the plaintiff, at hi requc t /ocarl'l
et delibcraret rnidalll J o epho E iwli h a gelclino- of th plaintiff
ad eqlliialldnlll ct it illcralld111n usq11e ad R eadin g in COlllitat 1t
Berk , assttlllpsit et proJ11isit the plaintiff, quod the aid J o eph
.and harl
the aid o-eldin g to the plaintiff redcliberarcllt, etc.
pon non assu111psit plead d, this cause came to trial before HOLT,
C hief Ju tice, at Vv e trninster fall; and the coun el fo r the defend.ant in i ting that the plaintiff ug ht to produce a not in writing of
this p romi e, w ithin th e tatute of fraucl , 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4: and
the Chi f Ju tice doubtin~Y of it, a ca e wa ~ made of it and ord ered
to be m oved in court, to have the opinion of the other judges. And
now it wa arg ued thi term by S ergea nt Darnall for the defend ant and 1lfr. R a_'\llllO Jl d for th e plaintiff. And it was insisted f r
the defendant that thi case wa within the statute of fraud ·,
29 Ca r. 2, c. 3, . 4, for it ·w a a promise to an wer fo r the default
and miscarriage of the per" n the hor e wa lent to. The very
letting out and delivery of th e hor e to English implie a c ntract by English to r e-deliver him, and he i bound by law o to
do, and consequently the lefendant i to an wer fo r the default
o f an other. In a ca e, 2 Will. & 1ar., your Lord hip settled this
rule, that where an action will lie against the party himself, there
an undertaking by J. S. is within the tatute; and where no action
will lie against the party him elf, there it is otherwise. And therefore I agree thi cas , that a man should ay to another, " D o you
build a hou e for J. S. and I will pay you,., that case is not within
the statute, because th ere J. . is not liable. But this ca e i not
m ore than this, if a man hould say, ''Do you let J. S. have O"ood ,
and if he do s not pay you 1 will," a nd thi i within the tatute,
an action will lie against J. . for the money for the
becau
good . Or, if a man hould say, "Tak J. S. into yo ur service, and
if h <l es not serve yo u faithfully, or if he wrong you , I will be
re pon ible,'' that i al 'O within th sta tute.
To thi it \Ya an wered for the plaintiff, that here th e cred it

was wholly given to the pefendant ; that. that rule of the sergeant's

mu t be under tood, where an action doe or cl e not lie aO"ain t
t he party himself n the C0ntract, and not wh re an action d
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or does not lie against i'iim upon collateral respects. And there-

fore in this case, for an actual conversion, or for refusing to re-

deliver the horse, English may be charged in trover or detinue,

yet. he being not chargeable upon the contract, the case is not

within the statute. This contract cannot be said properly to be a

promise to answer for the default or miscarriage of another, un-

less English were liable by the first contract.

Upon the first motion and arguing this case, the three judges

against Powys seemed to be of opinion that this case was not

within the statute, because English v^'as not liable upon the con-

tract ; but if any action could be maintained against him, it must be

for a subsequent wrong in detaining the horse, or actually convert-

ing it to his own use. And Powrli., Justice, said that that rule, of

what things shall be within the statute, is not confined to those

cases only, where there is no rem.cdy at all against the other, but

where there is not any remedy against him on the same contract.

This case is just like tlie case where a man says, "Send goods to

such a one, and I will -pay yoii." that is not within the statute, for

the seller does not trust the person he sends the goods to. So here
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the stablekeeper only trusted the defendant, and an action on the

contract will not lie against English, but for a tort subsequent he

may be charged in detinue, or trover and conversion, which is a

collateral action.

Powvs, Justice, said that there was a trust to English, for

the very lending of the horse necessarily implies a trust to the

person he is lent to, and consequently the defendant in this case is

to answer for the default of another, and is within the statute.

Powell, Justice, agreed, that if a man should say, "Lend

J. S. a horse, and I will undertake he shall pay the hire of it,"

or, "Send J. S. goods, and I will undertake he shall pay you," that

those cases would be within the statute ; and agreed with Powys,

that if any trust were given to English, then the case would be

within the statute. But he and the Chief Justice and Gould held,

that here was no credit given to English, and the Chief Justice

agreed with him, that if there had, this promise would have been

but an additional security, and within tlie statute. And the Chief

Justice said, that if a man should say, "Let J. S. ride your horse

to Reading, and I will pay you the hire," that is not within the

statute, no more than if a man should say, "Deliver cloth to J. S.,

and I will pay you." He said also, that a bailee of an horse for

hire is not bound to re-deliver him at all events, but if he be

r d es not li ' again t Lim up n col lat ~ raJ r , l
. \n 1 th refor in thi · ca e, f r an actual c m ·c L·ion, r f r r "fu in t r <l liYer th ' h r c, ' no-Ji h may be h;:irrr cl in troy r r d tinu
y ' t, h ' b ·inrr n t har · ah! UJ n th ·ontract, th ca
i n t
,,·ithin th ' talut . Thi . contra t ann t b ' a i I pr p rly to b a
pr mi ·c to an \\' r f r th I fault r 11 i carriacrc of anoth r , un i
Eno-Ii h w r lial 1 by th fir t c ntra t.
"Cp n th fir t m ti on and ar uin 0 thi ca , th thr
jud oa o-ain t P owy
e m cl t be f pini n that thi ca
wa n t
within th
tat ut , 1 ca u En Ii h wa n t lial l up n th
ntract; but if any acti n oul i b maii,tain cl arrain t him. it mu t 1 e
fo r a ub iu nt \\T nrr in leta inin o- th h r e, or a tuall y con rting it to hi own u . . nd PowE r., Ju tic
aid that that rul of
\\·hat thing hall be within th
tatut , i not confin d to tho e
ca e only wh r th re i n r erne ly at all again t th oth r, 1 ut
wh r th r i not any r m cly a o-ain t him on th am contract.
'T hi ca i. ju t lik the: ·a wh re a man ay , .. nd o-oo<l to
uch a n , and I ,,·ill i a.y you, " that i not within th tatute, f r
th cller cl
n t tru t th e p r on he nd the go d t .
o h re
th tabl ke p r nl y tru ted th 1 f ndant, an I an acti n on the
ontra t will n t lie aga in t En Ii h, but for a tort ul
JU nt h
may be cha.rgc I in detinue, or trov r and
nv r 1 n, which i a
collat ral action.
PO\n: , Ju tice, aicl that th r wa a tru t t E n o-Ii h, for
the ,, ry lending of th e hor
n c arily implie a tru t to th e
n qu ntl y th def nclant in tbi a
p r on h i I nt t , and
t an \\· er f r th defa ult of a noth er, an I i within th tatut .
PowELL, Ju ti ce, aar e i, that if a man h ulcl ay, "L nd
J. . a hor , and I will uncl r take h shall pay th hir
f it,'
or, ·· n l ]. . g ocl , and I " ·ill un l rtak h e hall pa y y u," that
tho e a c w uicl b within th tatut ; and ag r 1 with
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that if any tru t were gi n to ~ ng li h, th n th
a
' ould be
w ithin th tatut .
ut h and th
hi f Ju tice. and
that h r wa n er lit crivcn t -.·nl'. ;li h, a n 1 th
hi f Ju tice
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1 ut an aclcliti nal
urity, an l w ithin th tatut
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Ju ti . aid, that if a man houl l ay, ''L t]. . ri I y ur hor e
t R acling, a nd 1 will pay y u th hir " that i n t w itl;in the
tatut . nr:, mor than if a man houl l ay, ' eliv r 1 th t J. .. ,
and I will I a~· y LL' · lJ . aid al o , that a bail
of a n h r e f r
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n t I und t r - I !iv r him at all
nt , I ut if h e be
1

183

MEASK VS. WAGNER.

183

robbed of him without fraud in him, he is excused. x-\nd so it

was ruled in the case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Stra. 916.

The last day of the term the Chief Justice delivered the opin-

ion of the Court. He said that the question had been proposed at

a meeting of judges, and that there had been a great variety ot

opinions between, them, because the horse was lent wholly upon

the credit of the defendant; but that the judges of this court were

all of opinion that the case was within the statute. The objection

that was made was, that if English did not re-deliver the horse,

he was not chargeable in an action upon the promise, but in trover

or detinue, which are founded upon the tort, and are for a matter

subsequent to the agreement. But I answered that English may-

be charged on the bailment in detinue on the original delivery,

and a detinue is the adequate remedy, and upon the delivery Eng-

lish is liable in detinue, and consequently this promise by the

defendant is collateral, and is within the reason and the very words

of the statute ; and is as much so as if. where a man was indebted,

J. S., in consideration that the debtee would forbear the man,
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should promise to pay him the debt, such a promise is void unless

it be in writing. Suppose a man comes with another to a shop to

buy, and the shopkeeper should say, "I will not sell him the goods

unless you will undertake he shall pay me for them," such a prom-

ise is within the statute ; otherwise, if a man had been the person

to pav for the goods originally. So here detinue lies against Eng-

lish the principal; and the plaintiff having this remedy against

English the principal, cannot have an action against the defendant

the undertaker, unless there had been a note in writing.

Mease vs. Wagner (1821).

I McCord (S. Car.) 395.

This was an action for the articles furnished the funeral of

Mrs. Bradley, at the request and by order of the defendant. Mrs.

Bradley was the widow of Dr. Bradley, who left her his estate

during life, remainder to his nephew, John Bradley. Mrs. Brad-

ley, prior to her death, expressed a wish to be buried in a particu-

lar manner. As soon as she expired, the defendant was

sent for as a friend of the family, and she undertook to procure

robb d of him without fraud in him, he i excu ed.
nd o it
wa ruled in th ca e of Coggs v. Bernard, 2 tra. 9 L
Th la t clay of the term the .,hief Justice cleliverccl th e opin ion of the ourt. He ~a id that the iu ·tion had b n pr p d at
a m etin o- of juclo-e , and that ther had been a reat vanety or
opinion betw n them, b cau e th h Le wa Jent wbolly upon
the er <lit of the defendant; but that the judge of thi cou rt were
all of opinion that the ca _e \Ya within the tatute. The objection
that wa macle was, that if Engli h did not re- leliver the hor e,
he wa not chargeable in an action upon the promise, 1 ut in trover
or detinu , whi ch are fo unded upon the tort and are fo r a matter
ub equent to the agreement. But I an wered that Enali h may
be charg d on the bailment in detinue on the original delivery,
and a detin ue i th e adequate rem dy, and upon the d li very English i liable in detinue, and consequently thi promise by the
defendant i collateral, and is within th e reason and th very words
of the tatute; and i a much o as if, where a man wa indebted,
J. S., in consideration that the cl btee would fo rbea r th e man,
hould promi e to pay him the debt, uch a promi e i vo id unle
it be in writing. Suppose a man comes with another to a shop to
buy, and the shopkeeper should say, "I will not sell him the good
unles you will undertake he shall pay me fo r them," uch a promise is within the statut-" ; otherw ise, if a man had been the per on
to pay fo r the goods origi nall y. So here detinue lie again t E ngli h the prin cipal ; and the plaintiff having this remedy against
English th principal, cannot have an action against the defendant
the under taker, unl e s there had been a note in w riting .

MEASE VS . WAGNER ( 1821).
l

McCord ( S. Ca r.) 395.

Thi wa an action for the article furnished th funeral of
Mrs. Bradley, at the r equest and by order of the defendant. Mrs.
Bradley was the widow of Dr. Bradl y, who left her hi e tate
durino- life, remainder to hi nephew, J ohn Bradley. M r . Bradley, prior to her death, expre sed a w i h to be buried in a particular manner.
A
oon a she expired, the d f ndant wa ·
sent fo r a a friend of the family, and he uncl rtook to procure
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the articles necessary to such a funeral as the deceased had desired.

She proceeded lo the shop of the plaintiff, where she selected the

articles required, saying they were for Mrs. Bradley's funeral.

She was asked "by whom they were to he paid for?" She re-

plied, "charge them to the estate of Dr. JJradley. and as soon as his

nephew comes to town he will pay for them, or I will." The

articles furnished were such as were suitable to the condition in

which Mrs. liradley had lived.

Un the arrival of the nephew in the city, the account was pre-

sented to him, and he refused to \ydy it, .saying that the defendant

had no authority to procure the articles at his expense. The de-

fendant was then ap])lie(l to. and she refused payment. Some

time after this refusal, one of the witnesses remonstrated with the

nephew on the impropriety of his conduct, when he said he would

pay it, but did not. It appeared that a Miss Teabout adminis-

tered upon the estate of Mrs. Bratlley.

The counsel for the defendant contended that she was not

responsible, as it v.as a collateral and not an original undertaking.

The court charged the iur\' that it was an original, and not
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a collateral undertaking, and that the defendant was liable.

A verdict was accordingly rendered for the plaintifif. A mo-

tion was now made for a new trial, on the ground that the court

misdirected the jury.

Mr. justice Huger delivered the o])inion of the court.

It has been regarded as settled doctrine ever since the case

of Buckmyr v. Daniall, (2 Lord Raymond, 1085 ; Rolit. on Frauds,

218). that when no action will lie against the party undertaken

for. it is an original promise. If -V promise 1> that in considera-

tion of his doing a particular act, C shall pay him such a sum,

and if C do not ])ay liiui, he. A, will i)ay the same; this is said to

be no collateral undertaking on the i)art of A unless C was privy to

the contract, and recognized himself as a debtor also. (Fitzgib-

bon. 302: Robt. on I'raufls. 223.) Tn the case before me. the

defendant undertook for the representative of Dr. Bradley, against

whom no action could lie for the articles furnished for the funeral

of Mrs. Bradley. And there was no privity of contract betw^een

the plaintiff and the nephew^ of Dr. llradley. But it has been

urged, that the subsequent promise of the nephew^ had a retro-

active operation, and rendered him liable ; but if he were not liable

before the promise was made, he could not be so afterwards. It

was not in writing, and was nudinn pad inn. Had the defendant

the arti ·lcs 11 'C s:ary to su h a fun ' ral a · th dee a , cl had le ir cl.
' he proceed 'd to the shop uf the plaintiff, wh r ' he el ctecl th
articles l"l'q uired. saying they were for ).[r_. Bra lle_y' fun ' ral.
her'.·hl'. \\as :i.kcd .. l>y \\·hum they ,,·er' to be paid for?"
plied ... cha rgl' th ' Ill to the estate l)f Dr. l~raclley, and as oo n a. hi
nephe\\ comes to tmnt he \\·ill pay for them, or l \\·ill." Th
articles furnishccl wcr' such a ,,·ere suitabl' to the condition in
\\ hich >.lr .. l~radlev had lived.
On the arri,·al of the nephC\\ in the city. the acount. ,,.a· pr,_
sentecl to him. '1. nd lw refused to pay it, saying that th e clef n !ant
hacl no authmity to procure the articl ' S at his expcn c. Th defcnclant ''a" then applied to. and . he refused payment.
orne
tim after this n: fu-.,al. on ' of th e witn 'ssc rcm on trated \\·ith the
nephe\Y 0 11 the impropriety of hi s cnncluct. \\·hen he . aicl he would
pay it. but did not . lt appeared that a ).Ii:: T about aclmini ter cl upon the esrat' o f ). Ir . . Bradley.
The counsel for the cldenclant contenclecl that he \\·a not
rcsponsibk. as it \':as a collat ral and not an o riginal uncl rtakino-.
The court charged the jury that it \\·a: an original. and not
a collateral um! rtaking, ancl that th ' defenclant wa liable .
. \ Yerclict was ac ordingly r endered for the plaintiff. ~ \ motion wa. no\\' rnacl for a new trial. on the ground that th court
mi . directed the jury.
). Ir. ] ustice 11 L·c;ER cleliYerecl the opinion of the court.
It ha s been regard eel a. seltlccl doctrin ever . ince tbe a e
o f Jfoclrn1yr , .. Darnull. ( 2 L o re! Haymoncl, l 5; Rohl. on Fraud ,
218), that \\h en no action \\'ill lie a~. .;ain t the 1arly undertaken
for, it is an o riginal promi. e. I [ . \ promi e B that in con icl rati on of his doing a particular act. · shall pay him uch a um,
and if C do not pay l1im, he, ~ \. \\·ill pay the sam ; thi i ail to
h no collateral unckrt<l.king on 1hr part ) f . \uni s. C wa privy to
th contract. an cl rcrngniz cl himself a: ct debtor aL o. ( Fitzgibbon , :)02: lfoht. on Fraud . , 223.) In the ca e h f re me, th
clc.:f ndant unclcrtoo l· for th repr s ' ntati,·e o f l r. Bracll y, again t
whom no action ·mile! Ji' for the arti ·lcs furni . h cl for the fun ral
of .:\[r . Bracllev. . \ncl th re \\'a: no privity of · ntra t b tw en
the plaintiff and th e n phew of Dr. lhacll y. Dut it ha b n
nrg 'cl, that th, sub~cq·u nt promi . e of the n I h w had a r troactivc op ration, and rend r cl him liable; but if he were n t liable
aft rwar I . It
b 'fo re th promise wa maclc, h could n t 1
wa s n t in \Hiling, ancl wa 1111d11111 pactu111. Had the I fendant
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undertaken for the state or legal representative of Mrs. Bradley,

who was legally bound to pay the expenses of her funeral, it

would have been a different question ; but she unfortunately under-

took for one who was not responsible, and who was so far from

being privy to the contract, or acknowledg-ing himself a debtor,

refused payment and denied the authority of the defendant to ren-

■ der him responsiV)le.

I am of opinion, therefore, that the motion must be refused.

NoTT, Johnson, Richardson and Colcock, JJ., concurred.

Mr. Justice Gantt dissented.

Kin^, for the motion.

Hunt, contra.

Welch Tvs\ Marvin (1877).

uncl rta ke n for the sta le or legal rc prcsc11tatic.•c of Jfrs. Bradley.
' ho was legally h und to pay tb
x pen. c of her fun eral. it
would ha,·e been a different qu e tion; but h un fo rtuna tely undertook fo r one who was not r . pon ibl ', and wh o wa. o fa r from
being privy to th e contract, or ackn owl edgin g him elf a debtor,
r fu eel payment an d cl ni ed th e authority of the defendant to render him re pon ible.
[ am of opinion, th erefo re, that th e n1 otion mu t be refus ed.
::\OTT ,

J o:!. I NSOX,

Rr c H .\ TW SO::\T

a nd

OL CO K , ]] . .

co ncurred .

36 Mich. 59.

Error to Ionia Circuit.

Sessions & Striekland and .i. B. Morse, for plaintiff in error.

Lemuel Clute, for defendant in error.

Marston, J. Alarvin, who was plaintiff below, brought an
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action of assumpsit to recover the value of a certain meat furnished

-:\Ir. Ju tice G.\ . TT di entecl .
K in er . fo r th e motion.

H 1111 t, contra.

by him to be used in a boarding train upon the D., L. & L. ]\I. R. R.

It appears from the testimony that one Hiram Cook, who was

engaged in keeping such boarding car, had obtained his supply

of meat from the plaintiff, and in June, 1875, was owing him for

meats furnished $117.78; that about the T4th of June he refused

\\'F.J_

H ': 'S . ::.\J.\J.'.\' IN

(1 877 ).

to trust Cook any longer or furnish him with any more meat, unless

some diff'erent arrangements were made ; that Welch, who had

36 :\Iich. 59.

been supplying Cook with groceries, went to see Marvin, in

company with Cook, to make some arrangement about this matter.

Marvin testified that he (Welch) then said: "This pay is

Erro r to Ionia Circuit.

now assigned over to me from the railroad company, and I

am going to liecome responsible for the meat, and T want meat

to run this train, and what meat you let Cook have from now, I

will pay you for." Marvin then told Welch that Cook had got

S essiolls & Strickland and ~ J. B. ~\I ursc, fo r plaintiff in er ro r.
L elllu cl Clute, fo r defendant in rror.
-:\Lrn. TO:\f, ]. ::.\IarYin) who wa plaintiff below, brOLwht an
action of a ump it to r ecover the valu of a certain m eat furni shed
by him to be u eel in a boarding train upon th e D. , L. & L. ::.\I. R. R.
It appear from th e te timony that one Hiram Cook, who wa
engaged in keeping uch boarding ca r, had obtained his uppl y
of m eat from th e plaintiff. ;rnd in Jun e, r875, \Ya owin g him fo r
m eats furni heel r I7.78; that about th e qth of Jun e he refu sed
t o tru t ook any longer or furnish bim with any mor meat. unles
om e diff rent arrangement were made; that \\Telch, who ha d
ook with g r eerie , went to
e Iarvin , in
been upplyinocomp;rny with Cook, to mak ome arrangement about thi s matt r.
Marvin tes tifi ed that he ( \\ elch ) then aid:
' 'This pay i ~
now :is ig ned over to me from the railroad company, and I
am o-oing to become re pon ible for the meat, and I want meat
to run thi tra in, and what meat yon l t Cook have from no\\·, I
will pay you fo r ."' l\farvin then told \\Telch that ook had o-ot
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meat there from the middle of April up U) the first of June, that

had not been paid for, and that he would not let any more meat

go until he was paid for that; that Welch replied, " Well, you get

an order on me from Cook and I will accept that order, and pay

you as fast as the money comes into my hands to pay that." The

next morning an order was drawn up for $117.78; this

order was accepted by Welch, providing money enough came into

his hands from the compan_\- to pay his own account first, the bal-

ance to be paid on this order. Different amounts were paid by

Welch, in all amounting to two hundred and fifteen dollars ; but it

does not appear that any other orders were given. It also appears

from plaintiff's testimony that he, in September, received an order

from Cook on the railroad company for one hundred dollars, which

he endeavored to collect. After the arrangement made with Welch,

plaintiff' continued to charge the meats thereafter delivered to

Cook, in the same manner he had previously done, no change hav-

ing been made on his books in the manner of keeping the account.

There was considerable conflicting evidence, as is usually expected

in such cases, as to what the agreement really w'as, as to the reason
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of continuing to charge the meat to Cook upon plaintiff's books,

and the ett'orts made to collect the amount.

The courts, in charging the jury, very properly left it to them

to find what the agreement between the parties actually was, and

the conclusion to be drawn from such finding. Defendant's coun-

sel requested the following instructions to be given: "If the jury

find that Marvin sold meat to Cook and charged the same to Cook,,

and that Welch became responsible for it, in order to take the

promise out of the Statute of Frauds, and make Welch legally

liable, they must also find that Marvin thereupon absolutely dis-

charged Cook from lialiility, and looked only to Welch for pay."

Other instructions havmg a similar tendency were requested to be

given. These requests were refused, the jury being merely in-

structed that the manner of keeping the account, and efforts to

collect from Cook, were facts capable of explanation, and might

be considered by the jury. We are of opinion that defendant was

entitled to have the jury instructed as requested. Under no theory

of this case could Cook and Welch both be responsible to plaintiff,

severally, at his option. If Cook was liable for the meats fur-

nished after the arrangement with Welch was made, then clearly

Welch's liability could not be an original one. It is equally clear

that if Welch's promise was an original promise, and the delit his-

meat th re from th mi lclle f _\pril up to th fir t of Jun , lha
had not b n pai l f r, and that he woul l not let a1w m r m at
go until he wa paid fo r that; that W elc h replied, "Well, y u get

an rcler n m fr m
k ancl I wi ll accept that ord r, ancl pay
you a fa l a , th m n y m . int my hand to pay that. ' T he
next mornin
an
rd r wa. drawn up fo r
117.7 ; thi
rd r wa a 1 t d by \ elc::h providing money nough came into
hi hand fr m th c mpany to pay hi wn account fir t, th balance to b paid n thi ord r. Different amount w r paid by
\ elch, in all am untinl'. ; to t\\· hundred and fifteen dollar ; but it
iven. It al o app ars
do not app ar that any other r ler w r
from plaintiff' testim ny that h , in
pt ml r, r ec iv d an order
from ook n the rail road company for one hundred dollar , which
h ndeavor cl to collect.
ft r th arrano- m ent made w ith \ elch,
plaintiff ontinuecl to charge the m eat th r eafter delivered to
ook, in th am e mann er h had previou ly don , n change havino- be n made on hi b ok in th e manner f keepino- th account.
There wa con ideral 1 conflictin g evid nc , a i u ually expect d
in uch ca e , a to what th aoT m nt really wa , a to th e rea on
of continuing to charge the m at to ook upon plaintiff' books,
and th ffort macl to collect th e am unt.
The cou rt , in char i11g the jury, Y ry properly 1 ft it to them
to find what the agreement betw en th parti actually wa , and
th conclu ion to be drawn from uch finding. D fe ndant's counel r eque t cl th fo llowing in truction to b giv n: " If th jury
find that l\Iarvin sold m at to o k and charo-ed the ame to ook,.
a nd th at \\ elch became re I n ible for it, in order to take the
promi e out of th
tatute of Frauds, an l make \\ elch leo-ally
liabl , t hey mu t al o find that 1arvin thereupon al fot ly di char o-ecl 'o k from lial ility, an l 1 oked nly to \ \T lch for pay."
ther in truction hav ing a imilar ten l ncy were r qu t d to 1 e
given. Th e requ t " · -r r fu . ecl, th jury bing m r ly intructecl t11at th e mann r of k pinrr the account, and ffort to
f xplanation, and miaht
collect from ook, w r fact capabl
be con i dere l by th jury. \
are f opinion tba t I f endan t wa
cntitl cl to have th jury in tructed a r que tcd.
nd r no th ory
f thi ca c uld
ok and \V 1 h b th b r e pon il 1 t plaintiff,
ok wa Jial le for th m at fur-. v rally, at hi option . If
ni bed aft r the arranaernent with \ elch wa mad , th n cl arly
\V lch' lial ility c uld not b an orig inal on . It i qually cl arthat if \ !ch' pr mi wa an rio-inal promi , and th del t hi ,
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debt, then Cook could not be held liable thereon. The parties

might have made an agreement under which they would have

been jointly liable, which is not claimed in this case. But they

could not, under the circumstances, be severally liable, at

plaintiff's option. We know of no better test than this, in a case

like the present. Bresler v. Pendell, 12 Mich. 224; Gihbs v.

Blanchard, 15 Mich. 21)2; Corkins v. Collins, 16 Mich. 480.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial

ordered.

The other justices concurred.

KiMEALL vs. Newell (1845).

7 Hill (N. Y.) 116.

On error from the superior court of the city of New York,

Newell brought an action of covenant against Kimball in the

marine court of the city of New York, claiming to recover certain

debt, then o k co ul I n t be h Id liabl thereon. Th partie
mi ht hav mad an a re m nt un ler which they would have
been jointly liable, which i not claime 1 in this case. But they
could not, und er th circum. tanc e~ , b sev rall y liable, at
plaintiff's opti n. We know of no better test than thi , in a ca e
like the pre ent. Bresler v. Pendell) 12 Mich. 224; Gibbs v.
Blanchard, r 5 l\Iich. 2l)-; orlcins v. Collins) 16 Mich. 480.
The judgm nt must be reversed, with cost , and a new trial
ordered.
The other ju tice concurred.

rent due on a lease to one Theodosia Knowlton, for whom the

defendant had become surety. On the trial, the plaintiff gave in

evidence the following instruments :

"This is to certify that I have hired and taken from Daniel Newell

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the house in Nassau street, etc., for one year, to commence on the first

day of May next, at the yearly rent of four hundred and fifty dollars,

KIMB ALL

vs.

NEWELL

(

1845).

payable quarterly. And I do hereby promise to make punctual payment

of the rent, in manner aforesaid, and quit and surrender the premises,

7 Hill (N. Y.) 116.

at the expiration of the term, in as good state and condition as reasonable

use and wear thereof will permit, damages by the elements excepted.

Given under my hand and seal the 3rd day of March, 1840.

Mrs. T. Knowlton, [L. S.]"

"In consideration of the letting of the premises above described, and

for the sum of one dollar, I hereby become surety for the punctual pay-

ment for the rent, and performance of the covenants, in the above written

agreement mentioned, to be paid and performed by Mrs. Theodosia Knowl-

ton, and if any default should be made therein, I do hereby promise and

agree to pay unto the said Daniel Newell such sum or sums of money as

On error from the superior court of the city of I ew York,
Newell brought an action of covenant against Kimball in the
marine court of the city of New York, claiming to recover certain
rent due on a lease to one Theodosia Knowlton, for whom the
defendant had become urety. On the trial , the plaintiff gave in
evidence the foliowing ·instruments :

will be sufficient to make up such deficiency, and fully satisfy the conditions

of the said agreement, without requiring any notice of non-payment, or

proof of demand being made. Given under my hand and seal the 3d day

of March, 1840.

"M. T. C. KiMEALL, [L. S.]"

"This is to certify that I have hired and taken fr om Daniel N ewell
the house in Nassau street, etc., for one year, to commence on the first
day of May nex t, at th e yearly rent of four hundred and fifty dollars,
payable quarterly. And I do hereby promise to make punctual payment
of the rent, in ma nner aforesaid, and quit and surrender the premi sesr
at the expiration of the term, in as good state and condition as reasonable
u e and wear th ereof will permit, dam ages by th e elements excepted.
Gi ven und er my hand and seal the 3rd day of March, 1840.
MRs. · T. KNOWLTON, [L. S .] "
" In con id erati on of the letting of the premi ses above describ ed, and
for the sum of one dollar, I hereby beco me surety for the punct ual paym ent for the rent, and performance of the covenant ' in t h e above written
agreement m entioned, to be paid and performed by l\Irs. Theodosia Knowlton, and if any default should be m ade therei1~, I do hereby promi e and
agree to pay unto the said Daniel Newell such sum or sums of m oney as
will be suffi cient to make up such defici ency, a nd fully sati fy the conditions
of the said agreement, without r quirin g any notice of non-payment, or
p roof of demand being made. Given und er my hand and seal th e 3d day
of i\Iarch, 1840 .
" M. T. c. KIM R\LL, [L. S.]"
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It appeared that Mrs. Knowiton occupied under the lease,

and that a balance of rent, amounting to 553 1 .94, remained due the

plaintiff. It further api)eared that Mrs. Knowiton was a married

woman at the time the lease was executed ; and the defendant

contended that, inasmuch as her covenant was void by reason of

coverture, his was also void. The marine court held otherwise,

however, and rendered judoment in favor of the plaintiff, which

was afterwards affirmed ])y the superior court on certiorari, and

the defendant brought error.

R. II. Slianiioji, lor the plainiilT in error.

Hozi'ard & Oudcnionk, for the defendant in error.

Nelson. Ch. J. The defendant having consented to become

bound as surety for the rent of the premises leased to Mrs. Knowi-

ton, it is but reasonable to presume that, if he was not well

It app ared that ~Irs. I -nO\dto n occ upi cl under th 1 a ,
a ncl that a balan - of rent. am unting to . 31.9-i., rema in cl du the
plaintiff. It further a ppear ' l that ~IL. Knowlton ,,-a a married
woman at the time the lea. ' was ' xecut <1 : an 1 th
lef ndant
contended that, ina _mu ch a h r CO\'l'na nt wa Yoicl b\' rea n of
coYertur ·. hi ,,-a al
Yoid. The marin
ourt held th erwi ,
howeYer, and rend ·rcJ jucl o-mcnt in fav r f th e plaintiff, which
,,·as afterward s affirmed by th . upen or c urt on c rtio rari, and
the defendant 1 roubht error.

acquainted with her situation before, he then made some enquiries

into her circumstances and condition, and thus became fully pos-

R. JI.

han11 on , for th

plaintiff in error.

sessed of the facts which he now sets up as a ground of discharge.

But conceding that the cjcfendant had no knowledge of the

lf mmrd

& 01tdcrdo11l<, fo r th e cl fcndant in

rr r.

social condition of Mrs. Knowiton. and that he supposed she would
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be legally holden for the rent as it accrued, I am still of the opin-

ion that he is liable on his contract. Th.e doctrine for which his

counsel contends is thus stated liy Theobald: "The obligation of

the surety being accessor}- to the obligation of some person who is

the principal debtor, it is of its essence that there should be a valid

obligation of a principal debtor. The nullity of the principal

obligation necessarily induces the nullity of the accessory."

( Theob. Prin. & Sur. 2.) This is undoubtedly correct as a general

rule ; but it has its exceptions, and the case before us is one of them.

Mr. Chitty says: "Tlie rule that a party can not l)e liable upon

a contract of guarantee, unless the principal has incurred a legal

responsibility, is true, in some instances, in form or words, rather

than in substance." (Chitty on Contr.. 499.) He adds: 'Tn the

case of a guarantee to answer for the price of goods to be supplied

to a married w'oman, or goods (not necessaries) to be sold to an

infant, or other persons incompetent to contract, no doubt the

party guaranteeing, though professedly contracting only in the

character of surety, would be responsible." ( Id.) He refers to

the case of Mage^s v. Ames (4 Bing. 470). which was an action

against the defendant as surety for a married woman. There the

X ELsox, 'h. ]. Th e cl ef nclant ha Ying con ented to become
bo und a ·ur ty fo r the rent of the prerni s lea eel to l\Ir . Kn owlto n, it is but rca -onalJl to pr um e that, if he ,,-a not ,,. 11
acquainted \\·ith her situation before, he th en mad e om e enquiri
into her circum stances a nd condition. and tlrn became fully po . c .· ~cd of the fact · \\·hich he now sets up a a ground of di char
I hit con ceding that the dcfencbnt hacl no know led ere of the
soc ial condition of ~tr · . Kn O\\'lton. and that he uppo d he w ould
he legally hold en fo r t h rent a it accru cl, I am till f th e opinion th a t he i. liable on his c ntract. The doctrine for which hi
c0 un el contend i tlrn . tated by Th obalcl: "The obli ation of
the . urety being accc so ry to th e obligati on of om e per n who i
the princi1 al debtor, it is of it. e . encc that th er houlcl b a valid
ob li o·at ion of a principal debtor. Th' nullity of the principal
ob ligation n eces a ril y indu · ' th
nullity of the acce ory."
(T heoh. Prin. & .' ur. 2.) Thi. i. unclo ubt ecl l)· corr ct a a gen rai
ru le; but it has it e.·cepti n , ancl t he ca c h fore u i ne of th m.
lr . ~ hitty says : "Th rule that a party ca n 11 t b liabl up n
a contract of guarantee, unl
th e principal ha incurr cl a Jeo-al
respo nsibility, i true, in .om e in :tanc ~ . in form or \\' rel , rath r
than in ::;ub tan e. " ( hi tty on Co n tr.. -199·) H e aclcl : "In th e
ca e of a cruarantee to an w er fo r th e pric of o- cl t 1 ~ uppli d
to a married woman, or g od ( not n c sari ) to b old to an
infant, o r other p r. n incomp tent to con tract, 11 doubt the
1 a rty guarant eing, th ough pr fe clly ontractino- nly in the
haracter o f . ur ty, w ould 1 r - P nil I ." (1 1. ) H refer to
the ca e f Jfa crgs \'. ~~ln1cs (.+ Bincr. -1-70 ), whi h wa an action
aga111 t the dcfcnclant a · ur ty f r a married w oman. Th re the
0

Iienry E. Cam .
fleniT E. OKvf^f

KDJ

J~ . \ LL

\ -S. :NE\\' ELL.
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question was wliether the uiulertakiiii^ of the defenuant was an

original one, so as not to require it to be in writing. The court

held that it was collateral, and therefore should have been in writ-

ing. But neither the counsel nor court supposed that the defend-

ant would not have been bound, if the contract had been in writing.

On the contrary, that was assumed. In the case of White v.

Cuyler (6 T. R. 176), it w^as impliedly at least conceded by Lord

Kenvon, that a "[uarantor or suretv for a feme covert would be

liable on his contract. ( .See also Chitty on Contr., 515 ; Pitman on

rVin. and Surety. 13; Biickuiyr v. Bar vail (2 Ld. Raym. 1085) ;

Harris v. HitncJiback (1 Burr. 373) ; Chapiii v. Lapluiui (20 Pick.

467).

The doctrine of the civil law is very clear and satisfactory on

this subject. It is as follows : "Ahhough the obligation of a surety

be only an accessory to that of the principal debtor, yet he who has

bound himself surety for a person who may get himself relieved

from his obligation, such as a minor, or a prodigal who is inter-
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dicted, is not discharged from his suretyship by the restitution of

the principal debtor : and the obli^-ation subsists in his person ;

unless the restitution were grounded upon some fraud, or other

vice which would have the efifect to annul the right of the cred-

itor." ( Dom. B. 3 tit. § I, art. to, Strahan's ed.) Again: If the

principal obligation was annulled only because of some personal

exception which the principal debtor had, as if it w-as a minor,

who, in consideration of his being under age, got himself relieved

from an engagement by which he suffered some prejudice, and

that there had been no fraud on the creditor's part ; the restitution

of the minor would have indeed this eft'ect, that it would annul

his obligation to the creditor, and his engagement to save harmless

his surety, if he desired to be relieved from it. But the said resti-

tution of the minor would not in the least invalidate the surety's

obligation to the creditor. For it was only to make good the

obligation of the minor, in case he should be relieved from it on

account of his age, that the creditor took the additional security

of a suretv." (Id., B. 3, tit. 4, § 5, art. 2 ; and see i Ev. Poth. on

Obi. 237.)

I am satisfied that the decision of the court below was right,

and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Be.\rdsley, J. I diink the defendant was estopped from

denying the competency of Mrs. Knowlton to bind herself by the

covenant she assumed to execute. The defendant by his covenant

qu e tion ,,·a wh eth er the un der taking f th clefenuant wa an
orig inal on , o as not to r quire it to be in w riting. T he court
held that it wa collatera l. and th erefore should have b en in writing . B ut n either the c un cl nor co urt upposed that the cl fendant would not have been b uncl, if th e ontract had been in writing.
O n the contr::i. ry, th at \\·a · a ~ urned. In tb case of !Vhite v .
Cuyler ( 6 T. R. 176), it was impliedly at least conceded by L ord
K enyon, th a t a g uarantor or surety fo r a fem e cover t would be
liabl e on hi s con trac t. (.'ee al so Chi tty on Contr. , 515 ; P itman on
Prin. and ur ty. r 3 ; B 11 ckn1yr v. Darnall ( 2 L d. R aym . 1085) ;
Harr is v . H 1111 chback ( r Durr. 373 ) ; Chap in v . L apham ( 20 Pick.

467 ) .
The doctrin e of th e civil law is ver y clear and satisfactor y on
this ubj ect. It is as fo llow s: " A lfhoug h the oblig ation of a surety
be nly an accessor y to th at of the principal debtor , yet he who has
bound himself urety fo r a pe rson v.rho may g et himself relieved
from hi obligation, such as a minor , or a p rodigal who is interdi cted , i not di scharged from h is surety hip by the restitution of
the prin cipa l debtor : and th e oblif!atinn subsists in hi s persv11 ;
unl es the re titution we re g ro unded upon som e fraud , or oth er
vice which would have the effect to annul the right of the creditor ." ( D om. B. 3 tit.
I , a rt . 10, S trahan 's ed .)
Again: If the
pri11cipal oblig ation was annulled only because of som e per onal
exception which the principal debtor had, as if it was a minor ,
w ho, in con ideration of hi s bein g under age, got himself relieved
from an eng agem ent by wh ich h e suffe red som e prejudice, and
that ther e had been no fraud on the creditor's part ; the restitution
of the minor would have indeed this effect, that it w o ul~ annul
his oblig ation to the cred itor , and his engagem ent to save harml e s
hi s surety, if he des ired to be r elieved from it. But th e aid restitution of the minor would not in the least invalidate the surety's
obligation to th e creditor. F or it wa s only to make good th e
obligation of the minor , in case he should be relieved from it on
account of hi age, that the creditor took the additional security
of a suret) ." (I d. , B. 3, tit. 4, § 5, art . 2; and see r Ev. P oth. on
Obl. 237.)
I am satisfied that th e decision of th e court below was right,
and that the judgment should be affirm ed.
B EARDSLEY, J. I think the defendant was estopped from
denying th e competency of Mr . Knowlton to bind herself by th e
covenant she a ssumed to execute. The defendant by hi s covenant
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admits she was thus bound, and he shall not be allowed to gainsay

1 0

it by alleging her incapacity to make a legal contract. Had she

been induced to enter into this engagement by fraud or imposition,

or upon a usurious consideration, the case might have been other-

wise; but the defendant, although a surety, cannot be permitted,

on the ground now set up, to deny the legal existence of a covenant

which is explicitly conceded by his own deed. (Co. Litt. 352, a,

note 306; I Stark. Ev. 302, Am. cd. of 1830; Greenl. Ev., §§ 22

to 26, and the notes.)

The judgment of the court below is right, and should be

affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Dexter vs. Blanchard (1865),

II xA.llen 365.

Contract brought upon an oral promise by the defendant to

pay to the plaintiff a bill for the hire of horses and carriages, and

for injury to a wagon.

At the trial in the superior court, before Morton, J., the

a lmit he w a llrn b un 1, and h ~ ha ll not b all w d t gain ay
it by all g in h r incapacity to mak a 1 gal co ntra L Had she
b n indu c d to nter into thi en a a - m nt by fra ud or irn1 o ition,
r upon a u uri u c n id ration , th e ca mi o-ht hav 1 n oth rwi e; but th <l £ ndant, althou a h a urety, ann t b l rmitt d,
on th e aro und now t up, to <l ny th Jeaal e:xi tence of a cov nant
which i explicitly con d d by hi own cl d. ( . Liu. 352, a,
note 30 ; r tark. E v. 302 Am . e 1. of 1830; r nl. -. v.,
22
to - 6, an 1 th not s.)
T he j udgrn ent of th e ourt below i right, and h uld be
affirm d.

Jud o-m ent

affirm d.

plaintiff offered to prove that the horses and carriages were hired
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and the injury done by the defendant's minor son, to whom the

credit therefor was given ; and that not long after the date of the

last charge the defendant's son became sick, and while so sick

the plaintiff several times demanded payment of him, and there-

upon the defendant verbally promised to pay the plaintiff's bill if

DEXTE R 'US. BLA

the plaintiff would not trouble his son any further; to which

rr

the plaintiff' agreed. The son afterwards died. It was admitted

J

H ARD (I

65) '

llen 365.

that the bill was not for necessaries.

The judge ruled that upon these facts the action could not

be maintained, and a verdict was returned accordingly for the

defendant. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.

E. L. Shcnuan. for the plaintiff*.

JV. Brighain, for the defendant.

Btgelow, C. J. The ruling of the court was in accordance

with well established |)rinciples. The defendant's promise, al-

ONTR,\ T brought upon a n oral promi
by th e defendant to
pay to the plain tiff a 1 ill for the hire of h r e and carriage , and
fo r injury to a \Yao-on.
t th trial in the uperior court, b for
IoRT r, J., the
p laintiff offer cl to pr ve that the hor e and carriag s wer hir d
and th e injury Ion by the d f ndant' minor on, t whom the
er <lit th r for wa. g iven; and tbat not 1 n; aft r the dat of th
la t cha r a th e cl cfe nclant'
n becam e ick, and whil
o ick
the plaintiff CY ral tim e cl man led payment f him, an l th r up n th defendant VL:rl ally I r mi ~ cl to pay th plaintiff bill if
the 1 la intiff would not tr ul I hi
on any furth er; t which
th r la intiff ag-r cl. Th
n afte n -:a rcl died. It wa aclmitt d
that th 1 ill wa s not £ r n ce an e .
Th jud ge nil cl that up n th s fa t th a tion could not
be maintainecl , a nd a v relict wa i- turn l ac r linaly for the
defe ndant. Th 1 laintiff all g I .·c ption .

E. L. S herlll an , fo r th plaintiff .
l V. B riglza m, fo r th l

J.

Th rulin - f th
" ·ith w II e tabli h cl prin cipl . Th
I CE LOW .

'.

o urt wa
I f n !ant'

a cordance
pr mi , al-

111

DEXTER VS. B[,ANCHARD. 19l

DEXTFR \ '. .

TI[, , \ ~

lL\FD.

191

though it nniy have been made on a good consideration as to the

plaintiff, was nevertheless a promise to pay the debt of another,

and no action can be maintained upon it. Gen. Sts., c. 105, § i. The

fallacy of the argument urged in behalf of the plaintiff lies in the

assumption that there was in fact no debt due from the son of

the defendant, because he was a minor at the time he undertook

to enter into a contract with the plaintiff'. A debt due from a

minor is not void ; it is voidable only; that is, it cannot be enforced

by a suit at law against the contracting party, on plea and proof by

him of infancy. But it is voidable only at the election of the

infant, and until so avoided it is a valid debt. Nor can a third

person avail himself of the minority of a debtor to obtain any

right or security or title. Infancy is a personal privilege, of which

no one can take advantage but the infant. Kendall v. Lawrence,

22 Pick. 540; Nightingale v. JVifhiiigton, 15 Mass. 274; McCarty

V. Murray, 3 Gray, 578.

The effect of the doctrine contended for by the counsel for the

plaintiff would be that a verbal agreement to answer for the debt

of another would be valid, if it could be shown that the original
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contracting party could have established a good defence to the

debt in an action brought against him. We know of no principle or

authority on which such a proposition can be maintained. It cer-

tainly would open a wide door for some of the mischiefs which

the statute of frauds was designed to prevent.

The case for the plaintiff derives no support from the argu-

ment based on proof of an agreement by the plaintiff to forbear

to sue the defendant's son, in consideration of the' promise of the

latter to pay the debt. It is perfectly well settled that it is not a

sufficient ground to prevent the operation of the statute of frauds,

that the plaintiff has relinquished an advantage or given up some

lien or claim in consequence of the defendant's promise, if that

advantage or relinquishment did not also directly enure to- the

benefit of the defendant. It is only wdien such relinquishment or

surrender operates to transfer to the defendant the right, interest

or advantage which the plaintiff gives up, or to create in the

defendant some title or benefit derived from that which 'the other

party surrenders, that the promise can be regarded as an original

undertaking, and not within the statute. Cwfis v. Brozcn, 5 Gush.

488, and cases cited.

Exceptions overruled.

thou h it may have been made on a o-oocl c n id rati n a to the
plaintiff, wa neverih le a promi. to pay the d bt of an ther,
a nd n a tion can be maintained up n it. Ccn. t . c. 105, r. The
fallacy of the argum ent uro-ed in behalf f the plaintiff lie in th e
a ~ umption that there wa in fact no debt clue from the on of
the defendant becau c he \V a a minor at the time he undertook
to ent r into a contract with the plaintiff. A debt due from a
minor i not void; it i voidable only; that is, it cannot be enforced
by a uit at law a o-a in t th contractin o- party, on plea and proof by
hi m of infancy. Dut it i vo1dal le only at the election of the
infant, and until o avoided it i a valid debt. Nor can a third
per on avail himself of th minority of a debtor to obtain any
right or curity or title. Infancy i a per a nal privilege, of which
no one can take advantage but th e infant. Ke ndall v. Lawrence,
_2 Pick. 5-tO ; ~Vighti11gaie v. TVithingto n, 15 l\Ia ~· 27..+; ~H cCarty
v. J1urra'y , 3 Gray, 57 .
The effect of th e doctrine contended fo r by the co un el for th e
plaintiff would be th at a verbal agreement to answ r for the debt
of another would be valid, if it could be hown that the original
contractin o- party cou ld hav e e tablished a good defence to the
debt in an action brotwht again t him. \ Ve know of no principle or
a uthority on which uch a propo ition can be maintained. It certainly would open a wide door for orne of the mi chiefs which
the tatute of fraud wa designed to prevent.
The ca e for th e plaintiff derive no support from the argument ba ed on proof of an agreement by the plaintiff to forbear
t sue the d fendant' on. in con icleration of th e~ promise of the
latter to pay the debt. It i. perfectly \v eil settled that it is not a
sufficient ground to prevent th operation of the statute of fraud ,
that the plaintiff has relinqui heel an advantage or o-iven up ome
lien or claim in con equence of the defendant' promi e. if that
aclvantag-e or relinq ui hment did not also di rectly enure to the
benefit of the defendant. It i only when uch relinquishment or
~ urrender opera te to tran fer to the defendant the right, intere t
or advantage which th e plaintiff give up, or to create in the
de fendant ome title or b nefit derived from that which ·the other
party urrender. , that the promi e can be reo-arcled a an orio-inal
undertaking. and not within the statute. C llYf is v. Brmcm, 5 u h.
-i88, and ca e cited .
Exception ov rruled.
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'Leez's. Van dell, et al. (1887),

69 Tex. 34.

LEE

This suit was brought b}- appellant against 'i'andcll, ajjpellee,.

L,! • •

7

.\::\'DELL, ET . \L. ( I

7 ,

and \V. A. Gray and A. M. Waldrup, on a i)romissory note, joint

6 T x. 34.

and several upon its face, l)ut which it was a.llcged in the answer

that Gray and \Valdrup signed as sureties. The answer alleged

that Yandell was non compos mentis when the note was made and

that there was no consideration therefor.

a1 d
<rnd
that
that
that
1

Charles I. Evans, for appellant.

IV. II. Cozcaii. for appellees.

^Malthii'-., J. The third charge is as follows:

■'Jf }()u find from the evidence that the defendant, Yandell,.

at the time he signed the note sued on, was of unsound mind to

such an extent as to be unable to comjirehend the nature, meaning

This ~uil \Ya .· brou'"'ht 1 y app ' llant aO"ain!:-t Yandell. ap1 11 ,.
\\ ' . . \. Gray and . \. ~J. \\ 'aldrup, n a prumi ·su ry note, joint
se\'Cra l upon it. fa 'C, but whi ·h it \\'a . all rr' 1 in the an w r
(;ray a nd \ \ ' a lclrup signc I a~ · urctic. . Th an ·w ' r a ll g d
Yandell ,,.a · n 11 compo- m ' ntis when th ' not ' wa: made and
thcr' was no con ·irl ' ration th erefor.

and effect of his act in signing such note, you will return a verdict

for defendants."

Charles !. 1'..7.•a11s, for ai pcllant.

This was also assigned as error ; and, being the only instruc-

tion given in reference to Y^andell's sanity, it should be considered

l / '. 11. Co<l'a11, f r appellcc_-.

in the light of all the facts proven on the trial in reference to that
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subject. While it must be regarded as an imperfect presentation

~l.\LT1:rn,

J.

The thir 1 ' hargc

1·

a. fo li o\\· :

of the law of the case, as a general projx»sition it can not be said

to be incorrect ; and the plaintiff not having called the attetition of

the court to other phases of ihe ([uestion by asking appropriate in-

strticticns, ordinarily there would not be error in the omission.

(Parqiihar v. Dallas, 20 Texas, 200 ; Gallagher v. Bozvic, 66 Texas,

265.) In this case, however, two other persons signed said note as

sureties, and^ under the charge, the jury found in favor of said

sureties as well as the principal. Yandell.

As a general proposition, whenever a ])rincii)al on a note is

discharged, his sureties will be also ; but to this rule there are cer-

tain well established exceptions. For instance, the note of a mar-

ried wonic'in is generally held to be void; but if persons, not them-

selves under disability, sign the note of a married woman, without

the payee having been guilty of fraud or deceit in procuring the

signature of sudi married woman, the sureties would be liable

though the principal be discharged. (2 Daniel on Neg. Tnst., par.

1306a; Daz'is V. Staaf^s, 43 Ind. 103; Allen v. Bcrryhill, 27 Iowa

531 ; Hicks V. Randolph, 3 Baxter 352.)

"J f you fin cl from the cY iden · that the def nclant, Yand 11,
at the tim h e sig n cl th note ucd on, wa of un un I mind to
such a n exte nt a to be t~nabl t c mpreh nd th e natur m anin
Jnd ff ct f his a t in ig ni1io- uch 11 te, yo u wi ll r turn a v rdict
for <ld -ncla11t . ''
Thi wa s a lso assigned a err r ; and b ing the only in ·tru tioE g iyen in r ·fer nc to Yandell' a11ity, it h ul l be c n id r d
in the lig ht of all th ' fact l ro v n on the trial in r fe r nee t that
~ubj ct.
\\' bil e it 11111 t be regarded a an imp rf t Ir
ntati n
<•f the law of th e ca ·e, a. a cren ral pr po iti n it can not b
aid
to 1e incorr ct; and the l laint iff n t havin a ·all c.l th all 11ti n f
the ourt t oth e r pha ·cs of the qu ti n by a king ail r priat in~ tru ti 11. , o rdinarily th re w ulcl 11 t b
rror in th
(Farq uhar" · Dallas, 20 Texa , 20 : Ca/lacr/zer v. Bowie
Te ·a ,
26~ . )
In thi . ca , h wcv r two th r p r on ign 1 a id n t a
ur ti . . and 111 l r th
ha r cr , th jury f uncl in fav r f aid
~ ur ct i e a w 11 a th e prin cipal, Yand 11.
A a gen ral prop ~ iti n, wh neYcr a prin ipal n a 11 t' i
cl:. charg d, hi . ur ti . will h al ; 1 ut to thi rul th r ar
rtain w ' 11 " ta! Ji. h cl xc pti n . F r iii_ tan , th 11 t
f a marri cl womcin i g .n ra ll y h 1 I to b \' id : but if 1 r n. , n t th rn ]v . uncl r di sa bility, ig n th n t
fa marri cl w man , with ut
th paye hav in g h n g uilty f fraud r de it in J r ming th
. !gnatur
f su h marri 1 w man, th
ur ti
w ul l b lial 1
th ugh th prin cipal h di char r: cl. (- Dani 1 n
g . Tn t. , par.
13 a; D m·is \' .. taaps. 43 Tn cl. 1 3: All 1i v. B err) hill, 27 I wa
531 ; If icl?s v. Ran dol ph , 3 Ba t r 352.1
1

RUSSELL VS. ANNA15LE. 193

R

The same principle has been extended to sureties on notes ex-

SELL\' ' . ANNABLE.

193

ecuted by infants ; and it is beheved that no vahd reason can be

given why sureties of a person of unsound mind should not be held

liable under like circumstances, though the principal be discharged,

especially so, when the payee of the note is ignorant of the fact

that the principal is a lunatic ; as in such case a recovery might be

had even against the lunatic, if the payee acted in good faith.

(Pomeroy's Equity, volume 2, page 946.) The contract of a surety

is, that if the principal does not pay, he will, and sound policy as

well as the plainest principles of justice demand, that when there

is a valid consideration, and the payee has done nothing to deceive

or mislead either principal or surety, and the principal is held to Dc

not liable, on account of some disability existing at the time of the

making of the contract, whether such disability be coverture, in-

fancy or unsoundness of mind, the surety should be held to the

terms of his contract. The reason given in some of the cases why

the surety of a married woman is held, is that the payee and the

surety knew at the time that the contract was made that the mar-

ried woman might refuse to pay, or that the contract was made in
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reference thereto, the surety binding himself to pay in case she

should avail herself of her legal rights. In case of a lunatic ii

might be presumed that if the payee knew of the disability, the

sureties being his close friends, would also know of it, and that

the contract was made in reference to that state of facts. There

was no evidence that Lee had in any manner deceived, overreached

or defrauded Yandell in procuring him to sign the note. Hence

we are of opinion that the charge of the court should have been

limited to Yandell. and the question submitted as to the liabilities

of the sureties on the principles herein enunciated.

Reversed and remanded.

Opinion adopted November i, 1887.^

Russell vs. Annable (1871).

109 Mass. 72.

Contract, brought August 3, 1870, against one of the sure-

ties in the following bond given under the Gen. Sts. c. 123, §104,.

to dissolve an attachment :

•The opinion on other questions is omitted.

Th ame principle ha 1 en xt nd d l
ur tic n not execut cl by infant ; and it is 1 eli vecl that n va lid r a on can be
giv n why ur ti of a p r on f un ouncl mind houlcl not 1 e held
liabl under lil circum tance , thmwh the principal be di charrreci,
e pecially so, wh n th paye of the note i ignorant of th fact
that the principal is a lunatic; a in uch ca e a recovery might be
had even against the lunatic, if the pay e acted in good fa ith .
(Pomeroy' E ]Uity, volume 2, page 946.) T he contract of a sur ty
i , that if the principal doe. not pay, he will , and so und policy as
well a the plainest principle of justi ce demand, that when there
i a valid con ideration, and th e payee has done nothing to deceive
or mislead ither principal or urety, and the principal is held to De.;
not liable, on account of ome disability exi ting at the time of the
making of the contract, whether such di ability be coverture, infancy or un soundnes of mind, the urety hould 1 e held to the
term of hi contract. The reason g iven in some of the case why
the urety of a married woman i held, i that the payee and the
urety kn ew at th e tim e that the contract was made that the married ·w oman might refu se to pay, or that the contract was made in
r efer nee thereto, the surety binding him self to pay in case she
should avail herself of her legal rights. In case of a lunatic iL
mig ht be presum d that if the payee knew of the disability, tlle
uretie being hi clo e fr:ien ls, would also know of it, and that
the contract was made in reference to that state of facts. There
wa no evidence that Lee had in any manner deceived, overreached
or defrauded Yandell in procuring him to ig n the not . Hence
we are of opinion that the charg of the court should have been
limited to Yandell, and the question submitted as to the liabilities
of the sureties on the prin ciples herein enunciated.
Rever eel an l remanded.
pinion adopted Noveml er r, 1887. 1

R USSELL 'VS .

109 Mass. 72.
brought ugust 3, 1870 ao-ain t on of the suretie in th e following bond given under th e Ten. Sts. c. 123, § 104,_
to di solve an attachment:
ONTRACT,

1

T he opi nion o n oth e r que tion s i
I.j

omittc I.

194 GUARANTY AND SURETYSHIP-

"Know all men by these presents, that Erastus Dennett and Chas. R.

1 -l

Gl:.\R.\XTY ,\.T D .

RETY . ITIP·

Pottle, of Boston in the county of Suffolk, as principal, and George M.

Stevens, of Cambridge, and John F. Annable, of Somerville, in the county

of Middlesex, as surety, are hnldon and stand firmly bound and obliged

unto Arthur W. Russell, of Cambridge in said Middlesex, in the full and

just sum of two hundred dollars, to be paid unto the said Russell, his

executors, administrators or assigns, to which payment, well and truly

to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators,

jointly and severally, firmly by these presents, sealed with our seals, dated

the twenty-second day of July in the year of cur I.oid one thousand eight

hundred and sixty-nine. l"hc condition of this obligation is such, that,

whereas the said Russell has caused the goods and estate of said Dennett

& I'ottle, to the value of two hundred dollars, to be attached on mense

process in a civil action, by virtue of a writ bearing date the 2ist day of

July, A. D. 1869, and returnable to the superior court for civil business

to be holden at said Boston within and for the county of Suflfolk on the

first 'I'uesday of October next, in which said writ the said Arthur W.

Russell is plaintiff, and the said Erastus Dennett and Charles R. Pottle the

defendants, and whereas the said defendants wish to dissolve the said
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attaclimenl according to the provisions of the General Statutes in such

cases made and provided ; Now, therefore, if the above bounden Russell

shall pay to the plaintiff in said action the amount, if any, which he shall

recover therein, within thirty days after the final judgment in said action,

then the above written obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to

remain in full force and virtue.

"Dennett & Pottle, [seal]

"George M. Stevens, [seal]

"John F. Annable, [seal]"

"Signed, sealed and delivered

in presence of

"Edward Raymond."

The declaration alleged diat the plaintiff at said October term

1869 of the superior court duly entered the action named in the

bond, and such proceedings were had therein that he obtained

judgment against said Dennett & Pottle at April term 1870 for

$110 damages and $21.49 t'osts, and no part of said judgment

had been paid, though the defendant had often been requested to

.. Kno\\ a ll m en by th ese pre · ' nl , that Eras tu · Dennett and ha . R.
county f uffo lk, as principal, and
eorge ~L
te\ etb, oi a mbricl ge, and J o hn F ..Annable, o f . o m rYillc, in th county
ot . l1clcllescx, as · urety, ar h o ld ·n a nd stand firmly bound and bliged
unt C> . \rthur \ . Ru ell, f ambriclge in sai d ~Iidcll ex, in th ful l and
Just su m of tw hundr ·d dollars, l o b e paid unto the sa id Ru s JI, his
cXL'Luto r s, admini lrato r
r a s ig n s, l which paym ent, \\ell an l truly
to lie m a d e, we bind our · Jy , ur b irs, executors and a !mini trators,
jo intly a nd " rally, firmly by th
pr cnt , scaled with ur cals, dated
th e l\\'cnty-se nd clay of July in th y ar f ur Lo r d one thou sa nd eig h t
hunclrccl and ixty-ninc. The conditio n of thi s obligati n i such, that,
whcrea · the aid Ru s ll ha cau ed the goo I and · tat of aid D n n tt
J> ttlc. to the value of two hundr I cl liar , to b attach d on mense
proc ss in a civil action , by vi r lu of a writ bearing <lat the 2r l day of
July, AD. 1869, an l rclurnabl lo lh s uperi r court f r civil busi n s
to he h old n al aid Bo ton within and f r th county f uffolk o n t he
fir . t Tue cl ay of
ct bcr next, in which aid writ the sa id
rthu r \ \.
Ru ssell is pl<1intiff, an l th c:;;i. id Erci. tu s D nnett a n d harles R. Pott1e the
def nclant , and wh rca s the aid cl fe n !a n ts wi h to di sol e the said
a tt ac hm ent a cordi ng to the pro,·i ion
f th
en er al
talut
in suc h
cases made and pro,·iclc I ;
w, th r for , if th above bou n d n Ru
11
s hall pay to th plai n tiff in sa id acti n th amount, if any, w hich h e sha ll
r eco\'C r therein, wit hi n thirty day aft r the fina l j udgm nl in a id action,
th en t h ab Ye writt n ob ligat i n sha ll be null and void, oth e r w ise lo
r em a in in full fo rce and vi rt u e.
"DENNETT & POTTLE,
[ eal 1
''GEORGE :\I.
TE\'E
[ eal ]
[ s al ] "
" J OHN F.
Ni ABLE,
" icrn cd, sca led and clclivcrc<l
in p r 5ence of

P ttk, of Bo-;ton in th

"EDWARD RAYMOND. "

pav the same, and the defendant owed him the amount of said

judgment and the costs subsequently accrued thereon. The an-

swer denied each and every allegation of the plaintiff.

Trial in the superior court before Scudder, J., who by con-

sent of the parties reported the following case before verdict:

''This was an action on a bond, of which a copy is annexed. It

appeared that Erastus Dennett and Charles R. Pottle were co-

partners, under the firm name of Dennett & Pottle, and that the

Th declara tion a ll creel th at the 1 lai11 tiff at a id
tob r t rm
f th
uper io r c urt d uly nt r cl the a tion nam d in the
bond, an d uch pr eeclin gs wer ha l th r in tha t h obtained
j uclgment aga in ~ t a id 1 1111 tt
I ottle a t , \pril t rm I 70 fo r
$rro clamaae a nd - 1.4 c t , a n! n part f aid juclam nt
had b n pai I, thoug h th cl ef n la nt had f t n b n r q u t l t
pay th . am , and t h I fr nda nt ow cl him th a mount f a id
juclgm nt a nrl th e
L u.b iu .ntly accru I th r n. T he an\\·cr denied eac h a n l vc r ~v a ll g ati on f th pla intiff.
Trial in th
up ri r c urt b £ r
cudd r , J., ' h by onr porte I the f 11 win o- a
b f r v relict:
e 1t of th pa r ti
"Thi wa an acti n on a b nd , of w hi h a copy i ann xed. I t
app ar cl t hat E ra tu
nn tt a nd ha rl e R .
ttle wer e copartn r.. un d r t h firm nam
£ D nn tt & P ottl e and that th e
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execution of the bond, as to the principal, was by one of them.

RU SELL VS . A_r JABLE.

195

It was contended by the defendant that the bond was void upon

its face ; also that there was no legal execution of it by the prin-

cipals, and therefore it was void as to the defendant. If these

objections are valid, then judgment is to be for the defendant; if

invalid, then judgment for the plaintiff, $138.83. with interest

from June 24. 1870, being the date of original judgment and

costs. The officer's return on the original writ and judgment

may be referred to. The execution of the bond by the defend-

ant was admitted." The return of the officer thus referred to,

certified that the property attached by him for dissolution of which

attachment the bond was given, was property of Dennett & Pottle,

and that he took the bond '"of said Dennett & Pottle, with George

M. Stevens and John F. Annable as sureties."

/. S. Abbott, for the plaintiff".

C. C. Read, for the defendant.

Ames, J. It is well settled that one partner cannot bind his

associates by affixing his signature, in the name and style of the

firm, to an instrument under seal. To make such a transaction
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binding it must appear that there was either a previous authority,

or a subsequent ratification on the part of the other partners,

execution of the bond , a to th principal, wa by one of th em.
It wa contended by the defendant that the bond was vo id upon
iL face; al o that there wa no le ·al execution of it by the principal , and therefor it wa s void as to the defen lant. If these
objection are val id, then judgment i to be fo r the defendant; if
invalid, th n judgment fo r the plaintiff, $138.83, with interest
from June 24, 1870, being the date of original judgment and
co t . The officer' return on the original writ and judgment
may be referr cl to. The execution of the bond by the defendant wa admitted." The return of the officer thus referred to,
certified that the property attached by him for di solution of which
.attachment the bond was given, was property of Dennett & Pottle,
.and that he took the bond ':of said Dennett & Pottle, with Geo rge
M. tevens and John F. Annable as ureties. "

adopting the signature as binding upon them. Cady v. Shepard,

II Pick. 400; Van Deusen v. Blunt, 18 Pick. 229; Swan v. Sted-

J. S. Abbott, fo r the plaintiff.

nian, 4 Met. 548; Dillon v. Broivn, 11 Gray, 179. The report in

this case presents no evidence of any previous authority or sub-

C. C. R ead, for the defendant.

sequent ratification, and it follows that the bond is not so exe-

cuted as to bind the members of the firm.

The bond purports to be the joint and several contract of cer-

tain persons named therein as principals, and the defendant and

George M. Stevens as sureties. The defendant's undertaking is

only that the principal obligors shall fulfill the obligation which

by the terms of the bond they have assumed. But if the bond

was not binding" upon both Dennett and Pottle, (as it was not,

for want of due and proper execution of the instrument on their

part,) they assumed no obligation, and it was not binding upon

the sureties. It was essential to the bond that the principals

should be parties to it ; it is recited that they are so, and the

instrument is incomplete and void without their signature. The

remedy of sureties against their principals might be greatly em-

AMES, ]. It is well settled that one partner cannot bind his
a sociates by affixing his signature, in the name and style of the
firm , to an instrument under seal. To make such a transaction
binding it must appear that there was either a previous authority,
or a subsequent ratification on the part of the other partners,
.adopting the signature as binding upon them. Cady v. Shepard,
l l Pick. 400; Van Deusen v. Blmn, 18 Pick. 229; S w an v. Stedm an, 4 Met. 548 ; D illon v. Brm ·n, I l Gray, 179· The report in
this case presents no evidence of any previous authority or subsequent ratification, and it follo-ws that the bond is not so executed as to bind the members of the firm.
The bond purports to be th e joint and several contract of certain persons named therein as principals, and the defendant and
George M. Stevens as sureties. The defendant's undertaking is
only that the principal obligors shall fulfill the obligation which
by the terms of th · bond they have assumed. But if the bond
was not binding upon both Dennett and Pottle, (as it was not,
for want of due and proper execution of the instrument on their
part,) they assumed no obligation, and it was not binding upon
the suretir . It was essential to the bond that the principals
should be parties to it; it is recited that they are so, and the
instrument is incomplete and void without their signature. The
r emedy of ureties against their principals might be greatly em-
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barrassed, if sucli an instrument as this should be held binding.

19
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There is nothing- to estop any member of the firm, who did not

sig^i it, from denying- that he was a party to it, and it w^as no

part of the defendant's contract that he should be surety for one

member of the firm, and no{ for both. The instrument is incom-

plete without the signature of each partner, or proof that the sig-

nature affixed had the assent and sanction of each of them. The

sureties on a bond are not holden, if the instrument is not executed

by the person whose name is stated as the principal therein. It

should be executed by all the intended parties. Bean v. Parker,

1/ ]^Iass. 591; Wood V. IVaslibiuii, 2 Pick. 24.

The instrument, being found incapable of taking efifect as

a specialty, cannot operate as a simple contract. Cases have in-

deed arisen, in which a bond, dulv executed, expressing a contract

which the parties had a right to make, has been held to be valid

at common law. although not made with the fomialities, or exe-

cuted in the mode, provided by a statute under which it jnirports to

have been given. See Sweetser v. Hay, 2 Gray, 49, and cases there

there cited. But we find no case in which it has been held that a
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written instrument, purj)orting to be a specialty, and plainly in-

tended by the parties to have all the incidents and charlacteristics of

a bond in the strict and technical sense of that word, has ever been

transmuted l)y the court into a simple contract, for the reason that

it has not been properly executed to take effect as a contract under

seal.

It is therefore held Iiy a majority of the court, that there

.should be judgment for the defendant.

Note. — The dissenting opinion of Wells, J., is omitted.

Weare t'.y. Saw^yer (1862).

44 N. H. 198.

Assumpsit upon a promissory note of which the following is

a copy: (IVeare v. Sehool District, 44 N. H. 189.)

"$725.

Weare, Nov 10, 1855.

For value received, we, John Jepson, prudential committee, and

Paige E. Gove, clerk of School District No. 16 in Wcare, duly authorized

barra, cl, if . u h an in trurn nt a thi
h uld I c h lcl binding.
Ther i - nothing to
top any m mb r of th firm, wh did not
ign it. from lenying that h wa a party to it, an 1 it wa no
part f th cJ f ndant'
ontract that he boul I b' ur ty for one
mcmb r of the firm, an I not for b th. Th in trum nt i. incomplete without th
ignature of ach partner, or 1 r of that th
wnatur affixed ha I the a . nt and . anction of ach of th 111. The
ureti . on a b nd ar not holden, if th in trum nt i not ex cut d
by the p r on who
name i · tatecl a the 1 rincipal tber in. It
hould b ex -cutecl by all th' int ncl d parti . . Bca11 v. Parlwr,
i7 :\Ia . 591; TVood v. IVas/1b1tr11 1 2 Pick. 24.
The in trument, b in rr found incapabl
f taking ff ct a
a e ha
ina . pccialty. cannot op rate a a irnpl e contract.
deed ari en, in which a bond. dulv exec uted , e. ·pre ing a contract
which th partie. had a right to make, ha be n h 1 I t b
alid
at common law, although not mad with th forrnaliti , or ex cut cl in the mode. provided by a ·tatute und r which it purport t
ha\ e been o-iven.
e 57- •cctscr v. H ay 1 2 ray, 49, and ca e there
th re cit d. B ut w find no ca. e in which it ha been h lei that a
written in trum nt, purporting to h' a specialty, and plainly intended by th parti to hav all the inci l nt an 1 har+acter i tic of
a b ncl in the trict and t chnical en. e of that ''" rel ha ev r b n
tran mut cl by th court into a imp! contract, f r th r a on that
it ha not be n properly _·ecutecl to take effect a a contract uncl r
ea!.
It i there£ r e held by ;:i. maj rity f the ourt, that th r
should be j uclgment for the cl fendant.
XoTE.- The di s entin g opini on of

\

E.\RE 'US .

\\'ELLS.

J., is ornitt d

A \\'Y rm (I

62) .

. 19
;\
u::.1P IT upon a pr mi
ry n t
a copy : (TVeare v. 'chool District, 44

f \Yhich th
. I

fo ll ' mg

1

.)

vVEARE,
OV JO, I 55.
For Yalu r ceiY d, ' , J o hn J p cm, prud ntial c mmitt , and
Paig E. OYC, cl rk of chool
i trict No. 16 in \Vcare, duly authoriz d

WEARE VS. SAWYEK. 197

to liire money in the name of said district, for the purpose of building a

W EAR E \T . SA W YER.

197

schoolhouse, and John W. Chase, Moses Sawyer, Allen Sawyer, Daniel

Sawyer, Peter C. Gove, L. W. Gove, Lewis Greenleaf, J. P. Adams, Amos

Chase, I\I. F. Currier, D. G. Chase, A. H. Emerson, and D. S. Stanley, as

sureties, jointly and severally promise to pay the town of Weare, or order,

seven hundred and twenty-five dollars, on demand, with interest annually,

it being a part of the ministerial fund belonging to said town of Weare,

now in the hands of Hiram Simonds, to take care of said fund in behalf

of the town.

John Jepson, Prudential Committee.

Paige E. Gove, Clerk.

John W. Chase (and others), sureties."

Morrison, Stanley & Clark, for defendant.

Fowler & Chandler, on same side.

/. IV. Smith, for plaintififs. Perley, on same side.

Bellows, J. It has already been decided, in IV care v. School

to hire m ney 111 the name of aid d i t rict, fo r t he purpo e of bu il ding a
awye r, A ll en Sawyer, Daniel
choolh use, a nd J ohn vV. Cha e, ::\Jo e
·awye r, Pete r . Gove, L. W. Gove, L ewi · Greenl eaf, J . P. Adam s, Am s
Chase , l\ L F. Curri er, D . G. Chase, A. H . Erner on, and D. S. Stanl ey. a
ureties, join tly a nd evera ll y p ro mi e to pay t h t wn of \ i\T ea re, or or d r,
evf'n hund r d a nd twenty- fi ve dolla r s, on demand, w ith in terest a nnua ll y,
it bei ng a pa rt of the mini steria l fun d belongin g to sa id town of W ea re,
now in the ha nd of H ira m imond3, to take care of said fu nd in behalf
of the tow n.
J oHN J EP ON , P rud ential Commi ttee.
PAIGE E . GovE, Clerk.
J oHN \V. C u ASE ( and other ) , ureti e :·

District, and Weare v. Gove, reported in this volume, that the vote

to borrow money was not passed at a meeting duly called for that

1lfo rrison, S tall ley & Clark, fo r defendant.

purpose; and, therefore, as the agents of the district had no au-
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thority to put its name to the note, they are themselves bound;

Fowler & Chandler. on same

ide.

and the remaining ground of defense proposed to be set up is, in

substance, that at the time of the making of the note it was agreed

I . TV. S1 nith, fo r plaintiffs.

P erle}', on ame side.

that the defendants" undertaking should extend no farther than

to insure the performance of such contract as had been legally

entered into by the school district, whereas the defendants' con-

tract to pay the money is on its face absolute.

The general rule would, undoubtedly, exclude such parol

evidence ; and we are not aware of any exception by which it

could be admitted.

It is true that parol evidence may be received to prove that

one of the makers is but a surety ; although nothing of the kindi

appears upon the face of the instrument. Bank v. Kent, 4 N. H.

221. This, however, is not for the purpose of varying the obli-

gation as originally entered into, but is admitted in connection

with proof of indulgence to the principal, to show a subsequent

discharge of such surety, by substituting a new contract, to which

he was no party.

The case of Hoyt v. French, 24 N. H. 198, is in point. There

it was proposed to show by parol that when the surety signed the

note it was agreed that the first money paid by the principal

BELLOWS, J.
I t has already been decided, in vVeare v. s chool
D istrict, and Weare v . Gove, reported in this volume, that the vote
to borrow money was not pa ed at a meeting duly called fo r that
purpose; and, therefore, as the agent of the di trict had no authority to put its name to the note, they are themselve bound ;
and the remaining ground of defen e proposed to be set up is, in
ubstance, that at the time of the making of the note it was ag reed
that the defendant · undertaking shoul d extend no farther than
to insure the perfo rmance of uch contract as had been legally
entered into by the school district, wherea the defendants' contract to pay the money is on it face ab olute.
The general rul e would, undoubtedly, exclude such parol
evidence; and we are not aware of any exception by which it
could be admitted.
It i true that parol evidence may be received to prove that
one of the maker is but a surety ; although nothing of the kind
appear upon the face of the instrument. B ank v. K ent, 4 . H.
2 2 1.
T his, however, is not for the purpose of varying the obligation a orig inally entered into, bu t is admitted in connection
with proof of indulgence to the principal, to show a subsequent
di charge of such surety, by ubstituting a new contract, to which
he was no party.
The ca e of Hoy t v. French, 24 N . H. 198, is in point. There
it wa proposed to how by parol that when the surety sia ned the
note it was ao-reed that the first money paid by the principal
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should be applied thereon, and that money had been so paid, but

19
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nrr.

not applied ; and it was held that the evidence was not admissible,

as the effect would be to vary the terms of the note. Of the same

character is Lang v. Johnson, 24 N. H. 302.

It is said, also, that the hability of the surety is coextensive

only with that of the principal, and that the school district must

be regarded as the principal here. As a general proposition it

may be true that, in the contract of guaranty, there must be a

principal who is also liable. It would be true in all cases where

the guarantor stipulated to guaranty the performance of the prin-

cipal's engagement.

But in that large class of cases where the contract is to pay

a specific sum of money, there, we apprehend, the guarantor or

surety is, in the absence of fraud, bound by the terms of his

contract, although his principal, by reason of coverture, infancy,

or want of authority in the person assuming to act for him, is

not bound.

So it is laid down (Chit, on Cont., 9 Am. Ed. 441) in respect

to infants, married women, and other persons incompetent to
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contract; and we see no reason why the same doctrine does not

apply to the case of a want of authority. In fact it appears to

have been so applied in the case of a surety for a partnership,

w^here the name of the firm w^as affixed to the note wdthout au-

thority. Steivarf v. Boclini, 2 Watts, 356; 3. U. S. Dig. 496,

sec. 154.

The same principle is recognized in Conn v. Coburn, 7 N. H.

368-373, where a surety for an infant upon a promissory note,

given for necessaries, having paid the note, was permitted to re-

cover the amount of the infant; Parker, J., holding, that as the

surety w^as bound, as the debtor, to pay the note, he had a right

to do so, and call upon the infant. Such, also, is the doctrine of

St. Albans Bank v. Dillon, 30 Vt. 122, where the principal was

a married woman. Pars, on Cont. 194.

Beside, in the case before us, the agents, who used the name

of the district without authority, are themselves bound as prin-

cipals, and it is not competent to show as a defense that the sure-

ties supposed the district to be the principal. Had they been

misled bv fraudulent representations of the town, a remedy might

be found for them ; l)ut as the case stands, they, acting upon their

own understanding of the law and the facts, have promised to pay

the sum loaned, and we think they are bound by it.

h uld b appli I thereon and that 111 0 11 y had I ' ' ll
paid, but
not applied; and it wa h 11 that th C\'i I nc , wa not admi ibl ,
a th' efi 'Ct woul I b to vary th t rm of th n t .
)f th am
character i La11 a v. J olznso11 --+ . . ·. II. O-.
l t is aid, a l o, that th liability of th
urety i
xt n ive
only with that f the prin ipal, an 1 that th . ch ol cli trict mu t
be r garded a th prin ipal h r . . \ · a g neral propo iti n it
may I tru that in th
ontra t of g uaranty, th r mu t 1 a
prin ipal who i a l ·o liabl
It would I e true in a ll . ca
where
th o-uarant r tipulat d t guaranty th p r fo rman c f the I rincipal' engag m nt.
cla of ca e where the contract i ~ to pay
13ut in that Jar
a · pe ific um of m oney, there, we apprehend, the o-uarantor or
ur ty i , in th ab en
of fraud, b und by th t rm of his
contract, althOLwh hi prin ipal , by r ea n f cov r'tur , infancy,
or want of authority in the per n a urning to act f r him ,
not bound.
o it i laid cl \\'n ( hit. n
nt. , 9 Am. -< d. 44r in r p c~
t infant , marri d women, and oth r p r on inc mpete nt to
contract; and we ec no rea n why th
am 1 ctrin lo
n t
apply to th ca e of a want of authority. In fact it app ar to
hav be n
applied in the ca e of a urety for a partn r hip,
wh re the nam
f th firm wa affix d t th note without auth rity. Steiuart v. Boch711, 2 \ Vatt , 356; 3.
. Di a . 496,
c. 154·
The am principl i rec g niz e l in o w1 v . Coburn) 7 . H.
3 - 373, where a urety for an infant up n a promi ry note,
g iv n fo r n ce ari • , hav ing paid th not wa permitted t recove r th am Lint f th infant; ark r ]., h ldin o-, that a the
urety wa bound a th e l btor to pay th not , h had a right
to d o, and all up n th infant.
u h al o, i th doctrin of
St. Albans Ban/, v . Dilloll , 30 t. 122, wh r the principal was
a married w man. Par . on ont. 19-t·
I~ ide, ir~ th
a b fo r tL, th ag- nt , who u d th name
of th cli tri t without anth rity, ar th m elve b un l a prmipaL, ancl it i. n t omp t nt t h w a a def n that th ur ti
uppo e 1 th li tri t t b th principal. Ilad th y been
mi I cl by frauclul nt r pr ntati n
f th town, a r m dy mi ht
1 found for th 111; l ut a th a
tand , they actino- up n tht>ir
own und r ~a nding f th , law and the: fa t hav pr mi d to pay
th
um 1 an 1, ancl w think th y ar 1 und by it.
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HAZ 'RD V . GRl WOLD.

It is suggested, also, that, in case of a mistake in this respect,

it may be shown and corrected, but we think it can not be done

in this fomi, but only by bill in equity.

In accordance with the agreement of the parties, there must

therefore be

Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Hazard et al. z's. Griswold (1884),

21 Fed. 178.

Action of Debt on Bond.

Edivin Metcalf, for plaintiffs.

It i ugge ted, al o. that, in ca
f a mi take in thi rc · pcct,
it may b hown and c rrecte<l, but we think it can not 1 e <lone
in thi fo nn, but only by bill in equity.
In ace rdance with th agreement of the I artie , th ere mu t
therefor be
Judg-m ent for th plaintiffs.

Sam'l R. Honey and Arnold Greene, for defendant.

Before Gray and Colt, J.J.

Gray, Justice. This is an action of debt, commenced in the

Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island, on March 3, 1883,

by four citizens of Rhode Island against a citizen of New York, on

HAZARD ET AL. l'S . GRI \\'OLD (I

84)'

a bond dated August 24, 1868, and executed by Thomas C. Durant

21 Fed. 178.

as principal, and the defendant and S. Dexter Bradford as sure-

ties, binding them jointly and severally Ic the plaintiff's in the sum

of $53,735, the condition of which is that Durant "shall on his part
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abide and perform the orders and decrees of the Supreme Court of

Action of D ebt on Bond.

the State of Rhode Island in the suit in equity of Isaac P. Hazard

and others against Thomas C. Durant and others, now pending

in said court within and for the county of Newport."

The breach assigned in the declaration is that Durant has not

performed a decree by which that court, on December 2, 1882,

ordered him to pay into its registry the sum of $16,071,659.97.

(That part of the opinion preceding consideration of fifth plea

is omitted.)

The fifth plea alleges that Durant, at the time and place of

the making of the supposed writing obligatory, "was unlawfully

imprisoned by the said plaintiff's and others in collusion with them,

and then and there detained in prison, until, by the force and

duress of imprisonment of him, the said Thomas C. Durant, he,

with the said defendant as surety, made the said writing, signed

and sealed and delivered the same to the said plaintiffs as their

Ed7.oin 1Vl et calf, for plaintiffs.
Sa11z'l R. Honey and Arnold Greene, for defendant.
and COLT, J. J.
GRAY, Justice.
Thi is an action of debt, commenced in the
Supreme ourt of the State of Rhode I land, on 1\Iarch 3, 1883,
by four citizens of Rhode I land against a citizen of New Y ork , on
a bond dated ugu t 24, 1868, and executed by Thoma C. Durant
a principal, and the defendant and . D exter Bradford a sureties, binding them jointly and . everally t the plaintiff in the um
of $53,73 5, the condition of which i that Durant " hall on his part
abide 2.ncl perform the order. and decre of the Supreme ourt of
the tate of Rhode I sland in th e uit in equity of I aac P. Hazard
and other against Thoma
. Durant and oth er , now pending
in aid court within and fo r th e county of Newport."
Th breach as igned in the declaration i th a t Durant has not
performed a decree by which that court, on December 2, 1882,
ordered him to pay into its regi try the um of $16,071,659.97.
(That part of _the opinion preceding con ' ideration of fifth plea
is omitted.)
The fifth plea alleg that Duran t, at the time and place of
the making of the supposed writing obligatory, "wa unlavvfully
impri oned by th e said plaintiff and other in collu ion with them,
and then and ther e detained in pri on, until, by the force and
dure of imprisonment of him, th e aid Thoma
. Durant, he,
with th e aid defendant a urety, mad e the said writin g, igned
and eal ed and delivered th e ame to the said plaintiffs a their
Before
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deed." To this plea the plaintiffs have demurred, because it does

not allege that the writing was executed by the defendant under

force and duress of imprisonment of himself, nor that he did not

voluntarily execute it as surety with knowledge that it was exe-

cuted by Duraiil as ])rincipal under force and duress of imprison-

ment, as alleged in the plea. This plea docs not set forth facts

enough to make out a defense. Duress at common law. where no

statute is violated, is a personal defense, which can only l)e set up

by the person subjected to the duress; and duress to the principal

will not avoid the obligation of a surety ; at least, unless the surety,

at the time of executing the obligation, is ignorant of the circum-

stances which render it voidable by the principal. Thompson v.

Lockzvood, 15 Johns. 256; Fisher v. Shattuck, 17 Pick. 252;

Robinson v. Gonhi, 11 Cusli. 55; Bonnnan v. liiller, 130 Mass.

153; Harris v. Cannody. 131 Mass. 51; Griffith v. Siti^rcaz'cs, 90

Pa. St. t6i. The case of JIazccs v. Marcliant, i Curtis 136, in

this court, was not a case of duress at common law, but of oppres-

sion by the illegal exercise of official i)ower in excess of statute

authority, and was decided upon that ground.^
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Demurrers sustained.

Etsing 7'.9. Andrew.s (1895),

' " 66 Conn. 58: 50 Am. St. R., 75; 33 Atl. 585.

Action on a bond "iven bv the defendant's testator as surety,

brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county and tried to the

court, Thayer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered from the

plaintiff, and ap])eal 1)\ tlie defendant for alleged errors of the

court. Xo error.

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

cl cccl . ·· To thi s plea th e l laintiffs ha \ ' C d 'murrnl 1 ccau c it do s
not a llege that th e \\'ritin \\'a · 'Xe ·utcd by th<~ clef 'nclant under
fo rce a nd clur ' . f impri . nm cnt of 11;111 · If, nor that h lid not
x \'Oluntarily 'Xe ·utc it a: sur ·ty \\'ith kno\\'l dg that it wa
·ut<:u by Durant a. principal und er fo r c ancl clmc of impri onnol
t fo rth fact
mcnt. a · all egecl in th e I I a. This plea cl
enourrh to ma ke out a lcfcn c. I ure. at ·ommon law, \\·here no
tatut i · Yiolatcd, i. a per onal cl cfcn se . \\'hi h can only 1 e t up
by th e person subj 'C tecl to th e duress ; ancl clurcc: to th principal
\\'ill not avoid the obligation of a urcty; at I a t, uni s the urety,
at th time o f executing the obl: o·ation. i · ign orant f th circum· tance \Yhich r ncl cr it rn iclabl by th principal. Tli o111psoJL v.
L oc/?1.l•ood , 1:; J ohn . ~S ; Fisher v.
liattud:, 17 Pick. r2;
R obi11 so 11 \'. Co11ld. 1 1 ·u. h. SS; B OL l ' lllaJI \'. !Iillcr, r30 ::\Ia .
153; Harris\'. Car111 ody, 131 ::\[a . S'; Crifli.th v. it aTca·ucs, o
Pa. t. I 1. Th e ·as of Ha:l ·cs \' . Jfar cha11t, r urti I 36, in
thi court. \Ya. n it a ca c of cl u res at comm on la \Y, but of op pr . ion by th e ill egal cxer · ise of official po\\·cr in exec of tatute
auth ority, and \\°a clecicl cl upon that I.Yr .u11d. 1
D emurrer u tai11ed.

Howard B. Scott, for the appellant (defendant).

Lyman D. Brei^'stcr and JoJin 11. ferry, for the appellee

(plaintiff).

ANOkF.ws, C. j. Tlic plaintiff is tlie only living partner of the

late firm of E. Rising & Co. The defendant is the sole surviving

Er: m c

'The remainder of tlic opinion is omitted.
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01111. 5» · 50 Am.

t. R., 75; 33

ti. 5 5.

ction on a bond giYen by the cl fcnclant" t . tat r a urety,
brotwht to th e . up rior ourl in Fairfi lei c unty and tri d to the
court, THAYER, J.; fa t. found and judgment rendered from the
plamtiff, an cl appeal by t hr d fcnclant for allco- cl rror of th
co urt. x ~ rror.
Th ra. e i. uff1 icn tly tat <.l in th 111110 11.
1I0tL ard
1

H. Scott , fo r the app llant (clcfen !ant) .

L y 111a11 I. Brc'i. ·tcr an I Jol1JI JJ . Pc:' r)' ) f r th
( plain ti fl ).

c. J.

app 11 e

The nlaintiff i the nly liYill<Y partn r of th
late firm of :;_ Ei in g , o. The cl f nclant i th ol urv1vmg
"\ 'r im:-.:\\': '

lThc remai nder of t he opini on is omitted .
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executor nf the will of Thonias F. Fay, late of Danbury, deceased.

In his lifetime, Fay had become obligated in a bond as surety for

one Thomas F. Rowan, as princi]:)al, for which he bound himself,

his heirs, executors and administrators, joindy and severally with

the said Rowan, in the ]ienal sum of two thousand dollars to the

■said E. Rising & Co., conditioned that the said Rowan, who had

been employed by the said firm as salesman and collector, "shall

well and faithfully discharge his duties as such collector and agent,

and shall also account for all moneys, property and other things

which may come into his possession or control by reason of his

appointment and employment as such agent and collector." Fay

died on the 25th day of June. 1892. On the fifth day of July next

thereafter, the Court of Probate for the District of Danbury lim-

ited and allowed six months from said date for the presentation of

claims against his estate. After Fay's death, and between June

25th, 1892, and August 26th, 1893, Rowan received as such col-

lector and agent from the customers of E. Eising & Co. more than

tw^o thousand dollars of money which belonged to the plaintiff, but
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which he appropriated to his own use — of which amount the sum

of $739.41 was misappropriated by Rowan after May 26th, 1893.

This defalcation of Rowan was by him fraudulently concealed from

the plaintiff, and was not discovered by the plaintiff until the first

day of September, 1893. He then made demand of Rowan that

he should account for and pay over to the plaintiff the said amount

which he had misappropriated, but Row^an has at all times neg-

lected and refused so to do. He was then and at all times since

continues to be wholly insolvent.

The plaintiff' notified the defendant of such defalcation on the

26th day of September, 1893, and presented to him, as such ex-

ecutor, the claim of said partnership on said bond ; and on the i8th

day of November, 1893, made demand on him for the amount of

the said bond, but the defendant refused to pay it. This suit was

brought on the 21st day of November, 1893.

The defendant claimed as matter of law, that upon these

facts the plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations from re-

covering in this action for any sums of money misappropriated by

Row^an prior to May 26th, 1893. And that the fraudulent conceal-

ment b}- Rowan of his misappropriation did not prevent the statute

of limitations from running in favor of the defendant, nor postpone

the time of the arising of the cause of action upon the IxDnd until

the plaintiff discovered tl.e misappropriation. The court did not so

nf the wili nf Thoma F. Fay, lat of Danbury, clecea -ed.
In hi lif time. Fay had b me blio-at cl in a I nd a - urety for
on Thoma F. R owan. a 1 rinci pal, fo r \Yhich h bound him elf,
hi heir -, xecut r an cl ad mini ·trator , jointl y and ·vcrally with
th ~ aid R wan in th 1 nal . nm of tw o thou and dollar to the
aid E. i i1io- & · ., on litionecl that the aid R owan. ,,·ho hacl
been employed by th aid firm a_ ale man and collec tor ... hall
\Yell and faithfully discharge hi clnti . a uch coll ctor and agent,
and hall al o account fo r all money , property and oth er thing
which may com into his po . e ion or control by rea n of hi
appointment and employm ent a uch a~- nt and collector... Fay
died on tbe 25th day of June, 1892. On the fifth clay of July next
thereafter, the ·onrt of Probate for the Di strict of Danbury limited and allowed six month from sa id date fo r th e pre entation of
claim c:i.gain t hi e tatc. .c\fter Fay' death, and between June
25th, 1892, and Augu t 26th, 189 i , R owan received a such collector and agent from th e cu tomer of E. Eising & o. more than
t\\ o thou and dollar of m ney which belonged to the plaintiff. but
\Yhi ch he appro priated to hi own u e-of which amount the um
ot 739·-+I wa mi appr priatccl by R owan after 1\Iay 26th, 1893.
Thi defalcation of R owan was by him fraudul ently concealed from
the plaintiff, and was not di scove red by t he plaintiff until the fir t
day of eptcmb<:: r, 1893. He then mad e demand of R owan that
he hould account for and pay over to the plaintiff the aid amount
which he had mi appropriated, but R owan ha at all time neglected and r fu sed so to do. H e wa tl en and at all times ince
rontinue to be wholly in ol ent.
The plaintiff notified th e defendant of such defalcation on the
26th day of September, 1893, and pre ented to him, a uch execute r, the claim of aid partner hip on aid bond ; and on the 18th
day of November , rc93, mad e demand on him fo r the amo unt of
the aid b nd, but th e defendant refu eel to pay it. Thi uit wa
bro ught on the 21 -t day of 1\ovemher I 93.
The clef ndant claimed a matter f la\\·, that upon the e
fact the plaintiff wa barrec.! by the tatute of limitation from recovering in thi action fo r any um of money misappropriated by
R o\\·an prior to May 26th, 1893.
nd that the fraudul ent concealm nt by R o\\"an of hi mi appropriation did not prevent the tatute
of limitation from running in favor of the defendant, nor po tpone
the tim e of the ari ing of the cau e of action up n th e bond until
the plaintiff di covered th misappropriation. The court did not o
e'\:<'C l1tL1 c
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hold, but rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of

the bond with interest from the date of the demand. The defend-

ant appealed to this court.

The bond on which this suit is brought contains two condi-

tions : first, that Rowan should faithfully discharge his duty as

agent and collector for the said co-partnership ; and second, that he

should account for all moneys, property, or other thing that should

come into his hands, possession, or control, by reason of his em-

ployment as such agent and collector. A breach of each of these

conditions is alleged in the complaint, and the facts found by the

court show that each had been broken by Rowan.

Section 581 of the General Statutes — being a statute concern-

ing the estates of deceased person.s — provides that "when a right

of action shall accrue after the death of the deceased, it shall be ex-

hibited within four months after such right of action shall accrue" ;

and tliat unless exhibited within such time the creditor shall be

forever debarred of all right to recover the claim.

The breach of the second condition named in the bond' took

place, and the right of action thereon accrued, not earlier than the
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first of September, 1893, and within four months next before the

claim was exhibited to the defendant. The Superior Court might

well have rendered its judgment entirely on the breach of that

condition in the bond. McKim v. Glover, 161 Mass. 418. And

there is nothing in the case to show that it did not. Counsel for

the defendant does not dwell on this part of the case.

Under the statute above recited the defendant admits that the

plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of $739.41, that being the

amount of money misajipropriated by Rowan within the four

months next before the claim was exhibited to him. And he in-

sists that because of that statute the plaintiff cannot recover for

any moneys wrongfulh' appropriated by Rowan \)V\ov to the said

four months. If that statute stood alone it is more than likely that

this action would never have been contested. It is another statute

which causes the dispute. Section 1389 enacts that: "If any per-

son, liable to an action by another, shall fraudulently conceal from

him the existence of the cause of such action, said cause of action

shall be deemed to accrue against said person so liable therefor,

at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon shall first dis-

cover its existence." Applied to a cause of action, the term to

accrue means to arrive ; to commence ; to come into existence ; to

become a present enforcible demand. And the true meaning of this

hold but rcn<l r cl judgm nt fo r th plaintiff f r th am unt of
th bon<l with int r t fr n . th 1:: <la t I th e demand. The d f ndant app al d t thi court.
T h b nd on which thi u1t i br u o-ht contain tw
ondition : fir t that P o wan houl I fa ithfully d i charg hi duty as
ag nt and coll t r fo r th aid co-partn r hip ; and cond, that he
hould account f r a ll m n y prop rly r oth r thing that hould
ion, or contr 1, by r a on of hi mcom int hi han 1 , po..
ploym nt a . 11ch a 0 ent and ollector.
br ach of each of the e
conditi n i alleged in th complaint, and th fa ct found by the
court h w that ach hacl be 11 brok n by R owan.
ection S r f th · nera l ' tatute - being a tatut cone ming th e tat of cl cea. eel p r on. - provide that " wh n a rio-ht
of action hall accru aft r th cl ath of th dee a d, it hall b exhibit d within fo ur month after such ri g ht of action hall accrue";
and that unl e exhibited within uch time th creditor hall be
fur v r d barr cl f a ll ri ght to r ec ver th claim.
Th breach of th e econd condition nam e 1 in the bond took
place, and the ri g ht of action ther eon accru ed, not earli r than the
fir t f ept mbcr , l 93 , and w ithin fo ur m nth next befor the
claim wa exhibited to the defendant. The ' nperior ourt mio-ht
w ell have render ed its judgment entir ly on th breach of that
condition in th bond. M cK i11 i v. Cla1_1er, r 61 Ia . 4 1 .
nd
there is nothi1io- in th ca e to how that it did n t.
O L111 1 for
the defendant cl e n t dw ell n this part of th ca e.
U nder th statut al o e r cited th def n lant admit that the
plaintiff i ntitl ccl to recover the um of 73 7 ...p , that b in · the
am unt f m oney mi . appro1 riat l by R owan within the fou r
nd h inmonth n x t I fo re th e la im wa. x h ib ite d to him .
i ts that be a u. of that statute th plaintiff ca nnot r ecover for
a ny m on y wr ng foll y appr ,priat 1 by R owan prior to th aid
four m onth . If that ta tute t od alon it i m r than lik ly that
thi a ti n w ul 1 never hav 1 e n c nt ·tecl. lt i anoth er tatute
which au. e tit liput.
tin13
nat. that :"Ifany pron, liabl e to an a ti n by an th r, . hall fraudul ntly cone al from
him the x i t nc f th au of uch action, ai l au of action
hall b cl rn ,cl to accru again .. t ai 1 p r on so liabl th r for,
at th tim e w h n th per on ntitl cl to ue th r e n hall fir t di cov r it x i t nc .
A ppli l to a au
of action, th e term to
accru m an to a rrive : t c 111111 nc ; to com into exi t n ; to
nd the tru m eanino- of this .
1 com a pres nl nf r ibl 1 mand.
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statute is, that in cases to which it is appHcable, the cause of action

does not come into existence until it is discovered by the person

entitled to sue tliereon. The effect of this statute upon the present

case is that no cause of action came into existence by reason of

Rowan's defalcation until it was discovered by the plaintiff.

It is admitted by the defendant that this is the effect of the

statute, if limited to Rowan himself. But the defendant says that

the fraudulent concealment by Rowan does not prevent the accru-

ing of a cause of action against him, the defendant. He says that

fraudulent concealment of a cause of action prevents the running

of the statute of limitations only in favor of the very party who

commits the fraudulent concealment. He cites Wood on Limita-

tions (2d Ed.), page 139, and the cases there referred to, as author-

ity. Stated in somewhat different language the claim of the de-

fendant is, that although the accruing of a cause of action was by

reason of the last quoted statute suspended, as against Rowan, until

the defalcation was discovered, yet the accruing of a cause of action

was not suspended against this defendant; that as against him,,
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this defendant, the cause of action arose when Rowan committed

the defalcation ; and as it appears by the case that all of the defal-

cation, except the sum of $739.41, was committed more than four

months before the claim was exhibited to him, he cannot be made

liable for that part.

It seems to us that there is a fallacy — or rather it is a fatal

error — in this argument. It conflicts with the most essential fea-

ture of the law relating to surety and principal. The plaintiff seeks

to recover damages on account of the defalcation of Rowan. The

argument of the defendant assumes that a cause of action for such

defalcation could exist against him before any cause of action

therefor against Rowan had accrued. But the law relating to

principal and surety forbids this. The rule is that a cause of

action cannot exist against a surety, as such, unless a cause of

action exists against his principal. Ordinarily the liability of such

a surety is measured precisely by the liability of the principal.

Brandt on Suretyship, § 121 ; Seiwer v. young, 16 Vt. 658; Boone

County V. Jones, 54 Iowa 709 ; Patterson's Appeal, 48 Pa. St. 345 ;

McCabe v. Raney, 32 Ind. 309. So long as no cause of action ex-

isted against Rowan, the principal, no cause of action existed

ajjainst the defendant or his suretv. And the statute of limitations

does not begin to run in favor of any person, until there is a cause

of action. The obligation of a surety is an obligation, accessor^' to

tatut is, that in ca e to which it i applicabl , the cau e of action
doe not com int
xi t nee until it i di cov red by th p r on
entitl · d to u th r on. 'fh ff ct f thi. tatute up n the I resent
ca e i that no cau e f action came into x i tence 1 y rea on of
Rowan' defalcation until it \Va di co ered 1y th plaintiff.
It i admitted bv the defendant that this is the effect of the
tatute, if limit d to R owa n him elf. But the defendant ays that
the fraudulent concealment by R owan doe not prevent the accruing of a cau e of action again t him, the defendant. He ay that
fraudulent concealment of a cause of action prevents the running
of the statute of limitations only in favor of the very party who
commit the fraudul ent concealment. He cite vVood on Limitations ( 2d Ed.), paa-e l 39, an<l the ca es there referred to, a authority.
tatecl in s mewhat differ ent languag th e claim of the defendant i , that althoua-h the accruing of a cau e of action wa by
rea on of the la t quoted tatute u pended, a again t R owan, until
the defalcation ·w as discover ed, yet the accruing of a cau e of action
wa not u pend d again st thi defendant; that a again t him 1
thi defendant, th e can e of action aro se when R owan committed
the defalcation; and a it appear by th e ca e that all of the defalcation , except the sum of $739-41, was committed m ore than four
month before the claim wa cxhihited to him, he cannot be made
liable for that part.
It em to u that there i a fallacy-or rather it is a fatal
error-in this ara ument. It conflicts with the most essential feature of th law relating to urety and principal. The plaintiff eek
to recover damage on account of the defalcation of R owan . The
argum ent of the defendant a umes that a cau e of action for uch
defalcation could exi t aga.in t him before any cause of action
therefor again t Rowan had accrued. But the law r elating to
principal and surety forbid thi . The rule is that a cau e of
action cannot ex i t again t a urety, as uch, unle
a cau e of
action exi t again ~ t hi principal. Ordinarily the liability of uch
a urety i mea ured precisely by the liability of the principal.
Brandt on uretyship, § L I ; Scm er v. Young, 16 t. 658 ; Boone
Count}' v. Jones 5.+ Iowa 709 ·Patterson's Appeal 48 Pa. t . 345;
)If cCabe v . Rane·y 32 Ind . 309.
o long a no can of action existed aaain t R owan , the principal, no cau ~ of action exi ted
again t the defendant or hi _ surety. And the tatute of limitations
doe not beain to run in favor of any p r on, until there i a cau e
of action. The oblia-ation of a surety is an obligation. acce ory to
1
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that of a i)riiici])al debtor, and it is of the essence of this obUj^ation

that there should lie a vaHd obhp^ation of some principal. Thus,

where one ag'recs to become responsible for another the former

incurs no obligation as surety, if no valid claim ever arises against

the principal. Chitty on Contracts ( iitli Ed.j, 788. If the prin-

cipal is not holden, neither is ihe surety; for there can be no acces-

.sory if there is no principal. De Colyar on I'rinci])al and Surety,

Amer. Ed. 39; Addison on Contracts, § 1 i i i. The existence of a

principal debtor is a condition precedent to the operation of the

^contract of a surety. Ha-card v. fra'iii, 18 Pick. 95 ; Swift v. Beers,

3 Denio 70; MontitstepJ'en v. Lakcnum, L. R. 7 O. B.. 202; Mal-

let v. Batemaii, L. K. i C. P., 163. This is only in accordance

w ith the general law of contracts, which prevents a contract from

becoming operative unless and until all conditions precedent are

fulfilled. Brandt on Suretxshij). § 214; farmers and Mechanics'

Bank v. Kingsley, 2 Doug. ( Alich.) 379. So too, whatever dis-

charges the principal debtor discharges the surety. The liability of

a surety on a claim wliich is good as against the principal, ceases

•as soon as the claim is extinguished against the principal. The
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nature of the undertaking of a surety is such that there can be no

obligation on his part, unless there is an obligation on the part of

the principal. "It is correctly laid down, in Chitty on Contracts,

that the contract of a surety is a collateral engagement for an-

other, as distinguished from an original and direct agreement for

the party's own act : and, as stated in Theobold on Principal and

.Surety, * ''' * it is a corollary from the very' definition of the

contract of suretyship, that the obligation of the surety, being

accessory to the obligation of the principal debtor or obligor, it

is of its essence that there should be a valid obligation of such a

principal, and that the nullity of the ]irinci])al obligation necessarily

induces the nullity of the accessory. Without a principal, there

•can be no accessory. Nor can the obligation of the surety, as

such, exceed that of the principal. * * " It would be most unjust

and incongruous to hold the surety liable, where the princi])al is

not bound." Storrs, J., in Ferry v. Bnrchard, 21 Conn. 603. The

.same general doctrine is held in many other cases in this State.

Willey v. Paulk, 6 Conn. 74; Deforest v. Strong, 8 id. 522; Bull

V. Allen, 19 id. loi, 106; Glas:ier v. Douglass, 32 id. 393; Candee

V. Skinner, 40 id. 464.

It follows, then, that the fraudulent concealment by Rowan,

the principaUas it prevented the statute of limitations from rumiing

lhat of a principal cl btor, and it i ~ f the e s nc of thi
blih·ation
that th ·re ·h ul I be a valirl obligaticm of . me principal. 1 hu ,
wher ' o ne: agr
to b
m' r ''-' pon ibl ' for an th er th ' for m r
incur · no bligation a sur ty, if n Yalid !a im v r a ri s a ·ain t
th principal.
' bitty n · ntra ·t. ( 1 1th _, cl .) , 7
T[ th e pn11cipal is not hole! n , neith r i rh . ur ty: f r th r · a n b n acce ~o l ya r on Prin it al an l
ur ty,
·ory if th r' i n pri ncipal. D
.. \mer. Eel. 39; •\deli. on on C nt ract , . [ I 1 I. Th
x i t nc
f a
prin ·ipal d btor i a oncl iti o n pr c lent t th
peration f the
c ntra t of a ur ty. f fa .-::ard \'. fr(l 1i11, 1 P ick. 95 ; (L 1ift v. Beers
Denio 70; Jfowllstcpi1rn v. Lo/(C//lllll, T. h .. 7
B., 202; .llalIct v. Batc111m1, L. R. l
. P .. r ~Thi i
nly in accorclanc
\\·ith tlw ~<: n ral law f co ntracts, wh; ·h pr v nt. a contract from
be ornin g op t>rative unl e ·. and until all concliti n pr c d nt are
fulfilled. l ~ran It n ;")urety. hip. ~ ~ q ; Far!llcrs and JI eclza11ics'
Bani( v. J\i11gs/{'_'\', 2 Dmw. ( ~li c h. ) 379.
too, \Yhat ver di barges th' prinri1 a l cl htnr cli charg th ur ty . Th liability of
a ur t)· on a ci::t im \rhi ch i go cl a again t the principal, c a e
a. soon a t he claim i extinguiJ1 d again t th principal. The
nature of th e und ertakin g of a surety i. u ch that th r
an b n o
th ' re i an ol licrati n o n th part of
obl ig·atio n o n hi . pri..rt, uni
the principal. ··] l i. r rr t ly la id !o wn , in hitty on Contra ts,
that th e contract of a su rety i a co ll a t ral n o-age m n t fo r an.0t h r, a •li tinguishcd from an o rig inal and di rect acrrc m nt for
th party' ow n act; am~, a s ~ tatecl in Th e bol l n Principal and
S ur ty, * "' * it i. a o r llary fr om the very definiti n of t h
contra ct of ur t)·ship , that the ohli;'"ati on f th
ur ty, 1 eing
ace ory to th
bligation of th e principal cl btor or blig r, it
i of it e s nee that th r
h oulcl b a val id blig ation f uch a
principal, a nd that thr nullity of th pr in i1 a l ol li gation n c arily
indu cs th nullity of th accc · ry. \ itho ut a prin ipal, th re
· an be no acce ory. Nor ca n the hli gati u of th
ur ty, a
uch , exc cl that of th prin 1pal. * .,, ':' Lt w ul 1 be rn t unju t
an l in ongru ou to h I l the ur ty li ab1 , wher th principal i
not 1 uncl."
TORR, ].. in F{'rry v. Burrhard, 21 'onn. 03. The
. am o-eneral cl ctrin
h el l in many oth r ca
in thi
tate.
TVilley v . Paull?, 6
nn. 7-1; D{'Foresl v. tron o·, 8 i 1. 522 ; Bull
v. AlleJL. 19 icl. 1 T, 106; Gla.-::icr v. Dou a-lass, 32 i I. 3 3; andee
J?illJI('}', -I
id. -t6.::J..
It fo ll w , th n, that th frauclul nt
nc alment by R wan,
th prin ipal a it pr v ntecl the tatutc f limitati n fr m running
0

N.
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in his favor, also s!.op])e(l it from running- in favor of the defenda-

ant, his surety. Bradford v. McConnick, 71 Iowa 129; Boone'

County V. Jones. 54 id. 6Cm)\ Charles v. Hoskins, 14 id. 471.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred..

ViLLARs vs. Palmer, Adm'r, ct al (1873).

67 111. 204.

in hi · favo r , :il ( ~opp <l it frum runnin g in fa vor { th lef ndaant, hi
ur ty. B rad( :rd v. J\f cCr:rm i c l~) 71 Iowa i 29; Boone·
County v. ]oll es. 54 id . 69; Charles v . ff osllills) r4 id. 47r.
T h re i no error.

This was a hill in chancery, hy William Villars, against Levin

T. Palmer, administrator of the estate of Guy Merrill, deceased,

Jn thi

pinion th e

ther jud o-es concur r d.

and John G. Leverich, to enjoin proceedings at law by Palmer as

administrator of the estate of Merrill, for the use of Leverich,

upon a promissory note, given by one George W. Taylor as prin-

cipal, and signed by the complainant as surety, and payable to said

Guy Merrill as master in chancery. The bill showed that the

estate of Taylor was solvent, and that the debt could have been

VrLLARS

made if the claim had been presented before it was barred by the

vs. P .\Lurn) A dm ' r , et al ( 1873 ).

67 Ill.

two years limitation. The court below dismissed the bill, and the

2 0 4.

complainant appealed.

Messrs. Toiciiscnd & Young, and Mr. E. S. Terry, for the
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appellant.

Mr. 0. L. Davis and Mr. /. B. Maun, for the appellees.

Sheldon, J. The claim on the part of the surety in this

case is, that, as by the neglect of the creditor to present his claim

against the estate of Taylor, the principal, all remedy in respect

to the debt has been lost against the estate of the principal, that

should operate to discharge the surety.

The complaint is of mere delay, not of any affirmative act on

the part of the creditor, whereby the surety has been affected.

But it is the well established principle, that mere delay on the part

of the creditor to proceed against the principal does not discharge

the responsibility of the surety.

In cases of this sort, there is not any duty of active diligence

incumbent on the creditor. All that the surety has the right to

This was a bill in chancery, by William V illars, again t L evin
T . P almer. administrator of th e estate of G uy Merrill, deceased,
and J ohn G. L everich, to enj oin p roceeding at law by P alm er as
admini trator of th estate of Merrill , fo r the use of L everich,
upon a promissory note, g iven by one Geor ge W. Taylor a prin cipal, and ig ne I by the complainant as urety, and payable to a id
Guy Merrill as ma ter in chancery. T he bill showed th at the
esta te of Taylor was solvent, and that th e debt could have been
made if th e claim had been presented before it was barred by the
two year limitation. The court 1 elow di smi ssed the bill. and the
complainant appealed .

require of the creditor, in the absence of anv statute provision, is.

M essrs. T ownsend & Yo ung) and Mr. E . S. T erry) for th e
appellant.
Mr. 0. L. Dav is and Mr. J. B . Jl f allll) for the app llee .
The claim on the part of th e surety in thi s
case i , that, as by the neglect of the creditor to pr sent his claim
against the estate of Taylor, the principal, all rem edy in respect
to the debt ha been lo t again t the estate of th e principal, that
should operate to discharge th e urety.
The complaint is of mere delay, not of an y affirmative act on
the part of the creditor, wher by the urety has been affected.
But it is the well est~blished principle, that m ere d lay on the part
of the creditor to proceed again t th e principal does not di scharge
the re pon ibility of the urety.
In ca es of thi sort, there is not any duty of active dili gence
incumbent on th e creditor. A ll that th e urety has the ri g ht to
require of th e creditor, in the ab ence of an y statute provi ion, i r
SHELDO
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that no affirmative act shall be done that will operate to his preju-

dice. It his business to see that the principal pays.

The law furnished the surety here with ample remedies for

his protection. He might have paid the debt according to his un-

dertaking, and have sued the principal himself; or he might have

gone into a court of equity after the debt became due, and obtained

a decree that the principal should pay it; or he might, under the

statute, have given to the creditor written notice to put the note

in suit, and thus have compelled him to sue the principal.

If he has seen fit to lie by, and the neglect to proceed against

the principal in his life time, or against his estate after his decease,

has been the means of depriving the surety of his indemnity, he

-must abide by the loss, and cannot throw it upon the creditor.

Without more, we need but to refer to the cases of The People

V. White et al. ii 111. 342, and Taylor v. Beck, 13 id. 376, where

the subject is fully considered and the authorities cited. In the

former case, the very point made by the surety here is decided

adversely to him.

Under the statute of March 4, 1869, Sess. Laws 1869, p. 305,
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where the principal maker of a joint note has departed this life,

it is made the duty of the holder of the note to present the same

against the estate of the decedent for allow^ance, to the proper

.court, within two years after the granting of the letters of admin-

istration. Rut that statute is too late to afifect the present case.

The decree of the court below dismissing the bill is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

AucHAMi'AUGH, Adm'r, vs. .Schmidt (1886).

70 Iowa 642; 27 X. W. 805.

Action upon a promissory note purporting to be executed as

a joint note by one Charles Leipold and the defendant. The note

was executed in Illinois, where Leipold lived, and still lives. It

became due May 23, 1871, and this action was commenced Jan-

uary 28, r885. The defendant pleaded that he signed the note

merely as surety ; that under the law of Illinois the note became

barred as against Leipold by the statute of limitations ; and that,

being barred as against Leipold, the principal, it was barred as

that no affirmaliYc acl ' hall b don that will p rate t hi preJUdi . It hi bu · ine lo e that th e principal pay .
The la\\. fu rni h ' d th e ur ty h r with amp! r 111 die for
his prot ction. lI mi h t hav I a i 1 the clebt ::i. cording l hi uncl rtakin ·. an 1 have ·u d th prin ipal him , 'lf; r he mi ht have
g one int a court f equity aft r th' debt 1 e am due, a nd 1 tained
a dee r c that lh prin · i1 al h ulcl pay it; or h might, under th
tatut , hav o-iv n to the cred ito r written noti e to put the note
in ~ nit, an 1 thu have c mpell l him t ue the p rincipal.
· If he ha
n fit t 1i by, a nd lh n glc t t proc d arrain t
th ' principal in hi lif time, o r arrain t hi c tate aft r hi decea
ha b en th mean
f d privino- th
ur ty of hi incl mnity, h
mtL' t ab ide by the 1 , and cann t thro\\. it upon th er litor.
\\'ithout m ore, w n ed but to refer t th ca e of The People
v. fUzitc ct al. II Ill. 342, an l Ta_vlor v. Beck I3 id. 376, where
th' -ubject i fully co n icl r ed and the authoriti
cit d. In the
forme r ca e, th very point ma le by the ur ty her is decided
aclver ely t him.
U nd r the tatute of March 4, I 69, e . Law I 69, p. 305,
\\·h ~ re th principal mak r of a joint note ha depart d thi lif ,
it i made the duty of the holder of the note to pre ent the ame
again t th e tate of the decedent for allowanc , to th prop r
court, within two " a r after the g rantino- of th letter
f admintra tion. But that tatute i too lat to affect the pre nt ca e.
The decree of the co urt b low di mi in o- th e 1 ill i affirmed.
D er c affirmed.
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.. \ ction upon a prom i or y n t purp rting t
x cut d a
a J int not by ne harl e L eip 1 I ancl the l f ndant. The note
\Va
x cuted in lllin i . wher L ipold lived, and till Ji
It
I cam du l\Iay -3· 1 71, and thi a tion wa comm need January 2 • 1 5. Th !cf nclant 1 I adc l that h
io-ned the note
mer ly as ur ty; that under th law of Illinoi the n t became
harr cl a again t Leipold by th
tatut of limitation ; and that,
b ino- baned a . aga in t Leip 1 I, th principal, it wa 1 arr d a

AUCHAl\ fPA UGH V .

AUCHAMPAUGH VS. SCHMIDT. 207

207

C lHfIDT.

against his surety, the defendant. There was a trial to a jury, and

a peremptory instruction given to find for the plaintiff. Verdict

and judgment were rendered accordingly, and the defendant

appeals.

Woodzvard & Cook, for appellant.

E. E. Hasncr and Daniel Smyser, for appellee.

ao-ain t hi ur ty, th def ndant. Ther wa a trial to a jury, ancl
a p rem pt ry in truction o-iven to find for the plaintiff. \ er lict
and jud2111 nt wer rendered accordin o-ly, a nd the defendant
appeal .
T

Adams, J. The note was executed to one Schneider, the

plaintiff's intestate. The fact that the note was signed by the

defendant as surety was proven only by the defendant's wife. An

objection was raised to her testimony on the ground that she was

an incompetent witness to prove such fact as against an adminis-

fVoodzmrd & Cook, for appellant.
E . E. H as11er and Daniel S111)'ser, fo r appellee.

trator. The court overruled the objection, and the evidence was

admitted, and no question is now raised as to the correctness of

that ruling. If we should be of the opinion that she was incom-

petent, and that there was no proper evidence that the defendant's

relation to the note was that of surety, we could not affirm upon

that ground, because we do not know that the defendant might

not have introduced other evidence upon the point if his wife's

testimony had been excluded.
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We come, then, to the question raised by the answer and the

admitted evidence of suretyship, and that is as to whether a claim

which is barred by the statute of limitations, as against the prin-

cipal debtor, is by reason thereof barred also as against a surety.

In answer to this question, we have to say that we think that it is.

Nc authority has been cited upon either side which is direcUy in

point. Ordinarily, we may presume that, where the statute has

fully run as against the principal, it w^ould happen that it had fully

run as against the surety. But the case before us has this peculiar-

ity: The defendant, when the note was executed, resided in Illi-

nois. Before the note was barred by the statute of that state he

removed to Iowa, and before the statute of this state had fully

run the action was commenced. If, then, the defendant were a

principal debtor, the note wQuld not be barred as against him, how-

ever it might be as against Leipold. He must therefore rely solely

upon the fact that he is surety upon the note, and upon the bar as

against Leipold. Such being the case, it is perhaps not surpris-

ing that no authority should be cited that is precisely in point. It

becomes our duty, therefore, to attempt to determine the case on

principle. It would not be denied that a surety upon a note may

J.

Th note was ex cuted to one elm id r, th e
plain tiff' inte tate. The fact that the note wa
io-n ecl by the
defendant a urety \\"a proven only by the defendant' wife. An
ob jection wa rai ed to her te timony on the ground that she wa,
an incompetent witne to prove uch fact a against an aclmini trator. The court overruled the ob jection, and the vidence \Ya
admitted, and no qu estion is now rai ed a to the correctness of
that rulino-. If we hould be of the opinion that he was incompetent, and that there wa no p£._oper evidence that the defendant'
r elation to the note wa that of urety, w e could not affirm upon
that ground, becau e we do not know that the defendant might
not have introduced other evidence upon the point if hi wife's
te timony had been excluded.
\ e come, then, to the question rai eel by the answer and the
admitted evidence of urety hip, and that i a to whether a claim
which i barr d by the . tatute of limitation , as again t the principal debtor, is b'y reason thereof barred al o as against a surety.
In an wer to this que tion , we have to say that we think that it i .
1 To authority ha been cited upon either ide which is directly in
point. Ordinarily, w e may presume that, where the statute ha
fully run a again t the principal, it would happen that it had full y
run a acrain t the surety. But the ca e before us ha this peculiarity : The defendant, "hen the note wa executed, r e ided in Illinoi . Before the note wa barred 1 y the statute of that state he
r _moved to Io" a, CJ.n d before the tatute of this tate had fully
run the action wa commenced. If, then, the defendant were a
principal debtor, the note wquld not be barred a again t him , hO\Yever it might be as again t Leipold. He mu t therefore rely olely
upon the fact that he i urety upon the note, and upon the bar as
again t L eipold. Such beincr the ca e, it is perhap not surpri ing that no authority hould be cited that i preci ely in point. It
become our duty, therefore, to attempt to determine th e ca e on
principle. It would not be denied that a urety upon a note may
DA?.I ,
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set up any meritorious defense which ilic principal, if sued, might

set u]) in Iiis own behalf. Now, when the statute of limitations

has run as against the principal, the law excuses him from setting,

up any meritorious defense which he may have, and allows him

to rely upon the technical defense of the statute alone. The theory

is that he was not under ol)ligations to preserve any longer the

evidence of his meritorious defense if he had any, and so the court

will not inquire whether he had such defense or not. The statute

has been very properly denominated the statute of repose. As the

surety is allowed to set up any meritorious defense which the prin-

cipal might have set up, we are not able to see why he should be

required to preserve the evidence of stich defense after the prin-

cipal was not bound to do so. Again, when a surety pays a debt,,,

it is his right to look to the principal for reimbursement. But a

surety ])aying a debt, after it had become barred as against the

principal, would be remediless. Now, w^e do not think that a

creditor, by his own dilatoriness, should be allowed to put the

surety in such position. It is not a full answer to say that a surety

might have protected himself. Jt may be conceded that he might.
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But, practically, sureties often overlook their obligations if their

attention is not called to them, and we do not think that the just

protection of the rights of the creditor requires that we should

hold so strict a rule against them as that fur which the plaintiff

contends.

It is said, however, that the defendant, if he is allowed to

plead the l)ar of the statute at all as against the principal, should

have averred and shown that no judgment in fact had been ren-

dered against the principal. But we think that we would be jus-

tified in assuming, from the plea made, that judgment had not

been rendered until it was averred and shown by the plaintifif to

the contrary.

Reversed.

Guild vs. Butler (1877).

122 Mass. 498.

Contract u])on a promissory note made by the (kfendant pay-

able to Robert W. Dresser & Co. or order, and by them indorsed

to the plaintifl.

t up any m rit ri u <l f n which lh pr in ·ipal, if u <l, might
in hi · wn behalf. l r w, wh en th e ta tut of limitati n
ha run a · aga in t lh prin ·ipal th e law xcu
him fr 111 tting
up any merit ri u cl f n
whi h he may ha v and a ll \\' him
t r ly upon the techni a l cl f n.: of th tatut al n . Th e th ory
i that b \\"a not uncl r ol li o-ation t pr rv any 1 no-er the
ev i<lcn e of hi m ritori u cl fe n if h had any, and s the ourt
will not inquire wh th r he had "Uch cl fe n or n t. Th tatute
ha b en very prop rly <lenominat d the tatute of r e1 c. A the
urety i a llow cl t et up a ny mcrilori u d f n whi h th principal mi crht hav
t up, w e ar ' n t abl t s c why h houl<l be
r quired t pre erve the videnc of u h cl fen
after the principal \\"a not b und to d , . Aga in, wh n a ur ty pay a d bt,
it i hi · ri g ht t 1 k to the principal fo r r imbur m nt.
ut a
surety paying a d bt, afte r it ha I b com e barred as again t th
principal , w uld be r emecl il s. Now, \ Ve do not think that a
er litor, by Iii ow n dilatorin e , .- hould b allowed to put th
urety in uch position. It i not a full an wer to ay that a ur ty
might hav pr tect d him lf. lt may b conceded that h mi ·hL
B ut, pra tically, ureties often overlo k th ir obligation if th ir
att ntion is not called to them, and we do not think that th ju t
protecti n of th ri g ht of th er dit r re l uir
that w
hould
hold so trict a rul ao-ainst them a that f r whi h th plaintiff
con tend .
·
It i aid, howev r , that th defendant, if he is allow cl to
plead the bar f the tatut at al l a again t th principal, hould
hav av rred a nd hown that no judgm nt in fa t had be n r 11der d again t th e principal. But w think that we wou ld b ju tified in a urning, fr om th pl a mad e, that judgment had n t
b n r nd r eel until it was averre 1 ancl h wn by th plaintiff to
th contrary .
t u1

Revcr ed.
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ontract u1 n a prom i ory n t ma le by th dd n lant pay.ab! t
1 rt W. Dr
r &
. or order, and by them indor . d
to the plaintiff.
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At the trial in the Superior Court, before Pitman, J., it ap-

peared that the note was made by the defendant for the accom-

modation of Dresser & Co., who at the same time ^ave him an

agreement in writing that they would themselves pay the note

at maturity ; that the plaintiff did not know this when he took

the note, but, after learning it, and after the commencement of

this action, united with other creditors of Dresser & Co. in a

petition in bankruptcy against Herman D. Bradt, the surviving

partner of that fimi, (Dresser, the other partner, liaving died,)

and afterwards voted for and signed a resolution of composition

imder the provisions of the act of Congress of June 22, 1874, §

17, by which the plaintiff' with the other creditors c>f Dresser &

Co. agreed to take, in full settlement, twenty per rent of their

claims, to be paid in three equal installments, in ten days, three

months and six months from the acceptance of that resolution,

which was approved by the court in bankruptcy and recorded.

The judge instructed the jury that, if the note sued on was an

accommodation note, and the defendant, as between him and

Dresser & Co., was but a surety, and the plaintiff knew that it
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was an accommodation note when he entered into the resolution

of composition, the fact of his entering into that resolution would

constitute a defence to this action. The jury returned a verdict

for the defendant ; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.

P. H. Hntchiiisoji, for the plaintiff'.

R. Stone, Jr., for the defendant.

Gray^ C. J. By the existing acts of Congress upon the sub-

ject of bankruptcy, a bankrupt's estate may be settled, and the

bankrupt discharged, in either of three ways :

First. The estate may be administered in the ordinary man-

ner by assignees appointed for the purpose, and a certificate of

discharge be granted by the court, with the assent, in some cases,

of a certain proportion of the creditors who have proved their

t th trial in the ' upcrior ourt, b fore PrL\J.\N' , ]., it app ared that the not wa mad e 1 y th defendant f< 1r the accomm odation f Dre er & o., who at the . ame time ~:ave him an
agr eement in writing that th ey would them elve pay the note
!it maturity; that th e plaintiff did n t know thi when he took
the note, but, after learning it, and after the cormnencement of
thi · action, united with oth r creditor of Dre er & o. m a
jletition in bankruptcy ao-ain t Herman D. B radt, !.h
u v1vmopartner f that firm , (Dre er, the oth r partner, liaving d ied,)
an l. afterward voted for and ig n cl a re olution . f composition
under th e provi ion of the act of Congress of Jun e 22, 1874, §
17, by whi ch th plaintiff with the other creditor cif Dre ser &
Co. ao-reed to take, in full ettlement, twenty per rent of their
claims, to be paid in three equal inst2.llments, in ten days. three

m onths and ix months from the acceptance of that resolution,
which wa approved by the court in bankruptcy and recorded.
The j udge in tructed the jury that, if the note ued on wa an
accommodation note, and the defendant, as between him and
Dres er & Co., was but a urety, and the plaintiff knew that it
was an accommodation note when he entered into the resolution
of compo ition, the fact of his enterin g into that resolution would
con titute a defence to thi action. The jury returned a verdict
for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged exception

claims. Any person liable as surety for the bankrupt may, upon

paying the debt, even after the commencement- of proceedings in

bankruptcy, prove the debt, or stand in the place of the creditor

if he has proved it ; or, the debt not having been paid by him nor

P. H. Hntchillsoll, for the plaintiff.
R. Stolle, Jr., for the defendant.

proved by the creditor, may prove it in the name of the creditor or

otherwise. U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5070. Mace v. IVells, 7 How. 272 ;

Hiiiif v. Taylor, 108 Mass. 508. But the surety's lial:)ility to the

15

GRAY, C. !. By the existing acts of Congre s upon the subject of bankruptcy, a bankrupt' e tate may be ettled, and the
bankrupt discharged in eith er of three ways:
First. The e tate may be admini tered in the ordinary rnanuer by a signees appointed for the purpose, and a certificate of
di charge be granted by th e court. with the a sent, in som e cases,
of a certain proportion of the cred itor who hav e proved their
claim . A ny per on liable a urety fo r the bankrupt may, upon
paying th cl bt, eve11 after th e commencement · of proceedings in
bankruptcy, pr ve the debt, or stand in th e plac of the creditor
ii he ha proved it; or, the deb t not having been paid by him nor
proved by the creditor , ma. prove it in the name of the creditor or
.!.herwise. l. S. Rev. St . 5070. 11/ace v. H ells, 7 How. 272;
Hullf v. Taylor, ro8 Aa s. r;o8. But th surety' liability to th

15
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creditor is not affected by any ceriiticaie of discharge granted to

the principal. U. S. Rev. Sts. § 51 18. Plagg v. Tyler, 6 Mass.

33-

Second. The estate may be wound up and settled by trustees

nominated by the creditors, upon a resolution passed at a meet-

ing for the purpose by three-fourths in value of the creditors

vy^hose claims have been proved, and conhrmcd by the court, and

upon the signing and filing, by such proportion of the creditors,

of a consent in writing that the estate shall be so settled; in

which case such consent and the proceedings under it bind all

creditors whose debts are provable, even if they have not signed

the consent nor proved their debts ; the trustees have the rights

and powers of assignees ; the winding up and settlement are

deemed proceedings in banla-uptcy ; the court may summon and

examine on oath the bankrupt and other persons, and compel

the production of books and papers ; and the bankrupt may obtain

a certificate of discharge in the usual manner. U. S. Rev. Sts.

§ 5'03-

Third. The creditors, at a meeting ordered by the court.
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either before or after an adjudication of bankruptcy, may resolve

that a composition proposed by the debtor shall be accepted in

satisfaction of the debts due them from him. Such resolution, to

be operative, must be passed by a majority in number of the cred-

itors whose debts exceed fifty dollars in value, and by a majority

in value of all the creditors, and must be confirmed by the signa-

tures of the debtor, and of two-thirds in number and one-half in

value of all his creditors The debtor is required to attend at the

meeting to answer inquiries, and to produce a statement of his

assets and debts and of the names and addresses of his creditors.

The resolution, with this statement, is to be presented to the

court; and if the court, after notice and hearing, is satisfied that

the resolution has been duly passed and is for the best interest of

all concerned, the resolution is to be recorded and the statement

filed, and the provisions of the composition shall be binding on all

the creditors whose debts, names and addresses are shown on the

statement, and may be enforced by the court on motion and rea-

sonable notice, and regulated by rule of court, or may be set aside

by the court for any sufficient cause, and proceedings in bank-

ruptcy had according to law. U. S. St. June 22. 1874, § 17. This

section, providing for a composition under the supervision of the

court, is taken from and substantially follows § 126 of the Rng-

:·editor i not affcctl:d l>y any 'e rtifi -at · nf di -hargc rrrant d to
the principal. L· . .'. Rev. ' ts. ' 5 t 1<) . Flcwg v. Tyl r,
1\Ia
33.
. ' ccond. Th ~late may b' \\·otmcl up and Ltlcd bv tru t
nomrnated b) th er clitor:. u1 on a r sol uti on pa ' cl al a m ting inr th' purpos' by thr -f urth in valu of th er ditor
\\ hu. c claim. hav he ' 11 prov cl, and co nfirm cl by the co urt, and
upt >n the sirrninrr ancl filing, by uch 1 r p rti on f th er ditor ,
of a -on nt in writing that th
stat
hall I
o ettl d; in
\\ hich a
:u h on. nt a nd th pr , ding uncl r it bind all
credi tor. whos debts ar' pr vable, v n if th y hav
the cons nt nor proved th ir debt ; th tru . tee hav
and power of assign . ; th winclino- up and
de med pro cling ~ in bankruptcy; th c urt may ummon an
cxamin
n oath th ' bankrupt an 1 th r per 11 , and c mp 1
the producti n of hook an 1 pap r ; ancl th I ankrupt may obtain
a clrtificate of di . cha rge in th u. ual manner.
. R v. t .
~ l 3.
Third. Th credit r.. at a rn ting order 1 by the ourt,
either befor
r after an adjudication of bankruptcy, may re olv
that a compo iti 11 prop cl by th d I t r hall 1 e accept d in
. at i faction f the cl bt du th em fr rn him.
uch r lution, to
b op rative, mu t b pa . cl by a maj rity in numl r f th reditor. who e cl bt xcc cl fifty r]ollar. in valu ' and 1 y a maj rity
in valu of all the er clitor , an l :mu. t be nfi.rm d 1 y th i natur s of th cl ht r, ancl of tw -third . in numb r an l one-half in
vain f all hi er ditor
Th cl bl r i r quir l to attend at the
m cting to an w r inquirie , and to proclu
a tatem nt f hi
a ~ <'t and d bt and of th name anrl. al lr . of hi . r ditor .
Th r oluti n, with thi . tat rn nt, i to be pre nted to th
court; and if th court, aft r n ti
and h aring, i ati fi. d that
th re. lution has h n duly pa. d an i i for th 1 e t int r t of
all one rn cl , the r oluti n i to 1 e reco rded and th tat m nt
fil ed, and t.h provi ion f th
rnpo iti n hall 1 binding n all
th
r clitor who e 1 bt. , nam and addr
hown on th
lat m nt, ancl may 1 nf r cl I y th
urt n moti n and r aonal 1 notic , ancl r g ulat cl by rul
f court, or may be t a icl
by th c urt fo r any uffi. i 1 t au . . an l pr
cling in bankrupt y had a c rding to law.
. • t. Jun 22, r 74, 17. Thi
ti n, provi ling f r a mp . ition und r th
f th
c urt. i. tak n fr m an l sub. tantially f 11 w
En~ -
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lish bankrupt act of 1869, St. 32 and 33 Vict. c. 71. See Ex
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E.

parte Jeivctt, 2 Lowell, 393 ; Re IVIiipple, 2 Lowell, 404.

It has been determined in England, by decisions of high

authority and upon most satisfactory reasons, that a creditor, by

participating in either of the three forms of proceeding, w^hether

by assenting to a certificate of discharge, or by consenting to a

resolution, either for a winding up through trustees, or for the

acceptance of a composition proposed by the debtor, does not

release or affect the liability of a surety. Bronnie v. Carr, 2

Russ. 600; 5 AIo. & P. 497, and 7 Bing. 508. Megrath v. Gray,

L. R. 9 C. P. 216. Ellis V. Wilmot, L. R. lo Ex. lo. Simpson

V. Henning, L. R. lo Q. B. 406. Ex parte Jacobs, L. R. 10 Ch.

211, overruling Wilson v. Lloyd, L. R. 16 Eq. 60.

The proceedings for a composition under the statute, depend-

ing for their validity and operation, not upon the act of the par-

ticular creditor, but upon the resolution passed by the requisite

majority of all the creditors, binding alike on those who do and on

those who do not concur therein, (if their debts are included in

the statement filed by the debtor,) and finally confirmed and estab-
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lished by the court upon a consideration of the general benefit of

all concerned, differs wholly in nature and effect from a volun-

tary composition deed, which binds only those who execute it.

Oakeley v. Pasheller, 4 CI. & Fin. 207; 5^. C. 10 Bligh N. R. 548.

Bailey v. Edwards. 4 B. & S. 761 ; Bateson v. Gosling, L. R.- 7

C. P. 9 ; Oriental Financial Corporation v. Overend, L. R. 7 Ch.

142; Cragoe v. Jones, L. R. 8 Ex. 81; Gilford v. Allen, 3 Met.

255 ; Phoenix Cotton Mamif. Co. v. Fuller, 3 Allen, 441.

Assuming, therefore, that this defendant, having signed the

note for the accommodation of the indorsers, was to be consid-

ered as a surety for them, and that the plaintiff, after acquiring

knowledge of that fact, stood as if he had known it when he took

the note, yet no defence is shown to this action.

Exceptions sustained.

Gillespie et al. vs. Torrance (1862).

25 N. Y. 306.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the city of New York.

Action upon a promissory note against the indorser only. De-

1i h bankrupt act of l
t. 32 and 33
ict. c. 7r.
' ee Ex
parte I e~ ett, 2 L w 11, 3 3; Re lfl hippie) 2 L w 11 , 404.
It ha b n let rmin d in England, by deci ion of high
authority an l upon mo l ati factory r a on , that a creditor, by
participating in either of the three form of proceeding, whether
by a enting to a ertificate of di charge, or by con entinO" to a
r e~oluti n,
ither fo r a winding up through tru tee , or for th
acceptance of a compo ~ ition propo ed by the debtor, doe not
r lease or affect th liability of a urety. Browne v. Carr, 2
Ru . 600; 5 l\lo. & P. 497, and 7 Bing. 508. 1ll egrath v. Gray,
L. R. 9 . P. 216. Ellis v. vVilniot) L. R. IO Ex. IO. Sinipson
. Henning) L. R. IO Q. B. 406. Ex parte .Tacobs) L. R. IO Ch.
21 l, overruling TT ·ilson v. Lloyd) L. R. 16 Eq. 60.
The proceeding for a composition under the tatute, depending for their validity and operation, not upon the act of the particular creditor, but upon the resolution passed by the requisite
majority of all the creditors, binding alike on those who do and on
those who do not concur therein, (if their debts are included in
the tatement filed by the debtor,) and finally confirmed and establi hed by the court upon a consideration of the general benefit of
.all concerned, differ. wholly in nature and effect from a voluntary compo ition deed, which binds only those who execute it.
Oakeley v. Pasheller) 4 Cl. & Fin. 207; S. C. IO Bligh . R. 548.
Bailey v. Ed'l ards. 4 B. & S. 761 ; Bateson v. Gosling) L. R. · 7
C. P. 9; Oriental Financial Corporation v. Overend) L. R. 7 Ch.
q.2; Crag.oe v. Jones L. R. 8 Ex. 8r; Gifford v. Allen) 3 Met.
255; Phoenix Cotton Manuf. Co. v. Fuller) 3 Allen, 44r.
Assuming, therefore, that this defendant, having signed the
note for the accommodation of the indor ers, was to be considered as a urety for them, and that the plaintiff, after acquiring
knowledge of that fact, stood a if he had known it when he took
the note, yet no defence i shown to this action.
Exception u tained.

GILLE. PIE

et al. ·us.

TORR NCE (

1862).

25 N. Y. 306.
_-\ppeal from the Superior Court of the city of New York.
ction upon a promi sory note against the indorser only. De-
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maker ; that tlie note was one of several j^iven for oak timber sold

to the maker by the pkaintiffs ; that the timl)er was a raft in the

Hudson river, opposite the city of New York, and that, on making

the sale, the plaintiffs produced certificates of inspection showing

that there were 29,441 feet of first quality oak, for wdiich \'an Pelt,

the maker of the notes, agreed to pay 27^2 cents per foot, and

5,523 feet of second quality or refuse oak. for which \'an Pelt

agreed to ])ay i3;}4 cents per foot; that, by the usage of the timber

trade in New York, the seller is deemed to warrant that the tim-

ber sold corresponds in quantity and ([uality with the description

in such inspection certificates ; that \'an iY-lt gave his notes, in-

dorsed by the defendant, for various sums, amounting in the aggre-

gate to $9,000. the ])rice of the timber as computed from the

inspection certificates, and all of which notes had been paid exce])t

the one in suit; that after the delivery of the timber it was dis-

covered that the inspection certificates were erroneous in this, that

of the timber of first quality there was 15,000 feet less than the

certificates stated, and an ecjual excess in the refuse timber ; that
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if the prices had been correctly computed according to the fact,

instead of being computed according to the certificate, it would

have amounted to less than $5,000; that the plaintiffs had, there-

fore, been over])aid, and there was no consideration for the note

in suit. On the trial, the judge, under exception by the defendant,

excluded evidence as to the f|uantity of the timber of the dift'erent

qualities ; declined to permit an amendment of the answer alleging

an express warranty : and excluded evidence of the usage set up

in the answer, making a sale by certificate equivalent to a warranty.

The other facts stated in the answer were substantially proved or

admitted. The ])laintiffs had a verdict and judgment, which hav-

ing been affirmed at general term, the defendant appealed to this

court.

Charles A. luifallo, for the appellant.

JVilliaiii Stiiiilcy. for the respondents.

Selden, J. The defense in this case is not founded on a

failure of the consideration of the note, otherwise than by a defect

in the quality of the timber for which it was given. That being

so, if there was neither warranty nor fraud in the sale of the tim-

ber, the defect in finality constitutes no defense. Seixas v.

fen ·c. that the indo r: 111 nt \\'a · for the a ·commo Iation f th
m<Jk ·r; that the not , \\·as n ' of s 'Vera! g iv ' 11 fo r oak timb r
ld
t the maker by th plaintiff . ; that the timber " ·a: a raft in th
Hu dson river, Pl it' th · ity f .:'\ ' \\' Y o rk, and that, o n makin
th ' . al ' , the plaintiff produ - 1 ·crt ifi ·at
f in p '·ti n Ji \\'in
that th 're,,. ' r' -CJ,-J. . p £' ' l of fir t quality ak, fo r \\'hi -h \ 'a n l It ~
the maker of the no t s, ag r 'Cd to pay 27 ,1'2 c ' n L 1 r foot, and
S·S-3 feet f s - ncl qual it y or r ·fu ' ak, f r wh ich \ ' a n I lt
a re ·cl to pay i3 .1, ..~ cent per foo t ; that, by th e u ag f th tim l r
trad ' in X \\' York, th
cll c r i cl em 'cl t \\'arra nt that th timb r so ld
rre p ncl in quantity a nd quality with th l
ripti n
in . uch in pecti n c rtificat s; that Yan Pelt a-av hi not , , inclor · cl hy the !cf ncla nt, fo r variou um , amountino- in th aggr gate to 9,000. the J rice of th timb r a comput <l fr om th
in p tion ertifi a te , a nd all f whi ch n t · had 1 en paid xc pt
th one in uit; that afte r the cl liv ery of t h timbe r it wa cli cov reel that th' in pccti n ce rtifi ca te . w ' r e rr n e u in thi , that
of th timbe r of first quality th r ' wa L 5,00 f t I s than th
ce rtificat
. tatecl, and a n eq ual exec
in th e rcfu e timb r; that
if the price had b n c rr c tl y c mputecl according t th fact
in t acl of bein g computed ace r<li 1w t the ertificat , it would
have am untecl to le
than , 5 ,0 ; that th plaintiff had, th r fore 1 ec n v rpaid, and th e re wa no con icl e rati n f r th n o t
in uit. O n the trial , th j uclgc, und e r 'xcep tio n by th cl efcnclant ,
ex luclecl v icl 'nee a t th quantity of the timb r f th cliff r nt
qualiti .. ; cl clin cl to permit an am nclm nt f th an \\' r all g in oa n xp re s warranty: ancl .·clucl cl
icl nee f th u ag . t up
in the an \\' r , m aki ng a al ' by ·ertificat quival nl t a warranty.
The th ' r fa ts s tat cl in th a n w r w er e ub tantially l r v cl r
aclmittecl . Th plaintiff hacl a verdict an 1 juclgment, which having b n affirm <I at g n ral t rm , th e lef n lant a i p al d t thi
COll rt.

Clzarlcs .•1. Rapallo. for th app llant.
I ( 'i/lialll Sta11 /c_1 for th r pon I nt .
1,

J.

The clef n
in th i
a
no t f u11cl d 11 a
failur
f th
11 . icl rati n f th n t , th rwi than I y a d f ct
in th 1uality f th timb r f r whi h it wa giv n. That b ing
, if th r - was n ithcr warranty n r fraud in th
al
f th tim 1 r, t he cl fc t in quality
n titut
11
cl f 11 e.
flxas v.
: EI.DEX.
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Woods, 2 Caines. 4<S; Sweet v. Col^afe, 20 Johns. 196; Welsh v.

Carter, i Wend. 185. Jotiusov v. Titus, 2 Hill, 606. The answer

does not alle.s^e fraud in the transaction, and unless it shows a

warranty of the c[uality of the timber, it presents no defense to

the note, either partial or total. The aro-ument of the ap])ellant's

counsel, to maintain the position that the defense rested upon a

failure of consideration, and not upon a claim for damages on a

breach of warranty, is very ingenious ; Init the answer and the

proof show that all the timber contracted to be delivered to Van

Pelt, and for which the notes were o^iven, was in fact delivered,

and the real ground of complaint is. that a much larger proportion

of it than was shown by the inspector's certificates, upon the faith

of which the purchase was made, proved to be of inferior quality.

The law being well established that such defect of quality, in the

absence of fraud or warranty, constitutes no defense to the note,

or to any part of it. and there being no pretence of fraud, it fol-

lows that the defense, if there is any, rests upon a breach of war-

ranty.

The question then arises, whether the plaintifif, an accommo-
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dation indorser upon a note given by Van Pelt to the plaintiffs

for the timber, can avail himself of a breach of the contract of

warranty in regard to the quality of the timber, made by the plaint-

iffs to Van Peh, on the sale to him. To decide this question, it is

necessary to ascertain the ground upon which such defenses, by

way of recoupment, as they were denominated prior to the adoption

of the Code, now, partially, if not wholly, merged in the much

broader term, counter-claim, were admitted. If we regard such

defenses as resting upon a failure of the consideration of the con-

tract on which the plaintiff's action is founded, then unquestionably

the defendant could avail himself of the breach of warranty in this

case, because an indorser or surety may always, where the con-

tract has not been assigned, show a failure, partial or total, of con-

sideration of his principal's contract which he is called upon to

perform. But if such defenses are regarded as the setting off. of

distinct causes of action, one against the other, then it is clear,

as will be shown hereafter, that this defendant could not avail him-

self of such defense.

The subject of the precise ground on wdiich a defendant is

allowed to reduce a recovery against him, in an action upon a

contract, by alleging and proving fraud, or breach of warranty —

whether the contract where there is fraud, is regarded as de-

JVoods, - aine . ~ ; ,)~'i.L'CCf v. o!gnte, 20 J ohn . . 196; {Velslz v.
Carter. c \V ncl . 1 5, .Toh 11soJJ
Titus, 2 Ilill, 6 6. Th a n. \\·er
does not a ll g;e frau I in th e tran , acti n, and uni
it , hows a
to
·w arranty of th e 1uality of th e timb r, it pr ent no clefen
the note, ither partial or t tal. The argument f th appellant'
coun I, to maintain the p sition that the defen e re tecl upon a
failure of con id ration, and not upon a claim fo r damage
11 a
breach of warranty, i very ingeni us; but th e answer ancl tht:
proof h w that all th e timber contracted to be delivered to Va n
Pelt, and fo r which the not were given, wa in fact delivered,
ancl th e r eal ground of complaint i , that a much larger proportion
of it than wa hown by the inspector' s ce rtificates, upon the faith
of which the purchase was mad e, prov cl to be of inferior quality.
The law being well establi shed that uch defect of quality, in the
absence of fraud or warranty, con titutes no clef nse to the note,
or to any part of it, and there being no pretence of fraud, it fo llows that the clefen , if there is any, rests upon a br ach of warranty.
The question then ari e , whether the plaintiff, an accomm odation indorser upon a note given by Van Pelt to the plaintiffs
fo r th timb r , can avail him s~ lf of a breach of the contract of
warranty in rega rd to the quality of the timber, made by th plaintiff to V an Pelt, on the sale to him . To decide thi que tion , it i
nee ary to ascertain the around upon which such defen e , by
way of recoupm ent, as th ey were denominated prior to the adoption
of the Code, now, partially. if not wholly, rn er o·ecl in the much
broad r term , counter-claim , were admitted. If we regard such
defen se eis r estin cr upon a fai lure of the con ideration of the contract on vvhich the plaintiff's action is founded, then unque tionabl y
the clef ndant could avail him elf of the breach of warranty in thi
ca e, because an indor er or surety may always, where th co ntract has not been a signed, how a failure, partial or total, of conideration of his principal'. contract which he is cal1 ed upon to
perform . But if uch d fen e are regarded a the settincr off. of
di tin ct cause
f actiou, one again t the other, then it i clear,
as wi ll be hown hereafter , that thi s defendant could not avail him elf of uch lef en e.
Th e subj ect of th precise ground on which a defendant is
allo\\ eel to red uce a recov ry against him, in an action upon a
contract, by a ll g in cr and proving fraud, or breach of warrantywhether th e contract wh ere there is fraud , i r ecrarded a de-
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stroyed, and the recovery had on a qiiantnin meruit, or whether the

reduction of tlie plaintiffs' claim rests upon a partial failure of

consideration, or upon the setting off of distinct claims against each

other — has often hecn discussed, but without any general concur-

rence of opinion on the question. Rcab v. Mc.lUistcr, 4 Wend.

90, et scq.; S. C. in error, 8 id. 109; Batter man v. Pierce, 3 Hill,

171, 177; Ives V. Van Epps, 22 Wend. 155; Nichols v. Dusen-

bury, 2 Comst. 286; Van Epps v. Harrison, 5 Hill 66; Barber v.

Rose, id. 78; Boston v. Butler, 7 East. 479; Withers v. Greene, 9

How. U. S. 213.

A careful examination of the subject, I think, must lead to the

conclusion, that wherever recoupment, strictly such, is allowed,

distinct causes of action are set off against each other. This would

seem to follow from the right of election, which all the cases admit

the defendant has, to set up his claim for damages by way of de-

fense, or to resort to a cross-action to recover them. Ivcs v. Van

Epps, 22 Wend. 157; Battennan v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171 ; Britton v.

Turner, 6 N. H. 481; Halsey v. Carter,, i Duer, 667; Barber v.

Rose, 5 Hill, 81 ; Stever v. Lamoure, Lalor's Supp. 352, note a.
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Tn many cases the defendant's damages would exceed the

amount of the plaintiff's claim, which shows conclusively that such

damages do not rest upon a mere failure of consideration. Where

there is fraud, the party deceived, on discovering the fraud, may

rescind the contract ; but if he does not do that, the contract on

his part remains entire, not liroken and not modified, and he is

bound to perform it fully according to its terms ; he has, how-

ever, arising from the fraud, a distinct cause of action, the amount

of which he may set oft' against any liability on his part growing

out of the transaction in which the fraud was perpetrated. As

was said by Bronson, J., in Van Epps v. Harrison: "When sued

for the price, the vendee may in general recoup damages ; but while

he retains the property he cannot treat the contract as wholly void,

and refuse to pay anything. By retaining the property he afHrnis

the validity of the contract, and can be entitled to nothing more

than the damages which he has sustained by reason of the fraud."

The same principle is applicable to cases of warranty, except that

the breach of warranty gives no right to rescind, unless there is

an express contract to that eft"ect. Street v. Blay, 2 Barn. & Ad.

456; Voorhces v. Earl, 2 Hill, 288; Gary v. Grunian, 4 id. 625;

Midler v. Eno, 14 N. Y. 597; Thornton v. Winn, 12 Wheat. 183;

Lattin v. Davis, Lalior's Supp. 16. Tn ordinary cases of breach

troyed, and the rec v ry had on a q 11a11t1t 111 111 crn it, or whether the
reduction of th plaintiff ' claim r' t upon a partial failure of
con id ration, r upon th
tting off f di tinct claim again t each
other-ha ften been Ji u d, but without any acneral concurr n
f pini n on th qu tion.
Rt'a/J \'. Jfr. lllistt'r -~ \ encl.
90, t'l seq.; S. C. in err r, id. 109; Batternu111 v. Pierce, 3 Hill,
1/1, 177; J~ es v. Van Epps, 22 \Vencl. 155; ~Yichols v. Dusenb11r)1, 2 om t. 2 ; Van Epps v. Ilarri 01t, 5 liill 66; Barber v.
Rose, id. 7 ; Baston v. Butler, 7 ' a t. 479 · I Vil hers v. Greene,. 9
How. U . . 213.
A careful examination of the subject, I think , mu t lead to the
conclu ion, that wherev r recoupment, trictly uch, i allowed,
di tinct cau e of action are et off again t each other. 1 hi would
eern to foilow from the riaht of lecti n, which all th ca e admit
the defendant has, to et up hi claim for damages by w~y of d fen e, or to re ort to a er s -action to re ov r them. Ives v. Van
Epps 22 \\'encl. 157; Battcrlllan v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171; Britton v.
Turner, 6 1\. H. 481; Halse;• v. Carter, l Duer, 667; Barber v.
Rose, 5 Hill, 81; Stei·er v. Lamoure_, Lalor's Supp. 352, note a.
In many ca es the defendant's damages would e re ed the
amount of the plaintiff' claim, which sh ws conclusiv ly that such
damage do not re t upon a m ere failure of con ideration. vVhe re
there i fraud, the party deceived, on di covering th fraud, may
re cincl the contract; but if he doe not do that, the contract on
hi part remain entir , not broken and not modified, and he is
bound to perform it fully accordino- to it term ; h ha , howev r, ari ing from the fraud, a d i tinct cau e of a tion, the amount
of which be may ct off against any liability on hi part a-rowing
out of the tran action in which the fraud wa perpetrated .
wa aid by Bronson, J., in Van Epps v. Harrison: "\ hen sued
for the pri e, th vend may in general reconp damag ; but while
h r tain the prop rty h cannot treat th ontract a wh lly voi 1,
and r fu e to pay anythinb-. By retainin::-..: the prop rty he aflirm,s
the 'zralidity of the co11tract, and can b ntitl cl to nothing more
than the darnag which h ha sustained by r a on of the fraud."
The ame principle i applicable to ca
of warranty, xcept that
th I reach of warranty o-iv no rio-ht to r -cind, un l
there is
an xpre c ntrn. t to that ffect. . lreet v. Rlay, 2 Barn. & d.
456; Voorhees v. Earl, 2 Hill, 28 · Cary v. Grwnan, 4 id. 625;
.Huller V. E110, r4 i\l. r . 597; Thornton v. vVinn, 12 v h at. 183;
Latti11 v. Davis, Lal or'
upp. r6. In ordinary ca
of breach
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of warranty, therefore, both contracts remain binding to their full

extent, and where recoupment is allowed, damages for a breach

on one side are set off against like damages on the other side. The

"cross-claims arising out of the same transaction compensate one

another, and the balance is recovered." 8 Wend. 115; 22 id.

156; 3 Hill, 174; 2 Comst. 286.

It has always been optional, as is suggested above, since the

doctrine of recoupment has gained a foothold in the courts, with

a party who has sustained damages by fraud or breach of warranty

in the' purchase of goods, when sued for their price, to set off or

recoup such damages in that action, or to reserve his claim for a

cross-action; and when he elected to recoup he could not, under

die Revised Statutes, have a balance certified in his favor, nor

could he maintain a subsequent action for such balance. Sickles

V. Pattison, 14 Wend. 257; Battcrman v. Pierce, 3 Hih, 171;

Wilder v. Case, 16 Wend. 583 ; Stcver v. Lamoure, Lalor's Supp.

352, note a ; Britfon v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481.

Under the Code of Procedure, doubtless a balance might be
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recovered (Code, §§ 150-274; Ogden v. Coddington, 2 E. D.

Smith. 317) ; but the right of election to set up a counter-claim in

defence, or to bring a cross-action for it, still exists. Halscy v.

Carter, 6 Duer, 667"; Wekli v. Hadctmi, 14 How. Pr., 97. Now

it is not easy to reconcile with these established principles, the

right of the defendant in this suit to avail himself of the claim

which A^an Pelt may have against the plaintiffs on a breach of war-

ranty. I. Such damages constitute a counter-claim, and not a

mere failure of consideration, and not being due to the defendant,

cannot be claimed by him. Code, § 150; Lemon v. Tridl, 13

How. Pr., 248; 16 id. 576, note. 2. \'an Pelt has a right of

election wdiether the damages shall be claimed by way of recoup-

ment in the suit on the note, or reserved for a cross-action.

The defendant cannot make tiiis election for him. 3. If the

defendant has a right to set up the counter-claim, and have it

allo\\ed, in this action it must bar any future action by Van Pelt

for the breach of warranty ; and as no balance could be found in

defendant's favor, he might thus bar a large claim in canceling a

small one. If the right exists in this case, it would equally exist

if the note was but $100 instead of $1,800. 4. Supposing the

other notes given for the timber to have been indorsed by dift'er-

ent persons, for the accommodation of Van Pelt, and all to re-

main unpaid, each of the indorsers would have the same rights as

of warranty ther for , both contract r main binding t their full
upment i allow d, damage for a breach
xtcnt, and where r
on one i I ar et off aO'ain t like damao- on the th cr id . T'hc
''cro -claim ari ing out f the ame tran action c mpcn ate on
another, and the balance i r covere I."
\Vend. I I 5: 22 id.
I 56; 3 Hill L7-I-; 2
mst. 286.
lt ha , alway been optional, a i ugge ted ab v , ince the
doctrin e of recoupment ha gained a foothold in the courts, with
a party who ha u tain d lamage by fraud or breach of warranty
in the pur ha ~e of go d , when sued for their pric , t et off or
i ecoup uch damage
in that action, or to re t:rve hi claim for a
cro -action: and when he elected to recoup he could not, under
the:: Revi d tatute , hav a balance certified in his favor, nor
could he maintain a ub eq uent action for uch balance. Sicl"lcs
v. Pattison, 14 \ Vend. 257; Batterlllan v. Pierce) 3 Hill, I7I;
lVilder v. Case) I6 \Vend. 583; Ste'uer v. Lamoure) Lalor'
upp.
352, note a; Britton v. Turner) 6 ::\. H. 4 r.
Under the Code of Procedure, doubtle a balance might be
recovered (Code, §§ I50-274; Ogdrn v. Coddington) 2 E. D.
Smith, 3I7); but the riO'ht of election to et up a counter-claim in
defenc:e, or to bring a eras -action for it, still exist . H alsC}' v.
Carter, 6 Duer 667; TVelclt v. Ha.-::lctnn 14 How. Pr., 97. Now
it i not ea y to reconcile with the e e tablished principle , the
right of the defendant in thi uit to avail himself of the claim
which Yan Pelt may have again t the plaintiffs on a breach of warranty. I . uch damage constitute a counter-claim, and not a
mere failure of con ideration, and not being due to the defendant,
cannot be clain~ed by him.
Code, ,,, ISO; Lrmon v. Trull) I3
Ho\\·. Pr., 248; I6 id. 576, note. 2. Yan Pelt ha a right of
election whether the damao-e hall b claimed by way of recoupm~nt in the su it on the note, or r e. erved for a cro s-action.
The defendant cannot make this ele tion fo r him . 3. If the
defendant ha a right to et up the co unter-claim , and have it
allowed, in thi action it mu t bar any future action by Yan Pelt
for the breach of warranty : and a no balance co uld be found in
defendant' favor, he mio-ht thus bar a large claim in cancelino- a
small one. If the right ~xi t in thi case, it would equally xi t
if the note wa but $mo in tead of 1 800. 4. upp ing the
other note given for the timber to have been indor ed by different per on , for th.e accommodation of Van Pelt, and all to ren:ain unpaid, each of the indorser would have the ame ri o-ht as
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the defciulanl. ll llicy were to set up the same defence, how would

the conflictinfj claims he reconciled?

In the case whicli was shown on the trial, there would seem

t( be a strong equity in favor of the defendant to have the note

canceled or reduced, by applyinj:;^ towards its satisfaction the dam-

ages which appear to be due to \'an I*elt for the breach of war-

ranty. It is. however, an equity, in which \'an Pelt is interested

to as great, and possibly to a greater, extent than the defendant,

and cannot l)c disposed of witliDUl having liim before the court,

so that his rights, as well as those of the defendant, may be pro-

tected. That remedy may be open to the defendant still, notwith-

standing the judgment; especially if the insolvency of the parties

renders that course necessary for his ]>rot.ection. 14 Johns., 63,

17 id., 389; 2 Cow., 261 ; 2 Paige, 581 ; 6 Dana. 32; 8 id., 164;

2 Stor\''s Vj[. Jur., §§ 1446, a, I437- My conclusion is, that the

court below was right in holding that the defendant could not set

up the breach of warranty in defence, partial or total, to the suit

on the note ; and as the warranty presented the only ground on

which there could be a claim of defence under the answer, there
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is no necessity for considering the other (|uestions presented in

the case.

The judgment should be affirmed.

All the judges concurring.

Judgment affirmed.

Peakf. T'.!.-. Deacon (1857),

24 Beav. 186.

Mr. R. Palmer and Mr. Bcrir, for plaintiff.

Mr. Sekcyn and .1//-. A'. W. lUUs, for defendants.

The Masti:r oi- tiii: Rolls.

I retain the opinion expressed by me yesterday. The facts

t;ie cl fcnclant. If th ) " . r e t ·c t up th' am cl f nc h \\' would
tlil conflicting - !aim~ be r '·onciled?
In the ca:e whi h \\·a . ho wn o n the trial, thcr \\' ulcl ' m
tr be a . trono- ·q uit) in fay o r of th cl f ' ndant t hav th
C~tnc led o r r 'clu, cl, by a1 ply in g towa rd . it s . ati fa ti n th
lamagc . wbi ·h app ' ar to he clue to \ 'a n l >c]t for th breach f warranty. It is. ho wev r, an eq uity . in \\·hich \ ' an P It i inte r t cl
t(I as great, and po::.. ibl) to a g reater, ext nt tha n th d e fendant,
and cannot be di . pos 'cl o f \Yitho ut ha,·in g him b fo r th
urt
~n that hi s right. . as \\" '11 a . the . ' of th cl 'f ' nclant , ma y b pr te ·t d. That r em cly may he o pen to the cl ef nclant . till. n twith. tanrling th judgment: '. pecially if the in o lY ' n cy f th parti
r ncl r. that co ur. n '·essa ry for his protecti n.
q J hn ., 3,
17 icl., ,51.(): _Cow .. 26 1: 2 Paige. 581: 6 Dana . 32:
id., I ...+;
2
try' . Eq. Jur.. ,'§ r-t-1-6. a. 1...J.37· ~[y co nclu io n i , that th
o urt below \\·as ri g ht in h oldin g that the def ' 11 lant could n t
t
up the br 'ach o f warranty in def ' 11 , partial o r t ta!, to th
uit
o n th n o te: a nd a th e warranty pr . entccl the o nl y a-ro und n
,,·hich there co uld be a claim o f cl ' f ence uncl r th e a n w e r, th r
i n o n c ss ity fo r ·o n s icl eri1w th ' oth er qu tion pr
nt d 111
the a e.

are shortly these: — Mr. Pearson applied to the defendants, who

are brewers at Windsor, for a loan of 250/., to enable him to take

a public-house, called The Carpenters' Arms. They said we will

Th

j ucl grn ent

~ h o ulcl

I e affirmed .

. \11 the judge co ncurring.

do so if you will get a good surety for the amount, and assign

over your pension and furniture. That was agreed to ; Pearson

JudITT11 cnt

affirmed.

( I 57 ) ,

PE .\RI. 'i. 1S. D1 ·:. \ CO:\'"

-...J.

n

av.

l

6.

Jfr. R. Pallllcr and Jfr. Bc<.•ir , f r plaintiff.
J/r. Sc/c.,•_\'11 ancl .1f r. R. Tf 7 . !:!!1s, fo r cl ' f ' ndant

Th ).L\STER OF T ll E R LL .
I r tain th op ini o n expr . eel by m e y

t rday. Th fa t
arc h rtly th
:- ).Ir. P ar 11 ap1 Ii d to th cl f ndant , who
a:- brew r al \Yincl o r , f r a loan of _50/. , t
nab! him to tak
a public-hmL ', ·al\ ncl The arpent ' rs ' . \rm . 'Th y said \\' will
cl
if y u will g t a
cl ur ty f r th am unt, an I a i ·n
(J , r y ur p n s i 11 an 1 furniture.
rl hat wa agre cl t : p ar 11
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^.offered the plaintiff as his surety for half the amount, and Castles

,as surety for the other half; the defendants accepted them, and

on the 16th of November, 1852, two joint and several promissorv

notes were triven to the defendants, one l)v Pearson and the plain-

tiff, and the other by Pearson and Castles. Six days afterwards,

viz., on the 23rd of November, Pearson assiii^ned his pension and

all the goods and chattels to secure this debt of 250/. ( )n this

transaction, the first point which was raised by the i)laintift', in my

opinion, fails. He says that this arrangement was a variation of

the contract of suretyship, and that it discharged the plaintiff, be-

cause the money was made payable on the i6th of November,

1858, or six years after the date of the mortgage. If the case

had rested here, the plaintiff would probably have been success-

ful, Imt the deed goes on, "or at such earlier or other time" as tUc

defendants should appoint for the payment thereof "in and by a

notice in writing." I do not think that this was such a variation

.ff r ed th plaintiff a hi , ur ty fo r half th am unt , and ca~tlc .
ur ty f r th
ther half ; th e cl fenclanL ace ptcd them. and
on th e 1 th of N ovemb r, I 52, t w joint an I ev ra l promisson ·
n le: we r
·iv n to th Id nclant , one by I ar on and th e plain tiff, and th e oth r by I ea rson and 'a ti c-. ·ix clays aft ·rw ards.
viz. , on th -:)rd of l'\ vcmb r , P ea r on a .. igne 1 hi s pen . ion and
all the g cl and chatt l to c ur thi s d ' bt of -5 /. ( )n thi
trc:.n .,acti n. the first point which wa rai cl by th e plaintiff. in my
opini n , fails. He ay that thi arrangement was a variation of
tL." contract of <;urety hip, and that it di ,chargecl th plaintiff, bcthe money wa mad e payable on the i6th f November ,
ca u
l 5 , or
ix y ar after th dat of the m ortgage. If the ca. e
hc..d r tecl here, the plaintiff woul l probably hav e been succc sful , but the deed goes on, '' or at uch ea rli r or other tim e·· as tnt
defendants should appoint fo r the paym ent thereof "in and by a
notice in writin g. " I do not think that t hi s wa such a variati on
in the terms of the security as to di charge the urety; but the
que lion i of little importance, as I am of opinion, on th e cv iclc-nce , that the plaintiff had notice of thi a sig nment and of th
t rm s of it.
The only other fact important to be stated arc the c :-The
defendant w ere landlord of The Carpenters'
rm s, and in the
yea.r 1856. four year after thi transaction, Pear on' s r ent being
con iderabl y in arrear, the defendants distrained and put a broker
in po es ion of the furniture under th e distre s; on thi , by
arrang ment, in tead of ellin g the good , they took them at a
valuation for n6/.
Th question is thi s :-The furniture having been expressly
mortgaged for the 250!. , wa it within the power of the def ndant ,
to th injury of the urety, to give up the security on the furni ture for the 250/. , and take it in discharge of another and different
debt clue to them elve ? I am of opinion that they could not do
o. It was aid, that thi ecurity wa not within the cope of the
Plaintiff's contract, and that a surety cannot go beyond it. That
i a mi take with respect to the relation between a principal and
urety. Lord ELDO expres ly stated, in Cra3 thorne v. Sz ,inbrn' nc, 14 Ve . r69, that the right of a urety depend rather on a
principle of equity than upon contract; th ere may be a quasi contract, but it ari
out of th e equitable relation h tween the partie ,
to be inferred from the knowledge of an establi heel principle of
equity. The . ame <;loctrine i al
tatecl in 111 ayhcw v. Cricl~ett, 2
il<-

0

in the terms of the security as to discharge the surety; but the

• question is of litde importance, as I am of opinion, on the evi-
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dence, that the plaintiff had notice of this assignment and of the

terms of it.

The only other facts important to be stated are these : — The

defendants were landlords of The Carpenters' Arms, and in the

year 1856, four years after this transaction, Pearson's rent being

considerably in arrear, the defendants distrained and put a broker

in possession of the furniture under the distress; on this, by

arrangement, instead of selling the goods, they took them at a

valuation for 116/.

The question is this: — The furniture having been expressly

mortgaged for the 250/., was it within the power of the defendants,

to the iniur\^ of the surety, to give up the security on the furni-

ture for the 250/., and take it in discharge of another and different

debt due to themselves? I am of opinion that they could not do

so. It was said, that this security was not within the scope of the

Plamtiff's contract, and that a surety cannot go beyond it. That

is a mistake with respect to the relation betw^een a principal and

surety. Lord Eldon expressly stated, in Craythorne v. Swin-

burne, 14 Ves. 169, that the rights of a surety depend rather on a

principle of equity than upon contract; there may be a quasi con-

tract, but it arises out of the equitable relation between the parties,

to be inferred from the knowledge of an established principle of

quity. The same gloctrine is also stated in Mayhezv v. Crickcft, 2

e

1
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Swan. 191, and it is laid down distinctly, that sureties are en-

titled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against

the principal debtor, and that whether the surety knows of the

existence of those securities or not is immaterial. If the creditor

makes available any of his securities, the surety is entitled to the

benefit of it.

The case of Capel v. Butler, 2 Sim. & S. 457, is a distinct

authority for this proposition. Mr<. Ellis soug-ht to distinguish that

case by saying, that, in that case, there was a recital of all the

securities, but that here there was none. The answer, however, is

this : — That there was notice to the suretv of the whole transaction,

and being so, the reciting it is immaterial. Lord Eldon distinctly

laid down in Mayhew v. Cricket! , 2 Swan. 185, that it is a matter

of perfect indifiference, whether the surety is aware of another

security having been taken by the creditor or not.

In the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Wood in Newton v.

Charlton, 10 Hare 651, there is a statement, in ever\- word of which

I concur. He says, as regards, the creditor, '"He is bound to give to

the surety the benefit of every security which he holds at the time
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of the contract, — every security which he then holds; and he is

net allowed, in any way, to vary the position of the surety with

reference to those securities ; that has been decided most dis-

tinctly in Mayhew v. Crickett by Lord Eldon, where there was a

warrant of attorney in the hands of a creditor put into operation

by the creditor, and a judgment obtained, from which he after-

v/ards discharged the principal debtor. Lord Eldon held it utterly

immaterial, whether the warrant of attorney was known to the

surety at the time he entered into the contract or not. The surety

had a complete right to the benefit of it, and if the benefit were losi

to him, he was at once discharged."

It is argued that this was a security for a separate and dis-

tmct debt ; but I am of opinion that it was not taken for a separate

and distinct debt, but for the debt of 250/.

I am of opinion, therefore, that if the defendants enforce pay-

ment of the rent due to them out of the furniture, and then seek to

compel the plaintifif to pay the debt for which he became surety,,

the plaintifif is entitled to say to them, "'you must give me the bene-

fit of the security on the furniture and pension which were mort-

gaged to you for this debt."

What the defendants have done is this : — They have thought

fit to apply the produce of the furniture to a different and distinct

. wan. 191, and it i laid cl wn Ii tin tly, that ur ti
ar entitled to th benefit of e\' ry . curity which th r clit r ha a ain t
the principal debtor, and that \Yh th r the urety know
f the
existen e of those ecurities o r not is immaterial.

If the

reditor

make available a rw of hi
curitic , the urcty i ntitl l to the
benefit f it.
Th ca e of Capel v. Butler, 2 im. - . 457, i a di tinct
authority for thi l ropo ilion. ::.\lri. Elli ought to di tingui h that
ca c 1 ~, aying, that, in that ca e, there \Ya a recital of all the
curiti , but that here there wa non . The an wer, however, is
thi :-That th ere \\·a notice to th urety of the whole tran action,
and b i1w o, the r citino- it i immaterial. Lord ELDON di tinctly
laid down in Jla·y lzew v. Cric!?etl, 2 \\·an. 185, that it i a matter
of perf ct indifference, wh eth er the urety i a ware of another
ecurity havin o- b en tak en by the creditor r not.
In the judgm nt f Vice- hancellor \YooD in
e~ ton v.
Charlton, IO Hare 6'-1 , there i a tatement, in every word of which
I concur. H e ay , a r gard , th e creditor, ··He i bound to give to
th e ur ty th benefit of every ecurity which he holds at the time
of th e contract,-every ecurity which he th en holds; and he is
n t allowed, in any way, to vary the po ition of the urety with
referenc to tho e ecunt1 ; that ha been decided mo t di tinctly in /vfayhew v. Cricl?ett by Lord ELDOX, where th re wa, a
'.\arrant of attorn y in the hand of a creditor put into operatior.
hy the creditor, and a judgment obtain d, from which he afterwards di charo-ed the principal d btor. L rd ELD N held it utterly
immaterial, wheth r the warrant of attorney wa knO\ n to the
. urety at the time he entered into the contra t or not. The urety
had a complete right to the benefit f it, an l if th benefit were lost
to him, b wa at once di char cl. ''
It i argued that thi wa a ecurity for a parat and di tmct d bt; but I am of opinion that it wa not tak n for a parate
and di tinct d bt, but for the debt of 25ol.
I am of opin ion, th refore, that if the def ndant nfor payment of the r ent Ju e to th m out of th furniture and th n
k to
cump 1 the plaintiff to pay th e debt fo r which he became urety,
th plaintiff i ntitl ed t ay t th m · you mu t o-iv me th benefit of the ecurity n the furniture and pen ion ' hich w r mortga aed to you for thi de! t. "
\\'hat th def ndant have done i thi :- They 11av th ught
fit t apply th · prod uce of tb fumitur to a li:ffer nt and di tinct
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debt, contrary to the original arrangement, on the terms of which,

it is to be assumed, the surety consented to become Hable. I am

therefore of opinion, that whatever the defendants have received

ought to be appUed rateably in discharge of the whole debt, and

that the plaintiff is only liable to pay half of the balance.

If it were otherwise, the result would be this : — That if a man

advanced i,ooo/. to another on a mortgage of an estate, and had

the security of ten sureties, each of wdiom was liable for lool, he

might release or reassign the mortgage, and then sue the ten

sureties. This is a proposition impossible to be sustamed.

If the defendants have received anything from Castles, it

must not be taken into account; but with respect to the money

received from Pearson, it ought to be taken as a discharge for the

debt.

As to the pension, either they have received it or they have

not; if they have, it was distinctly applicable to the payment of

their debt; if they have not, they must show why they did not

make that securitv available.
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Pain vs. Packard et al. (1816).

13 Johns. 174.

This was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note made

by Packard & Munson, in which Packard alone was arrested, the

other defendant being returned not found. The defendant, Pack-

ard, pleaded: i. Non assumpsit 2. That he signed the note

d bi, contrary to th original arrangement, n the terms f which,
it i to be a urn l, the urety con ented to becorn liable. I am
th r for of opinion, that whatev r th defendants hav received
ought to b appli d rateably in di charg of th whol del t, and
that th plaintiff i only liable to pay half of the balanc .
If it w re otherwi e, the re ult would be thi :-That if a man
advanced l,oool. to anoth r n a mortgao-e of an estat , and had
th security of t n ur ti
ach of whom wa liable for root, he
might release or reas ign the mortgage, and then sue the ten
sureties. Thi i a proposition impossible to be sustained.
If the defendants have received anything froni a tles, it
mu t not be taken into account; but with respect to the money
received from Pearson, it ought to be taken a a discharge for the
debt.
As to the pension, either they have received it or they have
not; if they have, it was di tinctly applicable to the- payment of
their debt; if they have not, they mu t hovv why they did not
make that ecurity available.

which was for $100, payable on demand, as surety for Munson ;

that he urged the plaintiff to proceed immediately in collecting the

money due on the note from Munson who was then solvent; and

that, if the plaintiff had then proceeded immediately to take meas-

ures to collect the money of Munson, he might have obtained pay-

ment from him; but the plaintiff' neglected to proceed against

Munson until he became insolvent, absconded and went away out

of the state, whereby the plaintiff was unable to collect the money

PAIN

vs.

PACKARD

et al. (1816).

of ^lunson. 3. The third plea was like the second, except that

the defendant alleged a promise, on the part of the plaintiff, that

13 J ohns. 174·
Thi wa an action of asswnpsit on a promi sory note made
by Packard & :i\Iun on, in which Packard alone was arrested, the
other defendant being returned not found. The defendant, Packard, pleaded: r. Non assumpsit. 2. That he igned the note
which wa for $100, payable on demand, as urety for Munson;
that he urged the plaintiff to proceed immediately in collecting the
money due on the note from Munson who wa th n olvent; and
that, if the plaintiff had ihen proceeded immediately to take measure to collect the mon y of Munson, h might have obtained payment from him; but the plaintiff neo-lected to proceed again t
Mun on until he became in olvent, ab conded and went away out
of the tate, whereby the plaintiff wa unal le to collect the money
of ~Iun on. 3. The third plea wa like the second, except that
the defendant alleaed a promi e, on the part of the plaintiff, that
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he Wdiild immediately proceed to collect the money of Munson, and

a breach of that promise, by wiiich tlie defendant was deceived

and defrauded, and prevented from oljtainins;' the money from

Munson, etc.

There was a demurrer to the second and third pleas and a

joinder in dennuTer, which was submitted to the court without

argument.

Per Curiam. The facts set forth in the plea are admitted by

tlie demurrer. The jirinciples laid down in the case of The Peo-

ple V. Jaiiseii (7 Johns. 336) will warrant and support this plea.

W'c there say a mere delay in calling on the principal will not

discharge the surety. The same i)rinci])le was fully and explicitly

laid down by the court m the case of Taihnadge v. Brushy But

this is not such a case. Here is a special request, l)y the surety,

to proceed to collect the money from the j^rincipal : and an aver-

ment of a loss of the money as against the principal, in conse--

quence of such neglect. The averments and facts stated in the

plea are not repugnant, or contradictory to the terms of the note.

The suit here is l)y the ])ayee against the makers. The fact of
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Packard having lieen security only is fairly to be presumed to

have been known to the plaintiff. He was, in law and equity,

therefore bound to use due diligence against the principal in order

to exonerate the surety. This he has not done. There can be

no substantial objections against such a plea. It may be said, the

surety might have paid the note and prosecuted the i)rincii>al : but

although he might have done so, he was not bound to do it. If

he had a right to expedite the plaintiff in proceeding against the

principal and choose to rest on that, he might do so. In the case

of Trent Naz'. Co. v. Harlcy (10 East. 34) the plea was similar

to the present and not demurred to.

The defendant must, accordingly, have judgment upon the

(leniurrer.

Judgment for the defendant. -

^Not reported. . , ,, , ■ , i-

Hn the courts of some states the doctrine of this case is followed without quah-

fication; in others, with these qualifications-

a. The request of the creditor that he sue the principal debtor must be accom-

panied by notice that the surety will not continue to be liable if his request be ignored.

b. The request must be accompanied with an offer on the part of the surety to pay

the costs of the suit or to indemnify the creditor for such costs.

c. If made before the maturity of the debt, the request will be ineffective.

The doctrine of this case is, however, repudiated by the courts of most of the

he ''ould i111111ccliately proceed to coll ct the money of ~[un on, and

a breach of that promi. e, ]),· which the d 'i ' ndant wa decei,, d
and ddraudccl. and pr ·n~ nted from obtaining the money from
~lu1Lon,

tc.
There ,,·a. a demurrer to the sc ·nnd an 1 third plea an I a
joinder in demurrer, \\·hi ·h \\·a. -..ubmitt cl to the ourt without
argument.
Per C11ria111. The fact .ct forth in the plea are aclmitt d by
the clemurr ' r. 'The prin ipl '· laid clown in th
a
f T!zc People v. fa11sc11 ( 7 John .. 336) will warrant ancl . upport thi. pl a.
\ \ ' c thcr' ay a mer delay in calling on th I rin ipal will not
di charge the urety. 'Th am pri11 ·iple wa. fully and explicitly
bid cl0\n1 by the c,Jurt m the ca. c of Tai/11:11dgc v. Rrnsh. 1
ul
this i. not . uch a ca c. H re i. a p cial r iu t, 1 y the urety,
to proce cl to ·ol lc ·t the monc.\' from the prin i1 al; and an av rm ·nt of ::i lo of the money a again . t th 1 rincipal, in on ...
quencc f . uch neglect. The av rmcnt an l fact
tatecl in th
plea arc not repugnant, or contradict ry t Lh t rm of th note.
The ·. uil here is by the pay " ao-ain l th mak L. The fact f
Packard having been
curity only i fairly to be pre um d t
hav been kn wn to the plaintiff. He wa. _. in law and quity,
therefor bound to u clue cliligcnc cigain t th principal in ord r
urcty. Thi he ha not clon . Th re can 1
to exonerate th
no ub tantial objection. again t uch a pl a. It may he aid, the
:urety mio-ht have paid the r.ot ancl pro e ut cl th principal: but
although h might have d011e o, he wa n t bound t do it. If
he had a right t
:xp elite the plaintiff in pro e cling again t th
principal ancl ch o to re t on that. he might do o. In th ca e
of Trc11t .Ym. 1• Co. Y. Harley ( 10 Ea t. 3-t) th plea " ·a
imilar
to the pr nt and not demurred to.

states. '

Th cl f nclant mu t, accordingly, hav
demurrer.

Juclgm nt fr th

ju lgment ur n th·

cl f nclant.::

1 ~ ot reported.
'In thC' ourt~ of . omc states the doctrine of this cas is followed without quali·
fication; 111 others, with the c qualifications·
a. The requ ·st f the er ditor that he su the principal cl btor mu. t be accom·
panicd by notice that the surety will not continue to I» liable if his request be ignored.
b. The request must be accompanied with ;rn offer on the part of the urety to pay
the costs of the suit or to indemnify the creditor for such costs.
c. If mack before the maturity of the debt, the requ t will be ineffective.
The doctrine of this case is, howe\er, repudiated hy the courts of most of the
states.
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127 Mass. 298.
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Contract on a promissory note for $500, dated December 29,

1875, signed "Jos. A. Benjamin, Treas." payable to the order of

the defendant in forty-five days after date at the plaintiff bank,,

and indorsed by the defendant. Trial at June term 1878 of the

superior court, without a jury, before Rockwell, J., who re-

ported the case for the determination of this court, in substance

as follows :

Benjamin kept an ordinary banking account with the plaintiff

bank. At the time of giving the note in suit, he was treasurer

of the town of Egremont, and the bank gave him for this note

a draft to be used for the payment of a tax due from the town.

The note and the proceeds of it were not made a part of his

account with the bank, and the bank regarded the note as an

official or town matter.

On Februar}- 15, 1876, when this note matured, all things

necessary to charge the defendant as indorser were done. On

that day, and ever since, the bank held a note, made by Benja-
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min, which it had discounted, signed "Jos. A. Benjamin," dated

November 13, 1875, for $1500, payable in three months after ^

date at the plaintiff bank to one Callender, and indorsed by Cal-

lender. And on said February 15, there stood to the credit of

Benjamin, as his balance of account, the sum of $381.10, and

the same continued so to stand on the books of the bank until

about six weeks before the trial, when it was indorsed as of

February 16, 1876, on the note for $1500.

On February- 16, 1876, the day of the maturity of the note

for $1500, the president of the plaintiff' bank and its principal

financial manager, during business hours, told the cashier, if the

$381.10 standing to Benjamin's credit was not drawn out by his

checks before the close of business hours, to apply it on the

$1500 note; and at the close of the bank for that day, it being

found that Benjamin had drawn no checks on said balance, he

again directed the cashier to apply it on the $1500 note.

On Februarv 19, 1876. during business hours, the defendant

brought to the bank a check of Benjamin, made and handed to-

defendant on that dav, and which was as follows :

ontract n a promi ·. ory nnte fo r 500, elated December 29,
1875, ign ecl "Jo . A. Benjamin, Tr as." payabl to the ord r of
the defendant in forty-five day after elate at th e plaintiff bank,
and indor cl by the defer.dant. Trial at Jun e term r 78 of th
uperior court, without a jury, before RoCK\\' ELL, J ., who report cl the ca e for tb e determination of thi court, in ubstance
a follow :
Benjamin kept an ordinary banking account with the plaintiff
bank. ~ t the time of giYin o- th e note in uit, he wa trea ur r
of the town of Egremont, and the bank gave him for thi note
a draft to b u eel for the payment of a tax due from the tow n.
The note and the proceeds of it were not made a part of hi
account with th e bank, an l the bank r ega rded the note as an
official or town matter.
On F bruary l 5, 1876, wh en thi note matured, all thin onece ary to charge the defendant as indor er were clone. O n
that day, and ever ince, the bank held a note, made by Benjamin, which it had di counted igned ''Jos. A. Benjamin,'' dated
November 13, 1875, for ."'1500, payabl e in three month aft r
date at the plaintiff bank to one Callender, and indor eel by Callender. And on said February 15, there stood to th e credit of
B enjamin, a his balance of account, the um of $3 r.10, and
the ame continued o to tand on the book of the bank until
about ix weeks before the trial, " ·hen it wa inclor eel a of
F ebruary 16, 1876. on the note for 1500.
On F ebruary 16, 1876, the day of the maturity of the note
for I 500, the president of the plaintiff bank and its principal
financial mana<Yer, during bu ine hour , told the ca hi er, if the
$3 I.IO tanding to Benjamin' credit was not drawn out by hi
hour , to apply it on the
check before the clo e of bu ine
$1500 note ; and at the clo e of the bank for that day, it being
found that Benjamin had drawn no check on aid 1 alance, he
a<Yain directed the ca hier to apply it on the $1500 note.
On F bruary 19, 1876 during busine " hours, th e defendant
brought to the bank a check of Benjamin, made and handed to
defendant on that da ', and which wa a follm
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"South Egremont, Mass., Feb. 15, 1876. >5.38i. National Mahaiwe

Bank pay to the order of J. A. B., Treas.. note 15th inst., three hundred

and eighty-one dollars. Jos. A. Benjamin."

The defendant at the same time, acting at the request of

Benjamin, tendered to the cashier of the plaintiff bank this

"-outh Egremont. ::\fass., Feb. 1_:;, ll ;:-6. ~3 'r.
'ationa l ::\Iahaiwe
Bank pay tu th1.: order of J .. \ . D., T r a .. note 15th in t., thr e hundred
and eighty-one lullar ::; . J o . A B nj ami n.··

check and $120 in money in payment of the note in suit, and

demanded the note. 'I'he money had been furnished the defend-

ant by Benjamin, Ixit it did not appear that he informed the

cashier of the bank of this fact. The cashier decHned to receive

the check and money, and told the defendant he could nut accept

the check, because he had been directed to apply the balance of

Benjamin's account on another claim held by the bank, meaning

the Si 500 note. After this refusal, the cashier did, at the request

of the defendant, receive the $120 and indorse the same on the

note in suit, it being at the time understood that neither party

intended thereby to waive his rights in reference to the check.

1'he v$i2o have been retained by the bank.

It is not the practice of tlie bank to charge over-due notes

held by it to the account of a depositor until he has sufficient
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credits to pay the note. Benjamin became a bankrupt in the

spring of 1876, and died in July or x'Vugust of that year.

Upon tlie foregoing facts, the defendant contended, as a

matter of law, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover ; and

'the judge so ruled, and found for the defendant. If this ruling

was correct, judgiiient was to be entered for the defendant; but

if the plaintiff was entitled to recover, judgment was to be entered

for him for the sum of $381.10, and interest frum February 16,

1876.

/. Deivey, for the jilaintiff.

M. Wilcox, for the defendant.

Gray, C.J. Money deposited in a bank does not remain the

property of the depositor, upon which the bank has a lien only;

but it becomes the absolute property of the bank, and the bank

is merely a debtor to the depositor in an e(|ual amount. Foley v.

HiU. I I'liillips, 399, and 2 II. L. Cas. 28. Bank of Republic v.

Millard. 10 Wall. 152; Can v. National Security Bank, 107

Mass. 45. So long as the balance of account to the credit of the

depositor exceeds the amount of any debts due and payable by

him to the bank, the bank is bound to honor his checks, and liable

Th d f ndanl at th · am tirn , acting at th ' r qu t of
Denjamin, t n I r 'cl to th ca bier o f the plaintiff 1 ank thi
check an cl 120 in m oney in payrn nt f 1h n t in uit, and
demanded th'- not . Th e m on y ha I be<.'n forni hed the d fendant by Benjamin, bul it did not app ar that h informed th
ca hi r of th 1ank f thi fact. Th ca bier d clin~rl to r c iv
the check and mon y, and told the cl f ndant h c uld not ace pt
th e ch ck, becau
h had been direct cl t apply th balanc uf
Benjamin' ace unl on anotb r claim held by th bank m aning
th e . r 500 note. . A ft r thi refo ~ al, the ca bier did at the r q u t
of th cl f ndant, r
ive the $120 an l in lor
th
am on the
note in uit, it I ing at the time und r too<l that neither party
int ncl e l thereby to waiv hi ri ht in r f r nc to the checl'.
The I-O haY b n retained by the I ank.
It i not th practice of the 1 ank to charge over-due note
h lei by it to th account of a d p itor until h ha sufficient
er dit t pay th note. B njamin 1 cam a bankrupt in the
pring of r 76, and died in July or Auo-u t of that year.
pon the for go ing fact , the d f ndant contended a a
matter of law, that the plaintiff was not ntitled to recover; and
the j u<lo- o rul e l, and found for th defendant. If thi ruling
" ·a c rr 'Ct, j uclgi11 nt wa to b enter d for th d fendant; but
if th ~ plaintiff wa entitl d to r cov r, j uclg m nt wa to b nt red
for him for the um f 3 'r.10, an l inter t fr om F 1 ruary 16,
I 76.

J. iJC'i.L'C)', f r th plaintiff.
JI. I JI ilcox, f r th defendant.
:\I n y I p it cl in a bank d . not r main the
prop rty of th cl po itor, upon whi h th bank ha a li n n1y;
but it be om
th al olut - prop rty f th bank, and th 1 ank
i m rely a cl 1 tor t th 1 po it r in an iual amount. Fole3 v.
Hill, l Phillip , 3 , and 2 II. L. Ja . ~ . Banl~ of R epHblic v.
Jlillnnl. 10 \\'all. 1
Cnn v . •\Tatirmal
cc1trif'y Bani?, ro7
:\Ia . 45.
long a the 1 alanc
f ace unt to th
r dit of the
cl po itor xc I th amount f any d bt du and payable by
him to the 1 ank, th 1 ank i 1 oun l t h n r hi h ck . and liable
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to an action by him if it does not. When he owes to the bank

independent debts, already due and payal^le, the bank has the

right to apply the balance of his general account to the satis-

faction of any such debts of his. But if the bank, instead of so

applying the balance, sees fit to allow him to draw it out, neither

the depositor nor any other person can afterwards insist that it

should have been so applied. The bank, being the absolute owner

of the money deposited, and being a mere debtor to the depositor

for his balance of account, holds no property in which the deposi-

tor has any title or right of which a surety on an independent

debt from him to the bank can avail himself by way of subroga-

tion, as in Baker v. Briggs, 8 Pick. 122, and American Bank v.

Baker, 4 :\Iet. 164, cited for the defendant. The right of the bank

to apply the balance of account to the satisfaction of such a debt

is rather in the nature of a set-off, or of an application of pay-

ments, neither of Avhich. in the absence of express agreement or

appropriation, will be required by the law to be made as to benefit

the surety. Glacier v. Douglass, 32 Conn. 393; Field v. Hol-

land, 6 Cranch, 8, 28; Brewer v. Knapp, i Pick. 332; Uphani v.
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Lefavour, 11 Met. 174; Bank of Bengal v. Radakissen Mitter, 4

Moore P. C. 140, 162.

The general rule accordingly is, that where moneys drawn

out and moneys paid in, or other debts and credits, are entered,

by the consent of both parties, in the general banking account of

a depositor, a balance may be considered as struck at the date

of each payment or entry on either side of the account ; but where

by express agreement, or by a course of dealing, between the

depositor and the banker, a certain note or bond of the depositor

is not included in the general account, any balance due from the

banker to the depositor is not to be applied in satisfaction of that

note or bond, even for the benefit of a surety thereon, except at

the election of the banker. Clayton's case, i Meriv. 572, 610;

Bodenhani v. Purchas, 2 B. & Aid. 39, 45 ; Simpson v. Ingham, 2

B. & C. 65: S. C. 3 D. & R. 249; Pemberton v. Oakes, 4 Russ.

154, 168 ; Pease v. Hirst, 10 B. & C. 122 ; S. C. 5 Man. & Ryl. 88 ;

Henniker v. Wigg, Dav. & Meriv. 160, 171 ; S. C. 4 O. B. 792,

795 : Strong v. Foster, 17 C. B. 201 ; Martin v. Mechanics Bank, 6

Har. & Johns. 235, 244; State Bank v. Armstrong, 4 Dev. 519:

Commercial Bank v. Hughes, 17 Wend. 94; Allen v. Culver, 3

Denio, 284. 191 ; Voss v. German American Bank, 83 111. 599.

In the decision in McDozvell v. Bank of JVilmington & Brandy-

t an a tion by him if it doe not. \\'hen he owe to the bank
ind ep nd ent cl bt , alr acly du e and payable, the bank ha the
rio·ht to apply th balance of his g n ral account to th
ati faction of any such debt of hi . _F ut if the bank, in lead of o
applying the balance, ee fit to allow him to draw it ut. neither
the depo itor nor any· other p r on can aftenYard in i t that it
hould have been o appli d. The bank, being the ab olute owner
of the money depo ited , and b ing a m re debtor to th depositor
for hi balance of account, holds no property in which the depo itor ha any title or right of which a urety on an independent
d bt from him to the bank can avail him elf by way of ubrogation, a in Ba.ker v. Briggs, 8 Pick. 122, and .-:1111erican Banll v.
Baker, .+ ::\Iet. I6--t, cited for the defendant. The rig ht of th e bank
to apply the balance of account to the ati faction of uch a debt
i rather in the nature of a et-off, or of an application of paym nt , neither of which, in th e ab ence of expres agr ement or
appropriation, will be required by the law to be made a to benefit
the surety. Gla:;ier v. D ouglass, 32 onn. 393; Field v. H olla11d, 6 Cran ch, 8, 28; Ere" er v . Knapp , I Pick. 332; Upham v.
Lefavour, II 1\Iet. I7.+; Bank of Ben cral v. Radahssen 11fitter, 4
1' [oore P. C. I40, I62.
The general rule accordingly i , that where money drawn
ut and money paid in , or other debt and credit , are entered,
by the con ent of both partie , in the general banking account of
a. depositor, a balance may be con idered as struck at the date
of each payment or entry on either side of the account; but where
by expre
ao-reement, or by a cour e of dealinO", between the
depo itor and the banker, a certain note or bond of th e depo itor
i not included in the general account, any balance due from the
banker to the depo ito r i not to be applied in sati faction of that
note or bond. even for the benefit of a urety thereon, xcept at
t he election of the banker. Cla'y fon' s case, l 1\Ieriv. 572 , 610:
BodenhaJll . P11rchas, 2 B. & ld. 39, 45; Simpson v. fo g ham , 2
D. & C. 65:
. 3 D. & R. 249; P e111berton v. Oalus, .+ Ru .
I - --t. 168; P ease v. Hirst , IO B. & C. 122;
. C. 5 Man. & Ryl. 88 ;
Henniker v. Wigg, D av. & 1eriv. 160, 171; S. C. .+ Q. B. 792,
79.S: Strong v. Foster, 17 C. B. 201; } !arti11 v. J1 cchanics Bauk, 6
Har. & John . 235, 2-t4; State Bank v. Armstrong . .+ Dev. 519;
Commerc ial Bank v. Hughes, 17 V\ end. 9--t · Allen v. Culver, 3
Denio, 28--t. 191 ; Voss v. German A111erican Bank, 3 Ill. 599.
In the deci ion in ~1cD01 •ell v. Banll of TViln1ingto11 & Bra;tdv-
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unnc, I llarringt. (Dcl.j 369. and in llic dicta in Dazusoii v.

Real Estate Bank, 5 Pike, 283, 298, cited for the defendant, this

distinction was overlooked or disre<^ar(lcd.

Jn many of the cases, indeed, the money appears to have

been deposited after the debt to the bank matured, so that the

case was analogous to the ordinary one of a payment, which,

not being appropriated l)y the debtor, might be appropriated by

the creditor. I'.nt where the balance of account is in favor of the

depositor when his debt to the l)ank becomes payable, it is a case

of mutual debts and credits, which, except in proceedings in bank-

ruptcy or insolvency, neither the depositor nor his surety has the

right to require to be set off against each other. Judge Lowfll,

in allowing money on deposit to the credit of a bankrupt to be set

off in bankruptcy against the aggregate debt due from him to the

bank, said: "This deposit, though it operates as security and as

payment, was not intended for either, but is made so by the bank-

ruptcy of the debtor." /// re North, 2 Lowell, 487. See, also,

Deiiiinoii V. Boylstoii Bank, 5 Cush. 194; Strong v. Foster, ly

C. B. 217.
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In Strong v. Foster, a depositor gave to his bankers a prom-

issory note with a surety, which was not entered in his general

banking account ; and it was held, that the surety, when sued

by the bankers on the note, could not set up, either as payment

or by way of e(|uitable defense, that shortly after the note matured

the balance of account was in favor of the depositor to a greater

amount, and the plaintift"s did not apply that balance in discharge

of the note, or inform the defendant for three years afterwards that

the note remained unpaid. But the reasoning of the court applies

quite as strongly when the balance in favor of the depoistor exists

at the time when his debt becomes payable, as when it is created

by subsequent deposits. Chief Justice Jervis said: "Here the

note was never entered in the account at all : the rule as to adjust-

ing balances therefore does not apply." "It would be essentially

alternig the position of parties, to estaljlish that, because a banker,

wdio holds a note of a third person for a customer, has a lialance

in his hands in the customer's favor at the mattirity of the note,

such third person is thereby discharged, if it turns out that the note

was given by him as surety. There is no aitthority in equity for

any such position, and none certainly in law." 17 C. B. 216. 217.

And -Mr. Justice Willes observed: "As to wdiat was said on the

part of the defendant, that, if a set-off arises between the creditor

llarrino-t. (l el.) 3 s;, an I in th' dicta 111 Dm1./SOll
Heal Estat e Pa11k, 5 Pik » 2 3, -0 , ·it "cl for the <l f ·n la nt thi
distincti on wa - uverlo k' l r <lisre ·anl ·cl.
l n many of the cas , in 1<...:e I, the mon y app ar
have
be ·n cl ~ po sit ~ I after th i 'bt to th I nk matur I, :o that th
ca ·e \\·a analog·o n. to th ordinary on of a paym nt, \\'hich,
n t beinrr appr priat d by the del tor, might 1 e appropriat d by
th e creditor. nut where the iJa lanr ' of account i in fav r f th
clepo itor wh n hi · debt to th bank become payable, it i, a a e
of mutual debt and er dit -, which, ex ·ept in proc cling in I a1wrnptcy or in, olve ncy, n itber the d p itor n r hi urety ha th
right to require to be t off again t 'ah th er. Judge ow 1·LL,
in all ,,·ing money on depo it to the er dit of a bankrupt t b
t
off in bankruptcy a a in t the aggreo-ate cl bt du from him t the
bank, aid: "Thi clep it, though it 01 rate a ecurity and a
payment, was n t intended f r either, but i made so by the bankruptcy of the debtor." fll re . Vorth,
.
2 Lowell, 487.
e al o,.
DCllllllOn v. BO],'lston BQJi/c, 5 Cu h. 194; 'trollg v. Foster, 17
't1. '111c ,

·. D.

1
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In Stro1tR v. Foster, a depo itor gave t hi bank r a promi ory note \\'ith a surety, which was not entered in hi gen ral
bankin rr acco unt ; and it " ·a held, that the urety when ued
by the bank r on the not , co uld not , t up , ither a paym nt
or I y way of eq uitable def ·n e, that h rtly after the note matur d
t he balance f ac ount wa in favor of the depo it r to a o-r ater
amount, and th plaintiff clicl not a1 ply that balance in di char e
of th n te, or inf rm th e defendant f r tbr e yea r afterward that
th note remai ned unpaid. B ut the r ca nin g of the court ap1 li
quite as strongly w h n th balance in fav 1r of th cl p i t r ex i t
at the time when hi debt becomes payal 1 , a when it i c.r ated
by subsequ nt cl po it .
hief Ju tice J rvi
ail: ''H r the
note \\'a nev r ent r cl in th account at all : the rul a t adju ting balance therefore cl e n t apply.'' '' It ,,. ul 1 be e ntially
alterin g th p iti n f partie ·, to e ta l Ii h that, 11 au a bank r ,
who h ld a 11 t
f a third p r on fo r a u tom er, ha a balanc
in hi , hand in th cu tom r 'u fav r at th maturity of th n ite,
uch third per. 11 i lher by li bar cl, if it turn ut that th n te
wa
iv 11 1 y him a ur ty. Th r i n a Ltth rity in quity f r
any uch po iti n, and non certainly in la"··" 17 . B. 21 . 217.
nrl :\Ir. J u ti
\ Viii
b rv d: ''
t what wa aid n th
part f the cl fenclant, thrtt, if a et- ff ari e h tw n the er ditor
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and the principal debtor, the liability on the surety of the note is

extinguished ; that doctrine would lead to singular results. These

securities are often given to increase credits of bankers to their

customers If the liability of the maker were to depend upon the

state of the customer's account at any one moment, he might never

undergo the liability contemplated at all. The security is given

without any reference to the other side of the account. This is

the first time, I believe, that it has ever been suggested, that when

a note given under circumstances like these falls due, and there is

a balance in favor of the customer at the time, that balance must of

necessity be applied to the discharge of the note." ly C. B. 224.

Even the usual inference from the entry of such a note in the

account may be controlled by other circumstances. City Discount

Co. v McLean, L. R. 9 C. P. 602.

In the case at bar, it appears that the consideration received

by Benjamin from the plaintiff bank for the note in suit was to be

used by him in his official capacity as town treasurer, the note was

regarded by the bank as an olihcial or town matter, and neither the

note nor its consideration was ever made part of his general bank-
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ing account ; and that, when the check in favor of the defendant

was drawn by Benjamin and presented at the bank, the bank held

a personal note of Benjamin, overdue and exceeding in amount

the balance of account is in his favor at the time, the president of

the bank had directed the cashier to apply this balance to the latter's

note, and the cashier so informed the defendant when he presented

the check. Under these circumstances, neither Benjamin, the

maker, nor the defendant, the indorser, has the right to insist that

this balance of account should be applied to the satisfaction of the

note in suit, rather than of the other note of Benjamin ; and,

according to the terms of the report, there must be

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Davis et al, Plft's. in Err., vs. Wells, Fargo & Company (1881).

104 U. S. 164; L. Ed'n, Book 26, 686.

In error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah.

Mr. .hnncs M. JJ'oolworlh, for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. Shellabarger & Wilson, for defendants in error.

]Tlr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court:

16

and th l rincipal d ht r th liability n th e ur ty of the note is
extin; ui h d · that d ctrine w ul 1 1 ad to in ·ular r ult . The e
f banker t their
cur1tie are oft n o-iv n to incr a e r ·dit
cu t m r
If th liability of th mak r wer to dep nd upon the
tate of th cu tam er' s account at any ne m om ent, h e mi o-ht n ver
un l r ·o th liability contemplated at all. The security i g iven
without any refer nee to th e other side of the ace unt. T hi i
the fir t tim , I believ , that it ha s ever been ugge ted, that when
a n'Jte g iven under circumstance" lik the e fall due, and ther i
a balance in favor of the customer at th time, that balance mu t of
n ece ity b applied to the discharo-e of th e note." r 7 C. B. 22-1-.
Even th u ual infrrenc from th entry of uch a note in thl:
account may be controlled by other ci rcumstanc es . City Discount
Co. v 11! cLean. L. R. 9 ·. P. 692.
In the case at bar, it appears that the consideration r ceiv d
by Benjamin from the plaintiff bank fo r the note in uit wa to be
us ed by him in hi official capacity a town trea. urer , the note wa
r gar led by th e bank a an official or town matter , and n eit'her the
not nor its consider:ation wa ever made part of hi general banking account; and that, when the check in favor of th defendant
was drawn by Benjamin and presented at the bank, the bank held
a personal note of Benjamin, overdue and exceeding in a.mount
the balance of account is in hi favor at the time, the pres ident of
the bank had directed the cashier to apply this balance to the latter 's
note, and the cashier so informed the defendaI11t when he pre ented
the check.
Under the e circumstance , neither Benjamin, the
maker, nor the d fendant, the indorser, ha the right to insi t that
this balance of account should be appli ed to the ati faction of the
note in suit, rather than of the other note of B enjamin; and ,
according to the terms of the report, there mu t be
Judgment for the plaintiff.

DAVIS

et al., Plffs. in Err. , ·us.
104 U.

WELL S, FARGO
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. 164; L. Ed'n, Book 26, 686.

In error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah.
).fr. ] ames ,U. TVoo l·wort h, for plaintiff in error.
Me sr . Sh ellabarger & TVilson, for defendant in error.
~fr . Ju tice M ATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court:
16
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The action below was broug-ht by Wells, Farg'o & Co., against

the plaintiffs in error, upon a guaranty, in the following words :

the

The action 1Jel<)\\ \\a. brought by \Yell s. Fargo
., again t
in error. upon a o·uaranty, in th e [ ll ow in o- word :

plaintiff~

"For and in consideration of one dollar to us in hand paid by Wells,

Fargo & Co. (the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged), we hereby

guarantee unto them, the said Wells, Fargo & Co., unconditionally at all

times, any indebtedness of Gordon & Co., a firm now doing business at

Salt Lake City, Territory of Utah, to the extent of and not exceeding

the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for any overdrafts now made,

or that may hereafter be made, at the bank of said Wells, Fargo & Co.

1 his guaranty to be an open one, and to continue one at all times

to the amount of ten thousand dollars, until revoked by us in writing.

Dated, Salt Lake City, iilli November, 1874.

In witness whereof we have heretmto set our hands and seals the

day and year above written.

'Erwin Davis. [seal]

J. N. li. Patrick, [seal]

Witness: J. Goiuio.v "

The answer set up, by way of defense, that there was no

notice to the defendants from the plaintiffs of their acceptance

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

of the guaranty, and their intention to act under it ; and no notice,

after the account was closed, of the amount due thereon; and no

··For and in consideration of one dollar to us in hand paiJ by \V II ,
Fargn i.:'· Co. (the receipt of \\ bich is h er by acknowleclg cl), we her by
guarantlT unto them, the said \\.e:ll . Fargo & o .. unconclitionally at a ll
tmH s, any mclebtcdncs of (;orclon · o. , a firm now doing busin · al
al~ Lakl..' City, l'crritory of Ctah. to the 1..'Xl ·nt of an<l not exceedi ng
th e -;um ui t ·n thousand cl<,llar::-. ( ro.ooo) for any ove r<lrafb now m ade,
or that may hc:rl..'aftcr be made, at the bank of said \\' ell., 1'argo & Co.
·1 hi-, guaranty t bl: an upen one, and tc1 continue one at all time
to '.hl amount of ten thousand dollar.·, until re\oked by u · in writing.
D a ted. ~a lt L ake it ', I 1tl1 roye mb er, 187.1.
In witness whe r eof we have h e reunt o ll ou r hand · and ea! th e
clay and year above \Yritten.
·E1nnN DA\' I S.
[ · ea!]
J. 1\. II. P.\TRICK. [ ea!]
\\ itness: J. Go1wo." ··

notice of the demand of payment upon Gordon & Co., arid of their

failure to pay within a reasonable time thereafter.

Ijut there was no allegation that by reason thereof any loss

or damage had accrued to the defendants.

On the trial it was in evidence that this guaranty was exe-

cuted by the defendants l)clow and delivered to Gordon on the day

of its date, for delivery by him to Wells, b^argo & Co., which

took place on the same day ; that Ciordon & Co. were then indebted

to the plaintiffs below for a balance of over $9,000 on their bank

account; that their account continued to be overdrawn. Wells,

Fargo & Co. permitting it on the faith of the guaranty, from that

time till July 31, 1875, when it was closed, with a debit balance

of S6,200 ; that the account was stated and payment demanded

at that time of Gordon & Co., who failed to make payment ; that

a formal notice of the amount due and demand of payment was

made by Wells, Fargo & Co., of the defendants below, on May

26, 1876, the day before the action was brought. There was no

evidence of any other notice having been given in reference to

it ; either that Wells, Fargo & Co. accepted it and intended to

rely upon it, or of the amount of the balance due at or after the

account was closed ; and no evidence was oft'ered of any loss or

Th e ans,,· T et u1 , by way o f def n e, that th re wa no
notice to the defendant · from th e plaintiff of th ir ace ptan
of the o-uaranly, and their int ntion to act urn! r it· and no notic ,
after the acco unt wa cl o d, of th amount due th reon; and no
n ti ce of th clcmancl of paym nt upon Gord on r 'o., a1id of their
failt:re to lay within a rea onable tirn thereafter.
But ther wa no all gat ion that by rea on Lh er of any lo
or damage had accru cl to the clef nclant .
Un th trial it wa in evidence that thi g uaranty wa ex cut d by th defendant. below and cleliv re 1 to Gord n n th clay
fit dat for delivery by him lo \\'ell s, F'argo
-·o., which
t ook place n th ame clay; that Gordon & · . w re then indebted
to the plaintiff b low for a balance f over 9 ooo o n their bank
accuunt: that th eir acco unt continu cl to b ov rclrawn , \\ 11 ,
Faro-o , 'o . p rmittino- it on the faith f th guaranty, from that
Lim e Lill July 31, r875, when it wa 1 eel, with a cl bit balance
of 6,20 ; that the account wa ·tatecl and paym nt d mand d
at that tim
f ;orclon , 'o., who fail cl t make paym nt; that
a fo rmal noti e of the amount du and demand of paym nt wa
made by \\ 'ell , Fargo c'
f th clef ndant I low, on May
_6, ~ 76, th clay I efor the a ti on was br u~- ht. Thcr wa no
'vid nee of any th r n tic havin g b n giv n in r f rence t
it: either that \Yell , Fa ro-o &
. a pt d it and int nd cl to
rely up n it, o r of th amount f the 1 alanc Ju at r aft r the
ac o unt wa ·lo I: an l n evicl nee wa off rel of any lo• or

D. \\'I

VS. WEI. Le:; FARGO

· CO.

227

DAVIS VS. WEI.LS FARGO & CO. 227

damage to the defendants by reason tliereof, or in consequence of

the delay in giving the final notice of Gordon & Co.'s default.

The defendant's counsel requested the court, among others

not necessary to refer to, to give to the jury the following in-

structions, numbered, first, second, third and fifth :

1. If the jury believes from the evidence that the guaranty

damage to the defendant by rea on thereof, or in c:on equ nee of
the delay in giYino· the final notice of Gord on & o.' default.
T he defendant' co un el r que ted th court, among other
not nece ary to r f r to, to give to the jury the fo llowin o- intru ctions, number ed, fir t, econd, third and fifth :

sued upon was delivered by the defendants to Joseph Gordon,

and not to the plaintifl:, but was afterwards delivered to the latter

b}" Joseph Gordon, or b}' Gordon & Co., it became and was the

dut)- of Wells, Fargo & Co. thereupon to notify the defendants

of the acceptance of said guaranty, and their intention to make

advancements on the faith of it, and, if they neglected or failed

so to do, the defendants are not liable on the guaraiiity, and your

verdict must be for the defendants.

2. If Wells, Fargo & Co. made any advancements to Gordon

& Co. on overdrafts on the faith of said guaranty, it became and

was the duty of plaintiff to notify the defendants, within a rea-

sonable time after the last of said advancements, of the amount

advanced under the guarantv, and if the plaintiff failed or neg-

r. If the jury believes from the evidence that the guaranty
ue 1 upon ·wa delivered by the defenda nt to J o eph Gordon,
and not to the plaintiff, but wa afterward delivered to the latter
by J o eph Gordon, or by Go rdon & Co., it became and wa the
duty of \\ ell , Fargo & Co. thereupon to notify the defendant
of the acceptance of aid o-uaranty, and their intention to make
advancement on the faith of it, and, if they neglected or failed
o to do, the defendant are not liable on the guaranty, and your
verdict mu t be fo r the defendants.
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lected so to do, it cannot recover under the guaranty, and your

2.

verdict must be for the defendants.

3. What is a reasonable time in which notice should be given

is a question of law for the court. Whether notice was given is

•one of fact for the jury. The court, therefore, instructs you that

if notice of the advancements made under said guaranty was not

given until after the lapse of twelve months or upward from the

time the last advancement was made to Gordon & Co., this w^as

not, in contemplation of law, a reasonable notice, and your ver-

dict, if vou so find the fact to be, should be for the defendants.

If \ Vell , Far go & Co. made any advancements to Go rd on

& Co. on overdrafts on th e faith of aid g uaranty, it became and
,~·a ,

the duty of plaintiff to notify the defendants, within a reaonable time after the la t of aid advancement , of the amount
ad\ anced under the guaranty, and if the plaintiff failed or neglected so to do. it caru1ot recover und er the guaranty, and your
verdict mu t be for the defendant .

5. Before any right of action accrued in favor of plaintiff

tinder said guaranty, it was incumbent on it to demand payment

of the principal debtor, Gordon & Co., and, on their refusal to

pay, to notify the defendants. If the jury, therefore, find that

no such demand was made, and no notice given to the defend-

ants, the plaintiff" cannot recover upon the guaranty.

The court refused to give each of these instructions, and the

defendants excepted.

The following instructions were given by the court to the

jury, to the giving of each of which the defendants excepted:

3. \iVhat is a rea onable time in which notice hould be g iven
i a q ue tion of law for the court. \ Vhether notice was given i
-o ne of fact for the jury. The court, therefore, in tructs you that
if notice of the advancement made under aid guaranty was not
given until after the lapse of twelve months or upward from the
time the last advancement "as mad e to Gordon & Co., thi wa
n ot , in contemplation of law, a reasonabie notice, and your verdict, if you o find the fact to be, should be for the defendants.

5. Before any right of action accrued in favor of plaintiff
under aid guaranty, it wa incumbent on it to demand payment
of the principal debtor, Gordon & Co ., and, on their refu al to
pa:>·, to notify th e defendant . If the jury, therefore, find that
no uch demand was made, and no notice o-iven to the defend.anL, the plaintiff cannot r ecover upon the guaranty.
The court refu eel to o-ive each of the e in truction , and the
-defendant excepted.
The following in tructions were given by the court to the
j ury, to the gi' ino- of each of which the defendants excepted:

1
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1. You are instructed that the written guaranty offered in

evidence in this case is an unconditional guaranty by defendants,

of any and all overdrafts, not exceeding in amount $10,000, for

which said Gordon & Co. were indebted to the plaintiff at the date

of the commencement of this suit. If the jury believe from the

evidence that said guaranty was by said defendants, or by any

one authorized bv them to deliver the same, actuallv delivered

to plaintiff', and that plaintiff accepted and acted on the same, such

delivery, acceptance and action thereon by plaintiff' bind the de-

fendants, and render the defendants responsible in the action for

all overdrafts upon plaintiff made by Gordon & Co., at the date

of and since the date of said delivery of said guaranty, and which

were unpaid at the date of the commencement of this suit, not ex-

ceeding $10,000.

2. The jury are instructed that the written document under

I. You arc in truct c.l tbat th \\Titten guaranty off r d in
evidenc in thi · ca e i an unconditional rruaranty by defendant ,
of any and all overdraft , not .xceeding in amou nt IO ooo, for
which aid Gordon
'o. w r ind btecl t th plaintiff at the date
of the comm ncement f thi uit. If the jury b liev fr m the
videncc that aid o-uaranty wa by , aid ddendant , r 1 y any
one: authorized by th m to cl liver the ame, actually d livered
to plaintiff, and that plaintiff ace ptecl and acted on the ame, uch
cl livery, ace ptance an 1 action th reon by plaintiff bind th defendant , and render th def ndant r pon -ible in th action f r
at the elate
all overdraft upon plaintiff made by Gordon
of and incc the date of aid delivery of aid guaranty, and which
w re unpaid at the elate of the commcnc ment of thi uit. not e:xceeding $10,000.
T

T

seal, offered in evidence in this case, implies a consideration, and

constitutes an unconditional guaranty of whatever overdraft, if

any, not exceeding $10,000, which the jury may find from the

evidence that Gordon & Co. actually owed the plaintiff at the

.,
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date of the bringing of this suit ; and further, if you believe from

the evidence that an account was stated of such overdraft between

plaintiff and J. Gordon & Co., then the plaintiff' is entitled to inter-

est on the amount found due at such statement, from the date

thereof, at the rate of ten per cent per annum.

■ These exceptions form the basis of the assignment of errors.

The charge of the court first assigned for error, and its re-

fusal to charge upon the point as requested l)y the plaintiff's in

error, raises the question whether the guaranty becomes operative

if the guarantor be not w'ithin a reasonable time informed by the

guarantee of his acceptance of it and intention to act under it.

It is claimed in argument that this has been settled in the

negative by a series of well considered judgments of this court.

It becomes necessary to inquire precisely what has been thus

settled, and what rule of decision is applicable to the facts of the

Th jury are in tructed that the \\Titten document und r
eal, offer d in evidence in thi ca e, implie a con icleration, and
constitute an unconditional guaranty of \Yhatever overdraft, if
any, not exceeding $ro.ooo, which the jury may find from the
evidence that Gordon & ' o. actually owed the plaintiff at the
date of the bringing of thi s uit; and further, if you believe from
the evidence that an account wa tated of uch overdraft between
plaintiff and J. Gordon & Co., then the plaintiff i entitled to intere t on the amount found due at such tatement, from the date
thereof, at the rate of ten p r cent per annum.
2.

present case.

In .[dams v. Jones, 12 Pet. 213, Mr. Justice Story, delivering,

the opinion of the court, said : "And the question which, under

this view, is presented, is w'hether, upon a letter of guaranty,

addressed to a particular person or to persons generally, for

a future credit to be given to the party in whose favor the

Th e ex eption form the ba i f the a ignmcnt of error .
The charge of the c urt fir t a ibn cl for error. and it refu ·al to cha ra upon the point a requ t d by th plaintiff in
error, rai es the que tion whether the o-uaranty becom op rativ
if the guarant r be not within a r a onable time inform cl by the
guarantee of hi ace ptanc of it and intention to act under it.
It i claimed in argum nt that thi has been s ttl d in the
n 'gativ I y a erie of well c nsi lcr cl judoment of thi court.
It b com nece ary to inquir prcci ely what ha been thu
tti d, and what rule of cleci ion i applicabl t th fa t f the
pr . ent ca e.
ln ldams v. Jones) 12 Pet. 213, 1lfr. Jus tice tor':/) delivering
the opinion f th c urt, aid: " ncl the iue tion which, ~md r
thi vi w, i prr ent d, i wh ther, up n a letter of o·uaranty,
aclclre ecl to a particular p r on or to per on
n rally, for
a future er dit to I o-iv n to th party in who
favor th
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antor that the "person giving the credit has accepted or acted upon

the guaranty and given the credit on the faith of it ; we are all of

the opinion that it is necessary and this is not now an open (|ues-

tion in this court, after the decisions which have been made in

Ritsscll v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69 ; Edmonston v. Drake, 5 Pet. 624 ;

JJoHglass V. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 113; Lee v. Dick, 10 Pet. 482; and

again recognized at the present term in the case of Reynolds v.

Douglass, 12 Pet. 497. It is in itself a reasonable rule, enabling

the guarantor to know the nature and extent of his liability, to

exercise due vigilance in guarding himself against losses which

might otherwise be unknown to him, and to avail himself of the

appropriate means in law and equity to compel the other parties

to discharge him from further responsibility. The reason applies

wath still greater force to cases of a general letter of guaranty,

for it might otherwise be impracticable for the guarantor to know

to whom and under what circumstances the guaranty attached,

and to what period it might be protracted. Transactions between

the other parties to a great extent might from time to time exist,
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in which credits might be given and payments might be made,

the existence and due appropriation of w^hich might materially

affect his own rights and security. If, therefore, the questions

were entirely new, we should not be disposed to hold a dift'erent

doctrine ; and we think the English decisions are in entire con-

formity to our own."

In Reynolds v. Douglass, 12 Pet. 504, decided at the same

term and referred to in the foregoing extract, Mr. Justice McLean

stated the rule to be "That, to entitle the plaintiffs to recover on

said letter of credit, they must prove that notice had been given

in a reasonable time after said letter of credit had been accepted

by them, to the defendants, that the same had been accepted" ; and

added, "This notice need not be proved to have been given in

writing or in any particular form, but may be inferred by the jury

from facts and circumstances which shall warrant such inference."

There seems to be some confusion as to the reason and foun-

dation of the rule and, consequently, some uncertainty as to the

circumstanlces in which it is applicable. In some instances it

has been treated as a rule, inhering in the very nature and defini- _

tion of every contract, which requires the assent of a party to

whom a proposal is made to be signified to the party making it,

in order to constitute a binding promise; in others it has been

<Yuaranty , , dra\\·n, n ti cc is n ces, ary t he gi\·cn to th guaranl r that th ·p r on o-iving the credit ha accept cl or acted upon
th 0 uaranty and given the credit on the faith of it; \Y e ar all of
the pini n that it i nece ary and thi . i not now an ope n quc tion in thi co urt, after th e decision which have been made in
Russell \'. Clarll, 7 ranch, 69; Edlllo11slon v . Dralle. S P t. 62-t;
D ou a/ass \'. R ey11 olds, 7 Pet. l 13; Lee v. Dicll, IO Pet. 482; and
a 0 ·ain recognized at the present term in the ca e of Reyuolds v.
Douglass.. 12 P t . .+97· It i in it elf a reasonable rule, enablin oth o·uarantor to know the nature and extent of his liability, to
exerci e due vigilance in guarding himself again t losse which
might otherwise be unknown to him, and to avail himself of the
appropriate mean in law ancl eq11ity to compel the other partie!:>
to discharge him from furth er re pon ibility. The rea on applie
with till g reater force to cases of a general letter of guaranty,
for it might otherwise be impracticable for the guarantor to know
to whom and under ·w hat circumstances the guaranty attached,
and to what period it might be protracted. Transactions between
the other parties to a great extent might from time to time exist,
in which credits might be given and payments might be made,
the exi tence and due appropriation of which mig ht materially
affect hi own rights and security. H , therefore, the questions
\\·ere entirely new, we should not be di posed to hold a different
doctrine; and we think the E ng lish decisions are in entire conformity to our own."
In Re:ynolds v. Douglass_. 12 Pet. 50.+, decided at the ame
t erm and referred to in the foregoing extract, J1r. Justice McLean
tated the rule to be " That, to entitle the plaintiffs to recover on
aid letter of credit, they mu t prove that ~1otice had been given
in a reasonable time after said letter of credit had been accepted
by them, to the defendants, that the same had been accepted"; and
added. ''Thi notice need not be proved to have been given in
writing or in any particular form, but may be inferred by the jury
from fact and circumstance which shall warrant such inference. '
There seems to be some confu sion as to the rea on and foundation of the rule and, consequently, some uncertainty a to the
circum tarrce in \Yh ich it i applicable. In ome in tance it
ha been treated a a rule, inhering in the very nature and definition of every contract, which requires the assent of a party to
whom a propo .al is made to be ignified to the party making it,
in order to con titute a binding promi e · in other it ha been
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considered as a rule springing from the peculiar nature of the
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contract of guaranty, which reciuires, after the formation of the

obhgation of the guarantor, and as one of its incidents, that

notice should be given of the intention of the guarantee to act

under it as a condition of the promise of the guarantor.

The former is the sense in which the rule is to be under-

stood as having been applied m the decisions of this court. This

appears very plainly, not only from a particular consideration of

the cases themselves, but was formally declared to be so by Mr.

Justice Nelson, speaking for the court in delivering its opinion in

the case of Manufacturing Co. v. U clcli, lO How. 475, where he

uses this language :

"He (the guarantor) has already had notice of the accept-

ance of the guaranty and of the intention of the party to act under

it. The rule requiring this notice within a reasonable time after

the acceptance is absolute and imperative in this court, according

t(j all the cases ; it is deemed essential to an inception of the con-

tract : he is, therefore, advised of his accruing liabilities upon the

guaranty, and may very well anticipate or be charged with notice
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of an amount of indebtedness to the extent of the credit pledged."

And in lyUds v. Saz'age, i Story, 22, Mr. Justice Story, who

had delivered the opinion in the case of Douglass v. Reynolds, 7

Pet. 113, after stating the rule requiring notice by the gaiarantee

of his acceptance, said : "This doctrine, however, is inapplicable

to the circumstances of the present case ; for the agreement to

accept was contemporaneous with the guaranty, and, indeed, con-

stituted the consideration and basis thereof."

The agreement to accept is a transaction between the guar-

antee and guarantor, and completes that mutual assent necessary

to a valid contract between the parties. It was, in the case cited,

the consideration for the promise of the guarantor. And where-

ever a sufficient consideration of any description passes directly

between them, it operates in the same manner and wnth like effect.

It establishes a privity between them and creates an obligation.

The rule in question proceeds upon the ground that the case in

which it applies is an offer or proposal on the part of the guar-

antor, which does not become effective and binding as an obliga-

, tion until accepted by the party to whom it is made ; that until

then it is inchoate and incomplete and may be withdrawn liy the

proposer. I'requently the only consideration contemplated is, that

the guarantee shall extend the credit and make the advances to the

n ·ide recl a a rul e pr ing ing fro m the pec uli a r natur of th
ontract of g ua ranty, which req uire , a fter the fo~·mation of th e
oblicration of th e g uarantor, a nd a one of it incident
th at
notice ho ulcl be g iven of the intenti on f th ' g uarantee t act
un c! r it a a concl iti n f the promi e f the o-uarantor.
en
in whi ch the rul i to be uncl erT he fo rmer i th
toocl as hav ing been applied in the cl eci i n f thi co urt. 1 his
appea r very pla inly, n t only from a particular con ideration of
the a e them selve , but \Va fo rmally cletlar cl to be so by l\1r.
f 7tstice Telso11, -peak ing fo r t he co nrt in cleliv rin g its pinion in
th e case of Ji an11factu ri11g Co . v . 1l! rich, IO H ow. 475 , w here he
u se thi lan a u age :
" H e ( the g uarantor ) has al ready hacl noti ce of the acceptance of the g uaranty an d of th e intenti n of th e party to act un l r
it. The rule r equirin g thi notice within a r easonable tim e after
th acceptance i absolute and imperative in thi co urt, according
to all the ca e ; it is dcclll ed essell tial to an inception of the contract ; he is, tb er fo re, advised of hi accruin g lia bilitie upon the
g uaranty, and may very well anticipate or be charged with notice
of an am unt of inclebtecln es to the extent of the credit pl dgccl."
nd in TVilds v. Sa·uage, I Story, 2 2 , 11lr. Justice Story, who
had deliver ed th e opinion in the case f D ou ulass v. R e3 1w lds, 7
P et. I 13, af te r stating th e rul e r equiring notice by the g uarantee
of his acceptance, aid : "Thi doctrine, however, is inappli ab le
t th e circumstan ce of the pre ent . case ; fo r the aar m nt to
accept was contemporan eous w ith the g uaranty, and, indeed, contitutecl th e con idera tion and ba i th ereof. "
T he agreem ent to accept i a tran saction between the cruara ntee and g ua ra ntor, and complet es that mutu:il ass nt n
ary
to a valid contract betw een the partie . lt \Ya , in the ca e cit d
the con iclerat ion fo r tht promi e of th a-uarantor. And wh r ever a ufficie nt considerati on of an y cle cription pa e directly
b tween th em , it operate in th e am mann er and with lik ffect.
It e tabli hes a privity between them and creat s an oblio"at i n.
Th rule in qu e tion pr ceed upon the ground that the case in
w hich it appli i a n off er or propo a l on th part of the 2llaran tor, w hich cl
not b come effecti v and bin ling as an obli a. ti n un til ace pt cl b ) · the party to wh om it i made; that until
th n it i inchoat ancl incomplete an l may 1 e withclra1vn by the
propo er . F r equ ntl y the only con icleration c ntempla tecl i , that
t h g uara ntee ha ll extend the credi t a ncl mak th e advance t the
1

7

DAVIS VS. WELLS FARGO & CO. 231

third person, for whose performance of his obHgation on that ac-
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count, the guarantor undertakes. But a guaranty may as well be

for an existing debt, or it may be supported by some consideration

distinct from the advance to the principal debtor, passing directly

from the guarantee to the guarantor. In the case of the guaranty

of an existing debt, such a consideration is necessary to support

the undertaking as a binding obligation. In both these cases, no

notice of assent, other than the performance of the consideration,

IS necessary to perfect the agreement ; for, as Prof. Langdell has

pointed out in his Summary of the Law of Contracts (Langdell

Cas. on Cont., 987), "Though the acceptance of an offer and the

performance of the consideration are different things, and though

the former does not imply the latter, yet the latter does necessarily

imply the former ; and as the want of either is fatal to the promise,

the question whether an offer has been accepted can never, in

strictness, become material in those cases in which a consideration

is necessary ; and for all practical purposes it may be said that the

offer is accepted in such cases by giving or performing the con-

sideration."
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If the guaranty is made at the request of the guarantee, it

then becomes the answer of the guarantor to a proposal made to

him, and its delivery to or for the use of the guarantee completes

the communication between them and constitutes a contract. The

same result follows, as declared in IVilds v. Saz'ogc, supra, where

the agreement to accept is contemporaneous with the guaranty,

and constitutes its consideration and basis. It must be so wherever

there is a valuable consideration, other than the expected advances

to be made to the principal debtor, which passes at the time the

undertaking is given from the guarantee to the guarantor, and

equalh' so where the instrument is in the form of a bilateral con-

tract, in which the guarantee binds himself to make the contem-

plated advances, or which otherwise creates, by its recitals, a privity

between the guarantee and the guarantor. For in each of these

cases, the mutual assent of the parties to the obligation is either

expressed or necessarily implied.

The view we have taken of the rule under consideration, as

requiring notice of acceptance and of the intention to act under

the guaranty, only when the legal effect of the instrument is that

of an offer or proposal, and for the purpose of completing its

obligation as a contract, is the one urged upon us by the learned

counsel for the plaintiff in error, who says, in his printed brief:

third p r on, f r who. e per fo rmanc f his obli cration on that ace unt, the g uarant r uncl rtake . Dut a o-ua ra nty may a well be
fo r an existing debt, or it may be upported by om on icleration
Ji tin t from th advanc to the principal debtor, pa. ing dir tly
fr m the guarantee to the g uarantor. 1n the ca of the guaranty
of an exi ting debt, such a consideration i nece a ry to upport
the und ertakin cr as a binding obligation. In both th e ca es, no
notice of a ent, other than the performance of th con ideration,
1s nece ary to perfect the agreement; for, a Prof. Lang<lell ha
pointed out in hi
ummary of the Law of Contracts ( Langclell
as. on Cont., 987 ), ''Though the acceptance of an offe r and th e
perf rmance of th consideration are d ifferent things, an l though
the fo rm er does not impl y the latter, yet the latter doe nece a rily
imply the fo rmer ; and a th e want of either i fatal to the promise,
the que tion wheth r an offer ha been accepted can neve r , in
trictne , becom e material in tho e case in which a con ideration
i n ce ary; and for all practical purpose it may be aid that the
offer i accepted in such cases by giving or performing the co nsideration."
If the guaranty i mad e at th e request of the g uarantee, it
then become th e an swe r of th g uaran tor to a proposal made to
him , and it delivery to or fo r the use d the g uarantee completes
the communication between th em and constitut a contract. T he
am re ult follow , a declared in TVilds v. Sm.;agc, supra. where
th e agreement to accept i contemporaneou with the guaranty,
and constitutes its consideration and basi . It mu t be so wherever
th ere i a valuable con _i l rati on, oth er than th e expected aclvan:c s
to be made to th e principal debtor , which pa e at th e time th e
und ertaki ng i g iven from the guarantee to the cruarantor, and
equally o \\·here the instrument is in the form of a bilateral contract, in which the guarantee binds himself to make the contemplated advance , or w hich othern·i se er ate . by its recital , a privity
between the g uarante an6 the guarantor. For in each of the e
ca e , the mutual assent of tb e parties to the obli a-at ion i either
expre ed or necessarily implied.
The view we have taken of th e rul e und er con ideration, a
requmng notic of acceptance: and of the int ntion to act under
the g uaranty, only when th e legal effect of the in trurnent i that
of an offer or propo al, and for the purpose of completing its
obligation a a contract, i th e one urged upon u by the learn ed
coun el fo r the plaintiff in er ro r, v;ho ay , in hi I rint cl brief:
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"For the ground of the doctrine is not that the operation of the
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writing is concHtional upon notice, l)Ut it is, that until it is accepted

and notice of its acceptance given to ll.c guarantor, there is no

contract lietvveen the guarantor and tlie guarantee ; the reason

being that the writing is merely an .)fl'er to guaranty the debt of

another, and it must be accepted and notice thereof given to the

party offering himself as security before the minds meet and he

becomes bound. L'ntil the notice is given, there is a want of mu-

tuality ; the case is not that of an obligation on condition, but of

an offer to become bound not accepted; that is, there is not a con-

ditional contract, but no contract whatever."

It is thence argued that the words in the instrnnient which is

the foundation of the present action — "we hereby guarantee unto

them, the said Wells, Fargo & Co., unconditionally, at all times,

etc." — cannot have the effect of waiving the notice of acceptance,

because they can have no effect at all except as the words of a

contract, and there can l)e no contract without notice of acceptance.

And on the supposition that the terms of the instrument constitute

a mere offer to guaranty the debts of (lordon & Co., we accept the
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conclusion as entirely just.

But we are unable to agree to that supposition. We think

that the instrument sued on is not a mere unaccepted proposal. It

carries on its face conclusive evidence that it has been accepted by

Wells, Fargo & Co., and that it was understood and intended to

be, on delivery to them, as it took place, a complete and perfect

obligation of guaranty. That evidence we find in the words — "for

and in consideration of one dollar, to us paid by Wells, Fargo &

Co., the receipt of which is hereby ackii'.jwledged, we hereby guar-

antee," etc. How can that recital be true, unless the covenant of

gtiaranty had been made w ith the assent of Wells, Fargo & Co.,

communicated to the guarantors? Wells, Fargo & Co. had not

only assented to it, but had paid value for it, and that into the very

hands of the guarantors, as they by the instrument itself acknowl-

edge.

It is not material that the expressed consideration is nominal.

That point was made, as to a guarantee, substantially the same as

this, in the case of Lawrence v. McAluiont. 2 Flow. 452, and was

overruled. Air. Justice Story said:

"The guarantor acknowledged the receipt of the one dollar

and is now estopped to deny it. If she has not received it, she

would now be entitled to recover it. .V valuable consideration,

.. For the ground of the cl ctrine i. 11<)t that th op ration f the
\\Titing i conclit i nal up n noti e, hut it i that until it i accepted
and notic ' of its a cc ptance giYen to tl~ g uarant r, ther i n
ontract between th rrua rantor and the o-uarantee; the rea OH
being that the \\Titing is n1er iy an ,1ffcr to guara nty the clel t of
another, and it mu ·t be accepted ancl 11otice th re f o-iyen t th
party offering b im. elf a .
curity before the mind . me t and h
bccom . bound. L' ntil the notice is gi\'e n, there i a want of mu tuality: the asc i nol that of an o bli g:it io n n con liti on, but of
an offer to becom' bound not accepted ; : hat is, th r i n t a conditional contract. hut no cont ract \\·hat ' \'er."
It i then ·c a rg ued that the words in the in trument \\·hich i
the fo undati on of the pre. nt action-··,, c hereby rr uarantee unto
them. the said \\' ell , Far ;::;o & o .. 7t llco11dit ion ally, at all ti Jiles,
etc."-cannot ha\' ' the cff ct of \\·aiYin,r the notic of acccptan e,
b cau e th y can haYe no effect at all except a the \\·ord of a
contract, ancl there ca n be no contract witho ut notice f acceptance.
, \ncl on the uppo. ition that the terms of the in trmnent con litute
a mere offer lo g ua ranty th debts of ( ;orclon & 'o. , we accept th
concl u i 11 as en ti rely ju t.
Dut we arc un able to agree t that uppo ition. \Ve think
that the instrument u cl on i not a mere unaccepted propo al. It
carrie on it face co n lu ive evidence that it ha been accepted by
\\' elL, J<argo & 'o ., and that it wa un l r lood and intended to
be, on <l livery to th m, a it took pla c, a comp! t an 1 perfect
obligation £ g uaranty. That ev idenc ''" , find in th word - ' for
ancl in con icleration of o ne dollar, to u paid by \\'ell -, Fargo &
o ., the receipt of \\·hich i ~ hereby a knuwlcdo- d, " . hereby guarantee," etc. l [ w can that recital b ' true, unl
the co\'enant of
gnaranty hacl h en mac! \\·ith the as ent of \Y elL, Farg ,y o.,
·ommunicat cl to the guarantor ? \\'ell , Fargo c· Co. had not
only a ented to it, but had paid Yalu fo r it, and that int the very
hand of the guara ntor ·, a they by th ' instrument it elf acknowleclo-e.
It i not mat ' rial that th exp r s --cl on i<lerati n i nominal.
That p int was maclc, a. to a g uaranl' '. . uhslantially th e ame a ·
this, in th ca
£ Lm_,•rcncc \'. JJ c.l/1w.J//t, _II "" -1-5-, and wa
ov ' rrulecl. ~l r. Ju ·ti cc ~~TO RY aicl:
''The o-uarant r acknowledged th e r c ipt of th one lollar
and i no\\· e topp cl t cl ny it. l£ :he ha n t rec iYecl it, he
wonl l now be nlill cl to r ecov r it. _\ valuabl
o n iclerati on,
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however small or nominal, if given or stipulated for in good faith,
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is, in the absence of fraud, sufficient to support an action on any

■parol contract ; and this is equally true as to contracts of guarantee

.as to other contracts. A stipulation in consideration of one dollar

is just as effectual and valuable a consideration as a larger sum

stipulated for or paid. The very pouit arose in Diitchinaii v.

Touth, 5 Bing. ( N. C), 577, where the guarantor gave a guaranty

for the payment of the proceeds of the goods the guarantee had

consigned to his brother, and also all future shipments the guar-

antee might make in consideration of twO' shillings and sixpence,

paid him, the guarantor. And the court held the guaranty good,

and the consideration sufficient."

It is wortliy of note that in the case from which this extract

is taken the guarantv was substantial! v the same as that in the

present case, and that no question was made as to a notice of

acceptance. It seems to have been treated as a complete contract

by force of its temis.

It does not aft'ect the conclusion, based on these views, that

•the present guaranty was for future advances as well as an existing
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debt. It cannot, therefore, be treated as if it were an engagement,

in which the only consideration was the future credit solicited and

expected. The recital of the consideration paid by the guarantee

to the guarantor shows a completed contract, based upon a mutual

assent of the parties ; and if it is a contract at all, it is one for all

the purposes expressed in it. It is an entirety and cannot be sep-

arated into distinct parts. The covenant is single and cannot be

subjected in its interpretation to the operation of two diverse rules.

Of course the instrument takes effect only upon delivery. But

in this case no question was or could be made upon that. It was

admitted that it was delivered to Gordon for delivery to the plain-

tiffs below, and that Gordon delivered it to them.

But if we should consider that, notwdthstanding the com-

pleteness of the contract as such, the guaranty of future advances

was subject to a condition implied by law that notice should be

given to the guarantor that the guarantee either would or had

acted upon the faith of it, we are led to inquire, what effect is to

be given to the use of the words which declare that the guarantors

thereby "Guarantee unto them, the said Wells, Fargo & Co.,

unconditionally, at all times, any indebtedness of Gordon & Co.,

^etc, to the extent and not exceeding the sum of $10,000, for any

however mall or nominal, if ai,· n or t:pulated for in good faith,
i . in the ab ence of fraud, ufficient to upport an action on any
·parol contract: ancl this is equally trne a lo contract of guarantee
.a to other contract . .\ tipulation in consideration of one dollar
i ju t a eff ctual an cl \'aluable a con ~ ideration a a larger urn
tipulated for or paid. The very pomt aro e in Dutclzlllall v.
Tooth, S Ding. ( -:\. C.), -77, where the guarantor gave a guaranty
for the payment of the pro eecl of the good the guarantee had
con igned to hi brother, and al o all future hipments the guarantee might make in consideration of two hillings and sixpence.
paid him, the auarantor. A.nd the court held the guaranty good,
and the con ideration ufficient."
It is worthy of note that in the ca e from which this extract
i taken the o-uaranty wa
ub tantially the ame a that in the
pre ent ca e, and that no question was made as to a notice of
acceptance. It er-~ms to ha\'e been treated as a complete contract
by force of it tem1 .
It doe not affect the conclusion, ba eel on these view , that
the pre. ent guaranty " ·a for future ad,·ance a well a an exi ting
debt. It cannot. therefor , be treated as if it were an engagement,
in which the only con ideration \\"a the future credit olicited and
expected. The recital of the consideration paid by the guarantee
to the guarantor how a completed contract, ba eel upon a mutual
assent of the partie ; and if it i. a contract at all, it is one for all
the purposes expre sed in it. It i an entirety and cannot be separated into distinct part . The covenant is single and cannot be
subjected in its interpretation to the operation of two diverse rules.
Of cour e the in trument takes eff~ . . t only upon delivery. But
in thi ca e no que tion \\"a or could be made upon that. It wa
admitted that it wa delivered to Gordm1 for delivery to the plaintiffs below, and that Gordon delivered it to them.
But if we hould con ider that, r.otwith tanding the completene of the contract as such, the guaranty of future advances
vva ubject to a condition implied by law that notice hould be
. aiven to the guarantor that the o·uarantee either would or ha l
acted upon the faith of it, we are led to inquire, what effect i to
be given to the u e of the word which declare that the guarantor
thereby "Guarantee unto them, the aid \\Tell , Fargo & Lo.,
unconditio11all}', at a!! ti111cs, any indebtedne of Gordon & Co.,
,de., to the extent and not exceeding the um of $ro,ooo, for any
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of said Wells, Fargo & Co."

Upon the supposition now made, the notice alleged to be

necessary arises from the nature of such a guaranty. It is not,

and cannot be, claimed that such a condition is so essential to the

obligation that it cannot be waived. We do not see, therefore,

what less effect can be ascribed to the words quoted than that all

conditions that otherwise would qualify the obligation are by

agreement expunged from it and made void. The obligation l:»e-

comes thereby absolute and unqualified ; free from all coi^ditions

whatever. This is the natural, obvious and ordinary meaning of

the terms employed, and we cannot doubt that they express the

real meaning of the parties. It was their manifest intention to

make it unambiguous that Wells, Fargo & Co.. for any indebted-

ness that might arise to them in consequence of overdrafts by Gor-

don & Co., might securely look to the guarantors without the per-

formance on their part of any conditions precedent thereto what-

ever.

It has always been held in this court that, notwithstanding
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the contract of guaranty is the obligation of a surety, it is to be

construed as a mercantile instrument in furtherance of its spirit

and liberally to promote the use and convenience of commercial

intercourse.

This view applies with equal force to the exceptions to the

other charges and refusals to charge of the court below. These

exceptions are based on the propositions :

1. That if W'ells, Fargo & Co. neglected to notify the defend-

ants below of the amount of the overdraft within a reasonable-

time after closing the account of (Gordon 8z Co. ; and

2. That if they failed within a reasonable time after demand

of payment made upon Gordon & Co., to notify the defendants of

the default, the plaintiffs could not recover upon the guaranty.

For, if the necessity in either or l)oth of these contingencies

existed, to give the notice specified, it was because the duty to do

so was, by construction of law, made conditions of the contract.

But by its terms, as we have shown^ the contract was made

absolute, and all conditions waived.

It is undoubtedlv true, that if the guarantee fails to give rea-

ov rdraft now mad', or that h reafl r may 1J mad at the 1 ank
of aid \\ ' 11 , Fargo
Co. ''
C pon the upp 1 ition now mad the notice allerred t be
n~ce ary ari e · from the naturt of uch a guaranty.
It i not,
and cannot be. claimed that uch a condition i o e ential t the
ohliaation that it cannot b waived. \Ye Jo not ee, therefore,
what le effect can be a cribed to the word 1uoted than that all
condition that otherwi e would qualify th obligation are by
a~ Teement expunged from it and made void . The obligation b come thereby ab olute and un lualifierl; free from all cor\ditions
whatever. Tbi i the natura.1, obvio u and or linary meaning of
the term employ cl, and we cannot doubt that they exp re the
real m .aning of the partie . It wa their manife t intention to
make it unambicruous that \\'ell , Fargo & ·o .. fo r any indebtedne that might arise to them in con equ nee of verdraft by orcion & o .. might ~ ecu r ly look to the g uarantor without the performance on their part of any conditi ons preced nt thereto ' hatever.
It ha, alwav - b en held in thi court that, notw ith tanding
the contract of guaranty i the ohligab •n of a surety, it i to be
con tru cl a a mercantile in trument in furtherance of it
pirit
ancl liberally to promote the u e and convenience of commercial
interconr e.
'Thi vi " . appli t with equa l force to the exception to the
other charo-es ancl refusal to charge of the court below. Th e
exceptions are ba eel on the propo ition. :
T

sonable notice to the guarantor of the default of the principal

debtor, and loss or damage thereby ensues to the guarantor, to-

That if \Yell., Fargo & o. neglected to notify the defendan1 below of the amount of the overdraft within a rea on:ible
time after clo ing the acco unt of Cordon & o.; an 1
I.

2. That if thev failed withir1 a r a onal le time after d mand
of payment made t;pc n orclon & Co., to notify the defendant of
the default, th e plaintiff could n t re O\·er upon th guaranty.

For, if th e neces, ity in either or both of the contina ncies
e:.zist -d, to give the notice pecifi cl, it wa becau th duty t do
o wa , by n truction of law, made condition of th contract.
But by it term , a we hav
h \\·n, th contract " ·a made
ab olute, ancl all condition waived.
It i uncloubtedly true, that if th g uarantee fail to giv r aonable notice to the guarantor of the default of the principal
debtor, ancl lo or damage thereby en u
to the o-uarantor, to
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that extent the latter is discharged ; but l)f)th the laches of the

plaintitT and the loss of the defendant must concur to constitute a

defense.

If any intermediate notice, at the expiration of the credit, of

the extent of the liability incurred is requisite, the same rule

applies. Such was the expressed decision of this court in the case

of Manufacturing Co. v. Welch ( supra). An unreasonable delay

in giving notice, or a failure to give it altogether, is not a bar, of

itsell.

There was a question made at the trial, as to the meaning of

the word "overdrafts." as used in the guaranty; and it was con-

tended that it would not include the debit balance of accounts

charged to Gordon & Murrav. and assumed bv Gordon & Co., as

their successors, before the guaranty was made, nor charges of

interest accrued upon the balances of Gordon & Co.'s account,

which were entered to the debit of the account. The reason alleged

was, that no form?! checks were given for these amounts. The

point was not urged in argument at the bar, and was very prop-

erly abandoned. The charges were legitimate and correct, and
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the balance of the account to the debit of Gordon & Co. was the

overdraft for which they were liable. There could be no doubt

that it was embraced in the guaranty.

We find no error in the record, and the judgment is afhrnied.

HuNGERFORD VS. O'Brien, impleaded, etc., (1887).

37 Minn. 306; 34 N. W. 161.

The plaintifif brought this action in the district court for Otter

Tail county upon a promissory note made by the defendant

Charles J. Saw^bridge, the payment of which was guarantied by

the defendant O'Brien. Tb.e action was tried before Baxter, J.,

and a jury, and a verdict directed for plaintiff. Defendant O'Brien

appeals from an order refusing a new trial.

Razi'son & Houpt, for appellant.

that extent the latter i cli char rre l ; but 1 oth the !ache of the
plaintiff an l th l o ~ of th clef n<lant mu t concur t con titute a
defen e.
lf any int rm e lia te n tice, at the ?xp iration of th er <lit, f
the extent of th e liability in curred i r equi ite, th
am rule
ri.pplie .
uch \Ya s th expre eel cleci ion of thi court in the ca e
of ~1anufact11ri1ia Co. v. TV el ch (supra). An unrea onable delay
~r. giving notice, or a failure to give it altogether, is not a bar, of
it elL
There wa a que tion made at the trial, as to the meaning of
the word "overdraft ,'' a u eel in the guaranty· and it wa contend cl that it would not include the debit balance of accounts
charged to Gordon & Murra~· . and assumed by Gordon & o., as
their ucce sor , before the cruaranty was made, nor charge of
intere t accrued upon the balances of Gordon & Co .'s account,
which were enter ed to the debit of the account. The r eason alleged
wa , that no formci 1 checks wer given fo r these amount . The
point wa not urged in argument at th e bar, and wa very properly abandoned. The charge were legitimate and correct, and
the balance of the account to the debit of Gordon & Co . was the
over draft for which th ey \Yere liable. T here could be no doubt
that it was emb raced in the g uaranty.

E. E. Corliss, for respondent.

Dickinson, J. The defendant Sawbridge made his negotiable

We find no rror in the record, and the judgment is af/i,nned.

promissory note, which was indorsed to one Gage, who indorsed it

H u~GERFORD

37

·vs. O'BRIEN, impl eaded, etc. , ( 1887).
Iinn. 306 · 34 N. \V. r6r.

The plaintiff brought thi action in the district co urt for Otter
Tail county upon a p romis ory note mad e by the defendant
Charle J. awbridge, the payment of which wa. cruarantied by
the defendant 'Bri en. The action wa trieJ before BAXTER J.,
and a jury, and a verdict directed fo r plaintiff. Defendant O'B rien
appeals from an order rE-fu sing a new trial.
Ra'tc'SO!l

E. E.

& H oupt for appellant.
orliss, fo r r e ponct nt.
1

0

DrcKrx ·o~, J. The defendant Sawbridge made hi negotiable
promi ory note . ''"hich was indor eel to ne Gage, who indor e<l it

.236 GUARANTY" AXD SURETYSHIP-

in blank to the defendant O'Brien, and he, before maturity, trans-

236

ferred it for vahie to the ])laintit¥. indorsing upon the note and

signing this guaranty: "l-'or vakie, I hereby guaranty the payment

of the within note to Cassie Hungerford or l)earer." The note

was not paid. Nothing was done by the plaintiff at the maturity

of the note to fix the liability of the indorser Gage. The defendant

O'Brien had no notice of the non-payment of the note until more

than a year after its maturity. Upon the trial of the issue raised

by the answer of the defendant O'brien, evidence was presented

tending to show that the maker of the note w'as solvent at the time

of its maturity, l)ut has since become insolvent ; and that the in-

dorser, (jacfe, w-as also solvent. The court directed a verdict for

the plaintiff.

The nature of the obligation of the guarantt)r is affected by

the character of the principal contract to which the guaranty re-

lates. The note expressed the absolute obligation of the maker to

pay the sum named at the specified date of maturity or before. The

guaranty of "the pa}ment of the within note" imported an uncTer-

taking, without condition, that, in the event of the note not being
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paid according to its terms, — that is, at maturity,— 7the guarantor

should be responsible. The non-payment of the note at maturity

made absolute the liability of the guarantor, and an action might

at once have been maintained against him wdthout notice or de-

mand. Such was the effect of the unciualified guaranty of the pay-

ment of an obligation which was in itself absolute and perfect and

certain as respects the sum to be paid, and the time when payment

should be made, — all of which was known to the guarantor, and

appears upon the face of the contract. The liability of the guar-

antor thus becoming absolute by the non-payment of the note, the

neglect of tlie holder to pursue such remedies as he might have

against the maker (the guarantor not having required him to act)

would not discharge the already fixed and absolute obligation of

the guarantor, nor would neglect to notify the guarantor of the

non-payment have such effect. Broiv'n v. Curtiss, 2 N. Y. 225 ;

Allen V. Rightmere, 20 John. 365, (11 Am. Dec. 288); New-

comb V. Hale, 90 N. Y. 326; Read v. Cults, 7 Greenl. 186, (22

Am. Dec. 184) ; Breed v. HUlhoiise, y Conn. 523 ; Campbell v.

Baker, 46 I'a. St. 243 ; Roberts v. Riddle, 79 Pa. St. 468 ; Bank v.

Sinclair, 60 N. H. too; Heaton v. Hnlbert, 3 Scam. 489; Dicker-

son V. Derrickson, 39 HI. 574; Penny v. Crane Mfg. Co., 80 111.

;244; Clay v. Edgertun, 19 Ohio St. 549; Wright v. Dyer, 48 Mo.

in blank lo the defendant O 'Brien, and h , before maturity, tran ferred it f r valu"' to the plaintiff, ind or ing upon the note and
signing this guaranty: .. For value, I h-.: r by guaranty the payment
of the \\·ithin note to a -ie llung r fo rd or bear r. " The note
wa not pai I. l thing wa done by the plaintiff at th e maturity
of the not' to fix the liability of the inclorser age. The def ndant
O'Brien had no notice of the non-payment of the note until more
than a year after it maturity. U1 on the trial of the is ue rai d
by the an.sw r of the defendant O' JJri en, evidence was pre ented
tending to how that the maker of th e note was s !vent at the time
of its maturity, but ha ince become in olvent; and that the inclorser, c;age, wa al o !vent. The co nrt directed a verdict fo r
the plaintiff.
The nature of the obligation of th g uarant r i affected by
the ' haracter of the principal contrac~ to which the guaranty r late . The note expre eel the absolute obligation of the maker to
pay the um named at the pecifir:d dat'2 of matu rity or before. The
guaranty of "the payment of the within note" impo rted an miaertaking, \Yithout condition, that, in th e event of the note not being
paid according to its terms,-that i , 2.t maturity,-. the guarantor
hould be responsible. The non -payment of the n te at maturity
made ab olute the liability of the guarantor, and an action might
at once have been maintained again t him without notice or demand.
uch was the effect of the unc1ualified guaranty of the payment of an obligation which was in itself absolute and perfect and
certain as respects the um to be paid, and the time when paym nt
should be made,-all of which was known to the o-uarantor , and
appears upon the face of the contract. The liability of th guarantor thus becoming ab ~ o lute by the non-paym ent of the note, the
neglect of the holder to pursue such remedies as he mi o-ht have
against the maker ( the g uarautor not having requir d him to act)
vvould not discharge the already fix d and absolut obligation of
the guarantor, nor would neglect to notify the guarantor of the
non-payment have such effect. Br01..un v . Curtiss) 2 l J . Y. 225;
£:1.llell v. Right111ere, 20 J ohn. 365, (II · m. Dec. 288);
ewcomb v. Hale) 90 N. Y. 326; R ead v. Cntts) 7 Grecnl. 186, ( 22
Am. D ec. 184) ; Breed v. Hillhouse) 7 onn. 523; Ca mpbell
Baker, ...i-6 Pa. St. 243; Roberts v. Riddle, 79 Pa. t. 468; Bank v.
Sinclair) 6 ;\. H. roo: H cato11 v. Hulbert 3 cam. 489; D ickerson v. Dcrricksoll, 3 111. 574; Penny v. Crrme Mfg. Co.) 80 Ill.
2 -1-4 ; Clay v. Edgerton) i9 Ohio St. 549; TVright v. Dyer) 48 Mo.

H
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525. See, also, J^iiial v. Richardson, 13 Allen 521. modifying,

former decisions of the same court.

It follows that the fact that the maker had heconie insolvent

since maturit}', or that a mortgage security had become impaired

by depreciation in the value of the property, was no defence ; nor

was it a defence that the guarantor was not notified of the non-pay-

ment of the note. We are aware that the position here taken is

opposed by some decisions. Xo valid agreement was shown be-

tween the maker and the plaintiff extending the time of payment.

From the position above taken, it logically follows that the neglect

of the guarantee to take the steps necessary to fix the liability of

the indorser, Gage, did not discharge the guarantor. The latter,

by his unqualified guaranty of *:he payment of the note, took it

upon himself to see that the note was paid, and was therefore not

entitled to notice of its non-payment. (Authorities above cited.)

For the same reason, the plaintiff did not owe to the guarantor the

duty of taking the steps necessarv^ to fix the contingent liability of

the indorser by demand and notice of dishonor. PhUbrooks v. Mc-

Ezven, 29 Ind. 347; Lang v. Brevard, 3 Strob. Eq. (So. Car.) 59;
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Pickens v. Finney, 12 Smedes & AI. 468; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., notes

to Recs V. Berringfon. No such obligation is involved in this con-

tract of guaranty. Even in the case of an ordinary indorsement,

the holder, at maturity, is under no obligation to his indorser to

give notice of dishonor to prior indorsers or parties. The last in-

dorser becomes liable when he alone is notified, and he in turn

may fix the liability of prior parties by giving notice to them.

Order affirmed.

Mitchell. J., (dissenting). I am unable to concur in the

proposition that the plaintiff' owed no duty to O'Brien to take

steps, at the maturity of the note, to fix the liability of Gage, the

indorser. It does not seem to me that the fact that O'Brien's

guaranty of payment was unconditional and absolute is at all deci-

sive of the question. As between the parties to this action. O'Brien

occupied the position of surety, who, in case he had to pay the

note, would have recourse against Gage, the indorser, provided

steps were taken to fix the liability of the latter. The question,,

therefore, is to be determined by the equitable principles which

govern the relative rights and duties of creditor and surety.

It is a well-settled rule of equity that any laches by the creditor

in the care or management of collateral remedies or securities, if

loss ensues, will discharge the surety pro fanto. Nelson v. Munch,.

525.
ee, al o, T7 i!laf v. Richardso11, J Allen 52 r, mod ifying
former deci ion of the ame co urt.
It follow that th e fact that th maker had h c m in olvent
ince maturity, or that a mortgage ec urity had b come impai red
by depreciation in the value f the property, wa no defence; nor
wa it a defence that. the g uarantor " ·as not notified f the non-payment of the note. \Ye a re aware that th · position here taken i
oppo eel by ome deci · ion . ~ o valid agreement was hown bet\ een the maker :i.nd th e plaintiff extending the time of payment.
From the po ~ iti o n above taken, it logically fo llow that th e neglect
of the guarantee to take the steps necessa ry to fix the li ab ility of
the indor er, Gage, did not di charge th e guarantor. The latter,
by his unqualified guaranty d ~he payment of the note, took it
upon him lf to see that th e note was paid, and was therefore not
en ti tled to notice of it non-payment. (Authorities above cited.)
For the ame rea on, the plaintiff did not owe to the guarantor the
dt~ty of takinrr the steps nece ary to fix the contingent liability of
the i!1dorse r by demand and nc·tice of di honor. Philbro ohs v. 1llcEi en, 29 Ind. 347; Lang v. Brei•ard, 3 Strob. Eq. ( So. Ca r.) 59;
Pickens v. Fi1ute3 12 Smedes & 1\1. 468; 2 L ead. Cas. Eq., note ·
to R ecs v . B erring/on. No such obligation is involved in this contract of g uaranty. Even in the case of a n ordinary indorsement,
the holder, a~ maturity, is under no obligation to his indor er to
give notice of di honor to prior indor ers or parties. T he la t indorser becomes liable \Yh en he alone i notified, and he in turn
may fix the liability of prior partie by g iving notice to them.
Order affirmed.
l\I rTCHELL . ].. ( dissen tiJ1 g) . I am unable to concur in the
proposition that the plaintiff owed no duty to O'Bri en to take
tep , at the maturity of the note, to tix th e liability of Gage, the
indor er. It doe not seem to me that the fact that O 'B rien'
guaranty of payment was nnconditional and absolute i at all deciive of the que ti on. As behYeen the partie to this action. O'B rien
occupied the po ition of surety, who, in ca e he had to pay the
note, would have recou rse against Gage. the indor r, proi•ided
teps \Y ere taken to fix the liability of the latter. Th que tion,
therefo re, is to be determined by the eq uitable principles which
govern the relative right and duti s of er ditor and urety.
It is a well- ettled rul e of equity that any !aches by the creditor
in tbe care or management of collateral remedies or securitie , if
lo s ensues, will di. charge the surety pro tanto. Nelson v. l'v1 unch,.
1,
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28 Minn. 314. 322 (9 X. W. Rep. 863). As a surety, on payment

of the debt, is entitled to all the securities of the creditor, if,

throug-h the negligence of the creditor who has them in his posses-

sion and under his control, a security, to the benefit of which the

surety is entitled, is lost or not properly perfected, the surety, to

the extent of such security, will be discharged. IVuiff v. Jay, L. R.

7 Q- ^'- 75^- -^^'^'^ ^^'C ean see no difference in this respect whether

the security is chattel or personal. This is not a case of mere pas-

siveness by the creditor in not taking steps to enforce collection

of the (lel)t at maturity, but an omission to take steps to perfect

and fix the liability of the indorser, which amounted to positive

negligence. He had possession and control of the note on the day

of its maturity, and consequently was the only person who could

present it for payment, or who would know whether or not it was

paid, and hence was the only person in position to give notice to

the indorser in case of its non-payment. To require him to ao this,

would. I think, be both good business morals and good law.

Tin-: State, use of Holmes County, ix Swi.xney ct al. (1882).

60 Miss. 39.
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Appeal from the circuit court of Holmes count}-.

Hon. C. H. Campp.et.l, J- On the 13th of March, 1882, an

action was brought in tlie name of the State, suing for the use of

Holmes County, against J. S. Hoskins and his sureties, on his

bond as tax collector of tliat county, for two several sums of

~

::\Iinn . 3q. 3-- (SJ'-:\ .\\' . P ' P· >ri3) . . \ a urety, n paym nt
d ebt, i en ti t i cl t all the -e -nriti '
f th ' c reditor , if,
th ro ug h the n gli o- nee of th er ditor ,,·ho ha th rn in hi po
nt ro l a , urity, t th , be n fit f whi h the
sion a n d nncl r hi_,
. n rcty is C' ntitl cl . i 1 t or not pro perly 1 crkctccl , th ' ur ty to
th e cxtc:n t of nch curity, will he clischargecl . I f' u/(( \'.Jay, L. R .
7 Q. lL 7- ri . . \n I w e -an
n cliff r cnc in thi re pec t wb th r
th l' s curity i hatt 1 or p r nal. Thi i not a ca o f m er e pa nf rce coll ction
si,, ncs by th creditor in not ta king tep t
of th e debt at m aturity, but an omi ion to take tep to p erf ct
a ncl fi x th liability of th e incl r scr , " ·hich am ount cl t po itive
n th day
negli aenc . H e ha l pos e ion ancl ontrol o f th e n t
of it maturity . and co nc:equ ntly wa tb e only pe r n " ·h could
pre ent it fo r payrn nt , or \vh w ould know wheth er or not 1t wa ·
pa id. and h nee wa th onl y person in po ition to g ive n otice to
th e in lor er in ca e of it n n-payment. T o r quire him to ao thi ,
w ould, 1 think, be both good b.n in e m oral - and good law.
f th

money, for the years 1876 and 1877 respectively, which, it was

declared, he had collected and failed to pay over to the treasurer

of the county as the law reciuux'd of him and as he was bound by

the terms of his bond to do.

The third plea set up the defence that, "after the signing of

Tm ~

T. \ TE,

u

E OF

Hou .ms CouwrY,

;: •s ..

\\' I X'\EY

et al. (1882) .

said bond by said defendants, the said plaintitf, without the con-

sent (jf the said defendants, on the twelfth day of January, 1877,

by an act of the Legislature of the State of Mississippi, approved

60 Mis . 39.

on said day and entitled 'An act to provide for the collection of

the outstanding revenue for the fiscal year 1876,' altered, changed,

Appeal fr m the circuit c urt

f H olm

county.

and extended the time for the collection of taxes due the State of

.^Mississippi ,and the county of Holmes, and the time for the pay-

H on. . H. C. \ :-IPI: E LL, J. On th 13th f ::\Iarch, I 2 , an
action " ·a brou g ht in th e nam e of the tate. uin o- for th u
of
H olme
'o unty, again st J. . H oskin and hi s ureties, n his
hond a tax co ll ec tor of that co unty, f< r two
Yeral um of
ni on y , fo r th year 1 76 and r877 r e pectively, which , it wa
d eclared. he had o il ct cl and faikcl to pay ov r t th tr a ur r
of th county a th e law r equired o:f him and as h wa b und by
th e t rm
f hi b nd to cl .
The thir I i Jca
t up th ddcn e that. "after th
ianing f
. ai d honcl by aid cl fcnclant , the -aid i Jaintiff, without th con_en t f th
aid defendant , n th , tw ' lfth lay of January, I 77,
gi latur of the State o f -:\Ii i ip1 i, approved
by a n act of th
on said lay and ntitl rl ·An a t to pr vi I f r th e coll ction of
t h out ta nclin g r venu f r th fi _, -::i.l year le 7 .' alt r l, chan ed,
a n d x tencled th tim fo r th c 11 ti n of tax du th . tate of
} ,[i. i ippi and th c unty o f Ilolm e . an l th time f r th e pay-
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ment thereof l)y the said Hoskins to the State and county treas-

uries ; whcreljv said defendants were released as sureties on said

bond."

The fourth plea contained the same defence as the third, ex-

cept that the act of the legislature relied upon in the latter as

releasing the defendants as sureties on the bond was an act en-

titled : "An act in relation to the public revenue and for other pur-

poses," approved February i, 1877. To the third and fourth pleas

demurrers were filed and they, too, were overruled. The plaintiff

declined to plead over and appealed to this court.

C. V. Gzvin, for the appellant.

H. S. Hooker, for the appellees.

Campbell, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

We decline to follow the courts of Illinois, Tennessee and

ment thereof by the ·aid 11 sk in t the tal e and co unty trca -uri s; whereby sai d def en !ant were re lea cd a ur ' ti
n aid
bon I."
The fo urth plea contained the ame defence a th third, except that th e act of th e legi ·latur rcli cl up n in th latter a
rel a ing th e defendants a suretie on the bo nd wa an act entitl ed : " n act in relation to the public revenu a nd for other purpo e , " a ppr vecl February r, 1877. To the third and fo urth plea
cl murrer were fil ed a nd they, too, were overrul ed. T he plaintiff
declin cl to plead ove r and appeal ed to this co urt.

Missouri, in their views that sureties on the bond of a tax col-

lector are discharged by an act of the legislature passed after the

C. V. G<.vin, for th e appellant.

execution of the bond, without their consent, giving further time

for the collection of taxes and settlement by the officer, and

H. S. Hook er, for the appell ees.

we embrace and declare the more just and politic doctrine of
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the courts of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, and hold

CAMPBELL1 C. ]., delivered the opinion of the court.

that the official bond of the tax collector is given with a full

knowledge of the right of the legislature to alter the dates fixed

by law for the collection of taxes and the setttlement of the col-

lector, and subject to the exercise of that right at the pleasure of

the legislature, without the assent of the sureties. The Coinnwn-

z^'ealth V. Holmes, 25 Graft. 771 ; Smith v. The Commomvealtli,

25 Graft. 780 ; The State v. Carleton, i Gill, 249 ; Prairie v.

Worth, 78 N. C. 169. See also Smith v. Peoria, 59 111. 412;

Bennett v. The Auditor, 2 W. Va. 441 ; Cooley on Tax, 502.

The demurrer to the third and fourth pleas should have been

sustained.

McCONNELL vs. PoOR (I9OI). O

113 Iowa, 133; 84 N. W. 968; 52 L. R. A. 312.

Appeal by plaintiff' from a judgment of tlie district court for

Des Moines County in favor of defendant in an action brought

upon a contractor's bond. Affirmed.

V./ e decline to follow the courts of Illin oi , Tennessee a nd
Missouri, in their view that sureties on th e bond of a tax collector are discharged 1 y an act of the legislature passed after the
execution of the bond, without their consent, giving further time
for the collection of taxes and settlement by the officer, and
we embrace and declare the more just and politic doctrine of
the courts of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, and hold
that the official bond of the tax collector i g iven vvith a foll
knowledge of the right of the legislature to alter th e dates fixed
by law for the collection of taxes and the etttlement of th e collector, and subject to the exercise of that right at th e plea ure of
the legislature, without the as ent of the sureties. The Co m111 0JLwcalth v. Hol1nes, 25 Gratt. 771; Slllith v. The Ca 111monwealth ,
~S Gratt. 780 ; Th e State v. Carleton, l Gili , 249; Prairie v.
~Vorth 1 78
. C. 169. See also S1!lith v. P eoria. 59 Ill. 412 ;
Benn ett v. Th e A uditor, 2 vV. Va. 441 ; Cooley on Tax, 502.
The demurrer to the third and fourth pl eas hould have been
sustained.

McCoN
113 Iowa, 133 ;

E LL

8-~

vs. PooR ( 1901) .

o

N. \"1\1. 968· 52 L. R. A. 312 .

ppeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the cli trict court for
De- l\Ioine County in favor of defendant in an action brought
upon a contractor's bond. A ffirllled.
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Statement by Lado, J. Evans entered into a contract witb

plaintiff, July 14, 1891, to construct a dwelling house for him, and

on the same day executed a bond with defendant as surety con-

ditioned "that, if the said Evan E. Evans shall duly perform said

contract, then this obligation is to be void, but, if otherwise, the

same to be and remain in full force and virtue." The house was

built and in 1892 Evans began an action against the plaintiff for

a balance due. ^NlcConnell filed a cross petition in which he

averred several breaches of the contract and prayed for damages.

The result was a judgment against Evans for $943, to recover

which this action was brought against the defendant as surety on

the bond. By way of defense, he pleaded alterations in the con-

tract in four particulars : ( i ) That the work was done under the

direction of McConnell, instead of Sunderland, the architect, as

agreed: (2) the broken ashlar work was constructed with close

joints, instead of being tuck pointed, as stipulated; (3) the in-

creased cost occasioned by this change was not estimated at the

rate at which the work' was taken, and added to the amount to be

paid as exacted by the terms of the contract; and (4) other
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changes were made without estimating the increased cost, as re-

quired in the agreement. To these defenses the plaintiff pleaded

adjudication in Evans against McConnell as an estoppel. The

defendant also answered that he had advanced, in payment of

labor and material, with McConnell's knowledge and consent, a

large amount of money, and was released from liability on the

bond to that extent. Trial to jury and from judgment on a verdict

against him, the plaintiff appeals.

Ladd, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

A. M. Anlrobiis and Sccrlcy cr Clark with C. L. Poor, in

propria persona for appellee.

Ladd, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

How^ far will a surety on a bond be bound by a judginent

against his. principal alone? There is no little confusion in the

language or the courts on this subject, and entire harmony does

not prevail in the decisions. This has resulted sometimes in treat-

ing such a judgment as res judicata in an action against the

surety, rather than passing on the character of the contract, and

simply holding him to its perfomnance. It is a fundamental prin-

tatem nt by L\DD, J. ~va n
nt r cl int a contract withi
plaintiff, July I...j., I '"Y c, lo c n trn t a d\\' !lin o- h u ·c f r him, and
on th sam ' clay x " ut d a bond with defendant a. surety
ncliti n d "that, 1f th sai l _, van F. Evan hall duly pcrf m1 aid
contra t, then thi
bli~.;ati n i t b v id , but, if th erwi , the
am to be an I remain in full f re and virtu .., Th b u e wa
built and in r 9- Evan bega 1 a n a tion again t th plaintiff for
a balanc du . l\Ic 'o nnell fil cl a er
p tition in which he
averred ev ral br a he f th c ntra t and prayed f r damag .
The re ult wa a ju !gm nt ao·ain t _,van for $ 43 , to r c v r
whi b thi a 'ti n wJ.s br ught again t the d f nclant a ur ty on
the boncl. Dy way of defense, he pl ad d alteration in the contract in fo ur particular : ( r) That th e work wa don und r th
directi n of 1\!Ic · nncll , in tcacl of u11d rland , th archit ct, a
ao-reed: ( 2) th brok n a hlar w ork wa co n tru t d with cl e
joint in stead of being tu ck p intecl, a
tipulat l ; ( 3 ) th increa eel cost occa i 11 cl by thi change wa not
timat d at the
rate at which tb e work wa taken , and adde l to the amount to be
pai l as exact d by th e terms of the contract ; and ( 4) other
changes ' " r made without estimating the increa. eel
t, a r quired in th aoTeement. T o the e cl f n e th plaintiff pl aded
adj uclication in Evan a;a in t McConnell as an
t ppel. Th
def nclant al o an werecl that he ha l advanced, in paym nt of
lal or and material, with Mc onnell's knowledg and c n nt, a
larg amount of money, and was releas d from liability on th
bon 1 to that x t nt. Trial to jury and from juclo-m nt n a v rcli t
again t him , th plaintiff ap1 al..

ciple in jurisprudence that every man shall have his day in court.

LADD,

J.,

delivered the opinion of the

A . ill. A ntrobus and eerley
pro pria per ona for app Ile
L\DD,

J.,

deliver cl th

pini 11

c:r

ourt :

Clar!~

f th

with C. L. Poor, m

c urt.

lI w far ·will a urety n a b nd b b und by a j ud!Tment
ao-ain t hi principal a l ne? Th re i no littl co nfu i n in the
Jan ua e ~ : th co urt
n thi ubj ct, an l ntir harm ny cl s
not pr va il in th cl i i ns. Thi ba r ult 1 m time in tr ating such a judgment as res j udicata in an action agai nst the
ur ty, rath r than I a in · n th chara t r f th e c ntract, and
imply h ]clin g him t it p r forma nc . lt i a fundam ntal princi pl in j uri ·pru 1 nc that very man ball hav hi s day in court,

m'connell vs. poor. 241

__\l

0

~

EL L \ ' . POOR.

2-H

and shall be heard in his own defense, and of this right he may

not, under the constitution and laws of this state, be deprived.

For this reason, judgment against the principal may never fore-

close investigation of the surety's liability, unless by virtue of the

latter's undertaking, he has obligated himself directly or by impli-

cation to be bound thercb>-. \\diere, by the terms of the tond,

the surety is to be bound by the litigation to which he is not

a party, the courts decide, not that the judgment is an adjudica-

tion, because of the connection, but that he must perform the con-

and hall b h ·1rd in hi O\\'n def n -, and of thi ri o-ht he may
tate, be deprived .
n . t, un 1 r th e con tituti n and law of thi
F r thi rea on. judgm nt again t th e I rin cipal may n ver fo rcclo e inve tio-ation of th urety' liability, unle by virtue of the
latter's unrlertaking, he has obligated himself directly or by impli cation to be 1 ound th ereby. \\Th ere, by the term
f th e bond ,

tract as it is written. Shenandoah Nat. Bank v. Reed, 86 la. 136, 53 N.

W. 96. The only ground on which sureties on official bonds gen-

erally may be regarded as bound by the j udgments against their prin-

cipals is that the sureties by the terms of the bond agree, expressly

or impliedly, to abide the result of litigation against their prin-

cipals. This principle is well stated in Stephens v. Shafcr, 48

Wis. 54, 33 Am. Rep. 796, 3 N. W. 835. "The nature of the

contract in official bonds is that of a bond of indenniity to those

who may suffer damages by reason of the neglect, fraud, or mis-

conduct of the officer." The bond is made with the full knowledge

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

and understanding that, in many cases, such damages must be

ascertained and liquidated by an action against the officer for

whose acts the sureties make themselves liable, and the fair con-

struction of the contract of the sureties is that they will pay all

damages so ascertained and liquidated in an action against their

principal. See also Masscr v. Strickland, 17 Serg. & R. 354, 17

Am. Dec. 668. This court held in Charles v. Hoskins, 14 la. 471,

83 Am. Dec. 378, that judgment against a sheriff might be re-

ceived in evidence as fixing, prima facie, the liability of the surety.

True, other reasons for so holding than here suggested were as-

signed. But the doctrine of stare decisis has no application to the

reasons given for reaching the conclusion ; it is limited to the

very point decided. The fallacy in the reasoning of that case,

as well as Lowell v. Parker, 10 -Met. 309, 43 Am. Dec. 436, on

which it was based, lies in supposing that, because the surety may

claim, the benefit of a judgment in favor of his principal, it fol-

lows that he is concluded by one against him. But the surety is

discharged by a finding for his principal, not owing to the creditor

being estopped, but for that it establishes the absence of liability

of the principal ; and, if he is not liable, the surety cannot be, as

his obligation is merely incidental to that of the principal. Besides^

17

the urety i to be boun l by th e litigation to which he i not
a party, the court d cid , not that the judgment i an adjudication, becau e f the connection, but that h must per fo rm th e contract as it is written. Slu nanrioa/1 Nat. Bank v. Reed, 86 Ia. 13 6, 5 3
W. 96. Th e on ly ground on which sureties on official bonds generally may b e rega rded as bound by the judgments against th eir prin-

cipal is that th e ur ties by th e term of the bond agree, expre sly
or implied ly, to abide the res ult of litigation again t their principal . Thi principle i well tatecl in Str ph c!ls v. Shafer, 48
\Vi . 5-l-, 33 Arn. R ep . 796, 3 ~. vV. 835. "The nature of the
contract in official bond s i that of a bond of indemnity to tho e
\\'ho may . uffer damage _ by reason of the neglect, fraud , or mi conduct of the officer." T he bond is made with the full knowledge

and uncl e~ tanding that, in many ca e , uch damages mu t be
a certained and liquidat d by an action again st the officer fo r
who e act the ureties make themselve liable, and th e fair contruction of the contract of the suretie i that they will pay all
damage o a certained and liquidated in an action ao-ain t their
principal.
ee al so l\lasscr v. Stricllland, 17 Serg. & R. 354, 17
m. Dec. 668. This court h ld in Charles v. Hos/?i11s, q Ia. 471,
83 Am . D ec. 378, that judgment again t a sheriff might be received in evi lence a fixin g , prillla facic the liability of the surety.
True, other rea on for o holding than here uggested w ere asio-ned. But the doctrin e of stare dccisis has no application to the
rea on giv n for reachin g the conclusion; it i limited to the
very point decided. Th fallacy in the r a on in o· of that case,
a well a L o·well v. Parker, IO :'.\let. 309, 4~ m. D ec. 436, on
which it wa ba ed, lie in uppo ing that, becau e the urety may
claim the benefit of a judgment in favor of his principal, it follows that be i concluded by one again t him. B ut the urety is
di cha rged by a finding fo r hi principal , not owing to the creditor
being e topped, but for that it estal Ii hes the absenc of liability
of the principal; and , if he i not liable, the urety cannot be, a
hi obligati n i merely incid ntal to that of the principal. Be ide ,..
17
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the discharge of the principal does not always release the surety.

If the former he an infant when executing an instrument, and is

discharged on that ground, the surety may yet he held. Keokuk

County State Bank v. Hall, io6 la. 540, 76 X. \\\ 832. To the

point is this language, found in Jackson v. Griszvold, 4 Hill, 528:

"No doubt''' '•' * * -•' -^ a decision against the debt would dis-

charge him [the surety]. That, however, is not on the ground

that he is a party, but because the judgment or decree extinguishes

the debt ; and, the principal thing being thus destroyed, the inci-

dent — the obligation of the surety — is destroyed with it. The

effect is the same as a release by the creditor or a payment by

the debtor."

It is sometimes urged that as the surety has become respon-

sible for the debt or good conduct of the principal, judgment

establishes the fact on which the surety's liability rests. A com-

plete answer to this is that the fact has not been established against

the surety, because he has been afforded no opportunity to litigate

the question. Under the civil law, the surety was permitted to

defend, and even allowed to prosecute an appeal from the judg-
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ment against the principal, thotigh not a party to the judgment.

As he was given his day in court, there appears no serious objec-

tion to binding him by the litigation. Mtich of the confusion in

the decisions seems to have resulted from the attempt to apply

the rule of the civil law l)inding the surety by the litigation against

the principal, without allowing the former the participation there

accorded. \\Y' have called attention to the inapplicability of the

doctrine of estoppel in such cases, as the appellant, with much

propriety, has insisted that, if applicable at all logically, it must

extend to bonds in private transactions. The better opinion and

the voice of authority is the other way, and a judgment against

the principal is entitled to no consideration as against the surety,

unless by the terms of the contract the surety is to be bound

thereby. Giltinan v. Strong, 64 Pa. 244 ; Fletcher v. Jackson, 23

Vt. 581, 56 Am. Dec. 98; Arrington v. Porter, 47 Ala. 714; Doug-

lass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35 ; De Greiff v. Wilson, 30 N. J. Eq.

437; Firemen's Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 29 Ala. T47; Jackson v.

Griswold, 4 Hill, 528; 2 Van Fleet, Former Adjudication, § 567;

2 Black Judgm. § 592.

In Fletcher v. Jackson, 23 Vt. 581, 56 Am. Dec. 98, the court,

speaking through Redfield, J., said : "The general rule undoubt-

edly is that, in a collateral undertaking l)y way of guaranty, where

th

di. charge of t he pnncipal doe. no t ahrny

r ' lea

the

urety.

1£ th ' former b an infant wh n exec utin g a n in trurn ent, and i
di. barged on that gr uncl th e ~ ure t y may yet be h eld. Kcol?uk
County State Bank v. Ila!!, 106 la. 5-1-0, 76 >:". \\' . >32. 1 o the
point i. this language, fo und in Jack~ so11 v. Gris·1_vold, .+ llill , 5- :

.. .>;o doubt* ::: ':' * : : ·:: a cl e i ion ao-ainsl th debt would di urcty J. That, h ow ever , i no t o n the ground
charge him [th
that he i a party but becau e th e ju l!?':m enl o r deer extingui he
th' debt; and, th principal thing bein 0 thu de troyed, the incident-th obligatio n 0£ th e ure ly- i d e troy d with it. The
effect i the amc a a r elea e by th e credit r o r a paym nt by
the debtor."
1t i vrm1etimc urged that a the urety ha become re pon ·ibl c fo r the d ebt o r good conduct of the principal, judgment
e. tahli hes the fact o n which th e urety' liability r e t .
corupletc a n ,,·er to th is is that th e fact ha · n OL 1 ee n e tabli h eel a o-ain t
the s urety . beca u e he ha been afford ed no opportunity to litigate
tlie qu e ti o n. C ncl er th e c ivil law, th s urety wa permitt cl to
cle£cnd, and ven allow d to pro cute an app al fr om th judo-rnc nt again t th e principal, tho ug h n ot a party to th judgment.
~ \ . he was g iven hi da y in court, ther appear n
eri ou ol j .ction to binding him lw th liti aation. ;..Iuch of th c nfu i n in
the dcci . ion ~ . eern . t~ · have re ulted from the attern1 t to apply
the rule of the civil law binding th e urcty by th litigation ao-ain t
th principal, witho ut allowing th e former the participation the re
accorded. \\' c hav e called att ntion t th inapplicability of the
doctrine f e t ppel in u ch ca. e , a th appellant, with much
propriety, ha ~ in . i tcd that, if applicabl at all loo-ically, it mu t
extend to honcl . in private tran action . 1 h e 1 tt r o pini on and
the vo ic of authority i th other way, and a j udo-m nt again t
th prin ipal i e ntiti cl to no con iderati on a ao-ain t th
ur ty,
unl cs. by th e term s of th
ntra t the urety i to be b und
ther by. Giltinan v. tro11g, 6-t Pa. 24.1 ; Fletch er . I acksoJL, 23
Yr. sRr , 56 Am. Dec. 9, ; Arrington v. P orter, 47 Ala. 714; Douglass "· I lo'ZC 1lm1d, 24 \V nd. 35; De Grci(f v. TVilson, 30 . J. Eq.
-1-37; Firemen's Ins. o. v. JlcJ!illan , 2
la. 147; Iacleson v.
Gri.m 1old, 4 Hill. 5~R; 2 Van F l t, Fo rmer djudi ation , 5 7;
2
lack Jucl g m. § 592.
In Fletcher v. Jacleso 11, -3 \ t. 5 r, 56 m. D c.
, the court,
. peaki ng through Redfiel 1, J., ai 1: " Th g n ral rul e undo ul tecl ly i. that, in a co llat ral un l rtakino- by way o f auaranty, wh ere
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a suit is necessary to fix the liability of the guarantor, the first

judgment is prima facie evidence of the default. But, where the

guarantor is lialjle without suit against the principal, the judg-

ment against him is regarded as strictly matter inter alios. The

judgment of eviction, in order to show a breach of the covenants

of warranty, is a case of the first class. The judgment of evic-

tion is a necessary step in making out the liability of the warrantor ;

that is, the casus foederis. So, too, generally, I apprehend, when

anyone undertakes to indemnify against the consequences of a

suit, or that a suit brought shall be effectual, the judgment in

either case, being the casus foederis, is prima facie evidence of

the liability. And. on the other hand, where the suit may, in the

first instance, be brought directly against the guarantor, the judg-

ment against the principal, without notice to the guarantor, is not

evidence ; and so, too, if the guarantor have notice of suit against

the principal, he is not obliged to conrern himself in its defense,

but may await a suit against himself and then insist upon the

right to contest the whole ground.

The defendant in the case at bar was not a party to the con-
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tract, nor could he have insisted on being made a party to the

action between Evans and McConnell thereon. The latter might

have brought suit against both principal and surety on the bond,

hut he chose, as was his right, to base his action on the contract

alone. Even if these might have been regarded, for some pur-

poses, as one instrument, the appellant elected to treat them as

distinct and separate by basing his suit against Evans solely on

the contract, and that against Poor on the bond. The surety may

require the principal to defend, for this is his duty ; but the surety

owes no such duty to the principal, and is under no obligation to

defend him. Poor was not a party to the action on the contract,

for he could neither appear and control the suit nor appeal from

the decree. Nor was he privy to that action. Privity, says Green-

leaf, denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same* right

of property. Privity in law involves the right of representation,

and certainly the principal, in an action against himself alone,

may not represent the surety. As was said in Giltinan v. Strong,

64 Pa. 244: "The privity of the surety with his principal is in

the contract alone, and not in the action." For the acts or

omissions of the principal to wdiich the surety pledges himself in

hiis contract he is bound, and it is only in this respect the principal

represents the surety. This is the criterion of the competency of

.a uit i nee ary to fix th liability of th o-uarantor, th e first
judgment i pril!la facir videncc of th default. But, where the
guarant r i liable without uit aaa in t the principal, the j uclgment aaain t h im i - r ·ardecl a trictly matter inter alios. The
judgm nt of cYiction, in order to how a breach of th covenant
of warranty, i a ca e of the fir t cla . Tbe jud m nt of eviction i a nece ary tep in making out the liability of the warrantor;
that i , the cas11s focderis.
o, too, generally, I apprehend, when
anyone un lertake to indemnify again t the con equence of a
uit, or that a ui t brought hall be effectual, the judgment in
either ca e, being tbe cas1ts foederis i prima facic evidence of
the liability. And, on the other hand, where the uit may, in the
fir t in tance, be brought directly again t the guarantor, the judgment aaain t the principal, without notice to the a uarantor, is not
evidence ; and o, too. if th e guarantor have notice of uit again t
the principal, he i not obliged to conrPrn himself in it defen e,
but may a\\'ait a uit again t him ~elf an<l then in ist upon the
right to contest the whole ground.
The defendant in th e case at bar wa not a party to the contract, nor could he have insi ted on being made a party to the
action betwe n E, an and
cConnell thereon. The latter might
have brought uit again t both principal and urety on the bond,
but he chose, a \\·as his right. to ba e his action on the contract
alone. E, en if the e might have been reaarded, for some purpo e , a one in trument, the appellant elected to treat them as
di tinct and eparate by basin a hi uit again t Evan olely on
the contract, and that against Poor on the bond. The surety may
require the principal to defend, for thi i hi duty; but the urety
owes no uch duty to the principal, and is under no obligation to
defend him. Poor wa not a party to th e action on the contract,
for he could neither appear and control the suit nor appeal from
the decree. Nor \\"a he privy to that action. Privity, ays Greenleaf, denote mutual or ucce si ve relation hip to the same· right
of property. Privity in law involves the right of repre entation,
and certainly the principal, in an action again t him elf alone,
may not repre ent the surety.
s was aid in Giltinan v. St,,:ong ,
'64 Pa. 2-J.4: "The privity of the surety with hi principal is in
the contract alone, and not in the action.'' F or the acts or
omis ion of the principal to which th e urety pledge himself in
ni contract he i bound, and it is only in this re pect th e principal
repre ent the urety. Thi i the criterion of the competency of
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the principal's declarations and admissions. W licrc these form a

part of the acts or omissions of the principal lor which the surety

is bound, they constitute portions of the res gestae, and may bet

evidence against the surety. But beyond this line clearly the

surety cannot be affected by the acts or admissions of his prin-

cipal, for he is not represented by him. True, i'oor was the

attorney for Evans in the suit on the contract, contested it with

zeal and persistency, and was charged with notice thereof. See

Evans v. McCoinicll. 99 Iowa. 332, 63 N. W. 570, 68 N. W. 790.

But as surety he could make no defense to the action on the con-

tract. His client might have revoked his authority at any mo-

ment. He could have gone further, and dismissed the action, or,

rather, withdrawn his defense to the cross petition, without con-

sulting the surety. See Jackson v. Griszvold, 4 Mill, 528. For

the reasons stated we are of opinion th.c district court did not err

in holding the defendant not Ixnuid l)v the findings against his

principal in the former action.

2. The appellant insists the contract permitted changes, and

this is true. But the manner of making diem is specifically
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pointed (jut. "The value of svtch changes or alterations, without

additions or deductions, will be estimated according to the rate at

wliich the w^ork has been taken, and the amount added to or de-

ducted from the amount hereinafter specified." This precluded

the parties from en.tering into arrangements for additional work,

th principal' declaration , a nd ad mi , ion . \\ 'here these f rm a.
part of the act r omi ion of lh principal for which the ur ty
i bo und, they l:On titut 1 ort i n of the res gcstac, a.ncl may be\'iclrnce agai n t the ur ty . Dut beyond thi !in · cl arly the
·ur ' ly cannot b ~ aficctccl h · th act or admi ion · of hi I rmcipal, for he i · not r pre. ent cd by him. True, Poor wa · th
attorney for Evans in the . uit r n the contract, c nte t d it with
zeal and per i tc ncy, and was charo- cl with notic there f.
F.< 'a11s v. JJcC01111cll, 09 Iowa . 332, 63 X . \\'. 57 , 6 , . T _ \ \ ' . 7 o.
Uut as urety h c ulcl mak no clefen , e to th act ion on th contract. Ili s · lient might have re\·okccl hi auth rity at any m oment. H could have gem furth er , and cli mi ed the acti n, or,
rather, withdrawn his defense to th e ro s pe titi on, without conulting the urety. S e Jachso11 v. Gri 7.l 1old, 4 Hill, 52 . For
the rea on tated \YC are f opini on the cli trict co mi: lid not rr
in h ldin g the defendant not bound by the finding ao·ain , t hi
principal in the fo rm r action.

or that of a different character, without compensation correspond-

ing relatively to the contract price. If this were not so, an entirely

different building from that stipulated might have been erected

at the surety's cost. Thus, the alleged change in the broken

ashlar work alone occasioned an additional expense of $1,600 or

more, — more than the balance claimed. While the plaintiff had

the option of making alterations, he might not do so without pay-

ing therefor at the rate fixed by the contract.

3. The evidence was in conflict on every issue submitted to

the jury, and sufficient to support the verdict. The instructions

in the respects criticised were clear and accurate, and included

those requested, in so far as correctly stating the law.

Affirmed.

2 . The appellant in istc; the co ntract p rmitted chan o- , and
thi i true. But the manner of makin g th em i
p cificall y
I ointed out. "The value of such change or alteration , without
addition or deduction , will be e timatecl according to the rate at
which th e work has bee n taken, and th e amount add ed t
r d du ctccl from the amount h ereinafter pecifiecl." Thi prr elude L
the parti . from ent rin g into arrang ment for additional work,
or that of a differ nt character, without compen ation corr pondin g relati vely to the contra t pric . If thi w er not o, an entir ly
differ nt building· from that stipulated might hav been r ct d
at the ur ty' co t. Th u , th a ll ged chan
in the broken
a hlar work alone occa ion l an ad 1itional xpen s of I. o or
n1or , -m ore than th e balanc claim 1. \ Vhi l the plaintiff had
th option of making alterati n , he might not do so without payin g therefor at th rate fix cl by th ontract.

3. Th e ev idence wa. in
nflict on ev ry i ue ubmitt l to
the jury. and uffi ci nt t
upport th v relict. Th in tru tion
in th re. p ct
ritici cl w r cl a r an l accurate, and includ cI
tho r 'q ue ted, in o far a c rrectly tating the law .
. ffirm e I.
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Morrison ct al. I's. Arons ct al. (1896).

65 Minn. 321 ; 68 N. W. 33.

"i\IoRRl

ox ct al.

'i!S. :\ IWXS

ct al. ( l 96).

Action in the district court for Ramsey county. The case

•was tried before Kelly. J., who ordered judgment against defend-

65 l\Iinn. 321; 6

K. \\'.

3~ .

ant Arons for $801.43. and against defendants Williams and Hall

for $559.50, with interest. From an order denying a motion for

.a new trial defendants Williams and Hall appealed. Reversed.

Fred N. Dickson^ for appellants.

Frank A. Hutson and JVantcr, Richardson & Lawrence, for

respondents.

Collins, J. Plaintiffs entered into business as co-partners,

and employed defendant Arons as general manager, salesman, and

. \ tion in th e di trict court fo r P am ey co unty. The a e
\'a tri l b f r e Kelly, J., who ordered ju lg m nt aaain t defendant .Ar n fo r $ or..+3. and again t d fenclant \ Villiam and Hall
for 559. -o, with intere, t. From an orJ er denying a motion for
a n \\' trial d fendant \Villiam and Hall appealed. R ver eel .

collector. According to the written contract, the employment was

to continue as long as mutually agreeable. Arons was to receive

as compensation for his services a sum equal to one-half the net

profits of the business, and these profits were to be ascertained as

Fred .L • Diclison) fo r appdl ant .
F rank A . Hutson and TVarner, Richardson & LmL rc1Icc, fo r
r e pondent .
1

follows :

"During the existence of the employment of said party of the second

part, once each month, commencing with December i, 1892, a just and
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true inventory of the assets and liabilities of said firm shall be taken, and

all accounts which are considered bad shall be charged to profit and loss,

and from the residue of the accounts due said firm shall be deducted five

per cent, of the aggregate amount thereof as a reserve to cover bad debts,

and the excess of the assets over the liabilities and the capital stock of said

firm shall be determined and agreed upon as the net profits of said busi-

ness, and a sum equal to one-half of such excess shall then and there be

credited to said parly of the second part as and for his compensation,

and be considered an expense of said business. That when the relation

CoLLi r s) J.
Plaintiff entered into bu ine s a co-partner ,
and employed defendant Arons a general mana aer, alesrnan, and
collector. According to the written contract, the employment was
to continue as !ong as mutuaily agreeable. Arons wa to r eceive
a compen ation for hi erv1ces a sum qual to one-half the net
profit of the bu ine s, and the profit ,,·ere to be a certained a
fo llO\\' :

between said firm and said party of the second part is extinguished, then

the actual amount of profit or loss, as the case may be, of the business of

said firm, shall be determined, and, if there has been a net profit, a sum

equal to one-half thereof shall be allowed said party of the second part,

and anj' errors in estimating the net profits at the previous stated periods

shall then and there be rectified, and, if said party of the second part shall

have withdrawn more money from said firm than he is entitled to, he shall

then and there forthwith repay the same ; and. if there is any amount due

him on account of his compensation, it shall then and there forthwith be

paid him."

Arons, as principal, and defendants Williams and Hall, as

.sureties, entered into a bond, in which plaintiffs were obligees,

"During the exi tence of the empl oym ent of said party of the econd
part. once each month, commencing with December I, 1892, a ju t and
true i1wrn tory of the a ets and liabilities of a id firm ha ll be taken, and
all accounts which are con idered bad sha ll be charged to profit and los ,
and from the resid ue of the acco unt due said firm shall be deducted five
per cent. of th e aggregate ~mount th ereof a a re en-c to coyer bad debt ,
·and the exce of the a et ove r the liabilities J.nd the capital tock of aid
firm hall be determined and ag reed upon a the n et profit of a id busin e , and a um equal to one-half of such excess shall then and there be
credited to aid party of the eco n d pa'rt a and fo r his compensation,
and be considered an expen e of aid bu ine . T hat when the relation
between aid firm and said party of the econd part i extingui bed, then
the act ual amo unt of profit o r loss, a th e case may be, of the bu sine s of
aid firm. shall be determined. and, if there has been a n et profit, a um
equal to one- half thereof hall be allowed a id party of the second part,
and any error in e t imat in g the net profit at the previou stated periods
hall t hen and th ere be rectified, and, if a id party of the second part hall
have \Yithdrawn more money from aid firm than h e i entitled to, he shall
th en and there forthw ith repay the sa m e; and, if there i any amount due
him on account of hi cornpen ation. it shal l then and there forthwith be
paid him."

Aron , a principal, and defendant \\ illiam and Hall, a
uretie , enter e l into a bond. in which plaintiff w er e obligee ,
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which, after reciting that Arons was about to enter plaintiffs'

employ as general manager, salesman, atid collector, provided,,

and was conditioned, that :

"If iho said Charles T. Arons shall faithfully and honestly perform

all the duties of his said employment, and shall keep just and true accounts

of all moneys received and expended and all property bought and sold for

or on account of said firm by him or under his direction, and shall faith-

fully and fully, and as often as required, account for and pay over to said

firm any and all moneys belonging thereto collected or received by him,

or which in any manner come into his hands in the course of his employ-

ment by said firm ; and shall forthwith and on demand repay to said firm

any and all moneys he shall have withdrawn therefrom for his own use

in excess of the compensation due him for his services under the terms of

his agreement with said firm in that behalf (whether such moneys shall

have been so withdrawn with the consent of said firm or otherwise), as

often as it shall be determined that such overdraft has been made, then

the above obligation to be void ; otherwise to remain in full force and

virtue."

Ihis action was brought to recover an amount of money said
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to be due on the bond, and the trial was by the court. Xo evidence

was introduced tending to sliow any other settlement or account-

ing than that had when Arons' term of employment ended. In

fact plaintiffs admitted that they never ascertained, and could not,

at the time of the trial, ascertain, what the respective monthly

profits of the business had been. At the conclusion of the plain-

tiffs' case and again at the conclusion of the entire case, the defend-

ant sureties moved the court to disiniss the same as to thcni tijjon

the ground that, as it affirmatively appeared from the evidence

and admissions that no monthly settlements or accounting had

been had as provided for in the contract of employment, the sure-

ties upon the bond had been released from liability. These mo-

tions were denied, and th.e cotirt made its findings of fact and con-

clusions of law ordering judgment in plaintift"s' favor.

^lie court found the allegation in the complaint that no settle-

ment or accounting was had between the parties until after Arons'

employment ceased, to be true. We agree with the court below in

its construction of the contract, but we cannot concur in its hold-

ing that the sureties were not discharged by the failure and omis-

sion to have monthly accountings and settlements between Arons

and plaintiffs. The former was to have advanced to him $ioo each

month for personal cx])enses and on account of his compensation

under an agreenuni that, if this amount, with other sums of

money uhicli came int.) his possession, exceeded one-half of the

which, after re iting that •\ ron. was abo ut to ente r pla inti ff '
employ as general manager, ale!'man, and collector, I rovi led,
and was conc!itionecl , that :
"If the said harles T. . ron shall faithfully and hone tly perform
all the duties of his said employment. and hall keep ju t and t rn ' ace unts
of all moneys rccc:in: cl and expended and all property botwht and s 1 I f r
or on account of said firm hy him or under hi direction, and shall fait hfully and fully , and a · often as required . account for and pay O\'er to ai d
firm any and all moneys belonging thereto collected or receiYed by him,
or ,,·hich in any mann r come into his hancl in the cou r se of hi
mploymcnt by aid firm; and hal l fo rt h wit h a n d n demand repay to said firm
any an d all moneys h shall h ave w it hd raw n th erefro m fo r his ow n u
in excess of the compensation due h im fo r h is en·ices under t he te rm o f
hi ag reement wit h aid fi r m in that be ha lf (whethe r such m on eys hall
ha Ye been o withdrawn w it h t he consent of said fi rm o r othe r \\" i e), a
often a it hall be determi ned that uch oYe r cl raft has been made, th en
the aboYe obligation to be Yoid; ot herwi e to re mai n in fu ll fo rce and
Yi rtue."

Thi acti on wa bro ug ht to r ecove r an amount of money . a id
to be clue on the bone!, and the trial wa by th e co urt. K o evidence
wa intro<lucecl tendin g to how any other settlement or a co untin g than tha t had when A ron ' term f empl ym ent nded. In
fa ct plaintiff admitted that they never a certained, and could not,
at the time of the trial, a certain , wha t th r pective monthly
profit of th e bu ine had been. At the conclu ion of the plaint iff · ca e anc! again at th e conclusion of the entire case, the clef nda nt ureti e m oved th e c urt to di mi the ame a to th m up n
the g ro un d that, as it affirmatively appeared from th evid ence
and admis ions that no monthly ettl em ent or accounting had
been had a prov ided fo r in the contrac t of employment, the ureti e upon the bond had been r elea eel from liability . 'fh e e motions wer e denied, and th e conrt made it findin o· of fact and conclu ion of law orderin g judgm ent in plaintiff ' favor.
T he court f und the allegation in th e complaint that no ttl em ent or ace un ti ng wa ha d between the parti e until aft r r ans'
employment cea eel, to be tru e. \~' e ag r ee with the court below in
it con truction of th e contract, but we cannot concur in its holding that the ureti w re not di charged by the failur and omi ion to have monthl y acco unting a nd ettl em ent betw en rans
an d pl aintiffs.

Th e form er wa s to ha ve a dvan ce d to him $ roo each

m onth fo r per a nal expen e and on acco unt of hi compen ation
under an ag reem nt that, if thi am unt, with other um of
money \Yhich cam e int hi po s i n, exce <led one-half of the
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net profits of the business, the excess should be promptly refunded.

What the profits were, and the sum due to plaintifi:'s, if anything,

were to be provisionally ascertained each month ; and, had this

been done, it is quite certain that plaintififs would have discovered

before the expiration of 13 months that the business was not

profitable, while Arons would have learned that he was far from

earning a living out of it. The natural result would have been

for both parties to terminate their contract relation, and avoid

further loss. It is evident that there would be much less hesita-

tion on the part of a person called upon to become a surety upon

a bond given for the faithful performance of a contract with such

conditions than if the real situation was not to be ascertained for

months. The condition in the employment contract whereby

monthly accountings and settlements were agreed upon was an

exceedingly beneficial one for all concerned. It was an essential

feature of the contract whereby Arons agreed to conduct plaintiffs'

business enterprise for an indefinite period of time, his compen-

sation to be determined by the net profits. The contract of

suretyship was departed from and varied when this provision was
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wholly disregarded, and the case is brought directly within the

rule that, if an essential condition of such a contract is not com-

plied with, a surety is not bound. A new^ trial must be had.

Order reversed.

Followed in Fidelitv Mutual Life ^"Iss'n v. Dez^'cv (1901), 83 Minn.

389; 86 N. W. 423; 54 L. R. A. 945.

Aetna Ins. Co. z's. Fowler ct al (1896).

108 Mich. 557, 66 N. W. 470.

Error to Saginaw; Wilber, J. Submitted January 15, 1896.

Decided March 11, 1896.

Assumpsit by the Aetna Insurance Company against Charles

n t pr fits of lh bu in
, the exce
h oukl he promptly refunded.
\Yhat th pr fit w r e, and th ~ um due to plaintiff , i{ anything,
w r to b provi ionally a certain cl ach month; and. had thi
b n cl n e , it i c1uite certain that plaintiff would h ave di covered
before th expiration of 13 m onth that the bu in e ~ was not
profitabl e, whil e rons w ulcl have lea rn ed th at he w a far from
earnina a liv ing out of it. The natural r e ult w o uld have been
for both parti
to terminate their contract r elatio n, and avoid
furth er lo. . It is eYident tha t th r e would be much le h e itation on the part of a p er o n called upon to become a urety upon
a bond giYen for th e faithful per fo rmance of a contract with such
condition than if th e rea l ituation was not to be a ce rtain ecl for
m o nth . The condition in the employm ent contract whereby
m onthly accountings and ettlement w er e agreed upon wa an
ex ceedin o-Jy beneficial on e for all concerned. It wa an e sential
featur of the contract wh er eby Arons agreed to conduct plaintiffs'
bu in e , enterprise fo r an indefinite p eriod of tim e, hi s compensation to be determined by the n t profit . Th e contract of
urety hip wa Jeparted fr om and varied wh en thi s provi ion was
wholly di sregarcled , and th e ca e is brought directly within the
rule that, if an essential condition of uch a contract is not complied with, a urety i n ot bo und.
n ew trial must be had.

G. Fowler, Chester Brown, and Gustavus H. Fuerbringer upon

an indemnity bond. From a judgment for plaintiff on verdict

O rder r eversed .

directed by the court, defendants Brown and Fuerbringer bring

error. Reversed.

Wood & Joslyii, for appellants.

Followed in Fidelity ]\,Jutual Life Ass'n v. De7,•c·y ( 1901 ), 83 :\Iinn.
389; 86 ::.:i. \\ . 423; 54 L. R. .-\.. 9-ts.

W.eadock & Ptircell, for appellee.

AETX,\

IN . Co. ·us.

FowLER

ct al ( 1896 ).

108 }.Iich. 5 ;1, 66 N. \V. -1-70.
E rror to aginaw; \VILDER,
D ecided :-..Iarch r r . 1896.

J.

.~ ubmitte d

January 15, 1896.

As c~rP. IT by th Aetna In urance Company ag ain t Charle
G. Fowler. Ch e ter Brown , ancl Gustavu H. Fuerbringer upon
an indemnity bo nd. From a jnclgment for plaintiff on verdict
directecl 1 y the courl, de fendants Brown and Fuerbringer brina
error. Rever ed.

lf'ood & Joslyn) for appellant .
TVeadoc l< & Purrelt) for appellee.
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MoxTGOMF,RV, J. Actioii on tlie bond of an insurance agent.

Defendant Fowler was employed as the agent of the company at

Saginaw, and in December, 1883, executed a ])ond, with his co-

defendants as sureties, the conditions being as follows:

"The condition of this obligation is such that whereas the above-

named Charles G. Fowler has been appointed agent of the Aetna Insur-

~Iux T<;o .\ J l.I\\.

J. .\cti

o n Lhe bond of an in uranc acrent.
Def nclant Fo \\'ier \\'a , em pl •)"Cd a . th ' a nt f the c mpany at
~' agina\\', :i rnl in 1 ecembcr, i8~~. :x: 1..: culecl a bond, with hi codefendunt s as sureties, th
ondilion · b ino- a follow :
n

ance Company in Saginaw, Saginaw county, Slate of Michigan, who will

receive as such agent sums of money for premiums, payments of losses,

salvages, collections, or otherwise, for goods, chattels, or other property

of the said insurance company, and is to keep true and correct accounts

of the same, pay over such money correctly, and make regular reports of

the business transacted by hiin, to the said Aetna Insurance Company,

and in every way faithfully perform the duties as agent, in compliance

with the instructions of the company through its proper officers, and at

the end of the agency, by any cause whatever, shall deliver up to the

authorized agent of said company all its money, books, and property due

from or in possession. Now, then, if the aforesaid agent shall faithfully

perform all and singular the duties of the agent of the Aetna Insurance

Company, then this obligation shall be null and void."

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

The instructions to agents were to send statements of all luisi-

ness transacted during the previous month as early as the 12th of

each month. The testimony shows that for three months prior to

September i, 1893, the defendant Ix^wler failed to send remit-

tances, and it was shown that it was not the custom of the com-

pany to insist u])on absolute promptness in remittance, l)ut that

'"T he ondi t ion o f thi s obli gat ion is s uch that wh ereas th e abo\'cna m ed Cha rl es G. F o wle r has bee n appoint ·d agcm of th e A tn a In ·urance Com pany in ag ina w, ag in a w co unty. tal c f .:-Iichigan, wh o will
recci \ c as such ag ' llt s um s o f m oney fo r premium s, paym ent of los e ,
sa h ·ages . co ll ecti o ns. o r oth erwi se, for goo ds, chalt I , o r other pr p rty
o f th e sa id in s ura nc e co mpany, and is t o k p tru and corr ct account
of th e sa m e. pay ov ·r s u h m o ney co rrectly, and make r gular r eports f
th e bu . iness tran -;actecl by him, t o th e sa id Aetna In s urance
o rnpany.
a nd in e,·e ry way faith fully pe rform th e cluti s as agent, in complianc
w it h the instru cti ons o f th e co mpany throu g h it s proper officer , and at
thL· end of th e age n cy, by any cau se what ever, shall d Jjy r up to the
a uth o ri zed age nt o f said co mp any all it s m oney, bo ks, and prope1-ty due
fr o m o r in possess ion. N ow, th en, if th e a for esa i I agent shall faithfully
perform all and s ing ul a r th e duties of th e agent of th e A etna Ins urance
o mpan y , th n thi s obligati on shall be null and void."

after three months" delay it was the custom of the company to dis-

charge the delin(|uent agent. 1'he testimony further shows that

in the^ latter part of July or tlie first of August, 1893, the special

agent of the company, a Mr. Xcal. visited Saginaw, and, as he

described it, found the agenc\ in a "rocky condition ;" and. while

counsel were disagreed as to the effect of his testimony, we think it

is at least open to the construction that he then learned that Fowler

had misappropriated the funds of the company, and invested them

in realty. The circuit judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff'.

The recovery included a shortage in accounts before August ist,

and a shortage of $344.16 arising from the August business.

Two contentions are made : Firsl. that it was the duty of the

company to notify the sureties of any delay in the reiuittance, at

once, and that the continuance of the agent after failure to remit

in accordance with the instructions of the com])any to agents re-

leased the sureties as to future transactions: and, second, that the

company, on the discovery of the misappropriation of funds,

The instruC'Lion Lo agents ·were to . encl stat m nts of all bu iness transacted duri n g- th ~ previous m onlh as early as the 12th of
each m onth. Tbc testim ony hows th<.:.t for three month prior to
September i, I( 3. the clefenclant Fowler faile l to end r mittancc , ancl it wa shown that it wa not th cu t m of th company to in i t upon :ib ~o lute promptne s in remittance, but that
afler three m onth . · d lrty it wa the custom f th c mpany to d i charge the delinquent ag nt. The testim ny further hows that
in the latter part f July or the fir t of ,\u gu t, 1893. the pe ial
agent· of the company, a ~\Ir. )J eal, visited aginaw, and, a h
de cribed it, found the agency in a "r cky ondition ;'' and, ·w hile
coun el were di agr eel a to the effect of hi t tim ny, we think it
i at lea t open to th on truction that he then learn cl that Fowler
hacl mi appr priatcd the fund of th company, and inve tel th m
in realt_\·. The cir uil judge directed a verdict f r th plaintiff.
'The recov ery in luclecl a sh rtao-e in account befor Augu t r t,
and a shortage nf , J+~I · i ari ing from the A1 1gu t bu in
Two , nl ntions :ir made: Firs!, that it wa the clut.\' of the
company lo nol ify thC' ur tiC' s of any lelay in the remittance, at
one . and that th c ntinuanc of the ahent after fai lur to r mit
in accor<lanc with the in tructiun of th company to acr nt rel a cl th
ureti e a . t foture tran . action ; and, saond, th:i.t the
company, on t!1 di cov ry of the mi approJ riation of fun l ,
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August 1st. was liound to discharge the agent, or. at least, the

.sureties were not bound to respond for his future defalcations,

unless, after being informed of his previous acts of dishonesty,

they consented to his retention.

We think that the court below correctly ruled that the mere

fact that the company had knowledge that the agent had failed to

remit did not imi^ose upon it the duty to notify the sureties or

discharge the agent. JVatertuzvn Fire Ins. Co. v. .Simmons, 131

Mass. 85 (41 Am. Rep. 196) : Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Barnes,

64 N. Y. 385 (21 Am. Rep. 621). The duty which the company

owed to the sureties was not a duty of active vigilance, to ascer-

tain whether the agent had been guilty of fraud (the sureties'

undertaking: was a guarantv of his fidelitv), but what was due

from the employer was good faith to the sureties. Just as it would

have been a fraud to withhold knowledge of previous dishonesty

-of the agent presumably not known to the sureties, but possessed

by the company, so it would be a breach of good faith for die

company to continue the agenr in a place of trust after discovering
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his dishonesty or defalcation, which is presumptively and in fact

unknown to the sureties, and without notifying the sureties of the

facts, and giving them an opportunity to elect as to whether they

will continue the risk. This is the doctrine of the leading case of

Phillips V. Foxall. L. R. 7 O. B. 666. The cases of Watertown

Fire Ins. Co. v. Sinimons and Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Barnes are

not inconsistent with this. The substance of the holding in each of

these cases is that the mere failure of remittance does not neces-

sarily amount to notice of dislionesty on his part, and that applies

to the present case as regards the charges occurring before August.

There is no evidence that prior to August the company had actual

notice that Fowler had converted any of the funds to his own use,

or was more than negligent in remitting or collecting the premi-

ums ; but as to the transactions in August the case is dilTerent.

Under section 9191, 2 How^ Stat., it is made an olTense for an

insurance agent to receive and invest money of the company with-

out its assent: p.nd, as we before stated, we think there was testi-

mony tending to show notice to the company about the ist of

August that Fowler had invested the funds of the company in

realty. If the company, through its special agent, then knew this

fact, it cannot be said not to have had notice of the dishonesty of

the agent : and. if it had such notice, it was the duty of the com-

pany not to longer trust its funds with the agent until the sureties

twu t i t, wa bound to lischarg-e the agent, or, at lea t, the
were not bound to r sponcl for his future defalcation ,
ureti
unle , aft r being informed of his previous act of dis hone ty,
they con ented to his retention.
Vv think that the court be! w c rr ctly ruled that the mere
fact that the company had knowledge that the agent had failed to
remit did not impose upon it the duty to notify the ureties or
di charge the agent. TVatfrtvzc11 Fire Ins. Co. v. Si111111olls, 1 3 l
fas . S (41 Am. Rep. 196): Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Eames,
64 f\. Y. 385 ( 21 Am. Rep. 621). The duty which the company
owed to the sureties was not a duty of active vigilance, to ascertain whether the a.gent had been guilty of fraud (the suretie '
undertaking was a guaranty of his fidelity), but what was due
from the employer was good faith to the sureties. Just as it would
have been a fraud to withhold knmvledge of previous dishonesty
-of the agent prt.: umably not knmYn to the sureties, but posse eel
by the company, so it would be a breach of good faith for the
company to continue the agent in a place of trust after discovering
his di hone ty or defalcation, ·which is presumptively and in fact
unknown to the sureties. and \Yithout notifying the sureties of the
facts, and giving them an opportunity to elect as to whether they
will continue the risk. This is the doctrine of the leading case of
Phillips v. Foxall, L. R. 7 Q. B. 666. The ca e of Waterto<: n
Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons and Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Barnes are
not inconsistent with this. The substance of the holding in each of
the e case is that the mere failure of remittance does not necesarily amount to notice of dishonesty on his part, and that applies
to the pre ent case as regards the charges occurring before August.
There is no evidence that prior tc August the company had actual
notice that Fovvler had converted anv of the funds to his own use,
or was more than negligent in remitting or collecting the premiums; but as to the t ran sactions in August the case is different.
Under section 9 191, 2 How. Stat.. it is made an offense for an
insurance agent to receive and invest money of the company without its a ent: 8.nd. as we before stated, we think there was testimony tending to show notice to the company about the lst of
Augu t that F owler had invested the funds of the company in
realty. If the company, through its special agent, then knew this
fact, it cannot be aid not to have had notice of the dishonesty of
the agent; and, if it had such notice, it wa the duty of the com. pany not to lono·er trust its fonds \Yi th the agent until the ureti e
1
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had consented, with knowledge of the facts, to be held responsible

for the acts of a dishon.est agent. See, further, 2 Brandt. Sur.

§ 423 ; Conneciicut Mnt. Life Jus. Co. v. Scoit, 81 Ky. 540.

Judgnicnt reversed, and :> new trial ordered.

The other Justices concurred.

BuTiER z's. United States (1874).

had on ent 'd, with knowl dge of th fact , to be held r e pon ibl
e, fo rth r, 2 Brandt, ur.
fo r the act of a di hone t agent.
·+23; Connecticut Jlut . Life Ins. Co. v. cott, r K y . 540.

Juclgment

reve r. eel, an d

::i

new trial or lered .

21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 272; L. Edn. Bk. 22, 614.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the

Th

oth r Ju ti ce concurred.

Eastern District of Tennessee.

This was an action of debt in the court below, on a joint and

several internal revenue bond executed by Benjamin B. Emery, as

principal, and by Roderick R. Butler, Ethan A. Sawyer and Wil-

liam Choppin as sureties, in the sum of $15,000. Butler defended

B u n .ER

on the ground that, at the time he signed and affixed his seal to the

'US . l!N .L TED

TATE

(

1874 ) .

bond, it was a mere printed form, with blank spaces for the names,

21

dates and amounts to be inserted therein : and that the l)lanks were

\ ;vaJl. (8

U.

.) 272; L. E dn. Bk.

22,

614.

not filled, and there was no signature thereto, except Emery's ; that

Emery promised, if Butler would sign the bond, he would fill up

the blanks with the sum of $4,000, and would procure two addi-
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tional securities in the District of Columbia, each of whom was to

ln error to the ircui t Court of the L nited
Ea tern Di tri ct of Tenne ee.

tate

for the

be worth $5,000; and that the bond was delivered to Emery with

the understanding and agreement that the bond otherwise was not

to be binding on the defendant, but was to be returned to him ; that

the defendant never after ratified or acknowledged the validity of

the bond ; that the other sureties did not reside in the District of

Columbia, and were wholly insolvent and worthless ; and that

Emery obtained the signature by false and fraudulent representa-

tions. The circuit judge ruled that this was no defense to the

action ; a verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, and the defendant

excepted and brought this writ of error.

Messrs. S. ShcUahargcr, H. Maynard and /. M. JJllsori, for-

plaintiff in error.

Mr. C. H. Hill, Asst. Atty.-Gen., for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice Wwn-. delivered the opinion of the court:

T hi s wa an acti on of debt in th ourt below , on a joint and
everal int rna l r evenu e bond executed by Benj amin B. Emery, a
p rincipal, and by R oderick R. Butler. E than A . Sawyer and William Choppin a snretic , in th e snm of $ 15,000. B utl r def nded
on th e gro und that, at th e tim e he ig ned and affixe d hi eal t the
bond, it was a m ere print d form , with blank space for th nam ,
date and am ount to be inserted ther in: and that the blanks vv r e
not filled, and th ere was no ig nature the1-eto, excep t E m ry' ; that
E m ry p romi .s cl, if Du tler would ib n th e bond, he ·w ould fill up
the blank w ith the sum of $.+,ooo, an d would pr cure two addi tional securities in th e District of Col u mbia, each of whom was to
be ·w orth $ 5,000 ; and that the bond was deliver e l to E m ery with
the und er tarnling and agTeem cnt that th e bond otherwi e wa not
to be binclin o- on the defendant, but wa to be returned to him; that
the defendant never a fter ratified or acknowl ed o-ecl th e validity of
t he bond; that the th r ureti e clid n t r icle in the Di trict of
olumbia, a1td wer e wholly in olv"nt and worthle ; and that
E m ery ob tained th e ig natuire hy fal e a nd fra uclul nt r pre ntation . T he cir uit jn lge ruled that thi wa no cl fc nse t o the
action ; a verd ict wa taken fo r the pla intiff , and th defendant
excepted and broug ht thi ·w rit of er ror .

,_1f essrs. S. hellabargcr, H. Jfa )'1w r d and J. 111 . Hlilson for ·
plaintiff in er ro r.
l\fr. C. H . f Jill, . \

!\I r .

hi ef

JLL ti c

t. A. tty.-Gen .. fo r defendant in error.

{//.\ ITE d elivered th e pinion of th

omt:
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We cannot distinguish this case in ]^rinciple from Dair v. U. S.,

i6 Wall,, I (83 U. S., XXL. 491 ). The printed form, with its

blank spaces, was si^ied by Butler and delivered to Emery, with

authority to fill the blanks and perfect the instrument, as a bond to

secure his faithful service in the office of Collector of Internal

Revenue. He was also authorized to present it, when perfected,

to the proper officer of the Government for approval and accept-

ance. If accepted, it was expected that he would at once be per-

mitted to enter upon the performance of the duties of the office

to which it referred.

It is true that, according to the plea, this authority was accom-

panied by certain private understandings between the parties,

intended to limit its operations, but it was apparently unqualified.

Every blank space in the fonn was open. To all appearances, any

sum that should be required by the Government might be desig-

nated as the penalty, and the names of any persons signing as co-

sureties might be inserted in the space left for that purpose. It was

easy to have limited this authority by filling the blanks, and the fill-

ing of any one was a limitation to that extent. By inserting, in the
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appropriate places, the amount of the penalty or the names of the

sureties or their residences. Butler could have taken away from

Emery the power to bind him otherwise than as thus specified.

This, however, he could not do. Instead, he relied upon the good

faith of Emery, and clothed him with apparent power to fill all the

blanks in the paper signed, in such appropriate manner as might be

necessary to convert it into a bond that would be accepted by the

Government as security for the performance of his contemplated

official duties. It is not pretended that the acts of Emery are

beyond the scope of his apparent authority. The bond was ac-

cepted in the belief that it had been properly executed. There is

no claim that the officer who accepted it had any notice of the pri-

vate agreements. He acted in good faith, and the question now is,

which of two innocent parties shall suffer. The doctrine of

Dair's case is that it must be Butler, because he confided in Emery

and the Government did not. He is, in law and equity, estopped

by his acts from claiming, as against the Government, the benefit

of his private instructions to his agent.

The judgment is affinned.

\ Ve cann ::it clistino-ui h thi ca, e in principle from Dair v. U.
16 \Vall ,, 1 ( 3
., .rXl., ...J.91). The printed form, with it
blank pace , wa igned by Dutler and delivered to Emery, with
authority to fill the blank and perfect th in trument, as a bond to
ecure hi faithful er ice in the offi c of Collector of Internal
Revenue. He wa also authorized to pre ent it, when perfected,
to th e proper officer of th e Government fo r approval and acceptance. If accepted, it wa exp cted that he would at once be permitted to enter upon the per formance of the duties of th e office
to which it referred .
It is tru e that, according to the plea, thi authority ·was accombetween the partie ,
panied by certain private und erstanding
intended to limit it operation , hut it wa apparently unqualified .
Every blank pace in the form was open. T o all appearances} any
um that hould be required by the Government might be designated as the penalty, and th e name of any persons signing as cosureti s mig ht be in se1ied in the space left for that purpose. It was
ea y to have limited thi authority by filling th e blanks, and the filling of ac.y one was a limitation to that extent. By inserting, in th e
appropriate places, the amount of the penalty or the names of th e
sureties or their riesiclences, Butler could have taken away from
Emery the power to bind him otherwi. e than as thus specified .
Thi , however, he could not do. Instead, he relied upon the good
faith of Emery, and clothed him with apparent power to fill all the
blank in the paper signed, in uch appropriate manner as might be
necessary to convert it into a bond that would be accepted by the
Government as security for the performance of his contemplated
official dutie . It is not pretended that the acts of Emery are
beyond the cope of his apparent auth ority. The bond was ac- ·
cepted in the belief that it had been properly executed. There i
no claim that the officer who accepted it had any notice of the private agreem ents. He acterl in good faith, and th e que tion now i ,
which of two innocent parties shall suffer. The doctrine of
Dair' case is that it must be Butler, because he confided in Emery
and the Government did not. He is, in law and equity, estopped
by his act from clainiing, as again t the Government, the benefit
of hi private in tructions to his agent.
The judg ment is affirmed.
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StONF.R 7'i-. MlI.LIKIN, ft ill. (1877).

1 O~F.R 'l!S .

85 111. 2i8.

:\f ILLIKT.

,

ct a/. ( 18 77 ).

Mr. Harvey Pasco, for the a])])rl];uil.

5 Ill.

Mr. A. B. Biiiiii, for the appellees.

_ 1.,.

Mr. Ciiikf Ju.sticf. Shkldon delivered the opinion of the

'Court:

At the February term. 1874. of the county court of Macon

Jfr. I /ar -;Jcy Pa ·co 1 fo r th e a 1 p ·ll a nl.

■ county, a judgment was entered by confession, in favor of Millikin

& Co., against Thomas L.ec, John Lee and Andrew J. Stoner, for

J lr. . l. R.

!31t1111 ,

fo r th ap p ll ·e .

$453.33, upon a promissory note witli a warrant of attorney

attaclicd, purporting to be executed liy the three latter, dated the

2.]th day of June, 1873, payable ninety days after date to 11 Crea,

and assigned l)y him without recourse.

•\IR.
Court:

'n

I EF

J L"ST I

'E

ll l ~ L D OX

cl eliYer cl th e op1111on of the

An execution, issued upon the judgment, was levied upon

personal properity of John Lee, sufficient in value to satisfy it.

Afterward, by direction of Millikin & Co., the sheriff released the

property of John Lee from the levy, and levied the execution upon

•certain real estate of Stoner, and the l)ill in this case was filed by

Stoner to enjoin the sale of his property vmdcr the execution.
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The court below, upon final hearing on proof, dismissed the

bill, and the complainant appealed.

The chief ground relied upon in sui)port of the l)ill is, that the

signature of the name of John Lee to the note is a forgery. The

note is a joint and several one, the signature of Stoner being last

upon the note. He testifies that ^'homas Lee applied to him to

sign the note as his security ; ihat he refused to do .so unless Lee^

w'ould first get his brother, Jolin Lee, to sign the note; that Lee

went away saying he would go and get John to sign it; that the

next day he came back, saying that he had got John to sign it, and

presented the note with the signature of John Lee appearing to it,

and witness then signed it, supposing the signature of John Lee to

be genuine, knowing him to be rcs]X)nstble, and had he not sup-

posed the note to have been signed by John Lee, he would not

have executed it. Thomas Lee had made the arrangement before-

hand with ^lillikin & Co.. to lend him the money. H. Crea, the

payee of the note, was but nominally such, Millikin & Co., being the

real payees, and on presentment of the note, with Crea's indorse-

• \ t th e Febru a ry term. i 87-i.. of th e c unty court of 1\Iacon
county. a judgm ent wa enter ed hy co nfe i n , in favor of 1\Iillikin
· ' o. , again t T hom a L ee, J ohn L e a nd Andrew J. toner , fo r
S-1:3.~3 . upo11 a p ro mi ory not with a w a rra nt of atto rn y
attached, purportin g to be xecut d by th e three latter, da te 1 the
2_1th clay of Jun e, r )73, payable ninety cl ay after dat to H
rca,
a n d assigned by him w ithout r eco ur c.
:\n excct~ ti o n , i · uecl up n th j udg111ent, wa levied upon
personal propen'ty o f J ohn L ee, uffi -ient in val u to ati f y it.
_\ ftc n rnrcl. by direc tion of ~Iilli k in ~ ·o. , th e sh riff r elea eel th e
pro perty o f J ohn L ee fr 111 th E: levy, an cl 1 vied th e execution up n
certa in r ea l c la te of ~ t o n e r, ancl th e hill in thi ca wa fil ed by
S toner t r) en join the , al e of hi p rop rty 1111d r th e execu t ion.
The co urt belo w, upon fi nal hea ring on p roof, Ii mi eel the
bill. a ncl th e compl a in a nt appealc I.
Th e chi ef gro und r eli ed u1 . . on in support of th hill i , that th ,
to the note is a fo rg ry . Th
, ig na ture of th e nam e o f J oh11 L
note is a jo int ancl evc ra l one, the , io-nature of ton r b ing la t
u pon th e note. lT e tes tifi e , tha t Th om a L e a ppli ed to him to
, ig n t he n te a hi. cc urity : t ha t li e r fu eel t I o unle L e
would fir. t g t hi s b ro th er . J ohn L ee, to . ig n th e note ; that L
" ·en t away . ay ing h w ould go and g t J hn to s ig·n it; tha t th
next d ay h earn back, , ay ing tha t he h a cl got J ohn to ~ i gn it, an 1
pr n ted the not with th e , io·na ture of .1 hn L ee appearin o- to it,
and w itne th en ig necl it, uppo ing th e , ig natur f J hn L
to
he g nui ne, know in g him tn he r e. p nsihl . a n 1 had he no t uppo cl th e not to hav b n . ign cl b~· J Im L , h w ould n ot
h aYe ex ecut d it. 'T h m a L ee ha cl m a cl c th arra ng m nt b fo r hancl w ith .\ [illi k in l ~ o .. t I ncl him th m n y. II. r a, the
pay e of the not , wa hut n min a lly such, l\ Iilli k in &
., b in g th e
r eal pay
. a n 1 on p re entrn nt of th e not , with r a' inclor e-
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nient on it, by Thomas Lee to Millikin & Co., who were l)ankers,

they discounted the note, paying the proceeds to Thomas Lee.

rnent on it, by Thomas L e to Jillikin & o., who w Te bankers,
th y di c unt l th e not , payin:--.· the pr c- els t Thoma Le '.
The 1 ill a!Jeo·e , the wa_v J olin Lee' property came to 1 e rele::t cl was, that he made an affidavit that he nev r igned the note
and that hi ignatur to the same was a forg- ry, and that upon the
making of uch ;:i.fficlavit Millikin & Co. ca u eel hi property to be
relea e 1 from the levy. A lthoug h it i thi forgery whi ch i mainly
r Ii cl on fo r the li c har~re of ~ ton r, it i yet objected, a again t
the relea e of J hn Lee' property and the levy on toner's, that
there is no proof of the fo rgery, more than this affidavit. Upon an
examination of the bill , we tak that, as alleging the fact of the
f rgery: anrl th e answer of l\lillikin & C'.J'. and the sheriff admit
th same. B_v th e pleadings, the forgery must be con iclered an
admitted fact in the ase.
The rnnfess ion of judgment, then,
ao-ain t John Lee, wa untrnthorized, and a nullity, and bis prnperty
was rig htly released from th ~ levy under the execution.
\ Vhy hould tlii forgery operate in di charge of toner, and
entitle him tC) have his property exempted from sale on th
xecution ?
It ma y have b en a wron g toward him , and have caused him
to incur a greater ex tent of liability than he expected; and the
suppo ed obta~ning of the execution of th e note by J ohn L e may
have been the sole condition upon which he signed his nam e to the
note. Yet, on satisfactory evid ence to himself, in that r p ct, h
did place his name un co nditionall y to the note a a maker ther eof,
and left it \Vith Thoma L ee to deliver to Millikin & Co., knp1wina"
that on the faith of bi , Stoner' , promise to repay it, they would
.l.

The bill alleges, the way |ohn Lee's property came to be re-

leased was, that he made an affidavit that he never signed the note

and that his signature to the same was a forgery, and that upon the

making of such affidavit Millikin & Co. caused his property to be

released from the levy. Although it is this forgery which is mainly

relied on for the discharge of Stoner, it is yet objected, as against

the release of John Lee's property and the levy on Stoner's, that

there is no proof of the forgery, more than this affidavit. Upon an

examination of the bill, we take that, as alleging the fact of the

forgerv ; and the answer of Millikin & Co. and the sheriiT admits

the same. By the pleadings, the forgery must be considered an

admitted fact in the case. The confession of judgment, then,,

against John Lee, was unauthorized, and a nullity, and his property

was righth' released from the lew under the execution.

Why should this forgery operate in discharge of Stoner, and

entitle him to have his property exempted from sale on the

execution ?
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It may have been a wrong toward him, and have caitsed him

to incur a greater extent of liability than he expected ; and the

supposed obtaining of the execution of the note by John Lee may

have been the sole condition upon which he signed his name to the

note. Yet, on satisfactory evidence to himself, in that respect, he

did place his name unconditionally to the note as a maker thereof,

and left it with Thomas Lee to deliver to Millikin & Co., knjbwing

that on the faith of his, Stoner's, promise to repay it, they would

part with their money to Thomas Lee. There is no just reason

why this promise to Millikin & Co. should not be kept.

Whatever of wrong there was to Stoner, was perpetrated by

his co-maker, Thomas Lee. Millikin & Co. were wholly innocent

in the matter ; they had no notice of anything which had been trans-

piring among the makers of the note, as between themselves. Nor

was it incumbent upon Millikin & Co. to exercise care over the

interest of the surety in the note, look to the inducement which led

him to become such, and see that it should not fail. They had but

to watch over their own interest, and see that the secitrity offered

was a sufficient protection for them. For the lack of the vigilance

they failed to exercise in this respect, they suffer the full conse-

quence in the loss of the security cf the name of John Lee. What-

part with their money to Thomas Lee.

There is no just reason

why thi s promi e to Millikin & Co. should not b kept.
\Vhatever of wrong there wa to Stoner, was perpetrated by
hi a-maker, Thomas L ee. 1Iillikin & Co. were wholly innoce nt
in the matter ; they had no notice of anything whi ch had been tran piring among the makers of the n te, a b tw een them elves. Nor
was it incumb nt upon l\lillikin & Co. to exercise care over the
intere t of the urety in th e note, look to the inducement which !eel
him to become snch. and see that it shou ld not fail. They had but
to watch over their own intere. t, and ee that th e security offe red
wa a ufficient protection for them . For th e lack of th e vigilance
they fail ed to exerci e in thi respect, th y uffer tb e full con equ ence in the lo of the ecnrity of the name of J ohn L ee. What-·
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ever of fraud and deception the co-makers of the note practiced

toward one another, was their own sole concern, and the conse-

quence, so far as may affect them in their relation to each other,

should be borne by themselves alone. There is no justice in re-

quiring" Millikin & Co. to assume the risk of such conduct, and no

sound principle upon which they should be made to suffer loss

because of it, not being privy thereto.

York County M. F. Insurance Co. v. Brooks, 51 Me. 506, and

Selscr v. Brock, 3 Ohio St. 302, arc direct authorities to the point

that such a forgery of the name of a prior surety will not discharge

a subsequent surety. See Young et al. v. Ward, 21 111. 223.

We regarcJ the language of Loud Holt, in Hern v. Nichols, i

ey r of fraud and deception the co-maker of the nole practiced
toward on another, " ·a their ow n . ole cone rn, and th con quenc , o far a.' may aff ct lhem in th ir r lati n to each other,
.:hould be borne by th m , ·h·e al one. Th ·re is no ju tic in r equiring .:\ I illiki n & 'o . to a ~ ume the ri sk of such co nduct, and n
_·oun l principle upon \Yhich they houlcl be mad to uff r lo
becau e L•f it, not bcin()" privy ther to.
) "or/I? County Jf. 1 lnsurrrn ce 0 . v. Brook ) . . I ).Ie. so6, an l
. 'c/scr Y. B1 ock, 3 hi ' t. 302, are direct auth riti t o the point
that uch a forg ry f th nam e of a pri r urety "ill not di charo-e
a ulLequent L~r ety .... e Young et al. v. TT 'ard, 21 Ill. 223 .
\\" c rega rd the lano-uagc of Lmm IJ OL T, in JI cm v . .\ iclz ols, l
-· alk. 2c 9. a :ipplicabl , that .. eeing that omcl cly mu t be a lo er
by thi deceit, it i m ore rea on that he that emr 1 y and put tm t
and confi 1 nee in the dee iver houlcl be a lo er, than a tran()"er. '
The ca e of Sce!J v . Th e P eo ple, 27 Ill. 173, i departed from
so far a it conflict with the principle of the pre ent deci ion.
1

Salk. 289, as applicable, that "Seeing that somebody must be a loser

by this deceit, it is more reason that he that employs and puts trust

and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser, than a stranger."

The case of Seely v. The People, 27 111. 173. is departed from

so far as it conflicts with the principle of the present decision.

We are satisfied with the decree, and it is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.
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Deering vs. Moore (1893).

86 Me. 181 : 29 Atl. 988.

Geo. C. Hopkins, for plaintiff.

C. P. Mattocks and /.. Burton, for defendants.

Haskell, J. Debt l)y an obligee against a surety upon two

bonds, given l)y a collector of taxes for the years 1884 and 1885,

c

'.

respectively. The last bond was not signed by the principal. Each

surety bound himself severally, and not jointlv. in the sum of

$5,000. The obligee received from two sureties a sum of money,

"in full discharge from liability upon each bond." Two questions

\Ye are ati fie l with the decr ee, an l it i. affirm cl.
Deere affinned.

are presented :

I. Did the failure of the principal to sign the last bond render

it void? We think not. The bond was conditioned that the prin-

cipal should faithfully perform official duty. This he was bound

by law to do, just as effectually as if he had covenanted to do it

DEER Ix ,

vs.

:\fooRE

86 l\T . 1R1; 29

(

1893).

tl. 988.

Geo. C. TI of'l?i11s, for plaintiff.

C. P. Jlattocks ancl L. B1trton, fo r clef ndant .
H .\S KELL , J. Debt by an ol li o·e again t a
ty upon two
bond , giv n by a collecto r of tax s fo r th y ar I -t and 18 5
re pectively. The la. t h n I wa n ,t igi.1 l by th I rincipal. Each
. urety bo und him 1f . e,· rally, and not jointly, in th
um of
, 5.000. Th oblige rec iY cl fr m h,·
11r .ti a . um of money,
"in full di charg fr 111 liability up n ea h h nrl.' T"· iue tion
ar pre nt 1:
T. Did th failur of the principal to ign th la t bond r nder
it void? \\ think not. Th 1on1 wa onditi n 1 that the princi pal houlcl faithfully p rform official luty. Thi h wa bound
by law to d , ju t a eff tually a if h had covenant l to do it
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by signing' tlie Ixmd. The engagement of the surety, therefore,

rested upon the legal obligation of the principal alrleady incurred.

It is not lik'e the cases, often referred to, where no obligation

attaches to the principal, outside of the bond itself. In those cases,

the principal not being bound, it would be unjust to hold the

surety. Nor is it like the case of bail, where the sureties have

peculiar rights flowing from the stipulation agreed to by the prin-

cipal. The bond must be held good at common law. Howard v.

Brozim. 21 Maine, 385; Scarborough v. Parker, 53 Maine, 252;

Goodyear Co. v. Bacon, 148 Mass. 542.

II. Did the discharge of two sureties release the defendant,

another surety ? No. The defendant was one of six sureties,

who bound themselves severally and not jointly, each in the sum

of $5,000. Their relations to each other are precisely the same as

if each one had executed a separate bond. They are neither neces-

sarily joint debtors, nor joint sureties. Had the principal executed

the bond, he would have bound himself in the sum of $30,000. The

sureties, instead of standing in jointly for that amount, divided it

equally among them, and each one became severally bound for his
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aliquot share. They are sureties for the principal, and may or may

not be called upon to bear a common burden, as circumstances may

require. If they are, (that is, if the whole liabilit}^ be less than

the aggregate amount assumed by all of them, it becomes a com-

mon burden, not by reason of any contract or engagement to in-

demnify each other, but on the principle of equity, that a common

burden shall be equally borne by all,) they become co-sureties, and

stand in relation to each other as joint debtors, and are bound to

contribute to each other, so that they shall all fare alike. In cases

of this sort, of course, none can be charged beyond the amount that

he has stipulated for. Warner v. Morrison, 3 Allen, 567. It fol-

lows, therefore, that the release of one would work the release of

all. That is based upon the presumption of payment, the seal

being conclusive evidence of complete and ample consideration. To

work the discharge of a debtor, the agreement must be made upon

sufficient consideration, and that pays the debt. At common law,

the part payment of a debt is not sufficient consideration for its

discharge. Bailey v. Day, 26 Maine, 88 ; Potter v. Green, 6 Allen,

442. If the discharge be by a sealed instrument, it is of no con-

sequence what the actual consideration may be, for the seal is con-

clusive evidence of sufficient consideration. By the statute of this

State, passed in 185 1, c. 213, R. S., c. 82, § 45, the settlement of a

by ig nin g· the bond. T he e1wag m ent of the surely, th refore,
re ted up n th 1 gal obl igation f th e principal already incurred.
It i not like the ca e , often ref rr d to, \vh ere no obligation
attach to the principal, ou t ide of the bond it elf. In tho e cases,
th principal not being bound. it would be unju t to hold the
or i it iike the case of bail, where th
ureties have
surety.
peculiar ri g hts fl owing from the stipulation agre d to by the principal. The bond mu t be h lcl good at common law. H award v.
BrD7.l'1l) 21 1aine, 385; Scarborouuh v . Par/ca, 53 ~Jaine, 252;
Good3•ear Co. v. Bacon, q8 1\Ia .. S-1-2·
JI. Did th e cli~cbar ge f two suretie r lease the defendant,
another urety? ~o. T he defendant wa one of six ~ ur e ti e,
who bound ti1 em selve severally and not join,tly, each in the sum
o f $s ,ooo. Their relation to each oth er are precisely the same as
-if each one had executed a separate bon 1. Tl1ey are neither nee sarily joint cl btor . nor joint su retie . Had the principal executed
th bond, he would have bound him elf in the sum of 30,000. The
s uretie , instead of standin g in jointly fo r that amount, divi led it
equally among th m, and each one becam e verally bound for his
aliquot hare. Th )' are sureti s for th principal. and may or may
not be called upon to bea r a common burden, as circum tances may
require. If they are, (that is, if the whole lial ility be less than
the aggreo·ate amount a sumed by all of them , it becomes a common bur !en, not by reason of any contract or engagement to indemnify each other, but on the principle of eq uity, that a common
burden hall be equally borne by all,) they become co-sureties, and
·tand in r elation to each other as joint debtors, and are bound to
contribute to each other, o that they shall all fare alike. In cases
of this ort, of cours , none can be charo-ed beyond the amount that
h has stipulated for. TV cm~er v. 111 orrison, '.) A llen, 597. It follows, therefo re, that the release of one w uld work the release of
J.11. That is ba eel upon the pres umption of payment, the seal
being conclu ive evidence of complete and ample con ideration. T o
work th e di charge of a debtor, th e agreement mu st be made up n
~ uffi cient consideration, and that pay th e debt. At common law ,
th e part payment of a debt is not sufficient con ideration for it
di charge. Bailey v. Dw:.'. 26 Maine, 88; Potter v. Green, 6 Allen,
442. J f th di charge be by a sealed in trument, it is of no consequ ence ,,·hat th e actual consideration may be,_for the eal is conclusive evidence of ufficient con icleration. By th e statute of thi
tate, passed in 1851, c. 2r3. R . . , c. R2, -tS , the settlem ent of a
.J.
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demand upon the receipt of money or other vaUial)le consideration,.

however small, will bar an action njxjn ii. It should be observed.

that the demand must be settled, in order to elifectuate that result.

Tlie discharfre of a debtor from liability upon a demand that is to

remain outstanding- will not so opea'atc. This distinction applies

where one or two joint debtors is discharged upon the considera-

tion of part ])ayment, leaving the demand outstanding against the

other. Such discharge will not bar an action against both ; nor can

it be pleaded by the other in an action against him, if the liability

be several. Bank v. Marshall, 73 ^Nlaine, 79; Driiikwatcr v. Jo}--

dau, 46 Maine, 432: McAllcsier v. Spragiic, 34 i\Iaine, 296.

In the case at bar, the attempted discharge of some of the

sureties is not pretended to have been by a sealed instrument. Had

it been, it would have w-orked a discharge of all the sureties, for

they stand in the relation to each other of joint debtors, being co-

sureties for the payment of the same debt. Xor does it pretend to

have discharged the whole debt, as provided for by statute. It

simply presumes to discharge some sureties from a liability or debt

that was to remain outstanding", and, therefore, not being upon
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sufficient consideration that would have paid the debt, or so much

of it as they had engaged to pay by their covenant, nor evidenced

by a sealed instrument, it was inefifectual to discharge any one.

The result is, damages upon the last bond should be assessed

in a sum equal to the existing default of the i)rincipal, with inter-

est from the time it accrued, leaving the defendant to such claims

for contrilnUion as shall ])rovc just.

Defendant defaulted. Damages to be assessed below.

DoDD vs. WiXN (1858).

27 Mo. 501.

This was an action in favor of Levi Dodd against Isham O.

Winn on a i)romissory note executed by David C. Glascock, M.

McDonald, R. I''. Richmond, Minor J. Winn. James G. Caldwell

and said Isham ( ). Winn. The jury found the following special

verdict: "We, the jury, find a special verdict as follows: On the

6th day of April, 1849, the plaintiff Dodd sued Minor J. Winn,

on the same note now sued on, before the recorder of the city of

d mand upon th· r ' cipt f money or 01 h ' r valuabl con id i-ati n,
how ~,·er small. will 1 ar an action npon it. It houlcl be b rved
that the demand mu t be ettled, in onl 'r lo ff ctuate that re ult.
The di_charge of a d btor from liability up n a demand that i to
remain ouL tancling will not o peirat . 'I hi clL tin.ction appli
where one or tw o j int lebtors i. di charo-ecl upon the con id ration of part payment, leaving the clemancl ut landing again t the
ot her. ~~uch di charg \\·ill not bar an action a ain t both; nor can
it be pleaclecl by tlY' thc:r in an action again t him, if th liability
he .eYeral. Ban!? v. Jfarslzall) 73 ::\Taine, 79: Drillh.L•atcr v. Jordan) -t-6 ::\Iaine, +32: 111 cAl!cstcr v. Sprar:.1te) 34 Maine, 296.
In the case at bar, the attempted cli charge of ome of th
suretie i not pretended to have been by a ealed in trument. I ad
it been. it would hav " ·orked a di charge of all the ureti , for
they tand in the relation to each othe r of joint debtor , bein0 ouretie for the payment of the same cl bt. X r does it pret nd to
have di charged the whole debt, as pr Yid d for by tatut . It
_imply pre umes to di charge c;ome suretie from a liability or debt
that \\·a to remain out tancling, ancl, therefQIJ.~'e, not being upon
ufficient consideration that would hav paid the debt, or o much
of it as tbey had engaged to pay by tbeir cov nant, nor evid nc cl
by a _ealed in trument, it wa ineffectual to di charge any one.
The r e ult i , damage upon the la . t bond hould be a e d
in a nm eq ual t the exi ting default of the 1 rincipal, " ·ith intere t from the time it accrued, leaving the defen !ant to uch claim
for contribut.i n a hall prove just.
Defendant clefaulted.

Damage

to 1 e a.

eel below.

DoDD '<-''· \ VrxN ( 1 c:8 ) .

27 ::.\Io.

501.

Thi \\·as an acti n in favor of Levi D lcl again t I ham
\\ inn on a pP mi
ry n te executed by Davi l C. Gla co k M.
l\IcDonalcl, H.. l<. Richmond, Minor ]. \\inn, Jame G. al lwelf
an l aid I ham 0. \Vinn. Th jur ' found the followinov r lict: "\\' , tli jury, find a pecial verdict a f 110\Y :
th clay f April, 1 -t , the plaintiff D !cl u cl 1\finor ]. Winn,
on the ame note n w 1 cl 0 11, b f r the r c rder f th city of

D DD
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Hannibal, the said Minor being one of the obHgors in tlie note.

Said Dodd recovered a judgment before said recorder against said

Minor on the 6th day of April, 1850; and an execution was issued

by said recorder on said judgment on the itth day of April, 1850,

and placed in the hands of the marshal of said city, and by him

levied on a house in said city as the property of Minor J. Winn;

that said marshal advertised said house for sale underj said execu-

tion, but did not sell the house, being ordered by the plaintiff's

counsel to tear down the advertisements and return the execution

"no property found;" which he did; and no execution has since

issued on said judgment by the recorder. The jury further find as

follows, that when the marshal levied on the house as aforesaid, a

part of said house was owned bv said ]Minor J. Winn, which part

so owed by him was worth the sum of $137.50. Said house was

standing on a piece of gromnd owned by Jeremiah Strode, who ha.l

leased it to said Minor J. Winn, with the privilege of taking off

wdien he pleased any house he might erect thereon. Minor J.

Winn had built the house in question on said lot, but had sold a

part of it before the execution was levied as before stated. The
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jury further tind that David O. Glascock was the principal in the

note sued on, and that Minor J. Winn and Tsham O. Winn were

each securities for said Glascock."

The court rendered judgment on this verdict in favor of

plaintiff' for eighty dollars debt (four-fifths of the amount of the

original note sued on), and assessed the damages for the detention

thereof at seventy-six dollars.

Lamb & Lakcnaii, for plaintiff in error.

Porter & Harrison, for defendant in error.

Richardson, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The law is well settled that a valid agreement between the

creditor and the principal debtor to extend the time of payment,

or any improper initerference by the creditor with the process of

law after the commencement of a suit, by which the suretv may

be injured or subjected to greater risk, or be delayed in the right

on payment of the debt to proceed against the principal, if made

or done wdthout the assent of the surety, will discharge him from

H;innibal , th e
id Minor being on
f the oblig r in th ' n t .
. aid D odd r ecover ed a j udg m nt bef re aicl r corder a gain t a id
_ Iin r on th 6th clay o f April , 1850; and an exe utiorn was i ucd
1 y aid r corder on aid judg111ent n the ltth clay f A pril, 1850,
and placed in th e hand of th e m ar ha ! of aid city, and by him
I vied on a house in said city a th e p roperty f l\Iinor ]. \ Vinn ;
that said mar hal aclvcrti e l aid hem e fo r al e uncl ed aid ex cution , but did not ell' th hou e, being ord ered by th e plaintiff'
coun.- 1 to tear !own the adverti sem ent and r turn the execution
''no property fo un d;'' which he did; a nd no execution ha
ince
i sued on said juclg m nt by th r e ord er. Th e jury further find a
fo llow , that wh en th e m a r ha l lev ied on the hou e a a fo r e aid , a
part o f .'ai d h o u ~ e wa. owned lw sa id ;..[inor]. \\Tinn, which pa rt
o ow ed by him wa ,,·orth th e um of 137.50.
a id hou e wa s
.:itancl ing on a pi ce of oTotmd owned by Jer miah Strode, who ha d
aid Minor J. \ i\T inn , with the privilege o f ta ki1w off
leas cl it t
wh en he pl ea~e d a ny h ouse he mi~·ht er ect th reon. 1\Iinor J.
\\ in11 lnd built the hou se in qu estion on said lot, but had old Cl
part of it befor e th e x ecution wa~ lev i cl a s befo r e tated. Th
jury furth er find th a t David ). G lascock was the principal in th e
note sued on , and that 1\Iinor ]. \ i\Tinn and I sha m 0. \Vinn w ere
ea ch securitie fo r aid G la cock. "
Th e court r endered j uclg-ment on this verdi ct in fa vo r o f
plaintiff for ighty dollars d ebt ( four-fifth s of th e amount of th e
orig ina l n te uecl on ) and a . e. eel the damages fo r th d etenti on
th ereo f at eventy- ix dollar .

his liability; (24 Mo. 333; 26 Mo. 243;) and the relation of prin-

cipal and surety or of co-sureties is not extinguished bv judgment.

Rice V. Morton, 19 Mo. 263. A release of the principal will dis-

18

Lal!lb & La!?c11mt, for plaintiff in error.
Porter f-r II arriso ll, fo r d efendant in error.
Rr

JL\RD

ox, Judge, lelive red the · opinion of th

court.

The law i w ell settl e l that a valid agreem ent b tween th e
creditor and the principal debt ·r to xtencl th time of pa ym ent,
or any improper in1terfer ence by the creditor with th e proce s of
la w aft r the comm encem ent o f a uit, by which th ~ urety may
be injured or ubj e tecl to greater ri k , o r be delayed in the ri o-ht
on payment of the d ebt to proceed a crain t the principal, if m a d e
or clone without th as ent of the surety, will di charg him from
hi liability· ( 24 M o. 333 ; 26 [0 . 24~ ;) and the r lati on of principal and urety or of c - ureti e i. not extinguishe l by j ucl g m nt.
Ric e v. Morton, 19 _l[o. 263. A r 1 a e f the principal will di -
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charge the surety, but one surety ina\ he discharg-ed. without

prejudice to an action against the others, to the extent that they

would be hable in a suit for contribution between themselves.

Ronton v. Lac\, 17 Mo. 3gij. The creditor can not, b\' discharging

one, increase the liability of the other; and he will n(A be allowed,

bv discharging one, to impose on the other a greater proportion of

a common burden than, in equity he ought to bear. .\t law. if there

are several sureties and one is in.solvcnt and another pays

the whole del)t, he can only recover against the solvent

sureties their pro rata ])art as if all of them were .solvent; but the

rule in equity is mure just and reasonable, and the insolvent's

share is apportioned among those who are .solvent, i Story Eq.

§ 498. The eighth section of our statute concerning securities

provides that one sr.rcty at the suit of another shall not be liable to

pay more than h.is due proportion of the original demand, but what

is his due proportion will vary according to the circumstances.

Thus, if there are three sureties, and all of them are solvent, and

one pays the debt, each of the others will be liable to him for one-

third of the amount only: but if one of ihem is insolvent, the other
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will be liable for one-half.

Tn this case it seems that Glascock was the principal debtor,

and that the other five parties to the note were sureties. Now if

all the sureties were solvent, and the defendant paid the debt, he

could only recpure AI. J. Winn to contribute one-fifth part of it,

and therefore could only ask to have one-fifth abated, and could

only complain of the conduct of the plaintift' in releasing the levy

of the execution to that extent. But if the other sureties are insol-

vent, M. J. Winn would be bound to contribute to the defendant

one-half instead of one-fifth of the debt; in which case, if the

plaintifi^ had released Al. j. Winn, \\c could only demand of the

defendant the other luoiety : and, on principle, the same result must

follow if he could have made half the debt but for his improper

interference with the execution. These questions can not be deter-

mined from the meagre statement of facts in the special verdict.

It does not appear whether the other sv;reties were solvent or not.

The statute authorizes this court to remand a cause when

the facts in a special verdict are insufticiently found; (2 R. C.

^'^5.S' P- 130I' § 35!) and the judgment then will be reversed and

the cause remanded; Judge Xapton concurring. Judge Scott not

sitting.

·hargc the ~ trcty. hut n' ·urcty may b di . ·har·g cl, \\·ith ut
prej ucli, lo an action again. t till' other : , to th
.x t nt that th y
'' oulcl be liable in a suit { r o ntrilrntio n b t\\·c n them elv .
H£)//fo11 , •. Lac\', t7 .:.\lo. 3<JlJ. Th Tl lit r ·an n l, hy Ii char o-in i:. ;
on" increase th' lial ilit~ of the o1her; a nd he \\ill no t h , a ll \\ 1,
l>y lischarging on , to impo c 011 th oth ' r a g r <."ale r I rop rti 11 £
a common burl n than in eq uity b ' u;ht to bear. .\t la\\·, if th r e
arc several : ureti<'s and me is in . lv ' nl a nd a no th r pay
the \\·h o l
cl 'ht, he 'an
n!y r ·cov ' r again t th
. . ol n t
:-. urctic. th ir pro rat a part a. if all o f th e m \\·e r o lv '·nt ; 1 ut th'
rule in r•q uity is more ju '.>l ancl rea:o nablc, and th ' in oh · nt' .
~hare i apporti onecl among th ose \\'ho arc .'o lv nt.
t ry Eq.
~ -+9 . Th eigh th se ·tion of o ur sta tut' con 'C rnin g ' ecuriti ,
provi l that o n e tirt' l\· at the ~ uit of another . hall n o t be Jiabl t
pay m o r1.; than hi . clu e p ro p rti o n f th e ori::::;inal cl mand, but what
i. hi du p rop o rti o n will va ry a ·co rdin g t0 th e ir um tanc .
Thu if th e r a r c thre' . ureti - , and all o f them are olv nt, and
o ne pay th lebt , ach of th e ot he rs \\'ill he li ab l t him for n thircl of th amount o nl y; but if n 0£ th'm i in
th r
\\'ill b liable fo r on -h alf.
ln thi s case it . e rn that G ia., ck \\'a th e i 11in ipal debto r,
to th note w r e ur ti . ::-JO\ if
a nd that th e o th er five parti
all the ur ti c \\·ere o lv ' nt, a nd th e cl ef ncla nt pai 1 th cl bt, h
co uld nly r quir - :;\l. J. \\.inn to co ntri l ute o n -fifth part o f it,
and th r ef re co ulci o nly a k to hav e o n -fifth abated and could
onl y complain f the conclu t f th plaintiff in r 1 a in o- th 1 vy
of th ex ution to that 'x t nt. But if th o ther ur ti e ar in 1, . nt, :\I. J. \\' inn would be bo und l o ·ontril ut to th d ef ndant
o ne- half in . lead of o ne-fifth f the d ebt ; in which a , if th
plaintiff had vel a cl ~J. J. \\'inn , h ' c ukl o nly demand of th
defendant the ther m o i ty; and, n prin 'i t 1 • th a m r ult mu t
fo ll w if h o uld ha\· ' m a d e half th cl ' bt but f r hi impr p r
inter£ r cncc with th ·xec uti n. The. e qu tion . an n t h d t rmin d fr m th mcagr . ta tem ent [ fact in th e p ial verdict.
1t d o
not a pp ar wh th ' r th
th r un~li e "' r
Iv nt or n t.
\\'h n
T h e tatul auth ri z . thi c urt l r man l a au
th fact s in a pec ia l YL:r li ct ar in s uffi icntly f uncl ; (2 R.
r 855, p. 13 1,
35:) and th ju lo-m nt th n will I r ev r ed and
th cau
rem anded · Ju lg Xa 1 ton
n · urnn g . Judoittin0 .
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Prior vs. Williams (1866.)

3 Abb. App. 624.

PRIOR
Horace Prior and James Prior, as executors of Henry Prior,

vs.

\!VrLLIAM S (

3 Abb. App.

deceased, brought an action, in the New York superior court,

1866. )

62~.

against GibsonT Williams, Harriet H. Chamberlin and William

B. Chamberlin, in which they asked, as subsequent mortgagees,

to be allowed to i^edeem certain premises in the city of Buffalo,

owned by Harriet H. Chamberlin, from the lien of a mortgage

held by Williams. They also asked that the mortgage under

which they claimed might be reformed.

The facts of the case were, that William B. Chamberlin, son

of Harriet Chamberlin, being a member of the firm of Prior, Hol-

comb & Co, doing business in New York, had induced his mother

to indorse certain notes in blank, upon the agreement that they

were to be signed by the firm and used in their business. One of

these notes, for fifteen hundred dollars, at three months, he

(William H. Chamberlin) signed with his own individual name,

and negotiated to Henry Prior, brother of the Horace Prior of his

firm. On the note falling due, Henry Prior agreed to extend the
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time for payment to one year, provided he were secured by a mort-

gage on Mrs Chamberlin's property in Buffalo, A mortgage was

accordingly made by Mrs. Chamberlin to meet the wishes of Henry

Prior. By a mistake, however, the mortgage was made to Horace

Prior, and the note, to secure the payment of which the mortgage

was made, was described as being payable "one year after the date

thereof/' instead of three months after date. The false descrip-

tion of the note was not noticed, and the mortgage was assigned

by Horace Prior to Henry Prior, and held by him up to the time

of his death, and after that by his executors, until the property on

which it was given being about to be sold under the foreclosure

of a prior mortgage, they brought this action to be allowed to

redeem, and to have their mortgage reformed by having the words

•'one year after date thereof," in the description of the note, stricken

out, and the words "three months after date thereof" inserted.

The referee reported in favor of plaintiffs, and the judgment

thereon was affirmed by the court at general term. Defendants

appealed to this court.

/. D. H. Chamberlin, for defendants, appellants.

rVilliani Dorsheiuier, for plaintiffs, respondents.

,.I race Pr ior and James Prior. as exec utor of H enry Prior,
decea eel, brought an action, in the ew York superior court,
again t ib on T \ Villiam s, Harriet H. hamberlin and William
B. Chamberlin, in which they a kcd, as subsequ nt mortgagee ,
to be allowed to 1•edeem certain prcrni es in the city of Buffalo,
owned by Harriet H. Chamberlin , from the li en of a mortgage
h ld by vVill iams. They aL o a keel tbat the mortgage under
which they claimed mio-ht be reform ed.
The facts of the case were, that \ Villiarn B. hamberlin, on
of Harriet Chaml rlin, being a member of the firm of P rior , Holcomb & Co, doing bu iness in New Y ork, had induced hi s mother
to indor. e certain notes in blank, upon the agreement that they
were to be igned b)' the firm and used in th eir business. O ne of
the e notes, for fifteen hundr d dollars, at thr e months, he
( vViJliam H . Chamberlin ) signed with hi ow n individual name,
and negotiated to Henry Prior, brother of the H orace 1 rior of his
firm . O n the note falling due, Henry Prior agreed to extend the
time fo r paym nt to one year, provided he \Vere secured by a mortgage on l\Irs Chamberlin's property in Buffalo.
mortgage wa
acco!"d ingly made by Mrs. Chamberlin to meet the wi hes of Henry
P rior. By a mistake, however, th e mortgage was made to H orace
P rior, and the note, to secure the payment of which the m ortgage
was made, wa de cribed as being payable 'one year after the date
t hercof,' instead of three month s after date. The fals e description of the note was not noticed, and the mortgage was assigned
by Horace Prior to H enry Prior, and held by him up to the time
f hi s death, and after that by his executors, until the property on
" -hich it was given being about to be sold under the foreclosure
of a prior mortgage, they brought thi. action to be allowed to
r deem, and to have their mortgage reform ed by having the words
" one year after date thereof," in th e description of the note, stricken
out, and th e words " three months after date thereof" inserted.
The referee reported in favor of plaintiffs, and the judgment
thereon was affirmed by the court at general term. Defendants
a ppealed to this court.
1

J. D. H . Clwniberlill for defendant , appellants.
JV illiam Dorslleilller, for plaintiff , respondents.
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Peckham. /. The only point made by the appellants re-

quiring examination is, whether this mistake in this mortgage can

be corrected by the court, as the mortgagor was a mere surety.

The appellant docs not urge that the mortgage is already

sufficient, as perhaps she might. See Jackson v. Boivcn, 7 Cow.

13, and cases cited.

Counsel referred to the remarks of the chancellor of Ofiiario

Bank v. Muniford, 2 Barb. 596, at 613. It is true the chancellor

used language which the case, as finally disposed of, did not

require. He remarked that a bond could not be reformed as

against a surety, "even though it was his intention to bind himself

at the time the bond w'as executed. For the statute of frauds

requires an agreement in writing to bind a surety, and if the surety

has not already executed a valid agreement to answer for the debt

or default of his principal, this court cannot compel him to execute

such an agreement, ui)on the ground that he has attempted to do

so, but has failed of accomplishing his object by mistake or inad-

vertence."

With deference, I do not think it an answer to a bill for the
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refonnation of an instrument, that it would have been invalid if

not in writing, and that, therefore, it cannot be refonncd. Upon

such a doctrine, a deed of land or a mortgage could not be reformed

even against a principal, because either is invalid if not in writing.

A party sells a fami of one hundred acres, l)ut by a mistake

of tne scrivener the (\(:iq(\ convevs but fiftv. The mistake is not

discovered until after the deed is accepted and the money paid by

the grantee. This doctrine would prevent the reformation of that

deed. The right to grant relief in stich a case will scarcely be

denied. But the proof of the case must be entirely clear and sat-

isfactory.

In Phelps V. Garrow, 8 Paige, 322, where one Smith had pur-

chased goods of the plaintiffs under an agreement to give Gar-

row's indorsement on their' draft on .Smith therefor, payable to

Garrow's order, the draft was made and indorsed accordingly.

Garrow took up the draft and then brought his action against the

plaintiffs as drawers. They then filed their bill against Garrow

to restrain the further prosecution of that suit, not to refonn the

draft. The court dismissed the com])laint, holding that Garrow

was not liable either at law or in equit}-, though he admitted that

he intended to become liable by indorsing the draft.

The courts now would hold him liable under such facts at law.

EC i-: n \:\I. !.
T h o nl y po in t m a d e by th apr llant r equiring exami nat i 11 i . . w h th r thi mi ta k in thi m a rt a <Ye can
b corr ctecl by th c u rt, a th e m ortgag r w a a rn re ur ty .
T he appellant doe n t 11r0· t hat th m rt <YaO" i a lr ady
uffici nt. as pe rha p h rni crht. , e Jac l?so11 v. Bo·we11, 7 ow.
I 3. and ca ·c. cited.
Counse l referred to the rem arks o f th e chancell o r of Ontario
Ba11k v . l!11111ford, - Barb. 596, at 6 13. It i. tru e th chancellor
cl f, did not
u eel la ng uage whi ch th ca e, a fin a ll y d i. p
ulcl n t be r eformed a
r equ ire. H r em a rked t ha t ;i bond
ao-ain ~ t :-t llrcty, "even thotw h it w a hi s intention t bind him elf
at the t im e t he bond was ex ecuted. Fo r th
ta tut o f fraud
req uir s a n agreem ent in writing- to bind a urety , a nd if the urety
ha not a lread y x cutecl a valid a g r em ent to an w r fo r th e d ebt
or cl fault of hi principal , thi co urt cannot compel him to x cute
u ch an ag r e m ent, up n th ground that h e ha att mpted to do
o, but ha · fa il ed o f accornpli hin o· hi obj ect by mi ta ke o r inadv r tence."
\Vith d eference, I do n o t think it an answer to a bill for the
r efonna tion o f an in t rument, that it w uld have been invalid if
~ pon
n ot in writin g, a nd th at, th erefor e, it a nnot be r eform cl.
uch a cl ctrin e, a d eed f la nd o r a m ortg a?"e could not be r f rmed
even again t a principa l, bcca n . e eith r i. invalid if not in writino-.
~ pa rty ell a farm of one lrnnclrccl acr , but by a mi take
o f tne cri veuer th e d eed OI"!vcy but fifty. 1 he mi take i not
di CCJ\' r e 1 until after th cleeci is a ce pted and th e rn on y paid by
th e oTantee. Thi do tr1n e ,,. uld pr v nt the r ef rmati on f that
cl eccl . Th e ri g ht to a-rant r eli f in . uch a ca e will , arc ly b
denied. But the proof of the case mu t be entirely lear and sati facto ry .
In P help v . Grzrro·w, ~ Paig 32_, wh r e one mith had purclia er! go d of th plaintiff nnder an ao-reem ent to g ive Garrow '. incl r m nt on th ir1 draft on ._mith th r efo r, payabl e to
~ arro w' .
rel r , th dra ft was mad and inclor eel a co rclin o-ly .
Ga r row to ]- up th e !raft and th en hr Lio-ht hi a t1on a rrain t th
plainti ff . a. drawe r.. Th y th n fil ed their bill a g ain t Garro\v
to r ~ tra in th , for~b r pr ecnti n of that u it, n t to r fonn the
cl th com1 laint h ol lin o- that arrow
d ra ft. Th c 1urt di mi
wa . not lia l I
ith er at law or in 1uity th uo-h h admitted that
h int nd cl t bee m e liabl by ind r. in o- th e draft.
Th e court. now w ould hold him liabl und r uch fa t at law.
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There, however, was no mistake of fact, and courts have frc-

C'uently recog;nized the force of a distinction between a mutual

mistake of law and of fact, althou,c;h, as a general rule, there is

little ground for the distinction. In most cases there is as good

ground for relief when both parties have acted under a mistake of

the law, as there is where the mistake is confined to the fact.

The mistake found here is one of fact. The other cases cited

b}- the appellants of Walsh v. Bailie, lo Johns, i8o; Dobbin v.

Bradley, ly Wend. 422; JViiig v. Terry, 5 Hill, 160; Birckhead v.

Brown, Id. 634, only illustrate the extreme strictness with which

contracts of sureties are construed, and that they will not be

extended beyond their letter. They have no pertinence to the

question.

The power of a court of equity to reform an instrument as

against a surety is fully recognized and declared in Story Eq. vol.

1, § 164.

In IViser v. Blaeh.lcy, i Johns. Ch. 607, where a bond given

by a surety f3r tlie guardian of an infant was taken by the surro-

gate in the name of the people, instead of the infant, the court cor-
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rected the mistake, — the chancellor remarking that he had no

ditificulty in saying that it was within the ordinary jurisdiction of

that court to correct such a mistake by holding the party acord-

ing to his original intentions. That was in harmony with good

morals as well as with sound law.

So in W caver v. Shyrock, 6 Serg. & R. 262, 964. Tilgh^ian,

Ch. J., affirmed the same doctrine as against a surety.

Many cases mav be conceived where the grossest injustice

would result if courts had no power to corrdct mistakes as against

sureties. Mistakes are as likely to occur with them as with others,

and there is no sound principle that prevents their being com-

pelled to act justly and honestly. Where the surety is aware of

and assents to the pur'pose to which his obligation is to be applied,

and it is so used, though without consideration except that ad-

vanced to the principal, equity will reform any mistake of fact so

that the obligation shall fulfill its purpose.

In the case at bar, from the facts disclosed, the testator would

probably have been able to collect his note at maturity had he not

relied upon the mortgage. Upon the mortgage nine months'

longer time was procured with the knowledge of the mortgagor.

It was given by her for that precise purpose, and so accepted by

the mortgagee. If by mistake in the description of the note or by

Th r , bo" · ver, wa. no mi . tak of fact, and c urt have frclucntly r coo-niz cl th force o f a cli . linction betw en a mutual
mi ' tak
f law ancl of fact, alth oug h, a a general rul e, there i
little a-round f r th e di tincti• n. ln mo t a e th re i , a good
T und for relief when b th partie have acted under a mi take o f
th la w, a there i where the mistake i confined to the fact .
The m; take fo und here i one of fact. The other cas cited
by the appellant of TValslz Y. I nilir, 10 J ohn , I o: Dobbin v.
Bradh'y, 17 \\'end. 422: I f7i11p: :•. Terry. :; Hill, r6o; Birckhead v.
ffrO"<.l'll, Tci. 63-t, only illu trate the c;-;: treme trictne s with which
contracts of sureties are con tru ed , and that they will not be
xtend l beyund iheir lette r. Th1::y haYe no pertinence: to th e
question.
The powc:r of a c urt of eq uity to reform an in trument. a
against a m ty i fully recoo11izecl and cleclarecl in tory Eq. ,·ol.
i,
r6-t.
ln : Vi er , .. B!ach/C'y, r J ohn . Ch. 607, where a bond given
by a . urety b r the g uardian f an infant wa taken by the urro a-ate in the nam e of th e people, instead of th e infant, the court corrected the mistake ,-Lhe chancellor remarking that he had no
difficulty in aying that it \\·a within the ordinary jurisdiction of
that court to correct uch 2 mi. take by holding the party acordincr to hi original intentions. That wa in harmony with good
rn oraL a well a. " ·ith sound law.
~ o in TV em cr v. SlzyroL"k, 6 erg. & R. 262, 96-t. TILGIDL\:>r,
C h. J.. affirme l the ~am e doctrine a against a urety.
::\Jany ca .e. may be cr1nceived where th e gros est inj u tice
w uld result if courts had no powe r to correct mi takes a. against
ureti e.. J\Ii take. are 2.s likely to occur with them a with others,
and there i no . ound principl that pr eve nt ~ th eir being com pelled to act ju tly J.nd ho n~stly. \\/h ere the surety is a\Yare of
and a ~ ent to th e pur'po e to which his obligation i to be applied,
and it i o u ed, though without consideration except that advanced to the principal, equity will reform any mi take of fact o
that the obligation hall fulfill it purpo e.
Jn the case at bar. from the facts di clo eel, the te tator would
probably have been able to collect hi . note at maturity had he not
relied upon the mortgag e.
pon the mortgaae nine month '
longPr time wa procured with the knowledae of the morto-ago r.
It wa criven b)· her for that preci ' e purpo , and o accepted by
the mortaagee . If by mi take in the de cription of the note or by
1
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an}- oilier mistake therein misleading the mortgagee, it has failed to

execute its purpose, the courts have the power, and we think it

their duty to reform the instrument so as to carry out the intent

of the parties.

Tlie judgment of the court below should be affirmed.

Note— The concurrini,' opinion of Wri(;ht, J., is omitted.

any th r mi . take th ' r in mi I arli n th m rtgag-c . it ha fail l lo
\.'.X lcute ils purpose . th c ~ irt hay tlie power, and w think it
th ·ir dut \' to reform th' in _trum cnt so a _ to ea rn· out th intent
of the parties.

Em.mert 1's. Tiio.Mi'.soN (1892).

~[

49 Minn. 386; 52 N. W. 31.

h

j ud g m ent o f th

omt b low . ho ulcl Ii affi rm cl.

Appeal from district court, Nobles county; Brown, Judge.

OTE-The conc ur ri n g opi n io n of \V R1c 1-1T ,

Action by Joseph Emmert against Peter Thompson and

J.,

is omit t ed .

others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintitl appeals.

-Affirmed.

Daniel Rolircr, for appellant.

Warner, Richardson & Lazvrencc and (7. ]V. Wilson, for

E~L\[ERT 7-'S. TU O:\ l l' SON

respondents.

( I(

2).

Collins, J. When the loan of money was made by defendant

·1-9 ::\Iinn . 3 6; 52 .. . \V. 3r.

Cornwell to defendant Afarr, to secure which, as agreed upon, the

latter mortgaged his entire farm, consisting of 240 acres, it was

for the stipulated purpose of relieving one tract (160 acres) from

Appeal fr om di trict c0 urt, . r bl
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the trust deed held by Ormsby, the balance (80 acres) from the

Hayes mortgage, and the entire farm from delinquent taxes. The

trust deed, the mortgage last referred to, and the taxes w^ere repre-

sented to l)e, and in fact were, first liens upon the pr*emises ; and

Cornwell believed, and it A\as implied from what Marr stated wdien

applying for the loan — there were no other incumbrances, and that,

c unty;

DRO\\"X _.

Juclg

Act ion by J o eph Emmert aga in . t l et r Thomp on and
thcrs. From a juclgm nt fo r cl fe ncla nt . plaintiff app al .
:-\ffirm cl .

with these paid oft" and discharged, his mortgage w^ould take their

Da niel R ohrer) fo r appellant.
TVamcr) Richardson & L a7..t•rc J1 cc and C. TV. TVilso!l . f r

place, and become the first and only charge upon the property. The

taxes and the amounts due on the incumbrances, aggregating

$1,434.82, were paid out of the proceeds of the loan, in accordance

with the agreement under wdiich it was made. l'ro]:)cr releases

r

pond n L

and discharges were procured and at once recorded, in the mistaken

belief on the part of Cornwell, and the agents who transacted the

business, that there was no other or prior charge upon the prem-

ises. P"or some time thereafter they remained in ignorance of the

OLLIXS, J. \\'h en tb loan of m oney wa mad I y cl fc nclant
' rn well tn clcfenclant f arr, to cur which, a arrr eel up n, th
latter m ortgaged hi entir farm. con i ting f _40 acre . it wa
f r the tipulatcd purpo of relievin'"'· on<: tract ( i 60 a r ) from
th tru t lcccl held by O rnL by, th halan c ( 80 acre ) fr 111 th
I lay _ m rtgag , a nd th ntir farm from cl eli nqu nt taxe . The
tnL t rlc d, the m or tgag la t ref rrccl tn, a nd th taxc w re r present cl to L . a nd in fa t w r , fir. t li 11 up n th p1~erni se ; and
"ornwell bt li vccl, a nd it \ \"2.S impli cl fr m wh at ::\Iarr tatecl wh n
J.PI lying for th loa n- th re w 1:: r no oth r incumbra nc , an l that,
with th e pa:cl o ff ancl cli sc harrr d, hi mortgag;e w ulcl tak th ir
place, and bee m th e fir, t a ncl only char Me up n the Ir perty. The
tax
and the am ount clu on th in curnbran c , aggr o-atinoI . .+3-1.82. w re 1,aid ut f the pr
cL of th I an . in accor lance
,,·it h the agrc rn nt uncl r which it \\·a · ma I . 1 r per r l a .
ancl di harg _ w r pr cur cl and at nee rccorcl ccl, in the mi tak n
belief n th part of orn w II. and th ag nt wh tran . act 1 th
bu in , i.hat th r wa ll 'J th r or l r i r char
up n tb e pr m 1. . .
For orn c i.irn th re::tfter th y rcmaine I m i 0 ·11 ranee f th e
v
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fact that ])laintiff's mortg-a^^e was in existence and of record when

the one in question was executed, and hy their acts had, of record,

hecome the senior Hen. As Alarr was and is insolvent, and plain-

tiff's niortgag-e, with costs and dishursements of foreclosure, now

exceeds in amount the value of the farm as found by the trial court,

the seriousness of the situation is quite apparent. The court be-

low subordinated the plaintiff's claim to that of defendant Corn-

well, to the extent of the payments made for taxes, and to satisfy

and extinoahsh the incumbrances, reinstating the liens, in effect ;

and its right and power sO' to do is the principal question now be-

fore us.

It has been well said that the doctrine of subrogation has been

steadily growing and expanding in importance, and becoming more

general in its application to various subjects and classes of per-

sons. It is not founded upon contract, but is the creation of equity

— is enforced solely for accomplishing the ends of substantial jus-

tice ; and, being administered upon equitable principles, it is only

when an applicant has an equity to invoke, and where innocent per-

sons will not be injured, that a court can interfere. It is a mode

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by

one who in justice and good conscience ought to pay for it, anid is

not dependent upon contract, privity, or strict suretyship. Stevens

V. Goodenough, 26 Vt. 676; Ilanisberger v. )\vtccy. 33 Grat. 527;

SiiiitJt V. Fornii. 43 Conn. 244. That in this way a court, luider a

great variety of circumstances, may relieve one who has acted

under a justifiable or excusable mistake of fact, is readily conceded

by appellant ; but he invokes and seeks to have applied to respond-

ents' case the general rule that the doctrine of subrogation w'ill not

be exercised in favor of a volunteer or a stranger who officiously

intermeddles, such as a person who pays without any obligation so

to do, or one who, without any interest to protect, liquidates the

debt of another. There are a very respectable number of cases,

several having been cited, in which relief has been refused under

circumstances precisely like those now before us, where one who

has loaned and used his money in good faith, and for the express

purpose of relieving a debtor from a pressing obligation, and his

real property from a specific lien for the amount of the same, under

a genuine but excusable misapprehension as to the rank and posi-

tion of security taken by him on the same property, has been

treated and characterized as a volunteer, a stranger, and an officious

intermeddler, and denied the rights of an equitable assignee. But

fact that plaintiff 111 rtgag \\'a in xi tence ancl of record wh en
the on in qu e ti on ·wa x cuted, and by th ir act ha I, of r cord ,
l\ larr wa. and i in Iv nt, and plain b come th~ nior li en .
tiff' mortgage, with c st and di bur ement f foreclos ure, now
exceed in amount the va lue f the farm a fo uncl 1 y th trial court,
the ri ou 11
of the ituati n is qu ite appare nt. Th cou rt b"low ubordinatecl the plaintiff. claim t that of defendant C rnwell, to the extent of the payment made for taxe , and to sati fy
and extin g-ui sh the incumbrance , reinstating the lien , in effect;
a nd it right and power so to do is the pri~n c ipal question now befor u .
It has been well sai l that the doctrine of sub rogation has been
stead il y growing and expanding in importa nce, and becoming more
general in it a pplication to var iou. ubj ect. and cla ses of perons. It i niot fo unded upon contract, but i the creation of equity
- i enfo rced solely f r accompli hing the encl of sub stantial ju tice; and, being admini tered upon equitable principles, it i only
when an applicant has an equity to invoke, and -vvh re innocent person ·will not be injured , that a court can interfer e. It is a m ode
which eq uity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a de! t by
one who in justice and good conscience oug ht to pay for it, and is
not dependent upon contract, privity, or strict urety hip. Stevens
v. Goodeno11gli, 26 V t. 676; Harnsberger v. Yance:, 33 Grat. 527;
Smith v. Forrrn ; 43 Conn . 24.+. That in this way a co urt, under a
g r eat variety of circ um stances, may relieve one who has acted
under a justifiable or excusable m i take of fa.ct, i r eadily conceded
by appellant; but he invok and seek to have applied to re pondents · case the general rul that the doctrine of ub rogatio111 will not
be xercise I in favor of a volunteer or a tranger who officiously
interm eddlcs, such as a person wbo pay without any obligation so
to do, or one who, without any interest to protect, liquidate the
delJt of another1. There are a very re pectable number of cases,
~ eve ral having been cited, in which reli f has been refu eel under
circum tance preci8ely like those now befo re u s, wh r e one who
ha loaned and used his money in gcocl faith, and fo r the expr es ~
purpo e of relievi1w a debtor from a pressino- obli o-ation, an l hi
rea l propen:y from a s1 cific lien fo r th amount of the ame, under
a gen uin but excusable m i apprehension a to the rank and po ition of -ecurity taken by hin; on the same property, has been
treated and characteri zed a a volunteer, a strc:nger , and an officious
interm eddler, and cl niecl the ri ghts of a n equitable a 1gne . But
1
,

RET ' HIP.
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of laic years, with the developnicnt of the ])rincii)ks on which the

doctrine is foundcih the courts have been taking' a l)roader and

more coniinendahle view of the situation of such a party, and at

this time very httle is left of the views expressed in the earlier

cases. The l)etter opinion now is that one who loans his money

upon real estate security for the express pur^x^se of takin>; up and

discharg-ing liens or incumhrances on the same property has thus

paid the del)t at the instance, request, and solicitation of the debtor,

expecting- and believing, in good faith, that his security will, of

record, be substituted, in fact, in ])lace of that which he discharges,

is neither a volunteer, stranger, nor intemieddler, nor is the debt,

lien, or incumbrance regarded as extinguished, if justice requires

that it should be kept alive for the benefit of the person advancing

the money, who thereby becomes the creditor. Of the many

authorities on this, we cite Association v. 'riioinpson, 32 N. J. Eq.

T33 : Gans v. Tliiciuc, 93 N. Y. 225 ; Sidcncr v. Pavcy, yj Ind. 241 ;

McKenzic v. McKciizic, 52 Vt. 271 ; Cobb v. Dyer, 69 Ale. 494;

Levy v. Martin, ^8 Wis. 198, 4 N. W. Rep. 35; Insurance Co. v.

AspinwaU, 48 Mich. 238, 12 X. W. Rep. 214; Crippcn v. Chaj;^-
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pci 35 Kan. 495, II Pac. Rep. 453; 3 Pom. Ju|. jur. 1212: Har-

ris. Subr. 81 I, 8i6; T^ixon. Subr. 165.

Tt is contended by ajipellant that Cornwell must, under the

circumstances, be declared culpably negligent when taking his

security and discharging of record the Onnshy and Hayes liens;

and, further, thai, as the plaintiff's mortgfage was then of record,

he had notice of it, in contemplation of law, and could not have

l)een misled or mistaken. Marr's application for a loan was for

the avowed purpose of taking up and discharging the Ormsl)y and

Hayes liens, and was well calculated to convey the impression that

these were the only incumbrances. Pie intentionally or otherwise

concealed the truth, omitting to state the existence of a junior in-

cumbrance in a large amount, a knowdedge of which would have

ended at once all negotiations with Com well's agents. It was

misleading, and the persons last named were not negligent because

they, to some extent, relied upon and w^ere misled by it. See

Nezi'cU V. Randall, 32 Minn. 171, 19 N. W. Rep. 972. It is a com-

mon thing for courts of equity to relieve parties who have by mis-

take discharged mortgages upon the record, and to fully protect

them from the consequences of their acts, when such relief will not

result prejudicially to tliird or innocent persons. Gcrdine v. Men-

age, 41 Minn. 417, .43 N. W. Rep. 91. Paraphrasing slightly a

o f lat }' ar_, with th e d v 1 pm nt o f th prin · ipl e · n whi ·h the
do ·trin is fou nd ·d, th ' ·o urts hav ,, b ' ·n taking a 1 r act r and
m o re comm nclah lc vi'\\' o f the . ittiati o n of . uch a party, and at
thi::, time very littl ' is ld t of th ' views cxpre
cl in th earli r
·ascs. The 1 tt r o pinio n 11 ,,. i . that o n ' wh 1 an hi . rn n y
upo n real cs tat ' _ccu rit y f r th
x pr ' S i urpn
f taking up and
discharging li ' IL o r in c umhrancc. o n th e am' Ir 1 rty ba thu
paid the cl ·bt at th imitance, reque. t, a nd o li itati n f th l ,1 t r,
,Xl ectin rr a nd h ·Ii , ·int-.;. in good faith, t hat hi
ccurity will , f
r 'co re!, 1 • ub . ti tut cl, in fart, in plac ' o f that whi h h e di barge ,
is n e ith r a , ·oluntec r, s tranger , nor int ·rmcddl r, n o r i the cl bt,
lien. or in umhran e r :-..;arded a e.· tingui hed , if ju t ic r quir
that it , houlcl he kept alive fo r th h n c fit of 1h p r o n aclvancin~.;
the money. wh o th rehy becom es th e r clit r.
f th man '
a utho ritie o n thi, we · it ,.js ·ociatio11 v. Tlzo111j>so1L, 3- r r. J. Eq.
T3): Gans v. Tlzic111c. 93 X. Y. 2-5: Sid 11cr v. I' a<!C}', 77 In !. 2 ..p ;
.l rc J..: eII= i (' v. l rc ]{ c II ::: i c ' 5- \ -t. 2 7 l ; c () bb v. D }'er) 6 .. I . -+ -+ ;
Lc<·y v. JI art in, -1R \i\' is . r J , 4 1 - . \ \ '. l ~cp. 35: flls1tra11 ce Co. v .
• lsj> i1m•all , -t8 .:\lich. 23<' , 12 ~-\.Rei. -t-t: Crij>pell v. ·1zappc!. 35 Ka n. -195. 1 1 Pac. R p. -+5); 3 Porn . Eq. Jur. L L ; lT arr is. ' ubr. R1 1, R1 ; Di x n , C:.ubr. 165.
It i contencled by appell a n t that o m\\· 11 mu t. uncl ·r the
. be d c larccl c ulpahl)· n egli g nt wh e n tak in ~. .; hi
c irc um . tan
. cc uritv c.. nd di . char cr i1w
{ r , rel th ' Orrn ])\' a nd Hay
li n ·
~
ancl. forth r, tha t . ;i.. the plaintiff . m o rt~.;age wa th n f r c rel,
he hacl n oti
o f it , in co ntemplat io n f law, a nd co uld n o t hav
he n mi lccl or mi · taken. 1\farr' applicati o n f r a 1 an wa f r
th aY ,,. cl purpo. e of tahng up and cli . c h a rging th
rm by and
] Jaye li n , and \Y a w 11 calculat cl t o ·0 nv y th impre i n that
th '
wer th e o nl y incumbrancc'. l l int nti nall y r o th rwi
·oncealecl th trnth, o mittin ,. . ; to . la.t ' th ' "Xi. ten
fa juni r in umbranc in ::t large a m o unt, a knnwlccl~e o f whi h \\"Ould h ave
e ncl d at 11 c all n g tiati o n wi~h 'o m,,· 11' ag nt . It wa
misle:icling, ancl th p rso n s la t na111 cl were n ot n ~) i o·ent 1 au ,,
th ey, to , , 111
x t nt, r Ii cl up n an<! w r mi 1 d by it.
Yc<crcll v. Ra11dall, 3- 'M inn. 17r, H) >!. \\T. hp. 97 ~. It i a com m on thing fo r o urt. f equity to r e li v partie wh hav 1 y mi tak cli charh d 111 rtgag
upon the r
rd, and t fully Ir t t
th 111 from t h
on qu n
o f th ir acts, wh n u h r li f will n t
r . ul t prej udi c iall y t thi r l r inn c nt p r on . Gerdine v. 11lenag c, -tr :.\I inn. -+ 1 7 . .+:) X. \V. R p . r. Para1 hra irw lio-htly a
-
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remark made in the opinion therein, it may l)e said that, consider-

ing this case as it stands between the appellant and respondent

Cornwell, it is obvious that it would be most unjust and inequitable

not to place the parties ;';; statu quo with respect to the amounts

paid out upon liens which were superior to that held by plaintiff,

now being foreclosed. It is true that at the outset the mistake grew

out of an error in the abstract books kept by Cornwell's agents;

but later, when examining the records in the office of the register

of deeds, the error was unnoticed and the mistake undiscovered.

It was a mistake of fact, and, in our judgment, not of such a char-

acter as to bar the respondents' claim to equitable relief. That, in

a proper case of mistake of fact, such relief may be afforded not-

withstanding the intervening mortgage was of record when the

error was committed, is well settled. Grih v. Reynolds, 35 Minn.

33 T, 28 N. W. Rep. 923. Cornwell misunderstood, and was justi-

fiabl}- ignorant of, the facts, and acted, through his agents, upon

the assumption that he and they knew the true state of the title

when the liens which liis nionev had <lischarged were satisfied of

record, and plaintiff's mortgage advanced to the position of the
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senior* incumbrance, without a single act of his, and to the very

great detriment of the person who had brought it about. The

■court was riglit in applying the principle of subrogation, or "equit-

able assignment,"' as it is frequently called.

Judgment v/as entered below, directing that the premises be

sold, on foreclosure of plaintiff's mortgage, as one farm, and that,

out of the net proceeds, there be first paid to respondent Cornwell

the sums of money which he paid out as taxes, and to take up and

satisf)- the incumbrances before mentioned. The appellant's coun-

sel distinctly approves that part of the judgment which requires

a sale of the premises as an entirety, but makes the point, in case

we affirm the action of the trial court on the main question, that the

farm should have been sold subject to the subrogator's lien for a

specific sum on the 160 and for another specific sum on the 80

acre tract, and thus tliere would have been avoided the possibility,

which he now suggests, of having shifted over upon one of these

tracts, to some extent, a burden which ought to wholly rest upon

the other. It is evident from the record that the attention of the

trial court was not called to this point, and hence the order that

the sale be of the v/hole as one body of land. But we are unable

to see how the result now suggested by counsel would have been

avoided by the adoption of his plan without selling the tracts sep-

r mark marJe in th op ini n therei n , it imty be a id that, con iclerino· t hi' as a it t:in I betw en th . app ll ant ancl r pondent
Cornwell , it i obvi0u that it would be: mo t unj u t and in quitabl '
not t pla e the parties in statn quo with resp ct to the amo unt ·
paid out upon lien whi ch w r superior to that held by pla intiff,
now I in g for clo eel. It i trne that at th outset the mi take g rew
out £ an er ro r in Lh e al . tract hook kept hy ornw ll' agent ;
but lat r, wh _n '-xamining the rero rd s in th e office of the r egister
of l els, th e error wa. unnoticed and the mi tak undiscovered .
It wa a mi stake of fact. an l, in our judgm ent, not f uch a character a to bar th e r espondents' claim to eq uitabl e r elief. That, in
a proper ca e of mistake of fact, such relief may b afforded notw~th ta ndin g th e intervenin g m rtgage wa of r eco rd when th e
error wa committe 1, 1 well settled . Lr rib v. Re,y11olds, 35 Minn.
331, ~8 N. \ . R ep. 923 .
onrn·ell mi sunders tood, and wa justifiably ignorant of, th facts. a ncl acted, thrnuo-h his agent , upon
the a umption lhat he and th y knew th e true tate of the title
when th _ liens which hi money ha d discharged were atisfied of
record, and plaintiff's mortgage advanced to the position of the
~ en i o 1'( incumbrance, without a sing le act of his, and to the very
great detriment of the person wl10 had brought it about. The
·Court was ri o-h t in applying- the principle of ubrogation, or " equitable a ig nment;'' as it is frequently call ed .
Jud o·m ent wa entered below, directing that the premi e be
sold, on fo r eclo ure of plaintiff mortgage, as one farm, and that,
out of the n t proc eds, there be fir t paid to respondent Cornw ell
the sum s of money ·whi ch he paid out as ta xes, and to take up and
ati fy the incmnbrance before mentioned. The appellant's counsel di tinctly approv that part of the j uclg ment which r equires
a ale of the premi es a an entirety, but makes the point. in case
we affirm the action of th e t rial court on the main que tion, that the
farm should h;:i_v b n old 11bj ect to the sul roo-ator's lien fo r a
_peci'fic . um on the 160 and for another specific sum on the 80
acre tract, and thu there " ·o ulcl have been avoided the po sibility,
whi h he now suggests, of having shifted ov r upon one of these
tract , to ome extent, a burden which ought to wholly rest upon
the other. It i evident from th e reco rd that th e attention of the
trial court 'Na not called to this point. and hence the order that
the ale be of the ·whole a" one body of land. But w e are unable
to ee how the res ult now , ugge ted by counsel would have been
avoided by the adoption of hi plan without elling the tracts ep-
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arately, keeping the funds derived from each chstinct. and apply-

ing- the same tn the Hquidation of the hens, so far as they might

go. Counsel does not contend that the two tracts of land should

have been sold separately, but, as before stated, indorses the judg-

ment directing a sale oi masse. He is concluded on this point by

his position as to the manner of sale.

Judgment affirmed.

jMorgan z.'s. Woudell (1901).

178 Mass. 350; 55 L. R. A. 33; 59 X. E. 1037.

arat ly, k pincr th fund.:; d ·riYcd fr m a h Ii tin t, an 1 applying the am to th liqui c!ati n f th' lien , o far a th y mi ·h.t
RO.
'o u1Lel do'. not
nt ·nd that th two tra t of land h uld
hav 1 cc n sold . parately, 1 ut, a. b for . tatecl indor
th jud mcnt clire ·ting- a al' c11 J11ass . H i conclud I n thi p int by
hi p . ition a · t th mann r f .al.

Jmlgi11cnt

Api'j:al by plaintiff from a judgment of the Superior Court

for Bristol county in favor of defendant upon an agreed state-

affirmed.

ment of facts to determine the lial)ility of defendant for a deb't

which he owed to the bankrupt. Judgment for defendant.

WordcU and Dillon were members of a partnership engaged

in the dry goods business. The partnership was dissolved by

~foR C. \ ~ 'US. \ \ lillELL

an agreement under which Dillon purchased the interest of the

(1901) .

copartners and agreed to pay the debts of the firm. Some of

these debts he failed to pay. After the dissolution of the firm

i7 Ma . 50; 55 L. R .\.

Wordell bought of Dillon goods for the purchase price of which

3~;

59

~.

E. ro37.
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this sction was brought. After Dillon's bankruptcy, defendanL

paid claims against the partnership to an amount exceeding that

which he owed to Dillon. The amount so paid he sought to set

off against the claim of the trustee for the purchase price of the

goods.

Further facts appear in the opinion.

by plaintiff fr m a ju Jo-m ent of the uperior ourt
fo r Dri t 1 county in fav r f clefcnclant upon an a oTe d tat ment of fact to d tcrmin e the liability f d efendant f r a d bl
which h ow ed to th e bankrupt. Ju Jo-m ent for d efendant.
_\ Pl'E.\L

Messrs. Williain M. Mori^cm and Jlciiry T. Richardson, for

appellant.

Messrs. John IV. Ciiiiunings and Charles A'. Ciuiiniings, for

appellee.

lloLAiES, Ch.J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy against a debtor

of the bankrupt. The debtor claims a set-off on the ground that

since the bankruptcy he has paid debts due from a former partner-

\Vord 11 and Dillon w er e m mber of a partner hip ngao-ed
th e dry go cl 1 u in e . Th e partn r hip wa di solved by
a n a crr eem nt und er which Dillon purcha eel th e int r e t f the
c partner and agr eel to pay th e d ebt of th e firm .
om of
th c debt he failed to pay. A fter th e di
lution of th firm
\Vorel 11 b ubht of Dillon good for th e purcha
I rice f which
thi c;c tion wa brOLwht. " fter Dillon · Uankruptcy, cl f ndal1 L
paid claim ao-ain t th e partn rship to an am unt x ee lin o- that
which he wed t Dillon. Th amount o paid h
ought to
t
ff acrain t th e claim f th tru t c for th pur ha c pri " f the
goo I.
111

Further fact
~I

app ar in the opinion .

TT ·illialll .JI. .Jforgan an 1 1-J Clll' )' T. Richardson, f

r .

r

app llant.
::\Ie . r
appell

l[

J olzn IV. C11nu11in o-s and Charles R.

DIE · ,

' h.

J., ) liver

d th e 01 ini

11

f th

un1nungs, f r
C

urt:

1 hi 1 - a s uit lw a tru. t
in bankruptcy again t a debt r
f th bankrupt. Th' debtor claim a ct- ff n th gr uncl that
inc the bankruptcy h ha 1 a i I cl 1 t Ju fr m a f rmer partn r -
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ship consisting- of himself, the bankrupt, and one McGuire, from

which debts the bankrupt had covenanted to save his partners

harmless. It is objected that the covenant runs to the two other

partners jointly, but it is sufficiently plain that there are several

covenants to each. The more serious objection is that the prin-

cipal debt paid is one which has been disallowed by final judg-

ment when offered by the creditors, H. B. Claflin & Co., for proof

against the estate, on the ground that they received a preference,

and that a claim oft'ered in the defendant's name in respect of

the payment also has been disallowed.

As it was assumed on both sides that the provision in § 68^

of the United States bankruptcy act concerning set-oft' is more

than a rule of procedure, and governs in this court as well as in

the courts of the United States, we shall make the same assump-

tion for the purposes of this case, without argument. See Hunt v.

Holmes, i6 Nat. Bankr. Reg. iot, 105. Fed. Cas. No. 6,890;

Partridge v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co., 15 Wall. 573. 580, 21 L.

ed. 229, 239. We shall assume further, as a corollary, that if a

set-off is to be maintained it must be brought within the words
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of the section referred to. Those words are: "A set-off or coun-

ter-claim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor of the bank-

rupt which (i) is not provable against the estate." These words

are universal in fomi, and we do not see how a set-off can be

claimed in this case outside of them.

If, then, the defendant claims by virtue of the rights of a

quasi surety [Fisher v. Tiift, 127 Mass. 313, 314) who has paid

and therefore is subrogated to the claim of a joint creditor of

himself and the debtor (§ 57') > the trouble is that he has to take

the claim of Claflin & Co. as he finds it, and he finds it a claim

which is not provable against the estate, because Claflin & Co.

have received preferences which have not been surrendered. Sec-

tion 570^. It seems hard that a matter between Claflin & Co. and

the bankrupt, with which the defendant had nothing to do, should

bar rights arising out of a payment which he was compelled to

make. But we do not feel at liberty to give the language of sec-

tion 57/ other than its most natural meaning, or to interpret the

subrogation there provided for as a subrogation free from the dis-

abilities attached to the creditor, or as a subrogation to the credi-

tor's rights independent of the effect of the preference upon them.

One result of such an interpretation would be to allow the claim

without a surrender of the preference, contrary to § 570-.

hip con i ting of him elf, the bankrupt, and one McGuire, from
whi h cl 1 t th · bankrupt had cov named to ave hi partn r
harmle . It i I jected that the c venant run to th two other
partner jointly, but it i uffici ntly plain that there are evcral
riou ol j ction i that the princove nant to each. Th m r
cipal debt paid i n which has b en di allowed by final judgment wh n offer d by the creditors, H. B. .laflin & Co ., fo r proof
again t the e tate, on the ground that they received a preference,
and that a claim offered in the defendant' name in respect of
the payment al o has been Ii allow d.
A it was assumed on both sides that. the provision in § 68b
of th U nited State bankruptcy act concerning s t-off is more
than a rul e of procedure, and governs in thi cou rt a well a in
the court of the U nited tates, we hall make the ame a umption for th purposes of this case, without arrrument. See Hunt v.
Ho/Jiles, r6 :\fat. Bankr. R g. 101, 105, F cl. Ca . Ko. 6,890;
Partridge v. Plwenix JI.Jut. L. Ins. Co., 15 \Vall. 573, 580, 21 L.
ed. 229, 239. \ Ve shall assume further, a a corollary, that if a
et-off i to be maintained it mu t be brought within the words
of the section referred to. Those words are: "A set-off or counter-claim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor of the bankrupt which ( r) i not provable again t the estate.' The e word
are univer al in fonn, and we do not see how a et-off can be
claimed in this case out ide of them.
If, then, the defendant claims by virtue of the right of a
qua i surety (Fis her v. Tifft, 127 Ma s. 313, 3q) who ha paid
and therefore is ubrogated to the claim of a joint creditor of
him elf and the debtor ( § 57i ), the trouble i that he has to take
the claim f Claflin & o. a he finds it, and he find it a claim
which i not proval le against th e e tate, b cause Claflin & Co.
have received preference which have not been surrendered. Section 57g. It eem hard that a matter betwe n Claflin & Co. and
the bankrupt, with which the defendant had nothing to do, hould
bar rirrht ari ing out of a payment which he wa compelled to
make. But we do not feel at liberty to give the language of section 57i other than it mo t natural meaning , or to interpret the
ubrogation there pr vided fo r a a ul rogation free from the di abilities attached to th e creditor, or a a subrogation to the creditor' rights independent of the effect of the preference upon them.
One r ult of uch an interpretation would be to allow the claim
without a urrender of th e pr f rence, contrary to § 57g.
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Jt is sugg-ested tliat tlio adjudication against Claflin & Co. is

res niter alios, and iIktc is no other evidence that they accepted a

preference. But the defendant's claim l)y sul)rogation is affected

by the judgment as it is by the preference, and for the same reason.

He stands in the shoes of Claflin & Co., succeeds to their place, in

the language of th.e Roman law, and is the same person with them

for this purpose, a notion frequently recurring in the law. Der-

nusson, Sul)rogation, 3d ed. chaj). 1, Xo. 7; Sheldon, subrogation,

2; 4 Masse, Droit Commercial, 2(1 ed. chap. 60, No. 2,125, D. 20,

4, 12, § 9, D 4, 12, 16. See Day v. Woreesier, N. & R. R. Co., 151

Mass. 302. 307. 308, 23 N. E. 824.

The defendant also claims a set-off by virtue of his covenant.

We assume that it has been adjudicated between the parties in the

district court that the defendant lias not a claim which he could

prove in his own name, and that this decision carries with it the

corollary that he could not prove his claim on the covenant against

the estate. If, therefore, the prohibition of a set-off of a claim

"which is not provable against the estate" is to be taken with simple

literalness as applying to any claim that could not be proved in the
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existing bankruptcy proceedings, the defendant's set-off cannot be

maintained. lUit we are of opinion that the seemingly simple

words which we have quoted must be read in the light of their

history and in connection with the general provision at the begin-

ning of § 68 for a set-off of mutual debts "or nuttual credits," and

that so read they interpose no obstacle to the defendant's claim.

riu' provision for the set-oft' of mutual credits is old. Stat. 4

Anne, chap. 17, § 11 ; 5 Geo. II.. chap. 30, § 28; 46 Geo. III., chap.

1 35' §3 ; Cjibson v. Bell, i Bing. x\. C. 743. 753 ; Ex Parte Prescott,

I Atk. 230. It was adopted in the United States (Acts 1800,

chap. 19, § 42, Acts 1841, chap. 9, § 5, and Acts 1867, chap. 176,

§ 20). I hit while the ])rovision as to nuitual credits was thought

to be more extensive than that as to nuitual debts {Atkinson v.

Elliott, 7 T. R. 378, 380), it was held that even the broader phrase

did not extend to claims which, when the moment of set-off ar-

rived, still were wholly contingent and uncertain, such, for in-

stance, as the claim upon this covenant would have been if the

defendant had not yet been called upon to pay anything upon the

original partnership debt. Abbott v. Hicks, 5 Bing. N. C. 578;

Robson, JJankr. 7th ed. 374. But the moment when the set-off

was claimed was the material moment. The defendant's claim

might have been contingent at the adjudication of bankruptcy,

It i · sugg '. tcd tlia! lh" a lj uclicalion aga in . t ' laf1 in
o. i
T • i.· n
olh r 'vid ' nc lhal th y a epled a
pref Tenc '. Hut the clef ' nd an t' s c la im by ul r ba ti n 1 aff ct <l
by the j udgmcnl as it is by lh l r fc rcnce, a n I f r Lh am r a n .
He tands in the h 's o f ' laJlin , ·o. su -c ed t th ir pla e, in
th e languag' of the Jfoman law, a nd i · th ame per on with th m
for this purp . e, a noti on frequently recurring in the la\Y . Dernu ·on, ' ubrogali n, 3<l c<l. chap. J, ;\ o. 7; ' h !don , ubro ation,
2; -J. .:\f asse, Dro it 'ommcrcial, _c\ 'cl. chap .
, ... • . 2 . 125, D. 20,
LJ, J 2, '9, I -J., 12, 16. •· 'e Day , .. I I 'o rccsicr, .\ '. & R.R. Co ., 151
~Jas ·. 3 2, 307, 308, -3 X. E. 82-1-.
The cl k ncl ant a lso cla im · a set-off by v irtu e of hi cov nant.
\\·e a sume that it has b en adj udi cated bet\\·e ' n the partie in the
di trict court that the clcfenclant ha not a claim whi h h e c uld
pro\'C in hi own nam e, an cl that this clcci ion carric with it th
corollary that he c ulcl not proYc h1 · -!aim on the c v na nt a ain t
the . tat
lf, thercf re, the I ro hibiti on of a
t-off f a claim
.. ,,·hich i not provabl ' aga in t thee tat," is to be tak n with im1 l
literalne as applying to a n y claim that cou ld not b pr vecl in the
ex i ting ba nkrupt -y procec ling , th e c!dencl;rnt's ct- ff cann o t be
maintain d . J hit we are of pinion that the e mitwly impl e
w ord s \\' hi h we have q uotccl mu. L he r ad in the 1i rrh t of th ir
hi to ry and in connection with the gen ' ral pro,·i i n at the be 0 ·in ni1w of 6 fo r a ct-off of mutual cl ' bts "or mutual er clit , " and
that o read they int rpo e no ol ta le to Lh e clef ncl ant' -Jaim.
Th p rov i ion fo r the set-off of mutual er dit i lei.
tat. 4
A nn , chap. J 7 , § Ir; 5 Ceo. II. , chap. 3 , 2 ; 46 'e . ] U ., chap.
135, 3: Gibson\'. Bell, 1 Ding. i\. C. 7-J.3, 753; Ex Parle Prescott,
1 Atk. 230.
It wa adopt d in th e ' nit ecl tat
( ct 1 oo,
chap. 19, 4-, , \ ct 18-J.I , cha1. 9 , § 5, a nd . \ ct I 7, chap. r76,
§ 20). 13ut w hil e the JW vi i n as to mu tual c reel it wa - th ug ht
t b m ore xtcn iv' than that a to mutual debt ( lt/(i!lson v.
Elliott, 7 T. h... 37 . 8 ) , it \\·a held that ven the br a cl er phra e
lid n t ext n 1 to -!aim which, when the mom nt of el-off arrived, till wcr' wh ll y
ntingent a nd unc rtain, uch , f r intance, a th claim UJ n thi cov na nl w ul l hav 1 e n if th
d f ncla nt hacl not y ' l been ca ll l up n t pay anything up n th
original partn r ·hip cl bl. .dbbott \'. Hic/(s, 5 Bin . r
57 ;
R ob n , Dank r. 7th cl. 37-t· nut th mom nt wh n th e
t-off
wa claim l wa the material rn m ' nl. The 1 f nclant'
laim
might hav l een
ntincrcnt at th aclj u licati n f bankruptcy,

re:; i11tcr alws, and th
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and so not proval^le in the absence of special provisions such as

are to be found in the later bankrupt acts in England and in the

United States act of 1867, although not in the present law, and yet

if it had been liquidated, as here by payment, before the defendant

was sued, he was allowed without question to set it off. Smith v.

Hodsoii, 4 T. R. 21 1 Ex parte Boyle, Re Shepherd, i Cooke, Bank-

rupt Laws. 8th ed. 561 ; E.v parte ITagstaff, 13 Ves. Jr. 65; Marks

V. Barker, i Wash. C. C. 178, 181, Fed. Cas. No. 9,096.

The limitations worked out liy these decisions were expressed

in the section of the act of 1867 cited above, in the words "but

no set-off shall be allowed of a claim in its nature not provable

against the estate." These words, as it seems to us, following the

cases, refer yet to the nature of the claim at the moment when it

was sought to set it off, not to its nature at the beginning of the

pending bankruptcy proceedings, and did not prevent a set-off of

a claim which was liquidated at the later moment merely because,

when the bankruptcy proceedings began, for some reason it did

not admit of proof. The present statute leaves out the words "in
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its nature," but we can have no doulit that it was intended to con-

vey the same idea as the longer phrase in the last preceding act,

from which in all probability its words were derived. "Provable"

means provable in its nature at the time when the set-off is claimed,

not provable in the pending bankruptcy proceedings.

The right to set off the claim when liquidated after the begin-

ning of the bankruptcy proceedings was based upon its being a

mutual credit, not upon the claim being provable, which it was not

until the later bankruptcy statutes. Russell v. Bell, 8 Mees. & W.

277, 281. Conversely, of course the exclusion of a set-off. when

the claim still was contingent and the defendant had made no pay-

ment, did not stand on the ground that the claim was not provable

in the existing bankruptcy proceedings, but on the ground that it

was not provable in its nature, and that there was no machinery

available to liquidate it. If we are right in supposing that the act

of 1867 meant merely to codify a principle, or rather a limitation

developed by the courts, and that tlie words of the present act mean

no more than those of the act of 1867, it follows that, although

the defendant's claim could not have been proved against die

estate, still it is a mutual credit and may be set oft' when he is

sued.

Judgment for defendant.

and o not 1 rovable in th e ab ence £ p -cial prov1 ion such as
ar to b fa un l in th e lat r 1 ankrupt act · in E ng land and in the
nited tate act of i R67, al th ug h not in the present law, a nd yet
if it ha 1 be n liquiclat cl, a h re by payment, before the defendant
wa sue I, he ,,·as all w l without que tion to et it off. S111ith v.
Hadsall, -t T. R. 211 E.r partc Boyle, R e Shepherd i ~ook , Bankrupt Law . 8th ed. 561 ; Ex partc f Vags taff, i 3 V . Jr. 65; J.1 1arlu
v. Bar!?.cr, l \Va. h.
. 178, 181. Fed. a ·. 1 . 9, 96.
The limitations work ed out by the e decision ~were exp r eel
in the ection of the act of 1867 cited above, in the words "but
no et-off hall be allo,,·ecl i a claim in its nature not provable
ao-ain t the estate." The e word . a it , cem s to u , fo llow ino- the
case , r f r )'et to the nature of th e claim at the moment when it
wa so ught to set it off, not to its nature at the beginning f the
pending bankruptcy proceedings, and did not prevent a set-off of
a claim which w ~L liquida ted at th later moment m erely becau e,
when th e bankruptcy proceeding began, fo r som e reaso n it did
not admit of proof. The present tatute leaves out the words ''in
it nature, " but we can have no doubt that it wa intended to convey th e ame idea as the 101wer phrase in the la st preceding act,
from which in all probabi lity its words were derived. "Provable"
m ean provable in its nature at the time when th e et-off i claimed,
not provable in th e pendin g bankruptcy proceedings.
The rig ht to set off the claim when liquidated after the beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding was based upon its b ing a
mutual credit. not upon th e claim being I rovable, which it wa not
until the later bankruptcy tatutes. Russell v. Bell, 8 Mees. & W.
277, 28r. Conver sely, of cour th e exclusion of a set-off, wh en
the claim still wa canting nt and the defendant had mad e no paym ent, did not stand on the ground that th e claim was not provabl
in the exi ting bankruptcy proceedings, but on th e ground that it
wa not provable in its nature, and that there wa no machinery
availabl to liquidate it. If we are right in suppo ing that the act
of 1867 m eant merely to codify a princir le, or rather a limitation
developed by the courts, and that th e word of the present act m ea n
no more than th ose of th e act of 1867, it fo llows that, although
the defendant ' claim co uld not have been proved again t th e
estate, till it is a mutual credit and may be et off when he i
ued.

Juclgm ent

for defendant.
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Thayer z's. I )a x i els ( 1 872 ) .

TH .\ YER

110 Mass. 345.

(/ S.

1

.\ ." LE I ..

( 1

72 ) .

Contract. The declaratiun allecfed iliai the defendant as

principal, and the plaintifif as surety, signed a note fur $500,

I I

1\la . .)-+5·

dated Septeniher 28, 1861, and pa^ahle on demand to Nathan

George or order, with interest ; that the plaintift' signed as surety

without consideration, and for the accommodation of the defend-

ant ; that the defendant failed to pay the note ; and that the

plaintiff had lo pay to Cieorge the ])rincipal of the note to take it

up. The answer denied the allegations of the declaration, and

also set up the statute of limitations, and a discharge of the de-

fendant in insolvency.

At the trial in the superior court, before Bacon, J., it appeared

that the plaintiff executed the note without any consideration,

and for the accommodation of the defendant; that the defendant

on h'ebruary 1 1, 1862, tiled his petition for the benefit of the in-

solvent law ; that a warrant was duly issued ; that at the third

meeting of the creditors George proved the note against the de-

fendant's estate ; that a small dividend was then declared ; that
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afterwards, in August, 1862, the defendant was duly discharged

from his debts; and that on May i, 1865, the plaintiff' paid to

George on the note $500, which was less than the amount then

due upon it, and took it up. The defendant asked the judge to

rule that the statute of limitations began to run against the

plaintiff's cause of action from the time the note fell due; and

that the discharge in bankruptcy was a bar to the action ; but

the judge refused so to rule, and ruled that on the foregoing facts

the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The jury returned a verdict

for the plaintiff, and the defendant allegxxl exceptions.

P. E. Aldricli, {S. A. Burgess with him,) for the defendant..

T. G. Kent, for the plaintift".

Ames, J. There was an implied promise, on the part of the

defendant, as principal, to indemnify the surety, and to repay to

him all the money that he might be compelled, in consequence of

his liability as surety, to pay to the creditor. Until the surety

has been compelled to make such payment, there is no breach of

this implied promise. The cause of actiun accrties then for the

Th d claration all '0" 1 that th e clef nclanl a
principal. and th plaintiff a
ur ' t)
ig n ' d a note fo r 500,
elated 'epl ' mb r ~ 1 , I
r and l ayab lc o n d mand lo X athan
(;corn- or ore.I r, with in t r t; that th e plaintiff i ·ned a
urcty
with out con ·i 1 ra ti n , an 1 f r th ' acco mmodation £ th d f ndant; that the Jcfcnclanl fa iled to 1 ay th e note; an l that th
plaintiff had to pay lo (~e r g' th prin · ipa l f th not to take it
up. The a nswer cl ' niecl th e alleo-a ti ons f the decla ration and
also
t up th
tatul ' of limitation , a nd a di cbaro-c f th d fendant in in olvency .
•\t th trial in th ' u1 ri r court, before .\ · x, ]., it app ared
that th plaintiff ex cutecl th e n te witho ut any c n iderati n,
an 1 fo r the ace mm dation f th defendant· that th e defendant
on F bruary J 1 , i 86~, fil ed hi petiti n f r lh b nefit f th inolvent law ; that a warrant wa dul y i u cl; that at th e third
m e tin o- f th er clitor Geo rge prov d th note ag·ain t th defendant'
sta te; 1hat a mall dividend wa · th n le Jar d; that
aft n a rcl , in Atio-u t, 1 62, the d fen<lant wa duly di charged
fr m hi d bt ; a nd t hat on ::\Iay l , r8 5, the plaintiff paid to
G ' r o- on the note 500 , which ·w a le than th e amount then
du upon it, ancl t ok it up . The d fenclant a keel th judo-e to
rul e that th e tatul
f limitati n b gan to run again t the
plaintiff' cau ., of action from th ti me th not f 11 due; and
that th Ii barge in 1 ankruptcy wa a 1 ar to th acti n ; but
th ' ju lo- r fu ed . to rul , and rul I that on th f r b . in o- fact
th plaintiff wa ntitl cl t recov r. Th jury r turn cl a v rdict
fo r the plai!1tiff, a nd th e defendant all gccl cxc pti n .
.\" T l{ .\ ' T .

P . E. A ldrich, (S. A . Bur <YCSS with him, ) for the def ndant_.
T. G. r nt, f r the plaintiff.
A11Es, ]. 'Ih r wa an im1 Ii cl pr mi . , on th part f the
def n !ant, a prin ipal , to in l mnify th e ur ty , and to r pay to
him all th m n y that h mi ht b
mp 11 rl, in n qu n
of

hi liability a
ur ty, t pay t th er dit r.
ntil th e urety
has b n
mp 11 cl t make uch payme nt, ther i no br a h of
thi implie l 1 r mi , c. The au .
f a ti n acc ru
th n f r th
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first time, and the statute of limitations then begins to run. (Jf

course the exception that the claim of the plaintiff is barred by

that statute cannot be maintained Apl^lcion v. Bascom, 3 Met.

169; Hall V. Thayer, 12 Met. 130.

At the time when the defendant petitioned for the benefit of

the insolvent law, the plaintiff's cause of action against him had not

accrued. Nothing was due at that time from die insolvent to the

plaintiff', and \\hether anything would become due depended upon

the contingency of his being compelled to pay, and actually pay-

ing, the note, in whole or in part. If the plaintiff' had taken up

the note, or made a payment upon it, at any time before the

making of the first dividend, his claim for the money so paid

would have been provable against the estate of the insolvent,

under the Gen. Sts. c. 118, § 25, and would therefore have been

barred by the discharge. But it appears from the report that no

money was paid by the plaintiff' as surety, and no cause of action

accrued to him against the insolvent, until long after the first and

only dividend was paid from his estate.

The case of Mace v. IVells, 7 How. 272, which is relied upon
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by the defendant, arose under the bankrupt act of 1841, a stat-

ute which diff'ered from our insolvent law, in allowing sureties

and other parties under a contingent liability to prove such con-

tingent liabilities as claims upon the estate, and "when their debts

and claims become absolute," to have them allowed.

The defendants also insist that the debt itself was provable

and was therefore discharged; but this is not true as to the con-

tingent claim of the surety. He had no claim that was provable

under the statute, at the date of the discharge.

Two other cases relied upon by the defendant, Wood v. Dodg-

so)i, 2 M. & S. 195, and Vaiisandaii v. Corsbie, 8 Taunt. 550,)

were decided under English statutes which in express terms make

the contingent liability of a surety a provable claim against the

bankrupt's estate. In the first of these cases the court say that

the statute was intended to benefit the sureties, by allowing them

to share in the dividend before the estate is all gone, and before

the actual payment of their liabilities. Neither of these deci-

sions is applicable to a case under our insolvent laws.

Exceptions overruled.

fir t time, and the tatute of limitation th en begin to run. Of
cour th ex eption th at the claim of the plaintiff i barr 'cl by
that tatut ca nn t b maintain ed ~--lf'f'/ cto !l v. Basco /JI ) 3 ).let.
i6 ; Halt v. Thayer) 12 l\I t. 130.
A t the tim \\'hen the cl f n !ant petitioned for the ben fit of
the in olvent la\\', the pla intiff's cau e of action aga in t him had not
accrue I. l\ othing wa du e at th at time from the in olv nt to the
plaintiff. and wh ether anything would become lue clepende 1 upon
th contino-ency of hi being compelled to pay, and actually payino-, the note, in whole or in part. If the plaintiff had taken up
the note, or made a payment upon it, at any time bcfor the
making of the fir t dividend, hi claim fo r the money o paid
\\ ould have been provable again t the e tate of the in olvent,
under the Gen. t . c. I 18, § 25, and wo uld ther fo re have been
barred by the di charg . Dut it appear from the repo rt that no
money wa paid by the plaintiff a urety, and no cause of action
accrued to him again st th e in olvent, until long aft r the fir t and
only dividend wa;; paid from hi e tate.
The case of 1ll ace v. ~Veils) 7 How. 272, which i relied upon
by the defendant, aro e under the bankrupt act f 18--1-1 , a tatute which differed from our insolvent law, in allowing ureties
and other partie und er a contin gent liability to prove such canting nt liabilitie a claim upon the estate, and ''when their debt
and claims becom e ab olute," to have tbem allowed.
The defendants also insist that the debt its lf wa provable
and wa therefore di charged; but thi i not tru as to the contingent claim of the urety. He had no claim that wa provable
under the tatute, at the date of the di charge.
Two other ca es r eli ed i.1pon by the defendant, TVood v . Dodgso 11 ) 2 1\I. & . 195) and Va llsalldan v. Corsbie) 8 Taunt. 550,)
,,-ere decided under Engli h statute which in express t rm make
the contingent liability of a urety a l rovable claim against th e
bankrupt's estate. In the first of th e~ e cases the court ay that
the statute was intended to benefit the ureties by allow ing them
to hare in the dividend before the esta te is all gone, and before
the actual payment of their 1iab ilitie . N eith r of the e deci~ i o n s i applicable to a ca e under our in olvent law
Exception overruled.
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Lansdale vs. Cox (1828).

7 B. Mon. (.Ky.) 401.

L\X · o .\LE

<' ·.

'ox

1 )2

) .

Mayes & Chapcac, for plaintiffs.

Hardin & Darby, for defendants.

7 n. :\I n. ( ry.) 4

t.

Opinion of the court by Chief Justice Bir.n.

Richard Lansdale and James Cox were the sureties of Shanks,

in an injunction bond to Summers, who sued Cox, the surviving

obhgor, and had judgment for $730.24, beside costs, which was

paid by Cox's surety in a replevin bond, and afterward paid by

.Hayes & Cliapc::;c, fo r plaintiff .
JJard in & Darby, f r clef nclant .

Cox to his surety. These proceechngs were in the Nelson circuit

court.

Cox thereafter, uix)n motion against the heirs of Shanks

Opini n of tb e o urt by

h icf Ju tic

Drnu.

[402] the principal, (stating that there was no executor or ad-

ministrator of Shanks,) had judgment, and execution, upon which

the sheriff made a small part of the judgment, (about $35.19,)

and returned that he could find no estate whereof to satisfy the

residue.

Cox then sued his motion against the heirs and administrators,

jointly, of his co-security, Lansdale, for contribution, and recov-

error.
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ered judgment ; to which the defendants prosecute this writ of

The whole doctrine of contribution between securities origi-

nated with courts of equity. There is no express contract for

contribution ; the bonds, obligations, bills, or notes, created liabili-

ties from the obligors to the obligees. The contribution between

co-sureties results from .the maxim, that equality is equity. Pro-

ceeding on this, a surety is entitled to every remedy which the

creditor has against the principal debtor ; to stand in the place of

the creditor ; to enforce every security, and all means of payment ;

to have those securities transferred to him, though there was no

stipulation for that. 'Jdiis right of a surety stands upon a prin-

ciple of natural justice. The creditor may resort to ]M-incipal, to

either of the securities, for the whole, or to each for his proportion,

and as he has that right, if he, from partiality to one surety, or

for other cause, will not enforce it, the court of equity gives the

same right to the other surety, and enables him to enforce it. Nat-

ural justice says that one surety having become so with odier

Richard Lan cl al and Jam
ox ,,. re th ur ti of ' hank ,
in an in jun ·tion b n I to Summer , wh
ued ~ ox, th
urv1v111<Y
obli or, a n cl had j ucl m nt fo r 730.~-t-, be ide co t , which wa
paid by · x · ur ty in a r epl ,·in bond and aft rward pai 1 1 y
ox t hi ·urcty . The pr ceeding w ere in th X 1 on cir uit
court.
· x th r after, up n m otion again t th e h eir of
hank
[ 402] the principal, ( tating that th r wa no xecutor or admini trator f ~ hank ,) had jud2111 nt, and x cuti n upon which
the heriff mad e a mall part of the j ucl o-m ent (about 35. 19,)
and r eturn <I that h c ul 1 find no
late whcr 'Of to ati fy the
re idu .
'ox th n ued hi m oti on ao-ain t th h ir ancl aclmini trator ,
jointly, of hi · c - ec urity, Lan dal , f r ontributi n, and r covered j uclg m ent ; to whi ch th e cl ef nclanL pro ecut thi writ of
error.
The wh 1 doctrine f contributi n 1 t,,. en
nat cl with ourt of e iuity. There i. 11 expr
contributi 11: th bond , blio-ation , bill.. or note
ti from the ol ligor to th ol lige . Th e contributi n 1 tw en
co- uret i r s ult fr om .th maxim, that equality i quity. Proce cling on thi , a ur ty i entitl ed t every r m dy which th
cred itor ha. again t the principal cl 1 t r · t tancl in th 1 lac of
th e red it r; to nf rce v ry c urity, an cl a ll m ean
f paym nt;
to hav tho
ecuriti e tran f rrecl t him, thOLwh th r wa no
tipulation f r that. Thi rig ht f a ur ty tand upon a principl of natural ju ti . Th er cl it r may r
rt to prin ipal , to
ith r of th e uritie . f r th wh IC'. r t a h for hi J r porti n,
a ncl a h ha s that rio-ht , if h , fr m partiality to n
ur ty, or
f r oth r au e, will n t nf rce it, th
urt f quity o-iv
the
. am ri o-bt to th oth r ur ty , and nal 1 him to enf r it. _ atural ju ti
. ay that n
urety havino- 1 com
with th r

LAN ' DALE
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sureties, shall not have the whole debt thrown upon him by the

choice of the creditor, in not resorting to remedies in his power,

without having contribution from those who entered into the

obligation equally with him. The obligation of co-sureties,

to contribute to each other, is not founded in contract between

them, but stood upon a principle of equity, until that principle of

equity had been so universally acknowledged, that courts of law,

ni modern times, have assumed jurisdiction. This jurisdiction of

the courts of common law^ is based upon the idea, that the equitable

principle had been so long and so generally acknowledged, and

enforced, that persons, in placing themselves under circumstances

to which it applies, may be supposed to act under the dominion

of contract, implied from the universality of that principle. For

a great length of time, equity exercised its jurisdiction exclusively

and undividedly ; the jurisdiction assumed by the courts of law is,

comparatively of very modern date; and is attended with great

difficulty where there are many sureties ; though simple and easy

enough where there are but two sureties, one of whom brings his

action against the other upon the implied assumpsit for a moiety.
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The action at law, then, by one surety against his co-security,

arises out of an implied undertaking, not by force of express con-

tract, and consequently the heirs can not have been expressly bound

by the ancestor. So that the action at law, by one surety against

the representatives of a deceased co-surety, must, by the principles

of the common law, be against the executor or administrator. To

reach the heirs in a suit at law, the remedy given by our statute

in such cases, must be jointly against the executors or adminis-

trators and heirs, not against the heirs alone. The remedy in

equity by substitution of the co-security in place of the creditor,

and so allowing the one surety his redress against his co-surety

or co-sureties for contribution, still remains ; the remedy at law,

by a regular action jointly against the heirs and executors or ad-

ministrators, by force and operation of the statute of 1792, may

be pursued.

Reversed, with directions to lower court to dismiss motion.^

'That part of the opinion dealing with the statute and practice thereunder is

omitted. '

19

nretie., hall n t hav th wh le d bt thr wn u1 n him by th
hoice of the credit r, in n t r orting to r m di in hi p wer,
without having c ntributi n from tho
,,vho enter d into the
1 li ati n
f co- ur tie ,
blig ati n qually ' ith him . Th
t contribute to ach th r i not fo und l in c ntract 1 tween
th m but tood upon a I rinciple of equity until that prin ipl of
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the court f common law i ba d upon t h idea, that the quitable
principl had b n o long an d o generally acknowledged, and
nfo rc I, that p r on , in placing; themselve under circumstance
t which it appli , may be suppo ed to act un I r the dominion
f contract, im pli cl from the univer ality of that principl . For
a g reat lenoth of time, quity exerci eel it j uriscliction excl u ively
and unclividedl y · the j uri diction a um d by the courts of law is,
comparatively of very modern date; and i attended with o-reat
difficulty where th re are many uretie ; thouo-h imple and ea y
nough ' here th ere are but two uretie , one of whom bring hi
acti'on ao-ain t th other upon the implied a ump it fo r a m iety.
The action at law, then, by one urety against hi co- ecurity,
ari e out of an implied undertakin g, not by fo rce of x pre contract, and con equentl y the heir can not have been expre ly bound
by the ance tor.
o that the action at law, by one urety again t
the repre entative of a deceased co- urety, mu t, by the principle
of the common la\\·, be again t the ex ecutor or admini trator. T o
reach the heir in a uit at law, the remedy given by our tatute
in uch cases, mu t be jointly again t the ex ecutor or admini trator and heir , not against the heir alone. TI:ie remedy in
equity by ub titution of the co-security in place of the creditor,
and so allowing the on uret. hi redre again t hi co-surety
or co- ureties for contril ution, till remains; the remeclv at law,
by a regular action jointly again t the heir and executor or admini trator , by force and operation of the tatute of 1792, may
1 e pu r ued.
R eversed , with directions to lower court to di miss motion.1
1 Tha t part of th e op inion
dea lin g with t he
omitted.
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Easterly vs. Barker (1876).
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66 N. V. 433.

There were two appeals in this case, the one l)y plaintiff

Y .4

from an order of the general term of the supreme court in the

fourth judicial department denying motion for a new trial and

directing judgment on a verdict, the other by defendant from

the judgment entered upon such order.

The action was brought ])y plaintiff as third indorser of a

promissory note to recover the amount thereof of the second

indorser.

The note in question was made by the Stevenson ]\Ianufac-

turing Company, payable to the order of one Knight, who in-

dorsed it. Defendant was second indorser, plaintiff' third, and

one MacDougall the fourth. Defendant alleged in his answer

that the note was given and discounted for the benefit of the

maker, in which company all the four indorsers were stockholders ;

that they indorsed for the accommodation of the company under

an agreement that as between themselves they should be co-sure-
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should be obliged to pay thereon.

Upon a former trial plaintiff' recovered a judgment for one-

fourth the amount of the note. It appeared on such trial that the

two other indorsers were insolvent. The general term reversed

the judgment and ordered a new trial on the ground that plaintiff

v/as entitled to judgment for one-half the amount. 3 N. Y. S. C.

( T. & C.) 421."

Upon the second, parol evidence was received to prove the

allegations of the answer, which was received under objection

and exception. The evidence tended to show that the note in suit

was a renewal of a former note ; that the agreement was made in

reference to the original note, which was renewed from time to

time. The testiniou}- was conflicting as to whether any thing

was said in reference to the liability as co-sureties at the time of

the indorsements of the note in suit.

Plaintiff was allowed to prove, under objection and excep-

tion, the insolvency of the other two indorsers, Knight and Mac-

Dougall. Evidence was given on the part of defendant tending

to show that the bank which discounted the note brought suit
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Ihereon against plaintiff alone at defendant's request upon his

giving security to indemnify the bank.

As to the agreement, the court charged, in substance, that

if the jury found that the agreement was made as claimed by

defendant, plaintiff was entitled to judgment for one-half the

amount of the note, to which defendant's counsel duly excepted.

The court also charged as follows: "If former notes have

been given under this agreement, with the understanding that they

were to stand with a joint, instead of a separate liability, and that

note was carried along until it came to this one, and they signed

this note with the arrangement and understanding resting upon

their minds, you will have no doubt in coming to the conclusion

ihat this agreement attaches to this last note;" to which plaintiff's

counsel duly excepted. Exceptions were ordered to be heard at

first instance at general term.

E. H. Avery, for the plaintiff.

Francis Kernan,-ior the defendant.

Miller, J. The first question presented upon these appeals

is, whether it is competent in an actiou by one indorser against
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a prior indorser for the defendant to prove by parol an agreement
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w re to tand v.1 ith a joint in teacl of a eparate liability, and that
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tbi. note with th arrangement and understanding re ting upon
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~hat this agreement attache to thi. last note ;" to w hich plaintiff'
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fir t in ~ tance at general term.

between all the indorsers that they were, as between themselves,

co-sureties where they are accommodation indorsers. In Barry v.

Ransom (12 N. Y. 462) it was held that an agreement made be-

tween parties prior to or contemporaneously with their executing a

written obligation as sureties, by which one promises to indemnify

the other from loss, does not contradict or vary the terms or legal

effect of the written obligation, and it may be proved by parol

evidence. It was said by Denio, J., in the opinion, that an agree-

ment among the sureties, arranging their eventual liabilities among

themselves in a manner different from wdiat the law would pre-

scribe, in the absence of an express agreement, would not contra-

dict any of the terms of the bond. It was also held, that the en-

gagement among themselves had no necessary place in, the instru-

ment between them and the other contracting parties. The case

cited referred to a joint and several bond, where the obligors were

equally liable upon its face. No reason exists, however, why the

same principle is not applicable to notes and bills of exchange.

'1 he- terms of the contract contained in instruments of this charac-

ter, which are within its scope to define and regulate, cannot be

E. H. A very, for the plaintiff.
Francis Kernan, -for the defendant.
MILLER, J.
The first question presented upon these appeals
is, whether it i competent in an actiO!i by one indorser against
a pnor indorser for the defendant to prove by parol an agreement
between all the indorsers that they were, as between themseives,
co-sureties where they are accommodation indorsers. In Barry v.
Ransom, ( 12 . Y. 462) it was held that an agreement made between parties prior to or contemporaneously with their executing a
written obligation a uretie. , by which one promises to indemnify
the other from loss, does not contradict or vary the terms or legal
effect of the written obligation, and it may be proved by parol
evidence. It was said by DENIO, J., in the opinion, that an agreement among the sureties, arranging their eventual liabilities among
themselves in a manner different from what the law would precribe, in the absence of an express agreement, would not contradict any of the terms of the bond. It was also held, that the engagement among themselves had no necessary place in. the instru11 lf'nt between them and the other contracting parties.
The case
cited referred to a joint and several bond, where the obligors were
qually liable upon its face. No reason exists, however, why the
ame principle is not applicable to notes and bills of exchange.
'l he· terms of the contract contained in instruments of this character, which are ·within its srope to define and rea-ulate, cannot be
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chang'ctl by parol ; Init the uiKlcrstancling between the indorsers

i^ a distinct and separate subject, an outside matter, which may

be properly proved independent of and without any reg'ard to the

han. d I y par 1; 1 ut th
i_ a di ti n t and

und r tandin

b tw

n th

instrument itself. This rule is distinctly established in reference

10 joint makers of promissory notes ; and although the previous

decisions had been somewhat uncertain it has been recently deter-

mined liy the decision of this court that where a person signed,

as surety, a joint and several promissory note, and it did not appear

by (lu instrument itself that such relation existed, he might prove

such fact by parol, and that such proof did not tend to alter the

terms of the contract. Hubbard v. Gtirney, 64 N. Y. 457. It is

not apparent that any such difference exists between the two classes

of cases which prevents the application of the same principle tc

both of them.

An attempted distinction is sought to be maintained because

the relation of indorsers to each other are fixed by law- ; while

the relations and obligations of sureties and obligors are not fixed.

tc

As between the principal and the sureties they are fixed quite as

much as between indorsers, and can only be settled as between
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sureties where the contract does not show the fact by parol proof

of the same. In support of the same views is the case of Philips

V. Preston (5 How. [U. S.] 278, 292), where the doctrine is laid

down that proof of a collateral contract, by parol, may be given

to show the liability of indorsers as between themselves. See, also,

McDonald v. Magrudcr, 3 Peters. 470; Aiken v. Barkl\\ 2 Speers,

747; Edelen v. White, 6 Bush. (Ky.), 408; Davis v. Morgan, 64

N. C. 570. The indorsements upon bills of exchange or promis-

sory notes rest upon the theory that the liability of indorsers to

each other is regulated by the position of their names, and that

the paper is transferred from the one to the others by indorse-

ment. But this rule has no practical application to accommodation

indorsers, where neither of them has owned the paper and no such

transfer has been made. It is easy to see that the application of

the rule contended for, in many cases, would work the most serious

injustice. Suppose a person sign as accommodation maker of a

promissory note, and the payee for wdiose benefit it is made in-

dorses it and pays the note, and afterwards sues the maker to

recover back the money, would it be seriously contended that

proof could not be given to show that he was merely an accom-

modation maker? Clearly not; and yet such evidence would

contradict the written instrument (luite as tnuch as it would to
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prove an agreement between indorsers in regard to their lial)ility

as between each other. Cases frequently arise wliere it is com-

petent to prove that the indorsement is made for the accommoda-

tion of the maker; and a drawee may show, after acceptance, that

he has no funds (3 N. Y. 423) in his hands, and that he was

merely an accommodation acceptor. GrlffitJi v. Reed, 21 Wend.

502. The cases to which we have been referred by the plaintiff's

counsel do not, we think, sustain the position contended for ; that

parol proof cannot be given to show an arrangement between

accommodation indorsers different from that which appears by

the legal effect of the instrument, and a particular examination

of them is not required. The uniform practice in this State has

been in conformity to the views expressed in reference to proof

of tliis character, and it would be establishing a new rule at this

time to hold that such testimony was incompetent. There was,

therefore, no error committed by the judge in the admission of the

evidence to which objection was taken.

There is no force in the objection made by the plaintiff's

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

counsel tliat the evidence failed to establish the agreement alleged

in the answer to have l>een made in reference to the note in suit.

It was purely a question of fact what the agreement actually

made was. No request was made to take the case from the jury,

and sufficient was shown to submit the question raised to their

consideration. There is no ground for claiming that the defend-

ant was estopped from setting up the verbal agreement alleged

to have been made as a defense. The arrangement of the defend-

ant wdth the bank for the prosecution of the note and the collection

of the same of the plaintiff", and the security given thereupon do

not contain the elements of an estoppel. The defendant was not

the actual party in the suit, and the most which can be said in

regard to it is, that the defendant preferred to have it collected

of Easterly instead of himself, and to compel Easterly to sue him

for the proportion which he was lawfully liable to pay. There

was no assum.ption in this, we think, that estops the defendant.

We are also of the opinion that there was no error in that

portion of the charge wlierein the court instructed the jury that

if former notes had been given under the agreement with the

understanding that they were to stand with a joint instead of a

separate liability, and they were carried along until they came to

this one, which, if it was signed wnth the arrangement and under-

standing resting upon their minds, they would have no doubt

pr v an agr rnent b tw n in I r r in r arc! to th ir lial ility
.a b tw n each ther.
a
fr qu ntly ari
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the actual party in the uit, and the most which can be said in
regard to it i , that the defendant preferred to have it collected
of Easterly instead of himself, and to compel Easterly to ue him
for the proportion which he wa lawfully liable to pay. There
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vVe are also of the opinion that there wa no err r in that
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in coming- to the conclusion that this agreement attaches to the
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last note. This was a necessary result of the facts proved and

clearly right. The requests to charge upon this branch of the

case in' this connection were properly refused, as the propositions

presented were sufficiently covered in the charge which had al-

ready been made. The discussion had, leads lo the conclusion that

sufficient grounds are presented on the plaintitT's appeal for a

reversal or modification of the judgment.

Other questions arise upon the defendant's appeal, which

should be considered. It is claimed that an action at law by a

surety for contribution must be against each of the sureties sepa-

rately for his proportion, and that no more can be recovered, even

where one or more are insolvent. In the latter case, the action

must be in e(juity against all the co-sureties for contributions,

and, upon proof of the insolvency of one or more of the sureties,

the payment of the amount will be adjudged among the solvent

parties in due proportion. The principle stated is fully sustained

by the authorities. It is thus stated, in Parsons on Contracts

(vol. I, page 34) : ''At law, a surety can recover from his co-
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surety an aliquot part, calculated upon the whole number, without

reference to the insolvency of others of the co-sureties : but in

equity it is otherwise." See, also, Brozvne v. Lee, 6 Barn. & Cress.

689, 13 Eng. C. L. 394; Cuiccll v. Edzvards, 2 B. & Pull. 268;

Bcainan v. Bloncliard, 4 Wend. 432, 435 ; Story's Eq. Juris., § 496;

I Chitty on Con. (5th Am. ed.), 597, 598; Willard's Eq. Juris.,

108. There seems to be a propriety in the rule that where sure-

ties are called upon to contribute, and some of them are insolvent,

that all the parties should be brought into court and a decree made

upon equitable principles in reference to the alleged insolvency.

There should be a remedy decreed against the insolvent parties,

which may be enforced if they become afterwards able to pay",''

and this can only be done in a court of equity and when they are

parties to the action. The action here was not of this character;

nor were all the proper parties before the court. It was clearly

an action at law, and in that point of view, as we have seen, the

plaintiff could only recover for one-fourth of the debt for which

all the sureties were liable. The distinction 1>etween the two

classes of actions is recognized by the decisions.

The remedies, the parties and course of procedure are each

different. In the one, a jury trial is a matter of right ; w bile in

the other the trial is bv the court. The costs are also in the dis-
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an acti n at law, and in that p int f vi w, a w hav
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cretion of the court. (Code, §§ 253, 306; 13 N. Y. [supra\,

498.) As the judgment could not require each of the parties

to pay his aliquot share and furnish a remedy over against those

who were insolvent and the rights of the parties be finally deter-

mined and fixed, it was under the facts proven clearly erroneous.

Although in many cases under the Code the pleadings, if neces-

sary, may be made to conform to the facts, and the case disposed

of upon the merits, the defects here are so radical as to strike

at the very foundation of the action, and cannot thus be remedied.

Besides, the proper parties are not before us, and cannot be

brought in, except on motion in the court below. As the claim

was alleged in the complaint, there was no such defect of parties

apparent as required the defendant to take the objection by de-

murrer or answer.

It follows that the judgment must be affirmed upon the plaint-

iff's appeal with costs of appeal to be paid by the plaintitT upon

the final termination of the action, if the defendant succeeds; and

if the plaintilT succeeds, to be set ofif against the plaintiff's costs.

And the judgment must be reversed upon the defendant's appeal,
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with costs of the appeal in this court, and costs in the supreme

court to abide the event.

All concur, except Church, Ch. J., dissenting.

Ordered accordingly.

Moore e'.y. Bruner (1889).

31 111. App. 400.

Mr. C. L. V. Mulkey, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Courtney & Helm, for defendant in error.

Green, P. J. It is averred in the declaration in this case

that plaintiff, Bruner, and Moore, the defendant, together with

McCammon and Gray, became sureties on the bond of the guard-

ian of Barnes ; that the guardian died owing his ward, and after-

ward judgment was rendered in Massac probate court against

the estate of the guardian in favor of the ward for $500, but the

estate being insolvent no part of this judgment was paid ; that

27

cretin f th curt. ( od
25 306; 13 l' .
. l upra],
4
A the judgm nt c ul 1 n t r quir each f th parti
to pay hi aliquot hare an I furni h a r m dy ov r again t th
wh wer in olv nt and th ri ·ht of th par tie b finally d t rmin d and fixed, it wa und r the fa ts pr v n I arly rr n ou .
lthou ·h in many ca e under th
od th pleading , if nee ary, may be made to confo rm to th facts, and the cas di p ed
f upon the m rit , the defect - here are so radical a to trik
at the very foundation of th action, and cannot thu be r m died.
Be ide , th e proper part ies are n t befo re us, an d cannot 1 e
brought in, exc pt on motion in th court below. A the claim
wa all err d in the complaint, th ere was no uch defect of partie
apparent as requir d th e defendant to take the obj ection by d murrer or answer.
It follows that th judgment mu t be affirmed upon th plaintiff' appeal , with cost of app al t , be paid by th e plaintiff upon
the final termination of the action, if the d fe ndant sue eeds.; and
if tht> plaintiff succeeds, to be set off again t the plaintiff' cost .
And the judgment must be rever ed upon the defendant's appeal,
w ith co ts of the appeal in thi co urt, an d co t in the upreme
court to abide the event.
All concur, except CHu R H , Ch. J., di ssenting .
O rd ered accordingly.

afterward suit was brought in the Massac circuit court upon the

M ooRE vs. BRu

ER

(

1889) .

3 l Ill. . pp. 400.
llfr. C. L. V. ll1ulluy, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Courtne'y & H elm. for defendant in error.
P. J. It i averred in the declaration in thi ca e
that plaintiff, Bruner, and Moore, th defendant, together with
M cCammon and Gray, became ureties on the bond of th g uardian of Barne ; that th e guar lian di d owitio- hi ward and afterward judgment wa rend red in Ma sac probate court again t
th e e tate of the guardian in fa vor f the ward fo r $300, but the
e tate being in olvent no part of thi judgment wa paid : that
aften\ ard uit wa brought in th e fa a circuit court upon the
G-REE ,
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bond against Bruner and AlcCannnun, and judgment was there

recovered against them for $500 and costs; that ]^IcCammon is

insolvent and Gray died insolvent ; that plaintiff Bruner dis-

charged said judgment in full, wherefore defendant became liable

to pay him $269.45 by way of contribution. A count for money

paid out by plaintiff for defendant is added. The cause was tried

by the court. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff

for $260 and costs, to reverse which defendant sued out this writ

of error.

The cause of action set out in this declaration, is the payment

made by Bruner in satisfaction of the judgment recovered against

himself and McCammon as sureties upon said guardian's bond,

n I a ain t Drun r an I ~I - amm n, and jud2"m nt \\"a th r
and c t · that I 'amm n i
r
v r l a ain l th m f r
ray lied in olv nt; that plaintiff Drun r di in lv nt and
ha r <T d a id jud 0 m nt in full. wh r f r d f ndant b am liabl
t pay him 2 .4,.. 1 y \\"a)' f c ntributi 11.
c unt f r m n
paid ut by plaintiff f r d f ndant i add d. Tb au wa tri d
by th
urt. J ud o-m nt wa r nd r d in fav r f th plaintiff
t . t
which d f 11dant u d ut thi writ
f r - o and

one-half of which amount so paid, instead of one-fourth, Bruner

insists is the proportion plaintiff' in error as a co-surety is legally

lialMe to contribute, because of the insolvency of the two other

co-sureties, McCammon and Gray. This was the view of the

trial court and in accordance therewith the judgm'ent against

plaintiff' in error was rendered. The court erred in so holding.

At law the amount of damages which plaintiff w^as entitled to
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recover from defendant as a co-surety was one-fourth of the whole

debt paid, with interest from tlie time of payment. There were

four sureties, each of whom, as between themselves, became liable

at law to contribute an aliquot portion of the sum paid by Bruner,

and this aliquot portion is to be ascertained upon the basis of the

number of sureties, without regard to their solvency. Such we

understand to be the law in this state.

It is said in the opinion in Sloo v. Pool, 15 111. 48, "Sureties

are individually liable to the creditor, but one is as much bound

to discharge the debt as another. If the creditor endeavors to-

enforce payment from them, it is, as between themselves, the

duty of each to pay an aliquot portion of the debt. If that is not

done, and one is compelled to pay the whole, he is entitled to

contribution from the others iti the same proportion. The law

implies an agreement between them when they become responsible

to the creditor, that if one shall be compelled to pay the debt

the others will contribute so as to make the burden equal. If

one pays the whole debt he has a cause of action against the others

to recover their just proportion, as so much money paid to their

use. His right to contribution is complete as soon as he pays the

debt, and he may at once call on his co-sureties to bear the common

burden with him. At law he can not sue two or more jointly,

f a ti 11 t out in tbi d clarati n i
paym nt
mad 1y run r in ati fa ti n f th j ud m nt r ov red a ain t
ur tie upon aid uardian ' bond,
him lf and !\I ammon a
Oll e- half f whi h amount
paid in tead f n -fourth
run r
in i t i th pr p rti n plaintiff in rr r a a
- ur ty i
ally
lial. 1 to ontril ut , b au
f th in olv ncy of th tw
th r
c - ur ti , I arnm n and Gray. Thi wa the vi w of the
trial co urt and in ac ordance th r with th judgm•ent aaain t
. holdina.
plaintiff in rr r wa r end r d. Tl: court rr d in
t law th am unt f damaa
whi ch plaintiff wa entitl d t
r c v r fr rn d f ndant a a o- ur ty ·wa n -fourth f th "hole
d bt paid w ith intere t fr m th tirn of paym ent. Ther ' ere
four ureti , a h of wh m, a 1 etw n th rn elv , b am liabl
at law to ntril ute an aliqu t portion f th um paid by runer,
and thi aliqu t I rli n i ~ t b a r rtainecl up n th e ba i f the
numb r of ur ti , with ut re ard t th eir olv nc .
u h ' e
und r tand t b th e law in thi tat .
lt i aid in th
p1111 n in loo v. Pool) I 5 Ill. 4 , " ur ties
ar individuall) liabl to th er ditor but n i a mu h 1 u11d
to di charae the d bt a anoth r. If th er dit r nd av r to ·
nf re paym nt fr m th m , it i a b t\ n th rn lv , the
duty of ach to pay an aliqu t porti n f th d bt. If that i n t
don , an d one i
mpell d t pay th wh 1 , h
ntitl d to
contribution from th
th r in th
am pr portion. Th -law
impli
h e n th m ' h n th y b ome r pon ibl
hall 1 e c mp 11 d t pay the debt
t th
th
ntril ut
a t make th burden qual. If
on pay th wh 1 d bt h ha a cau e f action a ain t the thers
t r cov r th ir ju t pr p rti n a
mu h m n y paid to th ir
u e.
i ri g ht t contributi on i c mpl t a
n a h pay the
d bt and h may at n call n hi c - ur ti to b ar th common
1 urcl n w ith him . , \t law he -an n t u tw
r m r j intly,
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but he must sue each separately, and he can only recover from

one an aliquot portion of the debt, to be ascertained by the num-

ber of sureties, without regard to their solvency. In equity, if

one is insolvent the loss is apportioned among the others." In

I Parsons on Cont., 35, the rule is stated thus: "At law a surety

can recover from his co-surety only that co-surety's aliquot part, cal-

culated upon the whole number, without reference to the insolvency

of either of the co-sureties, but in equity it is otherwise." We have

examined the case of Golden v. Brand, 75 111. 148, cited on behalf

of appellee, and do not understand the court either did, or intended

to, abrogate or modify the rule announced in Sloo v. Pool, supra.

For the errors indicated the judgment is reversed and the

cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Re Walker; Sheffield Banking Co^iPANY vs. Clayton

(1892.)

66L. T. R.315.

The following are the only facts material to the present re-

port : —
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The testator in the year t886 gave to the London and York-

shire Bank two guarantees for the sum of 1000/. each to secure

the overdraft of Arthur Spencer and Reuben Spencer trading as

but h mu t u each parat ly, and he an only recov r from
on an aliquot porti n of the d bt, t be a c rtain d by th numlvency. In iuity, if
ber f uretie , with ut r gard to their
on
in Iv nt th I
i apportion d among th oth r .' ' In
I Par on on
ont. , 35, th e rul i stated thu : " t law a ur ty
tan re ov r from hi ~ c - urety only that c -s urety's aliquot pa rt calculat d upon the whol numb r, without r fe rence to the in lven y
of ither of th co-suretie . but in quity it i oth erwi e." \ Ve have
examin d th case of Golden v. B rand, 75 Ill. 14 , cited on I ehalf
of appellee, and do n t und r tand the c urt either did, or intended
to, abrogat or modify the rul e anno unced in S loo v. P ool_. su{' ra.
F or the error indicated tb e judgment i r versed an l the
ca1.1 e remanded.
R ver ed and remanded.

Spencer Brothers.

At the same time Agnes Spencer, the wife of Arthur Spencer,

'•

gave to the testator as security for anything he might be called

upon to pay under the guarantees, two equital:)le mortgages created

by memoranda of deposit of title deeds. The memoranda were

dated respectively the 5th July and the i8th Aug., 1886.

Subsequently to these .transactions Spencer Brothers trans-

R e V..

AU -::E R ; SH EFFIELf)

E

KKIN : C o :.iP _-\ :.'\TY

vs. CL

YTO

T

( 1892.)

ferred their account from the London and Yorkshire Bank to the

Sheffield Banking Company.

66 L. T. R. 315.

On the 9th Sept., 1887, the. testator gave to the Sheffield Bank-

ing Company a guarantee to secure the repayment of all moneys

then owing, or which might become owing to them by Spencer

Brothers either on their current account or on any other account

to the extent of 2000/.

The following ar the onl y fact mat rial to th e pre ent report:The te tator in the year 18 6 gave to th e L ondon and Yo rk~
hire Bank two g uarantees for the , um of m oo/. ach to ecure
the overdraft of rthur Spencer and R euben Spencer tradin o- as
Spencer Brothers.
~ t the ame time
gnes pencer, the ·wife of rthur pencer,
gave to the L tat r a security for anything . he mig ht be called
upon to pay under th o-uarantees, t wo equitable m ortgages created
by memoranda of depo it of title de ds. The memoranda were
dated re pectively th e 5th Julv and the 18th ug ., 1886.
ubsequently to the e . transactions pencer Brother tran f rred their account from the L ondon and York hire Bank to the
heffi eld Banking ompan).
O n the 9th ept. , 1887, the te tator gave to th
heffield Bankin0· Company a guarantee to . ecure the r paym nt of all money
then owing, or which might become owin o- to them by pencer
Brothers either on their current account or on an y other accoun t
to the extent of 2000!.
L
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In the nKintli of May, 1880. Spencer Brothers went into liquid-
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ation.

In th m nth f

The testator died on the 4th Nov., 1888, leavin*^ a will hy

which he apixjinted the defendants his executors. The will was

proved hy the defendants on the 24th Jan., 1889.

l

Jay

r f r th r \\. nt into liquid-

ati
a will hy
will wa

The plaintiff company then commenced a creditor's action for

the administration of the testator's estatc\ An administration judg-

wh i

ment was given in that action on the 25th April, 1890.

The testator's estate was insufficient for payment of debts,

including the liability of the testator under the guarantee given

to the plaintifif company.

The plaintift company now claimed to be entitled to the ben-

efit of the equitable mortgages given to the testator by Agnes

Spencer.

The defendants, on the other hand, contended that the plain-

tiffs were not so entitled, but could only rank as creditors pari

passu with the other creditors of the estate.

Graham Hastings, Q. C, and Curtis Price for the plaintiffs.

Buckley, O. C, and Ingle Joyce for the defendants.
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Stiklinc;, J., stated the facts and continued: — The plaintiffs'

contention was founded upon two cases. The first is an old case

of Maiire v. Harrison (ubi sup.)'' It is reported ver\- shortly as

follows : "A bond creditor shall in the (Jourt of Chancery have the

benefit of all cotmter-bonds or collateral security given by the prin-

cipal to the surety; as if A. owes LI. money, and he and C. are

acti n f r
tat . A n admini . trati n j ud iv n in that a ti n n th 25th , pril, I
t t t r
tat . ' a. in uffi i nt f r paym nt f d bt ~ ,
inclu lino· th lial ility of th te. tat r und r th
uarant
1v n
t th plaintiff c mpany.
Th plaintiff c mpaLy n '~ !aim I t be ntitl d t the b nfit f th
iuitahl m rt rt.R
g iv n t th t tat r 1 v
gn
. p nc r.
Th
11 th
th r han '.
nt nd d that th plaintiff \\' r 11 t
entitl I but c ul I onlv rank a
r d itor · pari
passu \\ ith th
ther r lit r of th
tat .

th

bound for it, and A. gives C. a mortgage or bond to indemnify him,

B. shall have the benefit of it to recover his debt." That case was

Grnha11i Hastinas, Q . C., and

urti.s Price f r th

plaintiff .

decided in Michaelmas, 1692. The plaintiff also relied upon a

dictum of .Sir William Grant in IV right v. Morley (ubi sup.)'''

Buckley, . .

., an l !11 le JO'yce for th defendant .

which nuis thus : "I conceive that, as tlie creditor is entitled to the

benefit of all the securities the principal debtor has given to the

surety, the surety has fully as good an equity to the benefit 6i all

the securities the principal gives to the creditor.'' As to the latter

{X)rtion of the sentence, there is no (|uestion at all. It is well estab-

lished at this date that the surety, on paying the debt, is entitled

to stand in the place of the principal creditor, and to have the ben-

efit of all the securities which the princijjal creditor had. Now

these two cases were verv much discussed in the well-known case-

1. I Eq. Cas. .'Vhr. 93; 20 Vin. Abr. p. 102.

2. n Ves. 22.

TJRLIN , ]. , tat c1 th fact and
ntinued :-Tb plaintiff '
ont ntion wa found cl up n two ca . The fir t i an old ca e
f ]\,four(' v. Harrison ( 1,tbi sup.) 1 It i r port l v ry h rtl a
f ll ow " I n 1 creditor hall in th ~ tl'rt of ~han ry hav th
b nefit f all nnt r-bond r collateral , curity o-iv n t y th principal t th
ur ty; a. if A. w
. m n y, and h and . are
b tmd for it-, and . ow
. a mort a
r 1 on l t ind mnify him,
. hall hav th ben fit f it t re o r hi d bt.
That ca wa
d ci l d in Micha lma , I 2. Th plaintiff als r Ii d up n a
di tnm :[ . ir William
rant in !Vriglit v. Morley 1tbi sup. ·
which r'UIL thu : "I con iv that, a th r <lit r i nltitl d t the
b n fit f a ll th
curiti . th prin ipal l bt r ha
ur ty, th . ur ty ha full a
o d an tnity t th
th
curiti th prin ipal o-i . t th r lit r. "
p rti n f th . nt n , th r i. no [U ti n at all. It i '
li h(:! l at tbi lat that th
ur tv, n pa_ in · th l bt. i
ntitl d
t ta'.1d in th pla
f th prin1 ipal r lit r and t hav th 1 nunt1
' ·hi h th pnn ipal r lit r had . ~ rr w
fit f all th
th ~ tw
a
w r v ry mu h di u
1 in th " 11-kn wn ca. e
x.

1

2.

11

q.

a . Ab r . 93;

v . 22 .

20

Vin. Abr. p.

102.

RK WALKER, FTC, VS. CLAYTON.

R · \\' "\ L.KER, FT.'.' . .

283

LAT

2 3

of Ex parte Waring (ubi sup.)", before Lord Eldon. That case

is most fully reported perhaps in Glyn & Jameson's Reports. It

appears from that report that, in the c(3urse of the arg-ument, Lorfd

Eldon spoke somewhat disparagingly of the case of Maitre v. Har-

rison. He said this : "I have never heard this case relied upon as a

governing case at this day." Tn the judgment as reported in 19

Vesey, p". 348, he puts it thus. "The prayer of the first of these

petitions has been supported upon this ground, that the short bills

and the mortgage * * * having been placed with Brick wood and

Co. as a security against their acceptances, the holders of those bills

have an equity to have that security applied specifically to the dis-

charge of those acceptances upon the general ground that, upon

a transaction of this kind, a person holding the bills which are the

subject of indemnity has a right to the benefit of the contract be-

tween the principal debtor and the party indemnified, and, though

not himself a party to that contract, to say that he, who has con-

tracted for the payment of certain debts out of those pledges, is

liable in equity to the demand upon the part of those whose de-
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mands are to be so paid for that application, and a case was cited

{Manre v. Harrison) which goes that length. With regard to that

case, or cases in general, I desire it to be understood that I forbear

to give my opinion upon that point." Then he goes on to say that

he decides not on Ex parte Waring but on another ground. The

result of these two cases, namely the dictum of Sir W. Grant in

Wright v. Morley and the judgment and observations of Lord

Eldon in Ex parte Waring, seems to me to be that Sir W. Grant

and Lord Eldon were not of the same mind on the point. Under

these circumstances I was ver>- anxious to discover what was really

done in the case of Maure v. Harrison, which it so shortly reported

in Eq. Gas. Abr. The registrar has been kind enough to make

search for that case. No decree was drawn up, but the entry of

the case has been found in the registrar's book, and the pleadings

have been discovered, and I am indebted to the learned reporter

of this court, Mr. Knox, for having made a summary of them for

my use, the pleadings themselves being somewhat lengthy. From

them and the notes in the registrar's book it is tolerably easy to dis-

cover what the case was. The plaintifif was Thomas Maure, the

defendants were William Harrison and William Morley and Mary

his wife. Thomas Maure was the father of the first wife of Will-

iam Harrison, the father of William Harrison the defendant. By

3. 2G. & J.. 404; 19 Ves. 3<5.

f Ex part fT ' ari11 g
n. That ca e
i mo t full y r p rted p rhap, in Jly n · J am on Rep rt . It
app ar fr m that report that in th our.
f th ar um nt,
rlcl
E ldon pok
rn what li ~ p a ra o- in ·ly of the ca e of Maure v. Harrison. H . aid thi : ' I hav neve r heard thi ca r li l up n a ~
o- emin?" ca. at thi lay.'' Jn th e jud rn nt a r port cl in 19
\ ey, p. 3-t-8 h put it thu . : ''The prayer of th fir t f he e
petition ha b en upport d upon thi o-r un l, that th hort bill
and th morto-arr * * * havin 0 · heen pla ed \.vith B-rickwood and
Co. as a ecurit y against their acceptance.., the holders of tho bills
have an quity to have that ecurity applied pe ifically to the di charge .f th o. e ace ptance upon th e general a-ro un d that, upon
a tran sacti n of thi·' kind , a per on holdin g th e bill which are the
subjert of indemnity ha a right to the benefit of th e contract betvveen th e principal debtor and th e pa1i:y indemnified, and, though
not him elf a party to that contract, to say that he, who ha_ contracted for the payment of certain debt out of thos pledges, is
liable in e iuity to the demand upon the part of tho e whose demand are to be o paid for that application and a ca e was cited
(Maure v . Harr is on) which go that length. \!Vith regard to that
ca e, or ca e in general, I desire it to be under tood that I forbear
to give m · opinion upon th at point. " Then he goe on to ay that
he decides not on Ex PC!rte vVa-ring but on another ground . The
result of these two case nam ely the dictum of ir 'N. Grant in
T-Yright v. _1 or!ey and th e judo-ment and ob ervation of L ord
Eldon in Ex parte W aring, seem to me to be that ir W. Grant
and L ord Eldon were n ot of the am e mind on the poirnt. U nder
the e circum ta.nces I wa very anx iou to di cover what wa reall)
done in the case of J fa nrc v. Harris-an, which it o hortly reported
in Eq. as. A br. The r egi trar ha been k1n-d enoug h t make
earch fo r that ca. e. No decre wa drawn np, but the ntry of
the ca e has been found in the r g i trar's book, and the pleading
have been discov red, and I am indebted to th e learned r porter
of thi court, [r. Knox, fo r ha.vino· ma.de a ummary of t hem fo r
my u e, th e pl actin g~ them elve being ome' hat lengthy. From
them and th e not ~ in th r g i trar book it i tolerably ea y to di cover what the case wa . The plaintiff wa Thoma Ma ure, th
defendant were \ illiam H arri on and
illia.m 1\Iorley and :\Iary
his wif . Thoma _ Iaure \\a the fath r of th e fir t "ife f \ ill iam Harri n, th e fath r of William H arri on the defendan . By
3.

2

G. a J.,

40 4 ; 19

Yes . 3~5 .
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that first marriage William Harrison the father had three children,

',\RA . TY .A)lD

RJ·:rv IIIP.

viz., William, the defendant, Thomas, and Margaret. The first

wife having died, \\'illiam Harrison, the father, married his second

wife Mary, the defendant, then the wife of William Maure, and

afterwards he died intestate leaving this widow and three children

by the first wife tliC persons entitled to his personal estate under

the statute of distribution. Aflministration was taken out by his

widow, and the shares of the three children in the intestate's prop-

erty amounted to 120/. It appears that the plaintiff, Thomas

Maure, the grandfather of William Harrison the defendant, was

very anxious that William Harrison, his grandson, should con-

tinue the business of a fanner which had been carried on by Will-

iam Harrison the father, but for that purpose it was necessary that

the sum of 120/. which fomied the portion of the intestate's estate

belonging to the tliree children should be paid over to W^illiam

Harrison the son, and that was accordingly done. The two other

children being infants, Thomas Maure the father and the plaintiff

in the action gave a bond to the defendant Mary IMorley, the legal

personal representative of the intestate, to indemnify her against
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all claims by those children. It appears that at this time W'illiam

Harrison, the defendant, was an infant, but the money was paid to

him. He attained twenty-one, and carried on the farm for some

time. After attaining twenty-one he repudiated the transaction

and began to press William Morley and Mary his wife for pay-

ment of his sharfe of his father's estate, which he had already

received in point of fact, though apparently an infant. There-

upon William Morley gave liini a bond for payment of his share,

and William Morley and Mary his wife began to sue the plaintiff

Thomas Maure in the Coiu-t of Exchequer for payment under the

bond which had been given by him. Thereuix^n the plaintiff insti-

tuted this suit in eciuitv to restrain the action, and to obtain delivery

up of the bond which had been given by him. Now, of the other

children who were interested in the intestate's estate, Thomas had

died an infant and intestate, and Margaret was still an infant, and

was not a party to the suit. Tlie argument is stated in the regis-

trar's book. It is to be observed that the bill is by the person who

gave the bond to be relieved of it, and the result is thus stated in

the registrar's book: "By the Court; l^o declare that the defendant

William is well ])aid, and he must deliver up the bond to the other

defendant." That is the bond (as I read it) which had been given

bv \\'illiam Morlev to the defendant William Harrison for pay-
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ment of his share. Whether that relief oui^ht to have heen in-

serted in the decree may he a question, because that would be relief

between co-defendants. Then it goes on, "stay all proceedings at

law on the plaintiffs' lOo/. bond" — that is a mistake, for 120/. as

clearly appears from the previous passage in the registrar's note,

where it is corrected in the margin, but the correction is omitted

here — "till Margaret doth release, and when the plaintiff hath pro-

cured ^largaret. who is not a party to the action, to release that

bond, then that Ixrnd to be delivered up" and so forth "but then

the plaintiff's bond to be at .niit for the recovery of Margaret's

nioietv of 120/." So that all that was decided in that action was

that the plaintiff', who had given his bond of indemnity, was not

entitled to have it delivered up to be cancelled till all claims had

been settled. Under these circumstances it appears that the point

for which it w'as cited in Eq. Cas. Abr. could not have been decided

in that case, and that at most the repoTited statement amounts to a

dictum in the course of the argument. It is now nearly two hun-

dred years since this case was decided, and the sole authorities on

a point which must have been of frequent occurrence are a dictum
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in 1692, a dictum early in this century by Sir William Grant in

the year 1805, and what appears to me to be the contrary opinion

of Lord Eldon a little later. Under those circumstances it seems

to me that there is no authority for the proposition in question.

Upon principle I cannot see why a surety who takes from the prin-

cipal debtor a bond or indemnity at once becomes a trustee of that

for the principal creditor. That is really the contention of the

plaintiffs. Of course the other doctrine is well established, viz.,

that the surety who pays the debt is entitled to stand in the place

of the principal creditor ; but this doctrine rests entirely on those

dicta which I have mentioned. It seems to me that under these

circumstances I cannot give effect to the contention of the plain-

tiffs, and that they must simply be left to prove against the estate

of the testator for wdiat is due, without having the exclusive bene-

fit of these securities in respect of which payments have been made

to the estate.

Solicitors for the plaintiff company, Pilgrim and Phillips.

Solicitors for the defendants, Fczu and Co., agents for Johm

James, W^irksworth.
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Appeal In plaintiff from a jud^iienl of the rircuit Court

Ky. .... '

for Henderson county in favor of defendant in an action to en-

L.

force a promise l)y defendant to reimlnirse plaintiff's assignee for

the amount which he had paid as surety for defendant's husband.

Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

My. R. II. CiDuiingham, for appellant.

Mr. Montgomery Mcrritt, for appellee.

O'Rear, J. While ap]xdlee was a married woman, and be-

fore the enactment of our i:>resent married women's act, appellant

H. S. Holloway, who was her kinsman, executed to the Planters'

Bank a note for $2,500, and one to the Farmers' Bank for $900,

as surety of appellee's husl^and. Appellant claims that he was

. \ l'l' E.\L by i la i11tiff fr 111 a ju I m 11t f th
uit
urt
f r 11 ncl r n
unt · in fav r f l f 11 !ant in an a ti n t
nf r · a pr m i
' d f n ]ant t r
{ Ja intiff' a I 11
f r
th am u11t whi h h had pa i l a
r l f nd nt' hu ban I.
, \ffirm d.

Th

fa t

ar

tat d in th

p int

n.

induced to incur these liabilities by appellee's personal assurances

or promises of indemnity against loss, and that he would not have

done so but for his reliance upon her agreement to keep him from

loss on that account. The husband died in 1893, after appellant's

Jfr. R . H .

11111tin o-fiant)

f r app llant.

Jlr. 1Jontuo 111 er3 Uerritr f r app 11

.
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liability had been assumed, and left an estate totally insolvent.

After the husband's death appellee wrote a])pellant asking him to

pay off the notes in question, and again promising to indemnify

him against loss. Appellant did pay off these notes, because, he

says, of this solicitation and promise. Appellee declining to com-

ply with her agreement to repay the surety these sums paid by

him, he sued her on the last-named or written promise to pay.

Other allegations were contained in the petition, but were denied,

and, there being a total failure of proof as to those that were

denied, we are to determine whether the trial court's peremptory

instruction to the jury to find f(;r the defendant was proper. The

determination of that question involves the one whether the prom-

ise of a married woman, made while under the disability of cover-

ture, inducing another to become bound as the surety of her hus-

band, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise of indem-

nity made to the surety after the removal of such disability.

It is argued for appellant that her original promise was based

upon facts imposing upon her a moral obligation, and that al-

hile app 11
wa a marri d w man, and b f r th nactm nt f ur I r nt marri d '' m n' a t appellant
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though not legally binding because the law prohibited her

from legally binding herself, upon the law's restrictions being

removed the original moral obligation was enough to support

a new promise to pay. While formerly extensively held that

a moral obligation was a sufficient consideration to uphold a con-

tract between competent parties, it has lately come to be denied,

until it may now be seriously doubted whether the ancient rule

longer obtains. EHshop, Contr. 44, and cases cited ; Parsons,

Contr. 432. 435, and notes. It has been held in this state that a

moral obligation, where it has also been a legal one, might be the

consideration of a new contract {Montgomery v. Lampton, 3

Met. 520; Muir v. Gross, lo B. Alon. 282) ; but we are not aware

that the rule has been extended further, and, in the light of the

trend of the later cases, we are disinclined to so extend it.

We have repeatedly held that the contract of a married

woman, not with reference to her separate estate, and where not

especially allowed by statute, was void, and that her subsequent

promise to pay such an obligation, made after discoverture, was

likewise void, — the first, because she was not competent to make
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the contract ; the second, because there was no consideration to

support it. Robinson v. Robinson, ii Bush, 179; Jennings v.

Crider, 2 Bush, 322, 92 Am. Dec. 487 ; Russell v. Rice, 19 Ky. L.

Rep. 1613, 44 S. W. no: Cltaney v. Flyiin. 2 Ky. L. Rep. 417;

and others.

Wc think the fair deduction from the foregoing line of de-

cisions is that, without reference to what may have been the merit

of the consideration of the original promise, the new contract, to

be binding, must be based upon a new consideration, legal and

sufficient of itself, and independent of the original one. That

the surety paid off these notes upon the faith of the appellee's letter

was not such new consideration ; for he assumed no new condi-

tion, and did nothing he was not already legally bound to do.

Tt follows that the giving of the peremptory instruction was

proper, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

1 cau
th law pr hibit d h r
up n th law' r tri ti n bein
rio-inal m ral bli ati n wa
n u h t
upport
a n w 1 r mi
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cisions is that, without r.efer nee to what may have been the m e ri~
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be binding, must be bas d upon a new consideration, legal and
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Varlck & Eldridge, for appellants.

^F. /. Street, for respondents.
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Rroxson, Ch. J. The case is shortly this. The i)laintiffs

sold land to Alorgan, who, instead of giving his bond and mortgage

to the plaintiffs to secnre the pnrchase money, got Flagler to give

his note to the plaintiffs for the amount, payable in one year ; and

Morgan gave a bond and mortgage to Flagler for his indemnity,

l •ar:cl~ c>,.,, E ldridg e f r app llant .
TI T. I. , treet f r r p n<l nt .

for the same amount, and payable at the same time with the note.

Before the crcflit expired Flagler liecame insolvent and the plain-

tiffs seek relief, either on the ground of an equitable lien on tlie

land for the purchase money, or by reaching the mortgage to

Flagler, and having it foreclosed for the payment of the debt.

By taking the security of a third person for the purchase

money the plaintiffs have lost their equitable lien on the land, and

can not have relief in that form, as has been very clearly shown by

the vice-chancellor in his opinion. And I agree in most that he has

said upon the wdiole case. But there is one point on which. I think
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the supreme court was right in reversing the vice-chancellor's

decree, and directing a foreclosure of the mortgage for the benefit

of the plaintiffs.

It is a settled rule in equity, that the creditor shall have the

benefit of any counter bonds or collateral securities w hich the prin-

cipal debtor has given to the surety, or person, standing in the situ -

ation of a surety, for his indemnity. Such securities are regarded

as trusts for the better security of the debt, and chancery will

compel the execution of the trusts for the benefit of the creditor.

Manrc v. Harrison, i Eq. Cas. .\b. 93, K. 5 ; Curtis v. Tyler, 9

Paige, 432; Wright v. Morlcy, m Ves. 22; Bank of Aitbuni, v.

Throop, 18 John, 505 ; 4 Kent, 307, 6th ed. ; i Story's Eq. §§ 502,

638. This principle covers the case : and the plaintiffs are entitled

to the mortgage which Morgan, the principal debtor, gave to

Flagler, the surety, for his indemnity.

But it is said that Morgan is not a debtor \o the plaintiff's, and

consequently that the relation of principal and surety does not

exist between him and Flagler. It is true that Morgan did not

unite with Flagler in making the note, nor did he come under any
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Other express oliligation to the plaintiffs. But he was originally a

debtor to the plaintiffs for the price of the land : and although the

plaintiffs afterwards took the note of Flagelr in lieu of the bond

and mortgage of Alorgan, they took it as a security only for the

purchase money, without agreeing to receive it in satisfaction of

the debt. Taking the note of a third person for an existing debt

is not payment, unless the creditor agrees to receive it in payment ;

and I find no such agreement in this case. Morgan is still liable

to the plaintiff's for the purchase money, and nuist of course be

regarded, as the principal debror ; for it is entirely clear, upon the

pleadings and proofs, that l^lagler gave the note at the request, and

as the surety of Morgan, with.out having any personal interest in

the matter. We have then the ordinarv case of creditor, principal

and surety, to whicli the rule in question has been applied ; and the

mortgage which the principal del:itor has given to the suretv nnist

be considered as a trust for the better security of the debt, which

a court of equity will enforce for the benefit of the creditor.

Foster &- Co. under their creditor's bill, took the eft'ects of Flagler

subject to this equity ; and there is no bona fide purchaser in the
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case.

I am of opinion that the decree of the supreme court is right,

and should be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

DoBiE z's. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of Nfav York (1897).

95 Wis. 540 : 70 N. W. 482.

Suit by David Dobie against the Fidelity & Casualty Company

of New York to compel defendant to exonerate plaintiff' from lia-

bility on an appeal l^ond. From a judgment for plaintiff' on the

pleadings, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

One Knute Anderson obtained a judgment against M. C.

Burke and John Burke. The action was for personal injuries.

The Fidelity & Casualty Company was an insurer of the Burkes

oth r e.x1 r
ol li ati n to the plaintiff . But h wa
riginally a
debtor to the r laintiff f r tb e price of the Jan I; and although th e
plaintiff afterwa!"c!s took th e note of Flaa-cir in li e u f the bon<l
and m ortgage of :'.\-Ioro-an, th ey took it a a ecurity nh· for the
pure ha e rn ney, without agree ing t recei\' e it in . ati faction o f
th debt. Takina the note of a third per o n for an e.xi tin debt
i not payrn nt, unlc the creditor agrees to recei\'e it in paym ent ;
an I 1 find no ~ uch ao-reernent in thi ca.e. ~I rgan i till liabl e
to the plaintiff for the purcha .'e m on ey, and mu t of cour e be
reaa rclecl , a he principal d ebto r: for it is entirely clear, upon th e
pleading and proofs . that Flagl er gave the note at the requ est, ancl
a . th e . urety of ~[ o rgan, with o ut having any personal intere ' t in
the matter. \\ e have th en th e ordi na ry ca e of c r editor. I rincipa l
an l ur'-ty, to which th e rul e in que tion has been applied; and the
m o rtgag which th e principal del t r ha given to the urety mu st
be con icier d a a tru t for the better ~ ec urity of th debt, which
a court of eq uity will enforce fo r the ben efit of th e creditor.
Fo te r & o. unde:r their creditor ' bill, took the effect of Flagler
sul ject to this equity: and tl1 e re is no bona fide purchaser in th
ca e.
I am of opinio n that t!1e decree of the suprern co urt is right,
and hould be affirmed.

against such claims, and was defending the action. It procured

Dobie and Tennis to become sureties on the appeal, and gave them

De ree affirmed.

its own bond in the sum of $7,000 to indemnify them, conditioned

20

Dom£

(. 'S.

FmEuTY & C.\st:.\LTY

Co.

OF NE\\' YoRK

(1897) .

95 \Vis. 540: 70 N. \ -. -t82.
nit by David Dobie again t the Fidelity & asualty Company
of New York to compel clefrndant to exonerate plaintiff fr m liability on an appeal bond. From a judgment for plaintiff on the
pl acling , d fendant appeal.. Affirmed.
ne Knute Ander on ohtained a .i udgment abain t l\l. C.
Burke an l John :Curk . The action wa for per onal inj urie .
The Fidelity & Ca ualty ompany wa. an in ur r of the Durke
against uch claim , an l \\a d frnding the action. It procur cl
D bie and Tenni to become ur tie . on the app al, and a-ave them
it own bond in the um of $;,ooo to indemnify th m, condition d
20

290 GUARANTY AND SURETYSHIP.

to "answer for all damages, interest and costs, if any, that shall be

... 90

.U.\RA. TTY .\XD SURETY IIIP.

adjudged" against the appellant, and "to save Tennis and Dobie

hannless from all costs and damages on account of their obligation

as sureties." Judgment was against the appellant on the appeal,

and Tennis and Dobie became liable on their undertaking. No

part of the judgment has been paid. The plaintiff brings this

action to compel the defendant, the Fidelity & Casualty Company,

to pay the judgment, and so exonerate the plaintiff from liability.

The plaintiff' had judgment upon the pleadings, according to the

demand of his complaint, and ihe defendant appeals.

Ross, Dzvycr & Hanitch, for appellant.

Thorson & Crazuford, for respondent.

Newman, /. (after stating the facts). The question pre-

sented is whether the complaint states a cause of action] The

action is by a surety to com])el his principal to pay the debt for

which both are liable, for the exoneration of the surety. It is

t "an " . r for all damage , int re t and co t , if any, that hall be
adjudged" ao-ain t the appellant, and "to av Tenni and Dobie
ham1le from all co t an 1 damage. on a count of their obliO"ation
a
uretie . " J uclgment wa aO"ain t th appellant on th appeal ,
and Tenni and D oi i became liable on their undertakinO". X o
part o f the j uclgment ha b n paid. Th plaintiff brin
th i
acti n to comp 1 th defendant, the F idelity & Ca ualty ompany,
t pay the juclo-ment, and o exonerate the plaintiff from liability.
The plaintiff had judgment upon the pleadings, according to the
demand of hi complaint, and th e defendant app al

ultiniatclv the defendant's liability. That party is the principal

debtor, \\ho is ultimately liable for the debt. The question is

whether a smx-t}- can, in equity, compel his principal to exonerate
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him from liability , by extinguishing the obligation, without having

Ross, D7- •:,•er & H anitch, fo r a1 pellant.
Thorson & Crmuford, fo r r e pondent.

first paifl it himself. It seems to be well settled that a surety against

whom a judgment has been rendered may, without making pay-

ment himself, proceed in equity against his principal to subject the

estate of the latter to the pa}-ment of the debt, in exoneration of the

surety. 2 Beach, Ec|. Jur. § 903 ; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur.§ 1417 ; Will. Eq.

Jur. 110: United Xctc Jersey Railroad & Canal Co. v. Long Dock

Co., 38 X. J. E((. 142: Beaver v. Beaver, 23 Pa. St. 167; Gibbs v.

Mennard, 6 Paige, 258; Warner v. Bcardsley, 8 Wend. 194; 7 Am.

& Eng. Enc. Law, 486, cases in note. The judgment of the

superior court of Douglas county is affirmed.

X EW:.IAx: J. (after tating the fact. ) . The que tion pr ented i ,,·hether the compla int , tate a au e of action j The
action i by a urety to compel hi I rincipal to pay th e d ebt for
which b th are liab l , fo r th e exon eration of the urcty. It i
ulti mat ly the def nclant' liability . That party i th principal
debtor. who is ultimately liable fo r the debt. The qu ti n i
whether a urety can, in eq uity, compel hi principal to exonerate
him from liabil ity , by extingui sh in g the obligation, without havinO"
fir t paid it him . lf. It seem to be well . ettled that a urety again. t
whom a juclO"ment ha been rend er ed may, without making payment him self, proceed in eq uity against his principal to ubject the
e tatc of the latter to the payment of the del t, in exoneration o f the
suret)·. 2 B each, Eq. Jur . .' 903; 3 Porn. Eq. J ur. 1417; \ ill. Eq.
Jur. J 1 o: U11itcd N e·w Jersey Railroad & Canal Co . v. !Jong D ock
Co., 38 ~ J. Eq. q.2: Bem1er Y. Beaver, 23 Pa. t. 167; Gibbs v.
JI e1111ard, 6 Paige, 258 ; {Varner Y. Beardsley, 8 \Y ncl. 1 4; 7 Arn.
& E rw. Enc. L aw, -t86, ca es 111 note. Th judO"m nt of the
uperior court of D twla cr>Unty i affirm cl.
0

T .

0

ganyB-**^'*

INDEX.

Acceptance, guarantor entitled to notice of, when, 8, 123.

notice of, when necessary, 61, 120.

when necessary to complete contract, 120.

Accommodation Indorser, breach of warranty, recoiipement, or

INDEX.

counter claim no defense in favor of, 215.

Action^ cause of. accrues as against surety when, 270.

for contribution, against whom, 48.

for contribution arises from implied undertaking, 274,

for indemnity when accrues, 48.

not maintainable on oral promise when, 191.

when lies against principal, promise of third person within

statute, 183.

when none lies against party undertaken for, promise of

third person, within statute, 184.

Adjudication^ against principal, effect upon surety, 241.

Aliquot-part, measure of recovery, 278-279.

basis of determining in actions for contribution, 280-281.

Alteration, of principal's contract, effect on surety, 50, 106, 137,
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244, 246.

of bond, when a defense, 251.

of bond by act of legislature, 239.

Another Person, promise to answer for debt of void if not in

writing, 149.

promise to pay debt of, made to creditor, 174.

debt of, oral promise to pay within statute, 132.

debt of, promise to pay, 162-163.

Bank, right of to apply depositor's account to satisfaction of his

debt, 222-4. .17/

absolute owner of money deposited, 222. .oho£

a debtor to depositor, 222. noiioR

Blanks in bond, authoritv to fill, 251. ^ vJilidBif

g narant r ntitle 1 t n tice of, when, , 123.
notice of, when n ce ary, (r, 120.
wh en n ece sary to complete contract, 120.
Ac cOJ\lMODATIO
I DORSER, breach of warranty, recoupement, or
counter claim no defense in favor of, 215.
AcTio , cause of. accrues as again t surety when, 270.
for contribution, again t whom, 48.
for contribution arises from implied undertaking, 274.
for indemnity when accrues, 48.
not maintainable on oral promise when, 191.
when lies against principal, promise of third person within
tatute, 183.
when none lie against party undertaken for, promise of
third person, within statute, 184.
_t\.DJUDICATIO r, against principal , effect upon surety, 24r.
ALIQUOT-PART, measure of recov ery, 278-279.
basis of determining in acti ons for contribution, 280-28r.
ALTERATIO , of principal's contract, effect on surety, 50, 106, 137,
AccEPT. \ r CE,

244, 246.

Bond, form of, 194. ' ' -^^"^ V'^^}'['''^^

form of condition, 248. '''^^^ *5' "'S"^

blanks in, authority to fill, 251. 'l^" '"^"^.^ ^^^"^^"^

alteration of by statute, effect on sur^J^^(^f^^'^'^"^'^'^

alteration of w'hen a defense, 245, 251; '^fcji'"! gamiM-js-oO -

official, right of legislature to alter '^3t/:J<' no'nvdhino'j j

,j^/:)c. ufifjocl ?.3i1'i-!u?. nsriv/

/)«rrf ?.i orto rr^rlv/ io vJilidBrf

of bond, when a defense, 25r.
of bond by act of legislature, 239.
ANOTHER PERSON, promise to an wer for debt of void if n ot in
writing, 149·
promi e to pay debt of, made to creditor, 174·
debt of, oral promise to pay within statute, 132.
debt of, promi e to pay, 162-1 63.
right of to apply depositor's account to satisfaction of his
debt, 222-4.
absolute owner of money deposited, 222.
• >I:f')£
a debtor to depositor, 222.
w rt>,
BLA KS in bond, authority to fill, 25r.
rr:·dr,il

BANK,

tJ1'l'l£r

form of, 194·
,·, ,f
rrinr·rr
1
form of condition, 248.
~
1•rrr rrrr • 1 ,., jJIJ?'J.,
blanks in, authority to fill, 25r.
.
alteration of by tatute~ effect on sutety'. '2;cf. rJ·nrr-- 1'
alteration of when a defense, 245, 25 I. r
..... 111 • ~· ,,_t
official rio-ht
of
leo-i
lature
to
alter
3Q.
rrurtrrdn
,m1·
0
0
'
' ~.,
Ji ,,,.,H . . rr·Hhr
1... rrr el '>flo rr·>rl /1 t · , •· lidsi

.BOND,

' ·

292 INDEX.

Bon d — Continued.

signer hound to know conlLiils. unless iMX-vcnlcd by fraudu-

1~u1., x.
lent device, 199.

for security for public work, statute concerning, function of.

48.

required of contractors for public works, 43.

penalty of. as limit of liability, 55.

Collateral, see promise.

Collection, guaranty of what amounts to, 82.

Composition, of debt secured, affects surety how, 210-211.

Concealment, of material facts ground for invalidating contract,

Condition, of bond, form of, 248.

Consideration, must be proved, 74.

B ;' 1>-Co11tin11ed.
. i;:.;n r l>ouncl
kn \\'
ntent . tmle pr ,. nl cl 1 y frauclu1 n l cl ,.ic , 1
for ecnrity for pnl lic work, tatule con erning-, functi n of.
48.
r quir d £ c ntra t r_ f r public w rk , 43.
penalty f. a limit f liability 55.

what constitutes, 58.

failure of may Ix* shown by surety, when, 213.

mutual obligations of parties as, 105.

what is sufficient, 111-112.

of guaranty, 58.

whether moral obligation is sufficient, 286-287.
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Construction, of guaranty, 58, 106.

rule of, as to wdiether guaranty is for single or continuous

dealing, 88.

relation of parties and circumstances enter into, 88.

to give effect to intention of parties, 24, 136.

Contract, of guaranty collateral, 2.

of suretyship direct, 2.

of surety and guarantor contrasted, 2, 6-8, 22-24, 26-27.

Contractor, for public work, bond required of, 48.

Contribution, measure of recovery in action at law, 280.

when right to accrues, 280.

action for arises from implied undertaking, 272.

action for arises not by force of express contract, 272.

liabilitv for, in action at law% 278.

liability for, suits in equity, 278.

origin of doctrine of, 272.

results from maxim that equality is equity, 272.

co-sureties entitled to, 255.

Co-sureties, indorsers may be, iiitcr-scsc, 275.

contribution between, of equitable, origin, 2^2.

when sureties bound severally are, 255.

liability of when one is insolvent, 258.

OI.L.\TER.\L, e promi e.
LLE TIOX, i::;uarant)' of what am unt t
2.
0;'11PO lTION, of lebl
cur cl, aff ct
ur ty how, 210-21r.
ON E.\Ll\IE TT of mat ria l fact o-round for in alidating contra t,
123 .
o~DITION, of I ncl, f rm f 248.
ON IDER TION, mu t b pr ved, 74.
what c n titute , S .
failure f may 1
h wn by
213.
mutual obligation
f parti
what i ufficient. lII-II2.
o f g uaranty, 58.
w h th r m oral
ufficient, 2R6-287.
CONSTRUCTIO
of g u a ranty, 58, 106.
rule of, a t wh th r o-uaranty i for ingl or continu u
dealing, 88.
relation of parti
and circurn tanc
nt r into, 8 .
to g ive eff ct to int n ti n of partie. , 24, I 36.
o _\TTRACT, of g uaranty
llateral , 2.
of ur ty hip di r t 2.
of urety and o-narantor contra ted, 2, - 22-24, 26-27.
ONTRA T R, fo r pul lic work, bond r quir d of, 4 .
0

0.

t.

quity 27_.

-7-·

I
INDEX.

DEX.

... 93

ntitlecl t b n fit f c llat ral ccunt1 , wh n, 2 .
dealin of with c ntinuing partner di charg , ur ty, when,
3 -37.
how bound to r p ct right and equiti
f ur ty, 36.
failur to ti m ney within his control 111 I ayrnent f hi ·
claim, effect of, 223.
dili · nee required f, 96-97.
mu t show notice f acceptance, wh n, 1 22-123.
failure of, to ue cl btor at surety' reque t, 219.
bound to diligence to exonerat urety, 220.

CREDIT R)
293

Creditok, entitled to benefit of collateral securities, when, 288.

dealings of with continuing- partner discharges surety, when,

36-37.

how bound to respect rights and equities of surety, 36.

failure to use money within his control in payment of his

claim, effect of, 223.

diligence required of, 96-97.

must show notice of acceptance, when, 122-123.

failure of, to sue debtor at surety's request, 219.

bound to diligence to exonerate surety, 220.

Debt of another, promise to pay. within the statute, 132, 171, 174.

of another, promise to answer for, 145.

of another, promise to answer for, rules for determininur

what is, 145-146.

of another, promise to answer for not dependent upon form

of expression, 147.

future, guaranty of within statute, 166.

none against principal, none against surety, 207-208.
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Debtor, transfer of property to third person in consideration of

agreement of debtor to pay the debt, 157.

Defalcations, future, liability of surety for, 249.

Default of Another, promise to answer for within statute, 182.

Defense, based on absence of liability of principal debtor to cred-

itor, 187-190, 192, 193, 196, 199-200.

based on extinguishment of liability of principal to creditor,

205, 206, 208.

based on principal's right of counter claim against creditor,

211.

based on loss or surrender of securities by creditor, 216.

based on refusal to sue debtor, 219.

based on lack of notice to guarantor of acceptance of guar-

anty, 225.

based on creditor's failure to use money in his control to pay

debt, 221.

based on lack of notice to guarantor of principal's default,

235.

based on alteration of contract, 238, 239, 245.

based on retention of employee after knowledge of his dis-

honesty, 247.

based on fraud of principal, 250, 252.

based on dealings between creditor and co-surety, 254-256.

breach of warranty recoupement or counter-claim not avail-

able as, to accommodation indorser, 213.

of another, promi e to I ay, \\·it hin the tatute, 132, 171, 174·
of another, promi e to an wer for, 145.
of another, promi e to answer for, rule for determining
what is, 145-146.
of another, promise to an wer for not dependent upon form
of expres ion, 147·
future, guaranty of within statute, 166.
none against principal, none again t urety, 207-208.
DEBTOR) transfer of pr perty to third person in con icleration of
agreement of debtor to pay the debt, 157·
DEF.-\LCATIO NS, future, liability of c;urety for, 2-1-9.
DEFAULT OF ANOTHER, promi e to answer for within tatute, 182.
DEFE SE) based on absence of "liability of principal debtor to creditor, 187-190, 192, 193, 196, 199-·200.
ba ed on extingui hment of liability of principal to creditor,
205, 206, 208.
ba ed on principal's right of counter claim against creditor,
21 I.
ba ed on lo s or surrender of ' ecurities by creditor. 216.
·
ba ed on refu al to sue lebtor, 219.
ba ed on lack of notice to o·uarantor of acceptance of guaranty~ 225.
ba d on creditor' failure t0 n e money in hi control to pay
debt, 22r.
based on lack of notice to guarantor of principal's default,
235.
based on alteration of contract, 238, 239, 245.
ba ed on retention of employee aft r knowled e of hi di ~ honesty, 247.
ba ed on fraud of principal, 250, 252.
based on dealings between creditor and co- urety, 254-256.
breach of warranty recoupement or counter-claim not available as, to accommodation indor er, 2 r 3.

DEBT

294 INDEX.

!~DEX.

Demand upon principal when necessary, 21, 22.

Diligence, exercise of by creditor required, when, 96, 97.

of creditor cannot be demanded, when, 103.

Duress a personal defense, 199-200.

to principal will not avoid obligation of surety, 200.

Employee, retention of after knowledge of his dishonesty, 249.

Equities, surety's must be respected, 36.

Exoneration of surety may be compelled, when, 290.

DE\I \ . ·o upon pri11cipal "h n nece ary, 21, 22.
Dru<;E E, xerci ' C o{ by er ditor rertuirecl. wh n. 96, 97.
of creditor cann t be d('man<le I, wh n, 103.
l ' RE
a peLonal def n 'e, 199-200.
to principal will not avoid obli<Yati 11 of ~ urety, 200.

Forbearance, effect of upon surety, 26.

a sutficient consideration, iii.

Fraud of principal towards surety, 251-252.

of principal when no defense to surety, 253.

Future Liability, guaranty of within statute, 166.

Guarantee, neglect of to fix lial)ility of indorser does not dis-

rcte11ti 11 of after knowledge of hi li hone ty. --+9·
EQUJTIE , urety' mu t be r pected, 36.
Exo i'ER.\TIO'\ of urety may be compelled when, 290.
E:\IPLOYEE,

charge guarantor, when, 237.

Guarantor, may limit his liability, 67.

CE. effect of upon surety, 26.
a sufficient con~icl ration, 11 r.
FR,\UD of principal towards snr ty, 251-252.
of principal when no defen. c to urety, 253.
FUTU RE LIABILITY, guaranty of within tatute, 166.
FoRnE.\RA

notice to, when necessary, 80.

liability of, distinct from principal's, 94.

engagement of, individual contract, 94.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t2j67hs5z
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

cannot be sued with his principal, 94.

of collection, obligation of, discharged when, 96.

discharged by laches, when, 97.

of payment, position of that of surety, loi.

of payment contrasted with guarantor of collection, 96.

distinguished from surety, 77-78.

entitled tc notice, when, 123.

entitled to notice of liability within reasonable time after tran-

sactions are closed, ']'j.

contract of, contrasted with surety's, 2.

and surety, difference betw^een, 7.

of payment, 24.

absence of notice to, of acceptance of guaranty, 232.

Guaranty, defined, 93.

special, consideration necessary to support, 66.

special, a trust in the promisee. 66.

special, not assignable, 66.

special, as to persons, 80.

general, 66.

limited, 67.

limited as to amount, 90.

neo-lect of to fix liability of inclor er doe not di ·charge guarantor, when, 237.
Gl .\R \~TOR; may limit hi liahility, 67.
notice to, when necessarv, 80.
liability of, di ti net from· principal' , 94.
engagement of, individual contract, 94.
cannot be ued \Vith hi principal 94.
of collection, obligation of, di. charged when, 96.
di ch=:trged by Jach s, ·w hen, 97.
of payment, position of that of urety, ror.
of payment contra ted ·with guarantor of collection, 9(i.
clistingui hed from sur ty, 77-78.
entitl ed to notice, when, I?-3.
entitled to notice of liability within r "a on al le time after tranactions a re closed, 77.
contract of, contra ted with urety' , 2.
and surety, difference between, 7.
of payment, 24.
ab. nee of notice to, of acceptance f <Ytiaranty, 232.
Gu .\R.\NTY, defined, 93.
pecial, consideration nece sary to upport, 66.
pecial, a trust in the prornisee. fi6 .
pecial, not assignable, 66.
special, as to persons, 80.
creneral, 66.
limited, 67.
limited as to amount, 90.

Gu.i\R.\XTEE,

I

INDEX. 295

DEX.

•Guaranty — Continued.

continuing, 65, 225.

continuing, what amounts to, 85-86.

continuing, what doe* not amount to, 88.

absohite, defined, 94.

absolute instrument amotmting to, 234.

absoktte, form of, 98.

notice of, when necessary, 78.

of collection, what amoimts to, 83.

of collection distinguished from guaranty of payment, 96.

when obligation matures. 82, 96. ^

for single dealing, forn) of. 87.

construction of, rules governing, 91, 140.

of payment, form of, 92, 98.

of payment defined, 96.

of payment, scope of, 94.

of payment not discharged by principal's failure to take pro-

ceedings against creditor, 236.

nor by neglect to fix liability of indorser, 237.
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of payment an undertaking without condition, 236.

of payment distinguished from guaranty of collection, 96.

undertaking of, contrasted with that of surety, iot.

contract of, incomplete without acceptance, 120.

contract of, made onl}' by n.mtual assent of parties, 120.

an offer or proposal, when, 120.

distinguished from indemnity, 153.

not enlarged by construction, 106.

contract of, collateral, 2.

contract of, differs hew from other contracts, 58.

right to revoke, 3.

construction of, 58.

when unaccepted proposal, 230.

when a complete obligation, 230.

and suretyship, distinction in form, 7.

Implication, nothing can be added by way of, 26.

Indemnity, action for, when accrues, 270.

whether moral obligation is sufficient to support promise of,

286.

promise of, must be supported by valid consideration, 287.

securities taken for, trusts, 288.

retiring partner's right to, 36.

distinguished from guaranty, 153.

rmplied promise of, 286.

oral promise for, valid when, [70.

G

ARA

TY-Continued.

continuing, 65, 225.
continuing, what amounL to, 85-86.
continning, what doe.- not amount to,
absolute, defined, 9--1-·
ab olute instrument amounting to, 234.
ab olute, form of, 98.
notice of, when nece sary, 78.
of collection, what amonnts to, 83.
of collection di tingnished from guaranty of payment, 96.
"hen oblio-ation mat11res, c 2, 96.
fo r single dealing, fo rm of, 87.
ron truction o{, rul gov ming, 91 , Lj.O.
of payment. form of, 92, 98.
of payment defined, 96.
of payment, scope of, 94.
of payment not discharged by principal' failure to take proceedings against creditor, 236.
nor by neglect to fix liability of indorser, 237.
of payment an nndertaking without condition, 236.
of payment distinguished from guaranty of collection, 96.
undertaking of, contrasted w ith that of su rety, IOI.
contract of, incomplete without acceptance, 120.
contract of, made only by mutual as ent of parties, 120.
an offer or proposal, when, 120.
distino-nishecl from indemnity, 153.
not enlarged by construction, mo.
contract of, collateral, 2.
car.tract of, differ, hew from other contracts, 58.
right to revoke, 3.
construction of, 58.
when unaccepted proposal, 230.
when a complete obligation, 230.
and suretyship, dtstinction in form, 7.
nothing can be added by way of, 26.
action for, when accrues, 270 .
whether moral obligation i sufficient to support promise of
286.
promise of, must be suppo1ied by valid consideration, 287.
securities taken for, trusts, 288.
retiring partner's right to, ~6.
distingnished from guaranty, r 53.
rm plied promise of, 28f5.
oral promise for, valid when, .c70.
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296 iNUKx.

TxDORSERS, liability of infcr-scsc shown by parol. 276.

contrasted with guarantors. 39.

Ixi-AXT, contract of, voidable only at election of. 191.

promise to answer for debt of. kji.

snrety on contract of, liable, 193.

Intkrkst in transaction as attectm^ character of pn>niisr. 145.

JuDGMKXT against principal, liuw far binds sm-etv. 240.

OEX.

1.'\UOH.'ERS, lial)ilit)

f i111cr-scst' : hc•\\'11 by par L _71.
contrasted \\'ith guarantor., 3q.
JxF_\ .- T, contra -t of," i labl C>nly at clccti n of. 191.
promi.:;c to an.:;\\' r for d ·lit l;f, 1<)1 .
surety on contract f, liable, I<J3.
Ix·1 ERE"T in tran action as affe-tin~- character uf prumis " q5.

Laijorers, bond for protection of, 53.

Letter of Credit, g-eneral, defined, ('18.

JL'Dt;:-,fF\."T

ao·ain t principal, lio\\' far hind . . urety.

2-10.

special, defined, 63.

I/fABiLiTV, absience of, of principal deljlc^r lo creditor, 195.

of surety not aflfected by composition of debt, when, 209.

third person must be discharged from, to take promise out

of statute. 186.

penalty named in bond, limit of, 254.

Lunatic, surety on contract of, lialjle. 193.

Married WoM'AN, surety on contract of. liable, 188-189.

contract of. void where not allowed by statute. 287.

promise of. made after discoverture void, when, 287.
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promise of, mu.st l)e (in new consideration, 287.

M \ti:rt \i. Mi:x, bond for protection of, 53.

Miscarriage of another, promise to answer for collateral. 133.

meaning of term, 133.

bond f r prol ctio n of, 53.
REDIT, general, definecl, ()8.
pe ial, define l, 63.
LL\DILITY, ab. nee of of pTincipal debtor
-reclilor, t95.
of surety not affe t cl by composition f cleht. when, 209.
third per_on mu t he discharged from . to tak prom1 e out
of tatnte. I 6 .
penalty named in 1 oncl , limit of, 254.
Ixx.\TI . surety on con tract of liable. i 93.
L\110RERS,

LETTER OF

Misconduct of principal, how affects surety, 251, 253.

Moral Odligation as sufficient consideration to support promise

of indemnity, 286.

MuNIC!l'Al.IT^■, surety on obligation of. liable wlien. 197-198.

XoTiCE of acceptance, when necessary, 61.

to guarantor of principal's default. 100.

to guarantor of acceptance of guaranty, 228.

absence of, when defense to giiar.nitor, 234.

necessary, when, 230.

necessary, why, 230.

guarantor entitled to, when, y/, 123.

Om.iGATKJN of surety not avoided ])y duress ui principal, 200.

none implied against surety, 136.

Orae Promi.se to answer for deljt of another, 149.

invalid when debt reniains payable by debtor, 149.

\V O\L\ x, nrety on cont ract of. liable. l -189.
contract o f. v id wher not allowed by . tatute, 2 7.
promi. c of , mad e after cli ~ coverture v id, when, 287.
promise f, mu st b on n ew co n id ration. 287.
-:\J.\TERT \ L "\ f l ~:'-J . bond f r protectio n of, 53·
MrscARRL\GE of anoth r, prornise to an w r fo r ollatc ral. 133.
meaning of term, 133.
-:\lrscoxuL·cT of principal, how affect. urety, 251, 253.
::\IoR.\L OuuC .\ TIO. a
ufficient consiclerati n t . upport p romi e
of ind emnity 286.
"\IuxrcrP.\LTTY, urety on obligation of, liabl \\'h en. 197-198.

-:\L\RRIF.D

of ac eptanc , wh en n ece , ary Gr.
to guarantor f principal's default. r
to o-u ~ ranto r of ace ptance of guaranty. 22
ab, en ce f. when d ef en. e t guarant r, ~:)4.
nece ary, when, 230.
n ece ·ary, why, 230.
g uarantor ent itl ed t o . wh n, 77, r23.

:\'OTC CE

urety not avoided by clmes
f prin ipal
none impli ed arrain t . urety. 1 ~n.
ORAL PRO~IJSE to an w r f r d bt of anoth r, i49.
invalid when clebt r main. payabl by cl btor, 149·

OnLIGATION of

200.

INDEX. 297

Original UNDKKTAKk\G basis of collateral or secondary prom-

I

ise, 127, 186.

~9/

DEX.

Payment by surety not new consideration, 270.

guaranty of, 24.

RI ,r. T,\L L'"NDERT \KIN.

ha.' i.

0£

coll alcral

r . e onclary prorn -

Partner retiring, surety when, 36.

e,

retiring cannot give note in partnership name after dissolu-

I-7

l

tion, 35.

retiring entitled to indemnity, 37.

continuing, dealings of creditor with, discharges surety.

when, 37.

continuing bound to indemnify retiring partners, T^y.

signing as principal without authority of firm, 195.

binds co-partners as sureties, when, 195.

Penalty stated in bond limit of liability, 54, 67, 255.

Principal, demand upon, when necessary, 21.

absence of liability of to creditor, defense to surety, 195.

judgment against not res judicata against surety, 240.

compelled to exonerate surety, ^vhen, 290.

irnplied promise of, to indemnify surety, 270.

249.
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retention of, in service after knowledge of his dishonesty.

duty of, to exercise good faith toward surety, 249.

fraud on part of, to withhold knowledge of employee's pre-

vious dishonesty, 249.

fraud of, towards surety, 25; 1-253.

Promise, original, when, 127.

original and collateral contrasted, 162, 165, 186.

collateral, within statute, 184.

to indemnify one for becoming guarantor whether or not

within statute, 167.

consideration for, what sufficient, 168.

not within statute when leading object is to benefit promisor,

206.

for reimbursement within statute, 170.

to indemnify one for becoming surety for another, 170.

to pay for goods furnished another, 186.

to answer for debt of another must be made to creditor to be

within statute, 65.

Promissory Note indorsed by third person presumption of liabil-

ity, 39-

indorsement by payee liability of. 38.

Recovery on guaranty of collection, when, 83.

Reformation of bond when descried as against surety, 290.

by surety not new c n i leration, 270.
o-uaranty of, 24.
PARTNER retiring, urety wh n, 36.
r tiring cannot o-ive not in partner hip nam e after ck olu tion, 35.
retiring entitled to indemnity 37.
ontir:u ing dealing of creditor with, cli charge
ur<:t , ..
when, 37.
c ntinuin o- bound to ind emnify retiring partners, 37.
igning a principal without authority of firm. 195·
binds co-partner a uretie , when, 195·
P E ALTY tated in bond limit of liabi lity, 54, 67. 255 .
PRl:\i"ClP,\L, demand upon, when nece ary, 2I.
ab ence of liability of to creditor, def n e to ~ urety, 195·
j ud oment aa-ain t not res judicata again t urety, 240.
compelled to exonerate urety, when, 290.
implied promi e of, to indemnify surety, 270.
retention of, in ervice after knowledge of hi di shone ty.
249.
duty of, to ei.xerci e good faith toward urety, 249.
fraud on part of, to w·ithhold know ledn-e of employee· previous dishonesty, 249.
fraud of, toward surety, 2s I-253.
PR01.IISE, original, when, 127.
original an I collateral contra ted, 162 165, 186.
collateral, within statute, 184.
t indemnify one for becomin~ guarantor whether or not
within statute, I 67.
con ideration for, what ufficient, 168.
not within tatute when leading obj ct i to benefit promi or.
206.
for reimbursement within statute, I70.
to indemnify one for becoming . urety for another, r70.
to pay for goods furnish t> d an oth er) 186.
to an wer for debt of another nrnst be made to creditor to be
within statute, 65.
PRmn ORY JoTE indorsed by third per on pre umption of liability, 39·
indor ement by payee liability of. 38.

PAYMENT

REco ERY

on

REFOR l\ LA.TIO

guarant~ of collection, when, 83.
of bond wh en descried a aa-ain t urety, 290.

298 INDEX.

9

I

DEX .

Security required for labor and materials in public works, 43.

Special Promise to answer for debt of another, void if not in

writing, 149.

Stkictissimi Juris, meaning of, 106.

Statute of Frauds, promise to answer for miscarriage of an-

other, within, 133.

joint promise to pay debt of one, 126.

secondary or collateral promises, within, 127.

promises, within, 127.

oral promise to answer for default of another, within, 132.

oral agreement to share commissions and losses, not within,,

promise not within, when, 157.

not applicable to promise of third person who receives money

or property of debtor, 157.

promise to pay for goods to be supplied to third persons, not

within, 176.

promise for reimbursement, within, 171.

applies only to promises made to a person to whom anotlier

is ans-werable, 174.
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promise within, unless third person is discharged from lia-

bility, 186.

promise to answer for default of another, within, 149.

promise within, when debt remains payable by debtor. 149.

promise to answer for debt of infant, within, 191.

Statute of Limitations, debt barred as to principal barred as.

to surety, 207-208.

when runs upon surety's claim upon principal debtor, 270.

begins to nm, when, 270.

Statute of Mich., providing security for public works, 43.

Statute of U. S., providing security for public works, 48.

Subrogation, definition of, 263.

not founded upon contract, 263.

the creation of equity, 263.

volunteer or stranger not entitled to, 263.

surety not entitled to, when, 267.

Surety, definition of, 36, T17.

contract of, direct, 2.

contract of, contrasted with guarantor's, 2.

and guarantor, difference between, 7.

discharge of, by change in contract without his consent, lO.

contract of, construction of, 21.

not discharged by delay to sue, 26.

requ ire l fo r labor and mal rial in public work , 43.
PE I\L PRO.\t LE to an ~ wer for cl IJt f an th r, Yoid if not in
wri ting , 149·
·nucrr. snu Jnm; m aning of, 106.
T .\ TUTE OF i:. R \ uo , p romi c to an wer for m1 carriage of another, within, 1 0 3.
joint prom i t pay deht of one, 126.
econclary or r:. llateral promi e , within, 127.
p romi e , within, 12/.
oral pr mi . c to :in w r for default of another, ·w ithin, 132.
oral ag reement to hare commis. ion an l 1 . e , not \ ithin,.
154·
p romise not within, when, 157·
not applicab!e to prom! e of third p r n who rec ive money
or property of clebtcr, l 57.
promi:)e t . pay f r g ood to be upplicd to third p r on , nnt
within, l/1 .
promise for r ~ imbucem e nt, within, 171.
applies o:'.1.ly to promi es marle to a per on to whom an oth r
is answerable, 174·
promis within, unless third per on is di charged frL rn lia bility, 186.
promi e to an ' wer for default of another, within, 14~·
promise within, wh n debt remain. payable by debtor, 149.
promi e to answer for debt f infant, within, 191.
STAT TE OF LDlITATIO . - , rlebt harred a to principal barred a ,
to surety, 207-208.
when run. upon surety's claim upon principal d btor, 270.
begins to nm, when, 270.
ST~\TUTE OF Mr H., providing ecurity f r public work , 43.
STAT U TE OF U.
., providing ecurity for public work , 48 .
. UBROGATION, definition of, 263 .
not found d upon contract, 263.
the creation of equity, 263.
volunteer or tran er not entitled to, 263.
urety not entitled t , when, 267.
U RETY, definition of, 36, T 17.
contract of, direct, 2 .
contract f, contra te l \Vi th g-t1arantor's, 2.
and guarantor, di ff r _nc between, 7.
di charg
f. by chang in c ntract without his con ent, IO.
contract f, con truction of, 21.
not di charo·e l by leiay to u , 26.
E URlTY

I
INDKX.

IH:X.

UR ETY-C(J11/ i11 11td.

291)

SuRETV — Contimii'd.

retirin,<4 partner, when is, 36.

equities of, must be respected. 36.

liahilily of. co-extensive with principal's. 30.

not Ixnuid unless principal is, 195.

how atfected by alteration of principal's l)on(l, 1}^k).

not released by statutcvry change, 239.

obligation of, not avoided by duress of principal, 200.

how^ affected by principal's loss or surrender of securities.

ret mng pi1rtncr, when i , 36.
equiti ec: f , must b r p cted, :)6.
liahilit y f, co- -xten .' i\' c ' ith princi}J<ll' . . 30.
not boi.md unit: principal i , i 9_s.
hO\•v Clff ct cl by alteration of prin cipal'. bond. 23<.J·
not rel a eel by tatut r y change, 239.
obligation of, n o t a voided by duress of principal , _oo.
h w aff ct cl by principal'. lo: . or . urre nclC'r o f c;cc uriti c.· .

217.

entitled to benefit of securities taken by creditor, 218.

how affected bv creditor's failure to use money within hi>

control in payment of his claim, 223.

how aft'ected by bank's failure to apply depositor's account

on principal's debt. 223.

released by variation of contract, 247.

how far bound by judgment against prmcipal, 241.

fraud of principal tcnvards. 25r-253.
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how affected by misconduct of principal, 251^253.

several obligation of. 255.

liabilitv of, amount stipulated the limit. 255.

discharged, when. 257.

discharged l)y release of princijial, 257.

discharged to what extent by release of co-surety. 258.

quasi right of, to subrogation. 267.

not released bv creditor of bankrupt consenting to conqiosi-

tion, 211.

release of, by change in contract. 50.

contract of. strictly construed, 50.

right of, to indemnitv. 270.

claim of. against principal debtor not barred by hitter's dis

charge in insolvency, 271.

how affected if principal fails to sue, 220.

right of. to expedite proceedings against princii)al, 220.

collateral securities taken Ity, are for benefit of creditor.

when. 288.

reforming instrument as against. 260.

may compel principal to exonerate him. 2c_)o.

entitled to remedies of creditor against princi])al debtor. 272.

entitled to stand in place of creditor. 272.

contrasted with indorser, 39.

undertaking of. contrasted wdth that of guarantor, lot.

when released by act of. parties secured. 105.

entitled to securities held by principal. 282.

contract of. not enlarged by construction. 136.

2 17.

entitle 1 to benefit of securities taken h~, creditor, 21 .
h w affected bv credito r 's failure to use m o n ev within hi ;-;
control in payme nt of lii . claim, 2-3·
ho w affected by bank' failure to apply cl epoc; it o r' s account
on principal 's debt, 223.
r elea eel by variation of co ntract. 2_~7 .
ho w far bo und by judg-m ent against principal, 2-~I .
fraud of principal towa rd s. 25_r-253 .
how affected by misconduct of principal, 251 - 25 3 .
eve ral ob li gat io n of . 255 .
liability of, amount tipuhttecl the limit . 255 .
cfi ... charo-ed, when , 257 .
clischarg·ed by relea se of principal. 257 .
di charo-ecl to what C'xtent bY release of co-suret \·. 238
qua i rig·ht o f, to subr- gation , 267 .
not released by creditn r o f hankrupt con e nting t o compo:->i tioin. 21 i.
rcl ea e f, by change in contract, 50.
contract o f. st ric t ly cc•nstrued. 50.
r;ght of, to ind emnitv. 2 70 .
claim f, against princ ipal clebh r no t barred ]),· latter' s di s-·
charge in in solv er:cy, '.?.7L
ho w affected if principal fails to u e. 220.
righ t of, to expeclit ~ proceed ing. again t principal. 220.
collateral seC11ritie ta k n lJv, arc fo r benefit o f creditor.
when, 288.
·
reforming in , trnme nt a ~ against. 26o.
may compel principal t exonerate him. 290.
entitled to r ernedie-s o f creditor again t prin cipal d C'hto r. 272.
entitled to tand in place of creditor. 2 72.
~ ontra tecl with incl o r se r , 39.
undertaki:1g of, contra ted with that of guarantor. 101 .
when r lea sed hy act of .parties secured. lOj .
entitled to ecuritie h lcl by principal, 282.
contrnct f. not e nlarged by construction. i 36.

800
'600 INDEX.

Surety — Coniinued.

entitled to stand in place of principal creditor on paying the

debt, 285.

concealment of facts will discharge, when, 123.

on bond for public work, liability of, 54.

debt of, barred if debt of principal is barred by statute of lim-

itations, 207.

entitled to notice of employee's dishonesty, 249.

Suretyship^ joint contract indicates, 7.

contract of, when becomes binding, 8.

construction of contract of, 21, 105.

Third Person, promise to pay for goods supplied to, 162.

Variation of surety's risk, 239, 247.

JNDEX .

. URET\-C(Jn/inued.

entitled to tand in place of principal creditor on paying the
debt, 285.
concealment of fact will discharge. when, 123.
on bond for public work, liability of, 54.
debt cf, barred if debt of principal is barred by tatute of limitations, 207.
entitled to notice of employee's di hone ty, 249.
URETY, HIP, joint contract indicates, 7.
contract of, ·when becomes binding, .
construction of contract of, 2r, 105.
THIRD PERSO r,
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VARIATIO~

promi e to pay for goods uppliecl to,

of :::metv' risk, 239, 247.

162.
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ANATOMY.— Ozd/ines of Anatomy, A Guide to the Dissection of the

Human Body. Based on a Text-Book of Anatomy. By American

'E

I

PUBLISHER AND BOOKSELLER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF
ANN ARBOR.

fICHIGAN ,

Authors. 54 pages. Leatherette, 50 cents.

The objects of this outline are to inform the student what structure are found in

each region and where the description of each structure is found in American Text-

Any book in this list will be sent, carriage fre e, to any address in the
world on receipt of price named.

Book of Anatomy.

BOWEN. — A Teachers'' Course in Physical Training. By Wilbur P.

Bowen, Director of Physical Training, Michigan State Normal Col-

lege. A brief study of the fundamental principles of gymnastic

training, designed for Teachers of the Public Schools. 183 pages.

43 illustrations. Cloth, $1.00.

CHEEVER. — Select Methods in Inorganic Quantitative Analysis. By

Byron W. Cheever, A.M., M.D., late Acting Professor of Metal-

lurgy in the University of Michigan. Revised and enlarged by Frank
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Clemes Smith, Professor of Geology, Mining and Metallurgy in the

State School of Mines, Rapid City, S. D. Parts I. and II. Third

edition. i2nio. $1.75.

The first part of this book, as indicated by the title, consists of Laboratory Notes

for a Beginner's Course in Quantitative Analysis. It considers the subjects of

Gravimetric and Volumetric Analysis, for beginners, by means of the chemical

analysis of a set of substances, properly numbered, in each case giving the methods

to be followed in such analysis; also the methods for calculating and preparing

volumetric standard solutions, generally following the course offered by Professor

Cheever to his students. It also considers the methods for the determination of the

specific gravities of various liquids and solids.

Although a number of the analyses contained in Part I. may be of only approxi-

mate accuracy, and of small commercial value, such are yet included with a special

purpose, to wit:— that they may supply the student with a wider range of work and a

greater diversity of chemical manipulation. This was Professor Cheever's idea,

and it is certainly a good one, especially since, in most cases, the work of the begin-

ner simply serves to emphasize the necessity of careful scrutiny of details and

methods for practical work in the future.

Part I. is offered, then, for the use of schools and colleges, and it is intended to

supply a'source of elementary information upon the subject of Quantitative Chemi-

cal Analysis rarely offered in such form in works upon that subject.— Preface.

The author was for many years Professor of Metallurgy in the University of

Michigan, and the methods here presented are those mostly offered by hina to his

students. As a beginner's book in quantitative analysis, it will be found eminently

practical, and it can be honestly recommended to the student who desires a source

of elementary information upon this branch of applied science. The book is divided

into two parts, the first consisting of laboratory notes for beginners. The subjects

of gravimetric and volumetric analysis are considered by means of the chemical

analysis of a set of substances, properly numbered, in each case giving the methods

to be followed in such analysis, and also the methods of calculating and preparing

volumetric standard solutions, etc. Methods for the determination of specific

gravities of various liquids and solids are also considered.

Part II. contains a number of select methods in inorganic quantitative analysis,

such as the analysis of limestone, iron ores, manganese ores, steel, the analysis of

coal, water, mineral phosphates, smelting ores, lead slags, copper, arsenic, bismuth,

etc. A chapter on reagents concludes the work. — P/iarmcMJeuttcal tlra.

CLASSEN -HARRIMAN.—()?/rt«//A7//T'^ Analysis. By Alexender

Classen, Director of the Laboratory of Inorganic Chemistry and

Electro Chemistry in the Royal Technical School, Aachen. Author-

ized Translation from the Fifth German Edition, with an Appendix

AN A TOMY .- Out/int!s of

A n atomy , A Cuidt! to tht! Dissection of tlte
Human Body. Based on a T ext · B ook of Anatomy. By Amer£ca n
/Juth ors . 54 pages. Leatherette, 50 cents.

The objects of thi s outline are to inform the student what structure are found in
ea c h region and where the description of each structure is found in American TextB oo k of Anatomy.

BOWEN .-A T eachers' Cottrst! in P/1ysical T r aining .

By Wilbur P.
Bowen, Director of Physical Training, Michigan State
ormal College. A brief study of the fundam ental principles of gymnastic
training, designed for Teachers of the Public Schools. 183 pages.
43 illustrations. Cloth, $1.00.
CHEEVER .-Sdcct llletltods in In organic Quautitative Analysis. By
Byron W. Cheever, A.M ., M.D., late Acting Professor of Metallurgy in the University of Michigan. Revised and enlarged by Frank
Clemes Smith, Professor of Geology, 1ining and Metallurgy in the
State Sc hool of Mines, Rapid City, S. D. Parts I. and II. Third
edition . 12m o. $ r. 75.
The first part of thi s book, as indicated by the title, consists of Laboratory Notes
for a Beginner's Course in Quanti tati ve Analysis. It c onsiders th e subjects of
Gravimetric and Vo lum etric Analysis, for beginners, by means of the chemical
analys is of a se t of substances. properly numbered, in each cas e giving the methods
to be fo ll owed in such analysis ; also the methods for calculatinl! and preparing
volumet ri c s tandard so luti ons, genera ll y following the course offered by Professor
Cheever to hi s students. It also considers the methods for the determination of the
specific gravities of various liquids and solids.
Although a number of th e ana lyses contained in Part I. may be of only a ppro ximate accu racy, and of small commercial va lu e. such are yet includ ed with a special
purpose, to wit :-that they may supply the student with a wider r ange of work and a
grea ter diversity of chemical manipu lation. This was Professor Cheever's idea,
and it is certainly a good one, especia ll y since, in most cases, th e work of th e beginner simply serves t o emphasize th e necessity of ca reful scru tin y of details and
methods fo r practical work in the future.
Part I. is offered , then, for the use of schools and colleges, and it is intended to
suppl y a source of elemen tary information upon the subject of Quan tit a tive Chemical Ana lysis rare ly ofl:ered in such form in works upon that subjec t.-Preface.
The author was for many years Professor of Metallurgy in the U ui versi ty of
Michigan, and the methods here presented are thos e mostly offered by him to his
st udents. As a beginn er's book in quantitative ana lysis, it will be found eminently
practica l, and it can be honestly recommended to the student who desires a source
of e lementar y informati on upon this branch of app li ed science. Th e book is divided
into two parts, tli e fi rs t consisting of laboratory notes for beginners. The subjects
of gravimetric and vo lumet r ic ana lysis are considered by means of th e chemical
analysis o f a set of substances, properly numbered, in each case g iving the methods
to be followed in such ana lys is, and a lso the methods of calculatin g and preparing
vo lum e tric s tand a rd s olutions, e t c.
Me thods for the de t ermination of specific
g r avi ti es of various liquids and solids are a lso considered.
Part II. contains a number of selec t methods in in org anic quantita ti ve analysis,
such as the analysis of limestone, iron ores, manganese ores , steel, the an a lysi s of
coal, water, mrnera l phosph a tes, smelting ores, lead s lags, c opper, arsenic, bismuth,
e tc. A chapte r o n r eagem s concludes tli e work .-Phalrmaceutical Era.

CLASSEN - HARRIMAN .- Quantitative Analysis.

By Alexender
Cla en, Director of the Laboratory of Inorganic Chemistry and
Electro Chemistry in the Royal Technical Cichool, Aachen. Authorized Translation from the Fifth German Edition, with an Appendix

Publications of George Wahr, Ann Arbor.

Publications of George Wallr, Ann Arbor.

on the Qualitative Analysis of Minerals, Ores, Slags, Metals, Alloys,

Ktc, Including the Rare Elements, by Norman F. llarriman. Assist-

ant 'in Chemistry in the University of Michigan. 79 Illustrations.

Handsomely bound in half leather, S4.00.

"QQiZVi. — Outlines of Case Taking as Used in the Medical Clinic of the Uni-

versity of Michigan. By George Dock, A. M., M. D. Professor of

Medicine, University of Michigan. 32 pages. Cloth, 25 cents.

D • OOGE. —//<?// -f to the Study of Classical Mythology; for the Lo-ver

tirades and Secondary Schools. By B. L. D'Ooge, Professor in the

Michigan State Normal College. 12 mo. 180 pages. Cloth. 45 cents.

A bibliography based on practical experience. The author is a professor in the

Michigan State Normal College. As the myths of all nations manifest themselves

tjrsi in religion, secondly in art, and third in literature, these reading references are

grouped in the above classes. One section is devoted to the study of mythology in

the grades, and an introductory chapter gives hints for teaching the subject in the

lower grades. The books suggested in the body of the work are given in one alpha-

bet at the end, with publishers and prices; there are also blank pages for additional

references, and a good general index.— Publishers Weekly,

DOW. — Outlines and References in European History. For the use
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especially of Students in History i and 2, University of Michigan.

Part I. From the Fourth to the Ninth Century. By Earle Wilbur

Dow, University of Michigan. 42 pages. Pamphlet. 35 cents.

DOW. — Outlines and References in European History. For the use

especially of Students in History, i and 2, University of Michigan.

Part II. From the Ninth to the Thirteenth Century. By Earle

Wilbur Dow, University of Michigan. 66 pages. Pamphlet. 35

cents.

DVVYER. — Cases on Private International Law. By John W. Dwyer,

University of Michigan. 8vo. 509 pages. Buckram, $2.50.

This is a very excellent collection of cases on private international law made by

Mr. Dwyer, covering a variety of subjects, and is intended especially for the use of

students, though certain to prove interesting and valuable to all practitioners. — Al-

bany l.aiv lournal.

The cases are not new, many of them are quite ohi, but are well chosen with the

view of illustrating international law where the contests arise between parties, one

of whom is domiciled in this country, and the other in a foreign country, or between

parties residing in different states in this country. These cases, which have been

selected by the author with much good judgment, illustrate with great fullness under

the conditions above stated the law pertaining to marriage, div.-^rce. legitimacy,

guardians, administration, judgments, corporatious. unmovables, movables, attach-

ment, contracts, statute of frauds, torts, procedure. Also domicil of students,

sailors, appientices, insane persons infants, married women, commercial domicil,

reverter, domicil in uncivilized countries, domicil of origin and choice. These

cases may well be called leading cases, and will afford much aid to the seeker of

information analogous to ihe subjects in these cases discussed.— tV^/n?/ Laur

Jottrnat.

I have examined with care the copy of Prof. Dwyer's selected cases on Private

International Law, which you sent me some weeks since, and I have no hesitation in

saying that it is the best selection I have yet seen of cases upon this subject. It is

especially satisfactory on the subject of 'Domicile", "Administration" and

"Guardianship".

Had I not already made a selection of cases for the use of my classes in the Law

School cf the University of Maryland, I should unhesitatingly select this book as a

text-book for that subject As it is I find that I am using several of the cases

selected by Mr. Dwyer, and have been for some time.

HENRY STOCKBRIDGE,

Baltimore, Md.

I have received and examined with much fullness and interest the volume of

•Cases on Private International Law", by Dwyer. I am much pleased with the

selection of cases, and think the topics covered by the cases are those of most

interest and importance in connection with the subject of Private International-

Law. I have taught Private International Law by means of lectures for several

years, and feel quite competent to judge of the sagacity in the selection of the

o n the Qualitative ,\n alpi: o f ~Iineral.-, Ores, ' lag. , :-.IetaL, !Inv. ,
Lt c., ln clu chng the Rare Element:, by , •orman F. 11 arriman, ssistant in 'he mi.t ry 111 the ' niver ·ity of ::\lich1gan. 79 lllustrat1ons.
llan d~omel y hound in half leath e r, 4.00.
DOCK .-Out/11us o.f Case Tal..·iJIK as l'sed in lite 11/edicnl Clinic o.f tlte C11i<•1rs1(v of ,Jful11Kan. lh George D ock,.:\. M., .\ I. D. Profe sor of
::'ll etltcine, L'niYersit\ of .\li c hi~an. 32 page .
loth, 25 cent.
D ' OO GE. - llelps to t/u Study (If Classical Jlytlt ology; for the Lowa
Crades and S aondary Sc/u1ols . By B. L. I 'Ooge, Profes or in the
~[ ic hig~n ' tate Normal
ollege. 12 mo. 180 pages.
loth. 45 cent .
A bibliography based o n practical e')[perience. The auth o r is a professor in the
Mi chi gan State o rm al College. A s the myths of all n a ti ons manifes t th emselves
first in religion, secondly in art, and third in literature, th ese re ading references are
grouped in th e above classes. On e section is devoted to th e s tud y o f mythology in
the grades, a nd an introductory chapter gives hints for te ach ing the subject in the
lower grades. The books sugges ted 111 the body of th e work are given in one alphabet at the end , wi th publishers and prices; there are also blank pages for addi u onal
references, and a good general index.-Publishers Weekly,

DOW .-Outlines and Nefert:nces in European lfist ory. For the use
especially of "tud ents in lli tory I and 2, niv ersity of ::\li c higan.
Part I. From the Fourth to the • inth e ntury . By Earle \ il\Jur
Dow, niversity of ~[ichigan. 42 page . Pamphlet. 35 cent .
DOW. -Outlines aJ1d Rifermces in 1~·uropea n History. For the use
especially of 'tudents in Ili story, r and 2, niversity of ?llic hi gan .
Part II. From the ~inth to the Thirteenth
entury. By Earle
\ ilbur Dow, University of ~Ti chiga n.
66 pages. Pamphlet. 35
cent .
DWYER .-C11us on Priva te International Law. By John \ . Dwyer,
Univer ity of li c higan .
vo. 509 pages. Buckram, $2.50.
Thi s is a very excellen t collection o f cases on private int ernationa l la w made by
:\Ir. l)w yer. coverin ~ a varie ty of s ubjects, and is intended especially for the use of
s tud en ts, th oug h ce rtain 10 prove interes tiu g and valuable to all prac titi oaers.-A/bany Law l ournal .
The cases are no t new, many of them are quite o ld , but are well ch osen with the
view of illu s tra tin g intern a ti ona l law wh ere the co ntes ts ari s e between parties, one
of whom is domi c iled in thi s country, a nd the o ther in a foreign coun try, or be tween
parties reo;idiag in different s ta tes in thi s country. Thes e cases, whi ch have been
selec ted by th e au th o r with much good judg ment, illustrate with great fullne ss under
th e cond ni o ns above s ta ted th e law pertatning to marriage, divC'lrce. leg itimacy,
gua rdi ans, adm ini s tra tion , judgmen ts, corpora tio ns . unmovables, movables, attachmen t, con tracts. s ta tut e o f frauds, to rts, procedure.
Also domicil ol cudents,
sa ilors, app 1entices, in r; ane persons infants, married women, c o mmercial domicil,
reverter, domi c il in unciviliz ed c o untries, domicil of origin and choice. These
ca se s may we ll be ca ll ed lea ding cases , and will afford much aid to the eeke r of
information analogous to the s ub Je~ts in th ese c ases di sc ussed.- Central LawJournal.
I have examined wi th care th e copy of Prof. Dw ye r 's selected cases on Pri va te
Internationa l Law, whic h you sen t me s ome weeks s in ce, and I ha ve no h es itation in
saying that it is the bes t s el ec ri on I ha ve ye t seen of cases upon this subjec t. It is
especial ly satisfactory on the ~ubject of •·Domici le", "Administrauon" a nd
"Guardiansh ip".
H ad I not already made a se lec ti on o f cases for th e use of my c la sses in the Law
Schoo l cf the ' 111verstty of :\laryland, I shou ld unhesitatingly select thi s book as a
tex t-book for th a t s ubject As it is I find tha t I am us ing seve ral o f t he cases
s electe d by Mr. Dwyer, and h ave been for some time .
HENRY STOCKBRIDGE,
Baltimore. l\fd.
I ha ve rec eive d and exami ned with much ful lness and in terest t he volume of
"Cases o n Private Intern a ti ona l L aw", by Dw ye r. I am much p leased with t he
se lec tion of cases, a nd think th e top ics cover ed by the cases are th ose of mos t
interest and importance in connection wi th the subjec t of Private I nternational
Law.
I have taugh t Private Internationa l L aw by means of lec tures fo r several
years, and feel qui te competent to Judge of th e sa gacity in the selection of tbe

Publications of George IVa/ir, Ann Arbor.

Publications o.f Geor ue Wa!tr, A 1m Arbor.

cases, and of the admirable arrangement of them in their sequential ordei by

Mr. Dvvyer in his volume of cases. I can most cordially commend the volume, and

shall myself hereafter use it in the Iowa College of Law. C. C. COLE,

Iowa College of Law.

I have examined with care Dwyer's "Cases on Private International Law," and

find them judiciously selected and edited. The author has succeeded in presenting

in a small compass many important decisions in which the leading doctrines of this

branch of the law are exhibited and applied in a manner to make the book useful

alike to the student and to the practitioner. I trust the work will meet with the

favorable reception it deserves. GEO. B. YOUNG,

St. Paul, Minn.

D WYER.^Zr/w and Procedure of United States Courts. By John W.

Dwyer, LL. M., author of "Cases on Private International Law."

Instructor in the Law Department of the University of Michigan.

8vo. 361 pages. Bound in Buckram, ^2.75. Sheep, $3.50.

The purpose of this work is to give a brief and concise statement of the organiza-

tion, jurisdiction and practice of the various courts of our national government. It

is intended as an elementary work for students in law schools, students in law

offices and for young lawyers who have not received systematic instruction in this
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subject. In stating the jurisdiction of the courts, the author has inserted a number

of the decisions of the Supreme Court. This valuable feature of the book cannot

fail to commend itself to students and instructors alike. Similarly, the object of

the chapter on the history of the United States is to remind the student of the cir-

cumstances as they existed at the time our government was formed — to recall the

principal events in our historical development, so that the constitutional provisions

may be inteipreted in their true light. The author asserts, truly, that a knowledge

of this branch of the law is more necessary at this time than ever before, because of

cases. and of the admir3.ble arrangement of th em in their sequential orde1 by
l\lr. Dwyer in his volume of ca es. I can most cordially ommend th e volume, and
shall myself hereat'ter use it in the Iowa College of Law.
C. C . COLE,
Iowa College of Law.
I have examined with care Dwyer's "Cases on Private International Law," and
fi nd them judiciously se lected an d edi ted . The author has succeeded in presenting
in a smal l compass many impo rtam decisions in which th e leading doctrines of this
branch of th e law are exh ibited and applied in a manner to make the book useful
alike to the studen t and to the prac tit ioner.
I tru s t the work will meet with the
favorable reception it deserves.
GEO. B. YOU G,
St. Paul. Minn.

DWYER.-Law and Procedure of United States Courts .

By John W.
Dwyer, LL. l\l., author of "Case on Private International Law."
In tructor in the Law Department of the University of 1ichigan.
vo. 361 pages. Bound in Buckram, $'2.75.
heep, $3.50.

The purpose of this work is to give a brief and concise statement of the organization, ju ri sd iction and practice of th e various courts o f our national government. It
is intended as an elementary work for s tudents in law schools, students in law
offices and for young law yers who have not received sys tem atic instruction in thi s
subject. In s t ating the jurisd icti o n of the cour ts. the author has inserted a number
of t he decisions of the Sup r eme Court. This valuable feature of the book cannot
fail to commend itself to students and instructors a lik e . Similarly, the object of
the chap ter on the history of the Uni ted States is to remind the s tudent of the circumstances as they exis ted a t th e tim e our goYernment was fo rmed-to recall the
principal events in our historical development, so that the consti tuti onal provisions
may E>e interpre ted in th eir true light. The author asse rts, t ruly, th a t a knowledge
of thi s branch o f the law is more necessary a t thi s time th an ever before, because o f
the steady rncrease of litigation, arising from the rapid grow t h and reaching out of
the business of the count r y and t he bringing of certain questions withm fede ral
con tro l. T he book is exceedingly well arranged, con taining besides tab les of cases
and tables of con tents, a copious index. It canno t fail to proYe highl y ustfu l for
the purposes intended. '0le can heartily commend i t to i nstruc tors and s tud ents.-

Albany Law Journal.

the steady increase of litigation, arising from the rapid growth and reaching out of

the business of the country and the bringing of certain questions within federal

control. The book is exceedingly well arranged, containing besides tables of cases

and tables of contents, a copious index. It cannot fail to prove highly useful for

the purposes intended. We can heartily commend it to instructors and students. —

Albany Laiv Journal.

DZIOBEK. — Mathematical Theories of Planetary Motions. By Dr.

Otto Dziobek, Privatdocent in the Royal Technical High School of

Berlin, Charlottenburg. Translated by Mark W. Harrington, for-

merly Chief of the United States Weather Bureau, and Professor of

Astronomy and Director of the Observatory at the University of

Michigan, President of the University of Washington, and Wm. J.

Hussey, Assistant Professor of Astronomy in the Leland Stanford,

Jr. University. 8vo. 294 pages. $3.50.

The determination of the motions of the heavenly bodies is an important problem

in and for itself, and also on account of the influence it has exerted on the develop-

ment of mathematics It has engaged the attention of the greatest mathematicians,

and, in the course of their not altogether successful attempts to solve it, they have

displayed unsurpassed ingenuity. The methods devised by them have proved use-

ful, not only in this problem, but have also largely determined the course of advance

in other branches of mathematics. Analytical mechanics, beginning with Newton,

and receiving a finished clearness from Lagrange, is especially indebted to this

problem, and in turn, analytical mechanics has been so suggestive in method as to

determine largely both the direction and rapidity of the advancement of mathemat-

ical science.

Hence, when it is desired to illustrate the abstract theories of analytical mechan-

ics, the profundity of the mathematics of the problem of the motions of the

heavenly bodies, its powerful influence on the historical development of this

science and finally the dignity of its object, all point to it as most suitable for this

purpose.

This work is intended not merely as an introduction to the special study of

astronomy, but rather for the student of mathematics who desires an insight into the

creations of his masters in this field. The lack of a text-book, giving, within moder-

ate limits and in a strictly scientific manner, the principles of mathematical astron-

omy in their present remarkably simple and lucid form, is undoubtedly the reason

why so many mathematicians extend their knowledge of the solar system but little

beyond Kepler's law. The author has endeavored to meet this need, and at the

same time to produce a book which sliall be so near the present state of the science

as to include recent investigations and to indicate unsettled questions.

DZIOBEK .-llfathematical Theories of Planetary llfotions. By D r.
Otto Dziobek, Privatdocent in the Royal Technical High School of
Berlin, Charlottenburg. Translated by l\lark \ V. Harrington, formerly Chief of the United States Weather Bureau, and Professor of
Astronomy and Director of the Observatory at the University of
{IIichigan, President of the University of Washington, and Wm. J.
Hu ssey, Assistant Professor of Astronomy in the Leland Stanford,
Jr. University. vo. 294 pages. 3. 50.
The de term ina tion of the motions of t he heaven ly bodies is an important problem
in and for itself, and also on account of th e influence it h as exe n ed on t he developmen t of mathematics It has engaged t he a tt en ti o n of the grea tes t ma th ema ticians,
and, in th e course of their not a lt oge ther successful a tt emp ts to so lve i t , th ey have
displa yed unsurpassed ingenuity . Th e methods devised by chem have proved useful, not only in thi s prob lem, bu t have also largely de term ined th e course of advance
in o t her branches of mathematics. Analytical mechanics, b e ginning with ew ton,
and r eceiving a finished clearness from Lagrang e. is especia lly indeb ted to thi s
problem, and in turn, analy ti ca l mechanics h as been so sugges ti ve in method as to
determine la r ge ly bo t h the direction and rapidit y of the advancement of mathematical scieHoe.
Hence, when it is desired to ill ustrate the abstract the or ies of analy ti cal mechanics. t he profundi t y of the ma thematics of t hP. prob lem of the motions of the
heavenly bodies, its powerful influence on the historical developmen t of thi s
science and fina ll y t he dignity of its objec t , al l point to it as most sui table for this
p ur pose.
This wo r k is intended no t merely as a n intro du c tion to the special study of
as t ronomy. but ra ther for the s tu dent of mathem3.tics who desires an insight into the
C1'eations of his masters in thi s fie ld . The lack of a text-book , giving, within moderate limits and in a strictly scientific manner. the principles of mathematical astron.
omy in their present remarkably simple and lucid form, is undoub tedly the reas on
why so many mathematicians ex tend t heir knowledge of the solar system but little
beyond Kepler's law. Th e author has endeavored to meet this need, and at t he
same time to produce a book which shall be so near t he present state of t he science
as t o include recent investigations and to indicate unsettled questions.

Publications of George Wahr, Ann Arbor.

Publications o.f George l Valzr, Ann Arbor.

FARRAH DWYER.— Grjcj on the Law of Htisharui and Wife. By

Albert J. Farrah, Dean of the Law Department of the John B.

Stetson University, Deland, Florida, and John W. Dwyer, author of

Cases on Private International Law, and Instructor of Law in the

Department of Law of the University of Michigan. 8vo. 488

pages. Buckram, $2.50.

FLORER. — A Guide for the Study of A'ieh/'s Burg Neideck and von

F A RR A H - DWYE R .-Caus on the Law of Hu sba nd and Wife.

By
Albert J. Farrah, Dean of the Law Department of the John B.
."tetson niversity, Deland, Florida, and John \ V. Dwyer, author of
Cases on Private International Law, and Instructor of Law in the
Department of Law of the
niversity of ::Vl ichigan. 8vo. 488
pages. Buckram, $2.50.

Jage»iiitin\<: German Syntax. By Warren Washburn Florer, Uni-

versity of Michigan. 88 pages. Pamphlet. 30 cents.

FLORER, ^79/(^//Vrt/ Selections for Beginners in German. With word

list. By Warren Washburn Florer, University of Michigan. Cloth.

FLOR ER.-..1 Guide for the Study o.f Rit:hl's Burg Neideck and von
Jagemann s German Syntax. By \Varren Washburn Florer, University of :\1ichigan. 88 pages. Pamphlet. 30 cent .

88 pages. 40 cents.

FLORER. — Guide for the study of Biblical Selection. Containing questions

for conversation and grammar drill. By Warren Washburn Florer,

University of Michigan. In press.

FLOR E R .-Biblical Selections f or B egimiers in German. With word
list. By Warren W ashburn F lorer, University of Mic higa n .
loth.
88 pages. 40 cents.

FLORER.—^/ Guide for the Study of Ileyse's V Arrabbiata. With

Questions for Grammar Review. By Warren W. Florer, University

of Michigan. Pamphlet. 20 pages. 20 cents.

FLORER. — Heyse's L' Arrabbiata. With word list and questions for gram-
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mar review. By Warren Washburn Florer, University of Michigan.

Cloth, 80 pages. 35 cents.

FORD.— 77/t' Cranial Nerves. 12 pairs. By C. L. Ford, M.D., late

F L OR E R .-Guideforthe study of Biblical Selection. Containing questions
for conver ation and grammar drill . By W arren \ ashburn Florer,
Universi ty of l\lichigan. In p ress .

F LORER.-..1 Guide for the Study of Heyse' s L ' Arrabbiata .

\ ith
Questions for Grammar Review . By W arren W . Flore r, U niversity
of Michigan. Pamp hlet. 2 0 pages. 20 cents.

Professor of Anatomy and Physiology in University of Michigan.

Chart, 25 cents.

FORD. — Classification of the Most Important Muscles of the I/umnn

Body, IVith Qrigin Insertion, .Vervotis Supply and Principal Action

FLORER. -.flryse's L'Arrabbiata. \Vi th word list and questions for gramnt ar review. By W arren \\' ashburn Florer, UniYersity of Michigan .
loth, So pages. 35 cents.

of Each. By C. L. Ford, M.D., late Professor of Anatomy and

Physiology in the University of Michigan. Chart, 50 cents.

FRANCOIS. — Les Aventures Du Dernier .4bencerage Far Chaieaubri-

,iiiU, Edited with Notes and Vocabulary. By Victor E. Francois,

FORD. -The Craniat Nerves. 12 pairs . By C . L. Ford, M . D., late
Professor of Anatomy and Physi ology in U nivers ity of Michigan .
Chart, 2 5 ce nts.

Instructor in French in the University of Michigan. Pamphlet, 35

cents.

GRAY. — Outline of Anatomy. A Guide to the Dissection of the Human

Body, Based on Gray^s Anatomy. By S. M. Yutzy, M. D., Instructor

in Osteology and Demonstrator of Anatomy in the University of

Michigan. 54 pages. Leatherette, 50 cents.

The objects of the outline are to inform the students what structures are found

in each region and where the description of each structure is found in Gray's Ana-

tomy. — Fifteenth edition, dated 1901.

FORD. - Classification of the J1Iost .Important Jlfuscles of the 1-fuman
B ody, With Qrigin Insertion, ,\'ervous Supply and Principal Action
of Each. By C. L. Ford, i\1. D ., late Professcr of Anatomy a nd
Physiology in the University of Michi gan.
har t, 50 cents .
FRANCOIS .-Les Aventures Du D ernier Abencerage P ar Chateaubriand, Edited wit!t Notes and Vocabulary. By Victor E . Francois,
Instructor in Fre nch in the University of i\1ic higan. Pamphlet, 35
cents .

GREENE. — The Action of Materials Under Stress, or Structural Me-

chanics. With examples and problems. By Charles E. Greene,

A.M., M.E., Professor of Civil Engineering in the University of

Michigan. Consulting Engineer: Octavo. Cloth, $3.00.

Contents. — Action of a Piece under Direct Force. Materials. Beams. Tor-

sion. Moments of Inertia. Flexure and Deflection of Simple Beams. Restrained

Beams: Continuous Beams. Pieces under Tension. Compression Pieces:— Col-

umns, Posts and Struts. Safe Working Stresses. Internal Stress: Change of

Form. Rivets: Pins. Envelopes: Boilers, Pipes, Dome. Plate Girder. Earth

Pressure: Retaining Wall: Springs: Plates. Details in Wood and Iron.

GRAY . - Outline of Anatomy. A Guide to tl1e Dissection of tl1e lfuman
Body, Based on Gray's Anatomy. By S. M. Yutzy, l\I. D., Instructor
in Osteology and Demon. trator of
natomy in the University of
Michigan. 54 pages. Leatherette, 50 ce n ts.
T he objects of the ou tline are to inform the studeHts wha t s truc tures are fou nd
in each regi on and where the desc ri pt1on of each s t ruc t ure is found in Gray's Anatomy . -Fifteenth edi d on, da ted 19o i.

GREEN E .-Tlte Action o.I 11/aterials Cnder Stress, or Structural 11/eclzanics. With examples and problems.
By harles E. Greene,
A.i\'1. , M.E., Professor of Civil Engineering in the University of
~lichigan .
onsulting E ngineer: Oc ta\' .
lolh, $3.00.
CoNTENTS.-Ac t ion of a Piece under Direc t Force. Materials . Be a ms. T orsion. Moments of Inertia. Flexure and Deflec t ion of Simple Beams. Res trained
Beams : Continuous Beams . Pieces under Tensi o n. Compression Pieces :-Columns, Posts and Struts. Safe Working S tresses . I n terna l S tr ess: Cha nge o f
Form.
Rivets : Pin s. Envelopes: Boilers, Pipes, Dome. Plate Girder. Ea r th
Pressure : Re taining Wall: Springs: Plates. Details in Wood and I ron.

Publications of George Wa!tr, Ann Arbor.

Publications of George Wahr, Ann Arbor.

HERDMAN-NAGLER.— ^ Laboratory Manual of Electrotherapeutics.

By William James Ilerdman, Ph.B., M.D., Professor of Diseases of

the Nervous System and Electrotherapeutics, University of Michigan,

and Frank W. Nagler, B.S., Instructor in Electrotherapeutics, Uni-

versity of Michigan. Octavo. Cloth. 163 pages. 55 illustrations.

$1.50.

It has been our experience that the knowledge required by the student of medi-

cine concerning electricity and its relation to animal economy is best acquired Dy

the laboratory method. By that method of instruction each principle is impressed

sitv of Michigan. Every form of electric modality that has any distinctive physio-

logical or therapeutical effect is studied in the laboratory as to its methods of gen-

eration, control and application to the patient. We believe this to be the only

practicable way for imparting the kind of instruction required for the practice of

electrotherapeutics, but in our attempt to develop a naturally progressive and at the

same time complete and consistent course of laboratory instruction we have tound it

a thing of slow growth. . . • , . ■ „„

This laboratory manual is the final result of our various trials and experiences,

and while we do not claim for it either perfection in the arrangement of matter or

completeness in detail, we feel that the time has come for putting our plans in a torm
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that will permit for it a wider usefulness as well as gain for it in the intelligent criticism

of the experienced workers to the field which it seeks to cultivate. -i*'rom Pre/ace.

HILDNER-DIEKHOFF.— ^/i'rw'.f Immensee. Edited by Hildner

and Diekhoff, University of Michigan. Cloth. 70 pages. 35

cents.

HERDMAN-NAGLER .-A Labora t ory l1Ia11ual of Electrotherapeutics .
By William James H erdman, Ph.B., M.D., Professor of Diseases of
the Nervous yst6!rn and Electrotherapeutics, University of Michigan,
and Frank W. Nagle r, B.S., Instructor in Electrotherapeutics, University of Michigan. Octavo. Cloth. 163 pages. 55 illustrations.
$1. 50.
It has been our experience th at t he kn ow ledge required by the s t udent of medicine concerning electri c ity a nd its relation to animal economy is best acquired oy
th e labora to ry me th od. By th a t me th od o f ins truc ti o n each princip le is impressed
up o n th e mind thr ough c;evera l separa te paths of th e sense perception a nd a manual
dex terit y is acqu ired whi c h is essential to s uc cess in t he th e rap e utic applica ti ons .
This bas be en tb e pla n adop ted for teaching elec trotherapeutics at the University of Michiga n. Every form of e lectric modali t y th a t lias any distinc ti ve physiologica l o r therape uti ca l effec t is studied in th e labo ra tory as to its meth ods of gen e r a ti on, con trol and app li ca ti on to th e pa t ient. 'vVe believe thi s to be the on ly
prac ticab le way for impa rti ng th e kind of in s truction required for th e pract ice of
e lectroth erape uti cs , bu t in ou r a tt emp t to deve lop a natura ll y progressive and at th e
same time c o mplete and consisten t course of labora tory instru c ti on we have found it
a t hing of slow growth.
Thi s labora tory manua l is th e fina l re su lt of our various tri als an d ex periences,
and while we do not claim for it e it her perfection in th e arrangemen t o f matter or
comp leteness in detail, we fee l th a t th e time bas come for putting oµr plans in a form
t bat w ill pe r mi t for It a wider use fulne ss as well as ga in for it in t he intelligent criti cism
of th e expe ri enced w o rkers to th e fie ld w hich it see ks to cultivate.-FromPreface.

HILDNER- DIEKHOF F.-Storm's Immensee.
and Diekhoff, U niversity of
ce nt s.

1ichigan.

Edited by Hildner
Clot h.
70 pages. 35

HILDNER-DIEKHOFF.— Z^^V/rfl'^i'w zu Storms Immensee. Von

Hildner und Diekhoff, University of Michigan. Pamphlet. 16

pages. 15 cents.

HILDNER-DIEKHOFF .-Leitfragen z zt Stor111s I111mensee.
Von
Hildner und Die khoff, University of Michigan. Pamphl et. 16
pages. 1 5 cents.

HILDNER-DIEKHOFF.— /^r^y/rtg- die Joumalisten. With notes and

questions. By Jonathan Hildner and Tobias Diekhoff, University of

Michigan. Cloth. 174 pages. 60 cents.

YiQ'\N'^\A^.— Directions for Laboratory Work in Physiology for the Use

HILDNER-DIEKHOFF.-Freytag die Joumalisten .
question .
1ichigan.

With n otes a nd
By Jonathan Hildner and Tobias Diekhoff, Unive rsity of
Cloth. I 74 pages. 60 ce nts.

of Medical Classes. By W. H. Hovi'ell, Ph.D., M.D., Professor of

Physiology and Histology. Pamphlet. 62 pages. 65 cents.

YiXS'&^'R.— Directions for Work in the Histological Laboratory. By G.

HOWELL .-Directions f or Laboratory Work in Physiology f or the Use
of JJ!fedical Classes. By W. H. Howell, Ph.D., M.D., Professor of
P hysiology and Histology . Pamphlet. 62 pages . 65 cents .

Carl Huber, M.D., Assistant Professor of Histology and Embry-

ology, University of Michigan. Third edition, revised and enlarged.

Octavo. 204 pages. Cloth, $1.50.

It is adapted for classes in medical schools and elsewhere where it is desired to

furnish the class with material already prepared for the demonstration of structure

rather than to give instruction in the technique of the laboratory. Provision tor the

latter Is made, however, by the addition of a section of about 50 pages on the meth-

ods for laboratory work. This section includes methods of macerating, hardening

and fixing, decalcifying, impregnation, injecting, embedding, c:aining, and methods

for preparing and staiiving blood preparations. The last is accompanied by an ex-

cellent plate of blood elements. The selection of methods has in the mam been

judicious. The expositions are both clear and concise.-Joumat of Comparative

V^ pitvfilcifixi

In this little book Dr. Huber has given us a model manual of microscopical tech-

nique in the laboratory study of histology. The subject matter is divided into con-

venient chapters, commencing with the cell and cell division (karyokinesis) in plant

and animal life, and gradually developing, by easy stages, the most complex tissues

of the animal and vegetable organism. Between each lesson blank pages are inter-

leaved, to be used by the student for drawing the objects s^en by him with a pencil

or crayon— a most excellent plan as nothing fixes the appearance and characteristics

of objects more firmly on the mind than drawing them, either free-hand or with a

camraa lucida (the former being preferable, as it educates the hand and eye). With

each subject is given the source and origin, the best methods for obtaining and pre-

paring it. and attention is called to the most noteworthy or characteristic points tor

examination.

HUBER .-Directions f or vVork in the .H istological Laboratory . By G.
Carl Huber, 1.D., Assistant Professor of Hi stology and Embryology, U nive rsity of Michigan. Third edition, revised and enlarged.
Octavo. 20-i pages. - Cloth, $1. 50.
It is adapted fer c lasses in medical £choo ls and elsewhere where it is desired to
furnish th e class with m a teria l a lready prepared for th e demon s tration of struc ture
rather than to give instruction in t he tech nique of the laboratory . Provision for the
latter Is m ade, however, by the add ition of a sec tion of about 50 pages on t he me t hods for la boratory work. Thi s sec ti on includ es me th ods of maceratin g, h a rdening
and fixin g, decalcify in g. impregnation, in je cti ng, embeddi n g. :::aining, and methods
for preparing and staiqjng bl oo d prepara ti on s . The la s t is accompanied by an excell en t p la te of blood elemen ts . The selec ti on of methods has in the main been
judicious. The expos i tions are both clear and concise.-J ournai of Comparative

N eurology.

Jn thi s littl e b oo k Dr. Huber h as give n us a model manua l of microscopical technique in the lab ora tor y s tu dy of hi s tology . Th e subject mat ter is divided into convemen t c ha p ters, commencing w ith th e ce ll and ce ll division (karyokinesis) in p lant
a n d anima l life, and gradually devel oping. by easy s tages, t he mos t complex tissues
of th e anima l and vegetable organism. Be tw een each lesson blank pages a re interleaved, to be used by th e s tud en t for d r awi n g th e objects ~en by him with a pencil
or crayon-a mos t excel le nt plan as no t hin g fixe s th e appearance a nd characteris tics
of objects more fi r m ly o n th e mind th an drawing them, ei ther free-hand or with a
camraa lucida (the former being p referab le, as it ed uca tes th e h a nd and eye) . \Vith
each subject is given th e so urce and o ri gin, th e best method s for obtaining and preparin g it, and attention is called to th e mos t not ewo rth y or characteri s tic points fo r
examinati on.

Publicatiom of Gtorge Wa!tr Ann Arbor.

Publications of George Wahr, Ann Arbor.

The second part of the book is devoted to methods for laboratory work: soften

iiig, hardening, decalcification, etc., of the matter in gross; embedding, sectioning,

staining and mounting, etc. The best stains, with methods of preparing the same,

and, in short, a general formulary for the various reagents, etc., concludes the work,

which is intended, as stated, as an aidt memoire supplementary to a course of lec-

tures on histology.

We congratulate Dr. Huber on the skill with which he has developed the idea,

and the didactic methods which he has employed. Such a book cannot but prove a

great help to both student and teacher, and it should be more widely known — St.

Louis Medical and Suroeon's Journal.

Dr. Carl Ruber's Laboratory Work in Histology is an excellent manual, and if

the medical students of Michigan University are conscientiously put through it they

must be extremely well taught. Dr. Huber puts the methods of embedding, staining,

etc., in a clear tabular form, and gives full practical instructions in all those minute

details which can only be given by a man who has a masterly knowledge of his sub-

ject. The American student, according to the evidence of this textbook, lias the

work of cutting and staining done for him, and has only to mount sections affixed to

coverslips. By this plan he must gain an excellent collection of slides. — British

Medical Journal.
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JOHNSON. — Elements of the Law of Negotiable Contracts. By E. F.

The second part of the book is d evo ted t o me th ods for lab ora tory work : sof ten
mg. hardening, decalcifica ti on. etc., of th e matter in g r oss; embe dding, sec ti o nin g,
s tainiag and mounting, e tc. The bes t s ta in s, with methods of preparin g the same .
and, in sho rt. a general form ul ary for th e various reagen ts, etc., concludes th e work,
which is intended, as s tated, as an aide m emoir supplemen tary to a cou rse of lectures on histology.
\Ve congratulate Dr. Huber on th e skill with which he has deve loped the idea,
and the didactic me thods which he has emp loyed . Such a book can n o t but pro ve a
grea t help to both s tu dent and teacher, and it should be more widely kn own - l.

Louis M edical and uroeon's Journal.
Dr. Carl Huber's Laboratory lVork in Efistology is an excellen t manua l , a nd if
the medical sLUdents o f Michigan Uni\"ers it y are consc ie nti ously put t hrongh it the y
mus t be extremely wel l taught. D r. H ube r puts th e me thods of embeddmg, s t aining,
etc., in a clear tabula r form, and gives ful l prac ti ca l ins tructi ons in a ll th ose minute
details which can on ly be given by a man who has a m as terly knowledge o f hi s subiect. The American s tud en t, according to th e evidence of thi s t e xtboo k , has the
work of cut ting and s taining done for him , and h as on ly to mou nt sec tion s affixed to
co verslips. By th is pl an he mu s t gain an exce ll e nt co llecti on of s lides.-Britis/i
J)fedical J ournal.

J OHNSON .-Elements of the Law of Nt!gotiab!e Contrads. By E. F.
Johnson, B.S ., LL.l\I., formerly Professor of Law in the D epartme nt
of Law of the Univer ity of Michigan . 8vo. , 735 pages. Full law
sheep binding . $3 . 75 .

Johnson, B.S., LL.M., formerly Professor of Law in the Department

of Law of the University of Michigan. 8vo., 735 pages. Full law

sheep binding. $3.75.

Several years of experience as an instructor has taught the author that the best

method of impressing a principle upon the mind of the student! sto show him a prac-

tical application of it. To remember abstract propositions, without knowing their

application, is indeed difficult for the average student. But when the primary prin-

ciple is once associated in his mind with particular facts illustrating its applica-

tion, it is more easily retained and more rapidly applied to analoi,'ous cases.

It is deemed advisable that the student in the law should be required, during his

course, to master in connection with each general branch of the law, a few well-se-

Severa l yea 1s o r experience as an in s tru c to r has tangh t the a uth or th a t th e best
method of impressing a princ i ple upon th e mind o f the s tud en ti s to s h ow him a practical a ppl ica ti on of it. T o r emem ber abs tr ac t propositions, w it:iout kn owine their
app li ca ti on. is indeed difficult for th e average s tuden t . Bu t when th e primary principle is o nce associa ted in his mind with par ti cu la r facts illu s tra ting its application. it is mo re easily re tai n ed and more rapidly applied t o ana lo .:ous cases.
It is deemed advisable th a t the st ud en t in the law sh:m ld be required, during his
course . to master in con n ec ti on with each gene r a l b r anch of th e law, a few well-selec ted cases which are illu s trative of th e philosophy of th a t subjec t. To r equi r e eac h
srnden t t0 do th is in th e la r ger law schoo ls h as b een found to be impracticable , owing to a lack of a sufficient number o f cop ie s of individual cases. Th e on ly sol uti on
of this diffi cuhy seems to be to place in the hand s of each s tn de nt a vo lum e con ta ining th e ciesired cases . In the tab le of c a s es w ill be fou nd many leadi ng ca!.es prin ted
in black type.- Frnm Preface.

lected cases which are illustrative of the philosophy of that subject. To require each

student to do this in the larger law schools has been found to be impracticable, ow-

ing to a lack of a sufficient number of copies of individual cases. The only solution

of this difficuhy seems to be to place in the hands of each student a volume contain-

ing the desired cases. In the table of cases will be found many leading cases printed

in black type.— From Preface.

KIRN.— AV/^.o'/,7« a Rational Demand. By Rev. G. J. Kirn, M.A., Ph.D.

230 pages. i2nio. $1.00.

It is really a fascinating theme, particularly to thoughtful and intelligent people.

KIRN. -Reltgion a Rational Demand.
230 pages . r2mo.
r .oo.

Ry R e v. G.

J.

Kirn, l\f.A., Ph .D.

It is r ea ll y a fascina ting th eme, p a rti c ula rl y to though tful a nd int e lli ge nt peop le.
The chap ter on Ma t e riali sm is alon e worth th e cost of th e boo k. -EvangeLicat l'des-

senger.

T he s tyle is r ema rk ab ly c lea r a nd terse.-C!tristian Harvester.
Dr. Kirn has done the cau se of rd 1gion a great ser vice by wri ting thi s boo k.Cliurc!t Advocate.
The argument is we ll sus tained: e ve ry p o int is met with cando r a nd fairne ss ,
aod th e conclusions are clear a nd s tro ng if not un a oswe rabl e.-Met/iodist Protestant.

The chapter on Materialism is alone worth the cost of the book.— Evangelical Mes-

senger.

The style is remarkably clear and terse. — Christian Harvester.

LEVI - FRANCOIS. -Question s Based on Levi and Fra n cois' R eader
37 pages. Pamphlet. 25 ce nts.

Dr. Kirn has done the cause of religion a great service by writing this book. —

Church Advocate.

The argument is well sustained : every point is met with candor and fairness,

and the conclusions are clear and strong if not \\nan'i\\era.b\e.—Alethodist Protestant.

LEVI-FRANCOIS. — Questions Based on Levi and Francois' Reader

37 pages. Pamphlet. 25 cents.

LEVI-FRANCOIS- — --/ I-'remh Reader for Begiwters, wilh iVoles and

V'ocat'ulayy. By Moritz Levi, Assistant Professor of French, Univer-

sity of Michigan, and Victor E. Francois, Instructor in French, Uni-

versity of Michigan. 12 mo. 261 pages. $1.00.

This reader differs from its numerous predecessors in several respects. First,

being aware that students and teachers in the French as well as in the German de-

partments of high schools and colleges are becoming tired of translating over and

over again the same old fairy tales, the editors have avoided them and selected some

interesting and easy short stories. They have also suppressed the poetic selections

which arc never translated in the classroom. Finally, they have exercised the great-

est care in the gradation of the passages chosen and in the preparation of the vocab-

ulary, every French word being followed not only by its primitive or ordinary mean-

ing, but also by the different English equivalents which the text requires. After

careful examination, we consider this reader as one of the best on the American

market.

LEVI-FRANCOIS .-A French Rt!ada for Begin.1ias, with Nott!s and
Vocalm!ary. By Moritz L evi, Assistant Professor of French, U niversity of Michigan, and ictor E. Francois, Instructor in French, University of Michigan . 12 mo. 261 pages. $r.oo.
This reader differs from i ts numerous predecesso r s in severa l respects. First,
being aware th at s tu dents and teach ers in t he French as we ll as in the German departments of high schools a nd co ll eges are becoming ti red o f trans la ting over anci
over again th e same old fairy ta les, t he edi tor s have avo id ed th em and se lec ted some
in teresting and easy short stories. They ha ve a lso s uppr essed the poetic selection s
which are never transla ted in th e c lass· room. Finally, th ey have exercised th e greates t ca r e in the grada ti on of the passages chosen and in th e prepa ra ti o n of the vocabulary, every French wo rd being followed n o t only by its pr imiti ve or o rdina ry meani ng, bu t also by th e different English equ iva len ts which the text r equire s . After
careful examina ti on, we consider thi s r ead e r as o ne of the b es t on the American
ma r ket.

Publications of George IVa/ir, Ann Arbor.

Publications of Gtorue Wahr, Ann Arbor.

LLOYD. — Philosophy of History. An Introihiction to the Philosophical

Study of Politics. By Professor Alfred H. Lloyd, University of

Michigan. i2mo. 250 pages. Cloth, $1.00.

Philosophy of History. — "Professor Lloyd has already outlined his conception

LLOYD.-Pliilosopliy of IIistory . An Introdu ction to the P!tilosophical
Study of P olitics. By Professor Alfred H. Lloyd, University of
Michigan. 12mo. 250 pages. Cloth, $1 .oo.

of history in a volume entitled Citizenship and Salvation (1897). The present ex-

position is at the same time more definite and more comprehensive. About a third

of the book is devoted to a philosophic study of the data of history; and this is

followed by an analysis of the social unit, the group, and by a systematic account of

the formula of history as it appears to the philosopher. The last four chapters are

essays in which such topics as "Good and Evil" and "The Great Man" are treated

from the historical point of view which is expounded in the main part of the vol-

ume. In these chapters as well as in the second part of the book acute and valua-

ble comments 011 different phases of historical development abound. The first part

of the volume, however, discussing Time. Causation, the Individual and Nature as

data of history [is the most] valuable." — The Philosophical Review, March, /poo.

"The Philosophy of History is a meritorious attempt to connect the facts of

history with the causes wnich have influenced the social evolution of the human

race. Most writers are satisfied with the visible, immediate and direct causes of

the rise or fall of nations but Professor Lloyd wants us to go deeper
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yet, [but] whatever be the mental attitude of the readers with regard

to the positions advocated in the book all will admit that it is written with great

keenness of perception and with a sincere desire to reconcile, so far as possible, all

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.- "Professor Lloyd has a lread y outlined his conception
of history in a volume enti tled Citizenship and alvation (I 97). Th e present e x·
position is at the same time more definite and more compre hen sive. About a third
of the book is devoted to a philosophic s tudy o f the data of hi s tory; and thi s is
followed b y a n analysis of th e socia l unit, the group, and by a sys cematic account of
the formula of hi s tory as it appears to the philosopher. The las t fou r chapters are
essays in which such topics as ' 'Go od and Evil" and "The Great Man " are trea ted
from the hi s to ri cal point of view which is expounded in the main pare of the vol.
ume . In these chapters as well as in the second pare of the book acute and va luable comments OH different phas es of historical development abound. The fi rs t part
of th e volume, however, discussing Time. Causation, the Indiviclual and
ature as
dat a of history Lis the mos t] va luable."-T/te P/iilosopllical R eview, March, IQOO.
"The PHILOSOPHY OF HrsTORY i s a meritoriou s attempt t o connect the facts of
history with th e caus es which hav e influenced th e social e volution of th e human
race. Most writers a re satisfied wi th th e visib le, immediate and direct causes of
the rise o r fa ll of nations . . . . . but Professo r Lloyd wan ts u s to go deeper
yet, . . . . . [bu t] whatever be th e mental atti tud e of th e readers with regard
to the positi ons a dvocated in the book all will admi t that it is w ritt en with great
keenn ess of perception and with a s incere desire to r econcile, so far as possible. all
intellectual a nd moral differences . If th e author has not s ucceed ed in a cco mpli shing the tas k [of r econciliati on], it is b ecause there are differences th a t can not be
r econcilecl, even b y benevolence a nd ingenuity comb in ed."-Annals of the American Academy of P o!ttical and Social Science, March, 1900 .

intellectual and moral differences. If the author has not succeeded in accomplish-

ing the task [of reconciliation], it is because there are differences that can not be

reconciled, even by benevolence and ingenuity combined." — Annals of the Ameri-

can Academy of Political and Social Science, March, igoo.

LYMAN-HALL-GODDARD.— ^/^^<5r^. By Elmer A. Lyman, A.B.,

LYMAN-HALL- GODDARD. - Algebra.

By Elmer A. Lyman, A.B.,
Edwin C . God dard, Ph.B., and Arthur G. Hid!, B.S., Instructor
in 1athematics, University of 1ichigan. Octavo. 75 pages. Cloth,
90 cents.

Edwin C. Goddard, Ph.B., and Arthur G. Hall, B.S., Instructor

in Mathematics, University of Michigan. Octavo. 75 pages. Cloth,

90 cents.

MATTHE\A^S. — Syllabus of Lectures oh Pharmacology and Therapeu-

tics in the University of Michigan. Arranged Especially for the

Use of the Classes Taking the Work in Pharmacology ana 7 kera ■

MATTHEWS.- ..)yllabus oj lectures on Pliarmat0log v and Therapeutics in tlie University oj ll1ichigan. Arranged Especially jor the
Use of tlie Classes Taking the Work in Plw rmacology ana 1 /zera ·
peutics at the University of J1ficlziga n. By S. A. Matthews, 1. IJ.,
Assistant in Pharmacy and Therapeutics, University of Michigan.
12mo. I 14 pages. $ r.oo.

peutics at the University of Afichigati. By ?. A. Matthews, M.D.,

Assistant in Pharmacy and Therapeutics, University of Michigan.

l2mo. 114 pages. $1.00.

McCANDLESS.— 7rt/;?//rtr Aiialysis of the Law of Real Property,

McCANDLESS .-Tabular Anulysis of tlie Law of R eal Property,
f ollowing Blackstone. Arranged by L. W. l\1cCandl ess. 19 charts.
Quarto. Cloth, $r. 50.

follozoing Blackstone. Arranged by L. W. McCandless. 19 charts.

Quarto. Cloth, $1.50.

This analysis follows Book II of Blackstone, and will prove a very valuable aid

to students. The critic remembers that in the dim and hoary past when he was

a student himself, he prepared an analysis of Bispam's Equity. He certainly en-

deavored to do complete justice to that learned work and the result was a sheet

some lx-1 (yards) in dimensions. Acting according to the advice of some intimate

friends he hung it up, on a shade roller, but somehow, never could persuade any-

body to read it completely through. In fact, the aforesaid critic was afraid to

attempt it Itself when the " magnum opus " was once finished and the fearful and

wonderful document still remains filed away somewhere among his dusty papers.

This little incident of a past career is mentioned not that we would discourage the

reader of Mr. McCandless's work or in any way compare his learned production with

the superficial synopsis which we had ourselves compiled. It has long been a source

of wonder to us why real estate law has not hitherto been "chartered," for there seems

to be no branch of jurisprudence so well adapted to such a form of presentation.

The author's work gives a bird's eye view of real property principles and as pre-

viously stated will prove of great value to the student, particularly around examina-

•tion time for he can tell at a glance what would otherwise force him to spend much

valuable time in searching through Blackstone. Take it all in all, the author is to

be heartily commended and we would like to see his work used as a text book in

not only the University of Michigan but in all the leading law schools of the country.

For the benefit of them who have not had the pleasure of perusing it we can state

that it is a series of some nineteen large charts each about 2 feet by i^, handsomely

bound so that the entire subject may be embraced in series of sweeping glances. —

Law Journal, N. V.

Thi s anal ys is fo llo ws Book II of Blackstone, and will prove a very va lu ab le aid
to studen ts. The cri tic remembers that in the dim and hoary past when he was
a s tuden t himself, he prepared an analysis of Bispam's Equity. He certainly endeavored to do complete jus ti ce to that learned work a nd the result was a s heet
some lx4 (yard s) in d i mensions. Ac t ing according to the advice of some intimate
friend s he hung it up, on a sh ade roller, but somehow, never could p e rsuade anybody to read it completely thrcugh . In fact, the aforesaid cri tic was afraid to
attempt it itself when the" magnum opus" was once fi ni shed and the fearful and
wo nd e rful document still remains fi led away somewhere among hi s dus t y papers.
This little incident of a past career is mentioned not th a t we would discourage th e
reader o f Mr. McCandless's work o r in any way compare his learned production with
the superficia l synops is which we had ourselv es compiled. It has Jong been a source
of wonder to us why r eal estate law has no t hitherto been "cha rt ered ," for ther e s eems
to be no branch of jurisprud ence so well a d a pted to such a form of presentation .
The author's work gives a bird's eye view of r ea l property principles and as previously s ta ted wi lt prove of g re at value to the s tud e nt, particularly around examination tim e for he can tell at a glance wha t would o t herwi s e force him to spend much
va luabl e time ID searching through Blackstone. Take it all in all, the auth o r is to
be heartily commended and we would like to see his work used as a te xt· book in
not only the University of Michigan but in all the leading law schools of th e cou ntry.
For the benefit of them who have not had the pleasure of p erusing it we can sta te
th a t it is a series of some nineteen la rg e charts each ab ou t 2 feet by 1 ~ . handsomel y
bound so that the entire subject may be embraced. in series of sweeping glances.Law J ournal, N. Y .

Publications of George IVahr, Ann Arbor.

P11b!icati,ms of Gtorge Wa!tr, Ann Arbor.

MEADER. — Chronological Outline of Roman Literature. By C L

Moader, A.B., Instructor in Latin in University of Michigan

Chart, 25 cents.

MICHIGAN "QQOYi.— The U. of M. Book. A Record of Student Life

MEADER .-CJ1ronologimt Outline of Roman Literature. By C. L
l\Ieacl er, A.B., lnstructor in Latin in
niversity of Michi gan
hart, 25 cents.

and Stiidiiit Organizations in the Uniz'crsity of Michigan. Articles

contributed by members of the Faculty and by prominent Alumni.

Si. 50.

MONTGOMERY-SMITH.— Zrt^^rrt/^ry Manual of Elementary Chetn-

tsiiy. liy Jabc/ Montgomery, Ph.D., Professor of Natural Science,

Ann Arbor High School, and Roy B. Smith, Assistant Profes-

sor in Chemical Laboratory, Ann Arbor High School. 12 mo. 150

pages. Cloth, $1.00.

This Work is intended as a laboratory guide to be used in connection with a good

text-book or course of lectures, and in its arrangement and scope it is based upon

MICHIGAN BOOK .-The U. of 11!. Book. A Record of Student Lzje
and Stud,•n! Organizations in the University of JIIichigan .
rticles
contributed by memuers of the Faculty and by prominent Alumni.
1.50.

MONTGOMERY- SMITH .-Laborat01:r ilfanual of Elementary C!umistry. By Jabez Montgome ry, Ph.D., Professor of atural cience,
Ann Arbor Hi gh chool, and Roy B. mith, Assistant Professor in hemical Laboratory, Ann Arbor IIi gh chool. 12 mo. 150
pages .
loth, $r.oo.

the practical experience of two instructors in the Ann Arbor High School. It is

therefore restricted to such work as may be done by the average high school pupil.

The experiments which are directed are given more to enable the student to compre-

hend the methods of analytical chemistry than to acquire particular proficiency in

the work of chemical analysis. The work is characterized by minuteness of explan-
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ation, a feature which will be appreciated by the beginner. — Pharmaceutical tira

NETTO. — T/te Theory of Substitutions and its Application to Algebra.

By Dr. Eugene Netto, Professor of Mathematics in the University of

Giessen. Revised by the author and translated with his permission,

by F. N. Cole, Ph.D., formerly Assistant Professor of Mathematics

in the University of Michigan, Professor of Mathematics, Columbia

University. 8 vo. 301 pages. Cloth. $3.00.

NOVY. — Laboratory Work in Physiological Chemistry. By Frederick G.

This Work is intended as a labora to ry guide to be used in conn ec ti on with a good
text-bo o k or course of lec rnr es, and in its arrangemen t and scope i t is based upon
the prac tica l expe ri ence o f two ins tru c to rs in th e Ano Arbor High School. It is·
therefore restricted to s uch work as may be done by the average high schoo l pupil.
The experiments which are directed a re given more to enable the s tuden t to comp rehend th e meth ods of analytica l chemis try th an to acqui re part icula r p r oficiency in
the work of chemica l analysis . The work is ch arac te ri zed by minuteness o f ex plana ti on, a feature which will be app recia ted by th e beginner.-PharmaceulicaL ltira

NETTO. -The Theory o.f Substitutions and its Application to Algebra.
By Dr. Eugene re tto, Professo r of l\Iathematics in th e niversity of
Giessen. Revi sed by the a uthor and translated with hi s permission,
by F.
. Cole, Ph.D., formerly Assistant Professor of Math ematic
in th e niversi ty of :\lichigan, Professor of l\I athematics, Columbia
U niversity. 8 vo. 301 p ages . Cloth. $3 .00.

Novy, Sc.D., M.D., Junior Professor of Hygiene and Physiological

Chemistry, University of Michigan. Second edition, revised and

enlarged. With frontispiece and 24 illustrations. Octavo. Cloth,

$2.00.

This book is designed for directing laboratory work of medical students, and in

showing them how to study the physics and physiology of the digestive functions of

the blood, the urine and other substances wliich the body contains normally, or

which it speedily eliminates as effete material. The second edition has appeared

within a very short time after the publication of the first. The first chapters deal

with the facts, the carbohydrates and proieids. Then follow others upon the saliva,

the gastric juice, the pancreatic secretion, the bile, blood, milk, and urine, while the

closing chapter deals with a list of reagents.

While the book is manifestly designed for the use of Dr. Novy's own students, we

doubt not that other teachers will find it a valuable aid in their work. At the close

of the volume are a number of illustrations of the various sedimentary substances

found in the urine, taken from the work of von Jaksch. — The ThtrapeuUc Gazette

This book, although now in its second edition, is practically unknown to British

readers. Up to the present, anyone wishing to find out how a particular analytical

method in physiological chemistry ought to be carried out, had of necessity to refer

to a German text-book. This comparatively small book— for it only covers some

three hundred pages — gives as good a general account of ordinary laboratory methods

as any teacher or student could desire. Although the author refers in his preface to

help derived from the works of Salkowski, Hauunarsten and others, it is but fair to

say that the book has undoubtedly been written by one who has worked out the

methods and knows the importance of exact practical details— Kdi»l^ury?i 3/ed.

Jour., Scotland,

Physiological chemistry is one of the most important studies of the medical curri-

culum. The cultivation of this field has until recently been possible to but few.

The rapid development of this department of science within a few years past has

thrown much and needed light upon physiological processes. It is from this quarter

and from bacteriological investigations that progress must chiefly be expected. The

rapid growth of this branch of cliemistry is attended by another result. It necessi-

tates the frequent revision of text-books. The present edition of Dr. Novy's valu-

able book is almost wholly re-written. It is representative of the present state of

NOVY .- Laborato1:r W ork in Physiologica l Ch emist''.Y·

By Frede rick G.
Tovy, Sc. D., M.D., Juni or Professor of Hygi ene and Physiological
Chemistry, University of Mi chigan.
econd edition, revised and
enlarged . With frontispi ece and 2-J. illustrations. Octavo. Cloth,
$2.00.

Thi s book is designed for directing la bora tory work of me d ica l studen ts, and in
show i ng th em how Lo s rnd y th e ph ysics and phys io logy o f th e di ges ti ve functions o f
th e blood, th e urine and o th er substances which the body contains normally, o r
which it speedi ly e limin a tes as effete material. Th e secon d ed iti on has appeared
within a very shor t tim e a ft e r th e publication of the first. The first chap ters deal
with th e fac ts , th e carbohydra tes and proteids. Then fo ll ow o thers upon th e sa li va,
tbe gas tri c juice, th e pancreatic secret ion, the bile, bl oo d , m ilk, and urine, while the
closing chap ter deals wi th a li s t of r eage nts .
While th e book is manifes tl y designed for the use of Dr. Novy's ow n s tudents, we
doubt no t tha t other teachers w ill find it a va luabl e a id in th e ir work. At th e c lose
o f the vo lu me are a number of illu s tr a tion s of the va ri ous sedimen tary s ubs tan ces
found in th e urine, take n from the wo rk of vo n Jak sch.-The Therapeutic Uazette
Thi s book, a lth oug h now in its second ed iti on, is practically unknown to British
readers. Up to the present, anyone wishing to fin d out how a p a rticular a na lytical
method in phys iological chemis try ough t t o be ca rried ou t, had o f necessity to refer
to a German text-bo o k. Thi s compa ra ti ve ly sma ll boo k-fo r it on ly covers some
three hundred pages-gives as good a genera l account of o rd inary laboratory methods
as any teac her o r s tudent c ould desire. Alth ough t he au th or refers in hi s preface to
help d e riv ed from th e works of Salkowski, Hammar s ten and o th ers, it is bu t fair to
say that the book has und ou btedly been written by one who has worked ou t th e
methods and knows th e importance o f exac t practical details-Edinburgh Med.
J oiir., Scot land.
Ph ys iological c hemi s tr y ts one o f the most i mpor tan t s tudies of th e 1nedical curricu lum . The cultivation of thi s fie ld has until r ecen tly been possible to but fe w.
The rapid developmen t o f th is department o f scie nce within a few years past has
thrown much and needed li gh t up on phys1o log ica l processes. It is from thi s quarter
and fr om bac teriological in ves ti ga tions th a t progress mus t ch ie fly be expected. The
r apid gro wth o f this branch of chemis try is a ttended by a no th er resul t. It necess itates th e frequent revision of tex t-books. Th e prese m ed ition o f Dr. N ovy's va lu able book i s a lmos t wholly re -written. It is repres enta tiv e of th e presen t state of

Publications of George Wa!zr, Ann Arbor.

Publications of George IVahr, Ann Arbor.

knowledge and is replete with information of value alike to student and practitioner..

Few are better prepared to write sucli a book than Dr. Novy, who has himself done

much original work in this field.— T/ie Medical BuUetin. Phtladflphia.

This is a greatly enlarged edition of Dr. Novy's work on Physiological Chemistry,

and contains a large amount of new material not found in the former edition. It is

designed as a text-book and guide for students in experimental work in the labora-

tory, and does not therefore cover the same ground as the works of Gamgee, Lea,

and other authors of books on physiological chemistry. As a laboratory guide it

should be adopted by our medical colleges throughout the country, because it is an

American production, contains only such directions and descriptions as have been

verified by actual practice with students, and because it is clear, concise and definite

in all its statements. Its first ten chapters treat of fats, carbohydrates, proteins,

saliva, gastric juice pancreatic secretion, bile, blood, milk, and urine. Chapter xi.

kn owledge and is replete with information of value alike to student and practitioner.
Few are better prepared to write such a book than Dr. Novy, who has himself done
much original work in this field.-The MeclicaL Bulleltn, Ph1ladPlphia.
This is a greatly en larged edi tion of Dr. Navy's work on Phy:,iolog1cal Chemistry,
and contains a large amo unt of new material not found in the former edition. It is
designed as a text-book and guide for students in experimental work in the laboratory, and does not therefore cove r th e samt ground as the works of Gamgee, Lea,
and other authors of books on physiological chemistry. As a laboratory guide it
should be adopted by our medical co ll eges througbout th e country, because it is an
American production, contains on ly such directions and descriptions as have been
verified by ac tu a l practice with s tudents , and because it is clear, concise and definite
in all its statemen ts. Its llrst ten chapte rs treat of fats, carbohydrates, proteins,
saliva, gas tric ju ice pancreatic secre ti on, bile, blood, milk, and urine. Chapter xi.
is devoted to the quantitative ana lysis of urine, milk, gastric juice, and blood, while
chapter xii. gives tables for examination of urine and a list of reagents.-A.m.

M erlico-Suroical B itllelin. N . Y.

is devoted to the quantitative analysis of urine, milk, gastric juice, and blood, while-

chapter xii. gives tables for examination of urine and a list of reagents. ^ — A.m,

Medico- Surgical Bulletin, iV. Y.

NOVY. — Laborato-y Work in Bacteriology. By Frederick G. Novy, Sc.

I)., M.D., Junior Professor of Hygiene and Physiological Chemistry,

University of Michigan. Second edition, entirely re-written and
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enlarged, 563 pages. Octavo. $3.00.

As a teacher of bacteriology, the author has had extensive experience, and the

second edition of his book will be highly prized by students for its practical service

and thoroughness. The methods of investigation described are mainly those which

have been employed in the hygienic laboratory or the University of Michigan, and

they have stood the test of practical demonstration and usefulness. One of the

most interesting parts of the book is the chapter on the chemistry of bacteria, and

the general reader cannot fail to obtain from it a clear understanding of the com-

plex changes induced by these minute organisms. The functions of the various

ferments are also very cleverly discussed. An enumeration of the chapter headings

will serve to show the scope of the work: Form and Classification of Bacteria; Size

and Structure of Bacterial Cell ; Life History of Bacteria ; Environment of Bacteria ;

Chemistry of Bacteria; the Microscope; Cultivation of Bacteria; Non-Pathogenic

Bacteria; Bouillon, Agar, Milk and Modified Media, the Incubator and Accessories;

Relation of Bacteria to Disease — Methods of Infection and Examination; Patho-

genic Bacteria; Yeasts, Moulds and Streptotrices; Examination of Water, Soil and

Air; Special Methods of Work. To the latter subject, two chapters are devoted,

in which are very fully outlined various special methods of value to advanced

siadent?,.— Pharmaceutical Era, N. Y.

This book is intended for the student and seems admirably to subserve the pur-

pose for which it has been written. The arrangement of the subject-matter con-

forms closelv to that followed in the Hygienic Laboratory of the University of

Michigan. Those methods only are described that have withstood the test of prac-

tical experience. Many of the methods and some of the apparatus are original.

N OVY .--Laboratory Work in Bacteriology. By Frederick G. ovy, Sc.
D., M.D., Junior Profes or of Hygiene and Physiological Chemistry,
University of Michigan.
Second ed iti on, entirely re-written and
enlarged, 563 pages. Octavo. $3.00.
As a teacher of bacteriology, the autho r has had extensive experience, a nd the
second edi ti on o f his book will be highly prized by s tud en ts for its prac ti cal service
and th oroughness. The methods of investigation described ar e mainly those which
have been employed in th e hygienic laboratory or the University of Michigan, and
they ha ve stood th e tes t of practical demonstration and usefulness. One of the
moH interesting parts of th e book is the chapter on the chemis tr y of bacteria, and
the general reader cann o t fail to obtain f rom it a clear understandrng of the c omplex changes induced by these minute organisms. The functions of the various
ferments are also very cleverly discussed. An enumera tion of th e chapter headings
will serve to show the s c ope of the work: Form and Classification of Bacteria; Si ze
and Structure of Bacterial Cell; Life History of Bacteria; Environment of Bacteria;
Chemistry of Bacteria; the Microscope; Cultivation of Bacteria; Non-Pathogenic
Bacteria; Bouillon, Agar, Milk and Modified Media, th e Incu ba tor and Accessories;
Relation of Bacteria to Disease-Methods of Infec ti on and Examination; Pathogenic Bac teria; Yeasts, Moulds and Streptotrices; Examination of Water, Soil and
Air; Special '.Vlethods of Work. T o th e latt e r subject, two chap ters ar e devoted,
in which are very fully ou tl ined various special methods of value to advanced

students.-Pharmaceutical l!Jra, N. Y.
This book is intended for the student and seems admirably to subserve the purpose fo r which it has been written. The arrangeme nt of the subjec t-matt er conforms c loselv to th a t followed in the Hygienic Labora tory of the Un i vers i ty of
Michigan. Those methods only a re described th a t have wi th s tood th e te s t o f practical experience. Many of the methods and some of the apparatus are original.
Illustrati ons of bacteria and descriptions of cultural peculi a rities have been
omitted, inasmuch as the student is expected to lea rn these from personal observation . The work is divided into 15 chapters under th e following beadings: Form and
classifi ca ti on of bacteria; size an d structure of the bacteria l ce ll ; the li fe-histo1y of
bacteria; the environment of bacte ria; th e chemistry of bacteria; th e microscope;
the hanging drop; simp le s taining ; gelatin and potato media; cultivation of bacteri a; th e nonpathogenic bacteria; boulllon, agar, milk, and modified media; the
incubator and accessories; r e lation of bacteria to disease. methods of infection and
examin a ti on; th e pathogenic bacteria; yeasts, moulds, and strep to tbri ce«: examinati on of wa ter. so il a nd air; spec ial met bods of work.-Pliiladelpltia Medical

Journal.

Illustrations of bacteria and descriptions of cultural peculiarities have been

omitted, inasmuch as the student is expected to learn these from personal observa-

tion. The work is divided into 15 chapters under the following headings : Form and

classification of bacteria; size and structure of the bacterial cell ; the life-histoiy of

bacteria; the environment of bacteria; the chemistry of bacteria; ihe microscope;

By John 0.
Reed, Junior Professor of Physics, University of Michigan, and
Karl E. Guthe, Assistant Professor of Physics, University of Michigan. I 5 pages, 9 illustrations: Octavo.
r.50.

REED - GUTHE .-A 11Ianual o.f Physical 11Ieasurements.

the hanging drop; simple staining; gelatin and potato media; cultivation of bac-

teria; the nonpathogenic bacteria; bouillon, agar, milk, and modified media; the

incubator and accessories; relation of bacteria to disease, methods of infection and

examination; the pathogenic bacteria; yeasts, moulds, and streptothrices : examina-

tion of water, soil and air; special metQods of vioiV..— Philadelphia Medical

REED .-College Physics. For Students in Academies and Colleges.
Physics I. 11fec/zan£cs-Sound-Light. By John 0. Reed, Junior
Professor of Physics University of Michigan. Octavo. Cloth. 300
pages. $I. 50.

Journal.

REED-GUTHE. — A Alanual of Physical Measurements. By John O.

Keed, Junior Professor of Physics, University of Michigan, and

Karl E. Guthe, Assistant Professor of Physics, University of Michi-

gan. 185 pages, 89 illustrations: Octavo. $1.50.

REED. — College Physics. For Students in Academies and Colleges.

Physics I. Mechanics — Sound — Light. By John O. Reed, Junior

Professor of Physics University of Michigan. Octavo. Cloth. 300

pages. Si. 50.

ROOD.— //;//('rA?«/ English Statutes. Edited by John R. Rood, Uni-

versity of Michigan. 8vo. 24 pages. Imitation leather, 25 cents.

ROOD .-Important English Statutes.
Edited by John R. Rood, University of Michigan. 8vo. 24 pages. Imitation leather, 25 cents.

Publications of George Wahr, Ann Arbor.

I'ublicalions of George Walzr, A n n Arbor.

This pamphlet contains the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3) complete, also

toid Campbell's Act, ihe Mandamus Act of q Anne, and the Victorian Wills Act.

The intention is to furnish students a copy of all those important EuKlish statutes

which have been generally re-enacted in the Americau statutes and are therefore

prominent in his courses of study.

This pamphle t contains the Statute of Fraud s (29 Ca r. JI. c. 3) complete, also
Lo1d Campbell's Ac t, lhe l\landamus Act o f 9 Anne , and t he Victorian \Vi l ls Ac t .
Th" intention is to furni s h s tudents a copy o f a ll those imp ortan t English s ta tutes
whi ch ha,·e been general ly re-enac ted in tile Americau s tatu tes and are th refore
prominent in his courses o f s tudy.

ROOD. — On Attaclniievts, Garuishnwnts, Judnnioits, and Executions. By

John K. Rood, University of Michigan. The table of contents,

R 00 D .- On . l ttacl1111e11ts, Ca r11isl111101ts, jud:;111e11ts, and Executions. By
John 1
Root! , Uni,·ersit!· o f :\li chiga n.
The table of contents,
table of cases, a nd text coye r I '3 pages. The leading and illustrat1Ye cases and note s CO Yer SI 4 pages.
Yery full index has bee n
compressed into "6 pages.
T otal i33 pages. The two books
bound as one, in buckram, for one µrice.
_1.oo. Octavo.
1

table of cases, and text cover 183 pages. The leading and illustra-

tive cases and notes cover 514 pages. A very full index has been

compressed into 36 pages. Total 733 pages. The two books

bound as one, in buckram, for one price. $3.00. Octavo.

The text is not claimed to be exhaustive upon any point. To make it so would

defeat the very purpose for which it was written r» tree is not complete without all

its foliage, but the outline of the branches cannot be clearly seen till the leaves have

fallen. In the present discussion, details have been similarly omitted so that the

more important matters can be seen. Anson on Contracts may be said to cover all the

matters treated in the elaborate works on particular contracts, such as sales, agency,

partnership, suretyship, deeds, mortgages, etc In like manner this manual is

intended to explain all the matters covered by the extensive treatises on jurisdiction,
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judgments, res judicata, attachment, garnishment, and executions. It is not de-

signed to trespass on the field occupied by any of these books, but to give what

none of them do or can — a clear outline of the whole, without that cloud of details

and the confusing review of inconsistent decisions upon them, which the writer of a

complete text must give. In this way, it is hoped that a compreliensive view of

•

Th e t ex t is n o t claim e d to be exhaus ti ve up o n any po int. To make it so would
defeat the very purpose for whi c h it was written n t ree is not comp le te wi thout al l
its folia ge, but the outline o f th e branches canno t be clearly seen till th e leaves have
fallen. Jn th e present discuss ion. detai ls have been simi larly omi tt ed so th a t the
more impo rtan t matters can be seen. Anson 0 11 Con tracts may b e s aid to cover a ll the
mac te rs tre a ted in the e labo ralewor ks on particular cont rac ts, such as s a les, agency,
partners hip , s uretyship. deeds, mortgages, e re
In like manner this manua l 1s
int e nded to explain all t he matters covered by th e ex tensive treati ses o n j uri sd iction,
judgments, res judica ta , a ttachment, garnishmen t, and executions. It is not des igned to trespass o o th e fie ld occupied by a ny of these books, but to give wha t
none o f them d o o r can-a clea r ou tli ne of th e who le , wi t hou t that cloud o f d e tai ls
and the confusing review of inconsistent de cisions upon them, which t he write r of a
comple te t ext mus t gi ve . In thi s way, it is hoped that a compr ehensive v iew o f
broad fundamen ta l principles may be ob tai ned, with a c lear vis ion of the relations
be tween each pa rt and a ll the othe rs, and of the success ive s teps in each proc eeding from beginning t o en d.

broad fundamental principles may be obtained, with a clear vision of the relations

between each part and all the others, and of the successive steps in each pro-

ceeding from beginning to end.

SOLIS. — 77/1? Diagnosis of Diseases of the Cord, Location of Lesions.

By Dr. Grasset. Translated by Jeanne C. Solis, M.I)., Demon-

strator of Nervous Diseases and Electrothereapeutics in the Uni-

versity of Michigan. gS pages. Cloth, 65 cents.

STRUMPELL. — Short Guide for the Clinical Examination of Patients.

Co:n[)iled for the Practical Students of the Clinic, by Professor Dr.

Adolf Striimpell, Director of the Medical Clinic in Erlanijen. Trans-

SOLIS. -The Diagn osis of Diseases of the Cord, L ocation of Lesions.
By Dr. Grasset. Translated by Jeanne
. Soli , f. D., D e mon st rator of N ervou Diseases and Elec trothereapeutics in Lhe Uni versily of Ji c higan. 9S pages .
loth, 65 cents .

STR UMPELL .-Short Guide f or tl1e Clinical Examination of Patients .
Compiled for the Practical tud e nts of the linic, by Professor Dr.
A.dolf tri.impell, Director of the J\l edica l linic in Erlangen. Translated by permission from the third German ed ition, by Jo . L. bt.
Cloth , 39 pages, 35 cents.

lated by permission from the third German edition, by Jos. L. Abt.

Cloth, 39 pages, 35 cents.

Preface to the Second Edition. — The second edition of this book has been

improved by me in several parts, and particularly the sections treating of the exam-

ination of the stomach and nervous system have been slightly extended. The author

PREFACE TO THE S ECOND ED ITION.-The second edi ti on o f th is boo k h as been
improved by me in seve ral par ts, and particularly the sec ti ons tr eating o f the examination of th P. s tomac h a ud nervous system have been s lig htl y ex tended. The au th o r
tru s ts that th e book may al so fu lfi ll i ts purp ose in the fuiure in assis ti ng th e s tu d ent
to learn a sys tem atic examinati o n o f the patient, and to impress on him the most
importau t requisite means a nd m e thod s.

trusts that the book may also fulfill its purpose in the fuiure in assisting the student

to learn a systematic examination of the patient, and to impress on him the most

important reijiiisite means and methods.

SUNDERLAND. — (>«<? Upward Look Each Day. Poems of Hope ana

Faith. Selected by J. T. Sunderland. Third Edition, 16 mo

White Binding. 30 cents; Cloth, 40 cents; Full morocco, 75 cents.

SUNDERLAND— G'/-rt;«.y of Gold. Some Thoughts and a Brief Prayer

Ear Each Day of the Months. Designed as Daily Llelps in the

Higher Life. Compiled by J. T. Sunderland. White Binding, 35

cents.

WARTHIN.— /"rfffZ/Vrt/ Pathology for Students and Physicians. A

Manual of Laboratory and Post-Mortem Technic, Designed Espe-

cially for the Use of Junior and Senior Students in Pathology at

the University of Michigan. By .Mdred Scott Warthin, Ph.D., M.

D., Instructor in Pathology, University of Michigan. Octavo. 234

pages. Cloth, $1.50.

We have carefully examined this book, and our advice to every student and prac-

•titioner of medicine is— buy it. You will never regret having invested your money in

Lo oi.~ Eac/1 Day.
Poems of /lope ana
Faith. Selected by J. T. nn clerlancl . Third Editi on, r6 mo
White Bind ing, 30 cents; Cloth, 40 cents; Full morocco, 75 ce nts.

SUNDERLAND. -One Upward

SUNDERLAND -Grains of Cold.

ome Th ougltts and a Brief Prayer
For Rac/1 Day (If th e J1font/1 s. Desi,r.;ned as Daily 1-lelps in tlie
.f/igl1er Life. Compiled by J. T . ' underland. White Binding, 35
cent .
W ARTHIN .--Pra cticnl Pathology / (JI' Studmts nnd Plzy1icia11s . A
1lfa11ual of Laboratory and P ost-Jlfortem 7eclmic, Dni£;11ed Especiall11 for the U>t! of Junior and Smior Students in Path ology at
the UnivasitJ' (If 1lficl1igan. By . ldred cott \Varthin, Ph.D ., M.
D., In structor in Pathology, niversity of Michigan. Octavo . 234
pages .
lo th , r. 50.
\Ve have ca refu lly examined this book , and our advice to eve ry s tuden t a nd p ra.ctiti o ner of medicine is-buy it. You will never regre t hav in g in ves ted your money 10

Publications of Geori:;e Wahr, Ami Arbor.

Publications of George Wa!tr, Ann Arbor.

and you will acquire such a large fund of information that the study of pathology

will become a pleasure instead of the drudgery which it so unfortunately seems to

be in many cases.

Part 1. of this book, embracing some 103 pages, deals with the materials, which

includes the proper examination and notation of the gross changes which have

occurred in every part of the body. In fact it is a complete expos6 of what a com-

plete and accurate autopsy should be, the observance of which is oftener followed

in the breach than in the actuality. Part II., which includes 134 pages, deals with

the treatment of the material. This is a very itnportant part of the work, as it gives

explicit directions in regard to the instruments to use, stains and staining methods,

drawing, the preservation of specimens, nardening methods, in fact, of all those

technical points connected with practical pathological microscopy. The examina-

and you will acquire s uch a large fund of information th at the s tudy of pathology·
will become a pleasure instead of th e drudgery which it sc unfortun a tely seems to
be in many c ases.
Part I. of this boo k, embracing some 103 pages. deal s with the materi a ls. which
includes th e proper ex amina ti on and notation of th gross chang s whi c h have
occur red in e"Ve r y part of the body. In fact it is a complete expos~ of what a com plete and accurate autopsy s hould be, the observance o f which is oftener followed
in the breach th an in th e ac tu a lity . Part II., which includes 134 paees, deals with
the trea tm ent of the material. This is a very impo rtant part of the work, :..sit gives
explicit direction s in regard to th e instrum e nts to use, s tains and s taining meth ods,
drawing. th e preservation of specimens , hardening methods, in fact, of all those
techni ca l points connected wuh practical pathological microsco py. The exami11ation of fre s h specimens. injections, method s fixing s pecimens as well as special
staining methods are ta k en up. In fact, s pace forbids us to give the en tir e, which
are most valuable in eve r y detail.-.St. Loui,o( l\ied1cal and ISuruteal Journal.

tion of fresh speciinens. injections, methods fixing specimens as well as special

staining methods are taken up. In fact, space forbids us to give the entire, which'

are most valuable in every detail.— yt. I/juw Medical and Suryical Journal.

WARTHIN.— .-^ Blank Biwk for Autopsy Protocols. Second Edition.

By Aldred Scott VVarthin, M.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of

Pathology in the University of Michigan. Bound in Full Canvass,

50 cents.
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The medical student at the University of Michigan is expected to attend twenty

autopsies during the last two years of his studies, and this book is designed to

WA R T HIN.-rl Blank Book for Autopsy Protocols.

Second Edition.
By Aldred Scott Warthin, M.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of
Pathology in the Cniversity of Michigan. Bound in Full Canvass,
50 cents.

The medical s tud en t a t the University o f Michigan is expected to attend twenty
autopsies during the last two years of his s tudi es, and this book is designed to
facilitate the keeping of a careful protoco l, which he is required to make in every
case. The book is of a convenient ~ize and can accommodate the au topsy protocols
of ten cases. Each autopsy is al lowed ten pages, carefully ruled for the various
organs.

facilitate the keeping of a careful protocol, which he is required to make in every

case. The book is of a convenient size and can accommodate the autopsy protocols

of ten cases. Each autopsy is allowed ten pages, carefully ruled for the various

organs.

WATSON. — Tables for the Calculation of Simple or Compound Inte7 est

and Discount and the Averaging of Accounts. The Values of

Annuities .^ Leases, Interest in Estates and the Accumulations and

Values of Investments at Simple or Compound Interest for all Rates

and Periods ; also Tables for the Conversion of Securities and Value

of Stocks and Bonds. With full Explanation for Use. By James

C. Watson, Ph.D., LL.D. Quarto. Cloth, $2.50.

A book most valuable to bankers, brokers, trustees, guardians, judges, lawyers,

accountants, and all concerned in the computation of interest, the division and set-

lement of estates, the negotiation of securities, or the borrowing and lending of

money, is the above work of the late Professor James C. Watson, formerly Director

of the Observatories and Professor of Astronomy at the Universities of Michigan

and Wisconsin, and Actuary of the Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Company.

It contains, in addition to the usual tables for the calculation of simi^le or com-

pound interest and discount, many tables of remarkable value, not found elsewhere,

for the averaging of accoutn-, the values of annuities, leases, interests in estates,

and the accumulations and values of investments; also tables for the conversion of

securities, and the values of stocks and bonds.

There are also given very full and clear explanations of the principles involved in

financial transactions, and a great variety of miscellaneous examples are worked

out in detail to illustrate the problems arising in interest, discount, partial payments,

averaging of accounts, present values, annuities of different kinds, annual payments

for a future expectation (as in life insurance), or for a sinking fund, conversion of

W ATSON .-Tables for the Calculation of Simple or Compound Inte1 est
and Discount and the Averaging of Accounts. Tiu Values of
rlnnuities, L eases, Inte1'est in Estates and the Accumulations and
Values of Investments at Simple or Comp ound Interest f or all Rates
and Periods; also Tables for the Conv ersio n of S ewrities and Value
of Stocks and B onds. With full Explanation for Use. By James
C. Watson, Ph.D., LL. D. Quarto. Cloth, $z. 50.
A b ook most valuable to bankers, brokers, tru s te es, gua rdian s, judges, lawyers,
accountants, and a ll concerned in the c o mputation of interest, the division and se tIement of estates, th e negotiation of secu rities. or the borrowing and lending of
money, is the a bove work o f th e la te Professor James C . Warson, formerly Direc tor
of th e Observatories a nd Professor of As tron omy at the Un ive rsi ties of Michiga11
and Wiscon s in, and Actuary of the Mi chigan Mutual Life In surance Company.
It contains, in addi ti on to the usual tables for th e ca lcu la tion of sim le or co m·
pound interest and discount, many tables of remarkable value. not foundpelsewhere,
for th e averaging of acco utn• , th e values of annuities. leases, interests 1n estates,
and the accumula ti ons and values of inves tm en ts; also tables for t he conve rsion of
securities. and the va lues of s toc ks and bonds.
There are al so given very full and clear explanations of the principles involved in
financial tran sac ti ons, an d a grea t variety of mi sce lla,neous examp les are worked
out in detai l to illus trate the problems arising in interes t, discount, partial payment s ,
averaging of accounts. present values, a nnuities of difterent kind s, annu:..1 payme111s
for a future expectation (as in life in s urance), or for a sin king fund, conve rsion of
securities, va lu es of £coc ks and bond s . ;;nd life intere s ts.
Thi s book was issued from th e press under th e au th or's carefu l s up ervision.
Pro fessor W a tson was noted for his c lear in s ight into problems in vo l ving computation s. and a lso for his wonderful ability in presenting the method of sc luti on of sucll
problem s 111 a p lain a nd s imple manner. The varied array of practical examples
given in connect on with his" Tabl e" s hows th ese facts in a r ema rkabl e manner.
This book provides, for t h ose leas t expe rt in calcu la ti ons, the means of avoirlin~
mistakes likel y to occur ; and for the man engro~sed in the cares of business, th e
means of making for himself, with e ntir e accuracy, th e calcu la tion which he may
need. at the moment when it is needed.

securities, values of stocks and bonds, and life interests.

This book was issued from the press under the author's careful supervision.

Professor Watson was noted for his clear insight into problems involving compula-

tions, and also for his wonderful ability in presenting the method of solution of such

problems in a plain and simple manner. The varied array of practical examples

given in connect on with his "Table" shows these facts in a remarkable manner.

This book provides, for those least expert in calculations, the means of avoiding

mistakes likely to occur ; and for the man engrossed in the cares of business, the

means of making for himself, with entire accuracy, the calculation which he may

need, at the moment when it is needed.

WRENTMORE-GOULDING.--.'/ Text-Book of Elementary Mechan-

ical Dra7c>iiig for Use i)i Office or School. By Clarence G. Wrent-

morc, B.S., C.E., and Herbert J. Goulding, B.S., M.E., Instructors

in Descriptive Geometry and Drawing at the University of Michigan.

Quarto. 109 pages and 165 cuts. $1.00.

This book is intended for a beginners course in Elementary Mechanical Drawing

for the office and school. Illustrations have not been spared, and the explanations-

WRENTMORE- GOULDING.-A Text-Boo!..· of Elementary llfeclia nical Dmwing for Use in Office or Sclwol. By Clarence G. \Vrentmorc, B.S., C.E., and H e rbert J. Goulding, B . ., M.E., Instructors
in Descriptive Geometry an d Drawing at th e Univer ity uf Michigan.
Quarto. 109 pages and 165 cut . $ coo.
Thi s book is intended for a beginners course in Elementary Mechanical Drawing
for the office and schoo l. Illu s trations h ave not been spa red, a nd the explanations.

P11bl1calio11s if George TT'a/1r A 11n A r bor.

Publications of Gcory;e IVahr, Ann Arbor.

have been made in a clear and concise manner for the purpose of bringing the stu-

dent to the desired results by the shortest route consistent with the imparting of an

accurate knowledge of the subject.

The first chapter is devoted to Materials and Instruments; the second chapter,

Mechanical Construction; third chapter, Penciling. Inking, Tinting; fourth chap-

ter. Linear Perspective; fifth chapter, Teeth of Gears.

WRENTMORE.— /Yrtw Alphabets for Offiice and SJiooL Sriected by

C. G. Wrcntniore, B.S., C.E., Instructor in Descriptive Geometry

have been made in a clear and concise manner for th e purpose of bringing the s tu dent t o the desired results b) th e sho rtes t route consis ten t with the imparting of an
accurate knowledge of the subjec t.
The first chap te r is devoted to Material · and Ins tr uments; t he second chap t e r,
l\l echanical
ons tru c ti on; third chapte r , Pencil ing. l nkiug, Tinung ; fou rth chapter , Linear P erspec t1\•e; fifth chapter, Teeth of Gears.

W RENTMO RE .- Plain .-!lphabds for Ojfiice and Sd100!.
dected by
<•.
;, \ \ ' ren tm ore, B. S., ·. E., l nstructor in D escriptive Geometry

and Drawing, University of Michigan. Oblong. 19 plates. Half

and 1 )ra\\ ing, L n1versi t\ of .\Iichigan.
leather, 7 5 cent~.

leather, 75 cents.

Oblong.

19 plates.

J lalf

REV. J. T. \0\}liQ, —'' Mormonism: Its Origin, Doctrines, and

Dan^^c'?-s.^' Paniphlet. 72 pages. 25 cents.

This brochure of seventy pages in paper covers is a sharp attack on the Mormon

REV.

J.

T . YOUNG - " Jfo r111011is111: .Its Orirri11
Pamphlet. 72 page . 25 cents .

D octrines, and

Dan,i;as."

system, showing iliat its beginnings were in fraud and villainy, that its doctrines

are debasing, and that its continuance in the United States is a political and reli-

gious menace. If Mormonism is one-tenih as bad as this booklet represents, the

marvel is that the viper life was not crushed out long ago. — The Standard. Chicago.

Thi s brochure o f seven ty pages in paper c overs is a s harp a tt ack o n the Mo rmon
sys tem, s howiag 1hat its be g innings we r e in fraud and vi ll ai ny, th a t its d oc trrne s
are debasing , and th a t i ts continuance in the Uni te d Sta tes is a poli tic a l and reli gi ous me nace . If Mormonism is one-ten th as bad as thi s boo kl e t represents, the
marvel is tha t th e viper life was not crush ed ou t long ago.-Th e tandard. Clticago.

Souvenir of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Containing 38

]>hoto-gravures of President James B. Angell, prominent University
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Buildings, Fraternity Houses, Churches, Views of Ann Arbor, Etc.,

I-"tc. Done up in blue silk cloth binding. Price, 50 cents, postpaid.

Physical Laboratory Note Book. — A .Vote Book for the Physical Lab-

i^ratory. Designed to be used in connection with any Physical

Laboratory Manual. Contains full directions for keeping a Physical

Laboratory Note Book. 112 pages of excellent ledger writing paper,

ruled in cross sections, Metric System, size 7x9^ inches. Bound in

full canvass, leather corners. Price, by mail, 30 cents. Special

prices to Schools furnished on application.

Botanical Laboratory Note Book. — A Note Book for the Botanical Lab-

oratory. 200 pages of best writing paper, ruled with top margins.

Pocket on inside of front cover for drawing cards. Bound in sub-

stantial cloth cover and leather back. Size 6xg^. Price, by mail,

35 cents. Special prices to schools furnished on application.

Engineering Laboratory Note Book. — A Note Book for the Engineering

rb r .
'ontai nin g 38
S ouve nir of t h e Univ e r s ity of Michigan , Ann
photo-gravures of President J ames B. ngel l, prominent
niversity
Building , Fraternity H ouses, hurc hes, Vi e ws of nn Arbor, tc.,
Etc. Done up in blue ilk clot h bind ing. Pri ce, 50 cents, pos tpaid.
Phy s ical Laboratory Note Book .-,-/ .Vote B ook for the P/1ysic,1l Laboratory. Designed to be used in conn ec ti on with any Physical
L aboratory t. Ianual.
ontains full directions for k ee ping a Physical
Labora tory ote Book. 112 pages of excell e nt ledge r writing pape r
ruled in c ross sections, Metric yste m, s ize 7 x 9Yz inches. Bound in
pec ial
full can vass, lea the r co rn e rs . Price, by mail, 30 ce nts.
prices to Sc hools furnished on application.
Botan ical Laboratory Note Book. -.A Note Book f or the Botanical Laboratory . 200 pages of best writing pape r, ruled with top margins.
Poc k e t on insid e of front cover fo r drawing cards. Bound in substantial cloth cove r and lea ther bac k.
ize 6x 9~. Price, by mail,
35 cents .
pecial prices to sc hools furni hed on applicati on.

Laboratory, University of Michigan. Full sheep binding. Size

5 j4 X 8. Contains 200 pages. (With general directions. Cross sec-

tion ruled). Price 75 cents.

"Field Engineering Note Book, Surveying. — 200 pages. Cross section

ruled. Full .Sheep binding, 50 cents.

E ngine e ring Laboratory Note Book. -A Note Book for the E n gineerin g
Laboratory, Un iversity of Michigan . Full sh ee p binding.
'ize
S Yi x . on tain 200 page . (With ge nera l directi ns.
ro
ection rul ed) . P rice 7 5 ce nL
F ie ld Engineering Not e Book , Surveying. - 200 page
ruled. Full Sheep binding, 50 ce nts.
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